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The probabilistic (or quantitative) modal µ-calculus is a fixed-point logic designed
for expressing properties of probabilistic labeled transition systems (PLTS’s).
Two semantics have been studied for this logic, both assigning to every process
state a value in the interval [0, 1] representing the probability that the property
expressed by the formula holds at the state. One semantics is denotational and
the other is a game semantics, specified in terms of two-player stochastic games.
The two semantics have been proved to coincide on all finite PLTS’s. A first
contribution of the thesis is to extend this coincidence result to arbitrary PLTS’s.
A shortcoming of the probabilistic µ-calculus is the lack of expressiveness re-
quired to encode other important temporal logics for PLTS’s such as Probabilistic
Computation Tree Logic (PCTL). To address this limitation, we extend the logic
with a new pair of operators: independent product and coproduct, and we show
that the resulting logic can encode the qualitative fragment of PCTL. Moreover,
a further extension of the logic, with the operation of truncated sum and its dual,
is expressive enough to encode full PCTL.
A major contribution of the thesis is the definition of appropriate game se-
mantics for these extended probabilistic µ-calculi. This relies on the definition
of a new class of games, called tree games, which generalize standard 2-player
stochastic games. In tree games, a play can be split into concurrent subplays
which continue their evolution independently. Surprisingly, this simple device
supports the encoding of the whole class of imperfect-information games known
as Blackwell games. Moreover, interesting open problems in game theory, such as
qualitative determinacy for 2-player stochastic parity games, can be reformulated
as determinacy problems for suitable classes of tree games. Our main technical
result about tree games is a proof of determinacy for 2-player stochastic meta-
parity games, which is the class of tree games that we use to give game semantics
to the extended probabilistic µ-calculi. In order to cope with measure-theoretic
technicalities, the proof is carried out in ZFC set theory extended with Martin’s
Axiom at the first uncountable cardinal (MAℵ1).
The final result of the thesis shows that the game semantics of the extended
logics coincides with the denotational semantics, for arbitrary PLTS’s. However,
in contrast to the earlier coincidence result, which is proved in ZFC, the proof of
coincidence for the extended calculi is once again carried out in ZFC + MAℵ1 .
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By the end of the 70’s, defining the semantics of programming languages in terms
of transition systems, i.e., directed graphs whose nodes represent program states
and transitions represent possible evolutions from states to states, was already a
common and well established technique. This way of interpreting the meaning of
a program is now well known under the name of operational semantics [96]. In
the last three decades the methods of operational semantics have been extensively
studied and many concepts and techniques have been developed, most notably
by deep insights of Gordon Plotkin [95] and Robin Milner [79]. As of today,
operational semantics is one of the most adopted tools for giving formal semantics
to programming languages and, more generally, concurrent systems exhibiting
computational features such as nondeterminism, stochasticity, timed-transition
steps, etcetera.
One of the most important gains one gets from giving a formal semantics to
programs, or more generally to computing systems, is the possibility of being able
to formally express interesting properties of systems, and of formally verifying if
a certain property is fulfilled by a given system. For example, one might want to
express the fact that “the program P always terminates its execution, whenever
it is fed with input(s) satisfying a given property F”, or similarly, “the system c
never reaches bad configurations, no matter how its execution is driven by inputs
received from an unpredictable controller”, where C is the software governing the
execution of a nuclear plant, and bad configurations occur when the temperature
of the reactor goes beyond a safety threshold. The formal language used to
describe such properties is given by the set of formulas of a program logic.
A program logic is specified by a grammar defining the set of its formulas, i.e.,
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the language of expressible properties, together with a semantics which provides
them with a mathematical meaning. Once we understand the meaning of a
system P as a transition system with set S of states by means of an appropriate
operational semantics, a natural choice for describing the semantics of a program-
logic formula F is as a map JF K :S→{0, 1} specifying which program states s∈S
satisfy the property expressed by F . We would then say that the program P
satisfies the property F at the state s, whenever JF K(s)=1.
Since the introduction, due to Saul Kripke (see, e.g., [64]), of possible-world
semantics, modal logics have been recognised as an important tool for express-
ing properties of directed graphs. Although relatively inexpresive in themselves,
modal logics provided the basis for the subsequent development of so-called tem-
poral (program) logics, a line of research pioneered by the seminal works of Arthur
Prior [98] and subsequently developed by Amir Pnueli [97], E. Allen Emerson [34],
Moshe Y. Vardi [109] and Dexter Kozen [62] among many others. The idea is
to enrich modal logics, and in particular the logic K [25], which are capable of
expressing (local) properties of the transition relations of directed graphs, with
further temporal operators allowing the expression of properties of interest for
program analysis. A typical example is given by the binary (existentially quan-
tified) until operator U . Roughly speaking, the formula U(F,G) holds at a state
s0 of a directed graph if there is a path s0, s1, s2, . . . sn in the graph starting at
s0, reaching at some point a state sn such that G holds at sn and F holds at
all previous visited states si, for i < n. Temporal logics of this kind, enriching
modal logics with operators capable of expressing properties of infinite sequences
of transitions in graph structures, include Computation Tree Logic CTL [23] and
some of its extensions such as CTL∗ [33] and ECTL [109], which are currently
among the most well-known and widely applied temporal program logics.
In 1983, Dexter Kozen introduced in [62] a new temporal logic, today well
known under the name of modal µ-calculus (Lµ). The logic Lµ is obtained by
enriching the base modal system K with greatest and least fixed-point operators
allowing the specification of recursive properties defined by (co)inductive defini-
tions. This logic has been subsequently widely studied [18]. Its semantics, which
can be formulated in a (mathematically) straightforward way, can benefit from
the reasoning methods coming from (lattice) fixed point theory [2]. At the same
time the logic Lµ is very expressive, as it can encode most of the temporal pro-
gram logics appeared in the literature, including CTL [18] and CTL∗ [26]. A
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precise expressivity result was obtained by D. Janin and I. Walukiewicz in [58]:
Lµ is the fragment of second order monadic logic (interpreted over tree structures)
consisting of those formulas which can not distinguish between bisimilar models.
This is an extremely satisfactory property: monadic second order logic is a very
expressive theory, well understood and admitting important decidability results
[99]; moreover, bisimilarity is a central concept in Robin Milner’s theory of con-
current systems (see, e.g., [79]), often taken as a satisfactory notion of behavioral
equivalence.
The modal µ-calculus is a low level logic, in the sense that interesting prop-
erties require the formulation of non trivial composite formulas. This is both
a benefit and a shortcoming. The syntax and semantics of Lµ are simple and
minimal. This allows fruitful connections to be established with other natural
mathematical concepts coming from, e.g., game theory and automata theory.
However, it is often difficult to correctly translate an intended property into the
low-level formalism. At the same time, it is hard to grasp the meaning of a Lµ for-
mula, expecially if it contains several nested occurrences of fixed-point operators.
In [32], E. A. Emerson and C. S. Jutla introduced an alternative semantics for
Lµ, often referred to as game semantics, which partially addresses this problem.
The game semantics follows the tradition initiated by Jaakko Hintikka and his 2-
player game semantics for first order predicate (classical) logic [55]: to each model
M and formula F of a given logic L, a game GFM played by two players (named
Player 1 and Player 2 for simplicity) is constructed. The formula F is satisfied
(under the game semantics) by the model M , if Player 1 has a winning strategy
in GFM , and it is not satisfied otherwise. Here the words players, game, strategy
and winning strategy have a formal meaning in the context of game theory, an
increasingly important branch of mathematics dating back to the seminal work
of John von Neumann [89, 112], which analyzes competitive dynamics involving
rational agents called players. The class of games used to give game semantics to
Lµ is known under the name of parity games.
A fundamental result in the theory of the modal µ-calculus is that the standard
(denotational) semantics and the game semantics, given in terms of parity games,
coincide on all models [32, 106]: for every transitions system L, the formula F
holds at s under the denotational semantics if and only if Player 1 has a winning
strategy in the associated parity game GFL . This allows one to take the most useful
viewpoint when reasoning about the logic Lµ: the denotational semantics offers
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powerful reasoning techniques coming from fixed-point theory, while the game
semantics is much more concrete and allows one to understand the meaning of a
formula by means of the interactions occurring in the parity game between the two
players, which generally reflect more transparently the properties one wants to
express with Lµ formulas. In particular it is often useful to consider Player 1 as the
controller and Player 2 as an adversarial environment which tries to cause some
undesirable behavior. Although having a radically different and complementary
semantics for a logic is already an achievement, the game semantics for Lµ has
proved to be very valuable, inspiring deep theoretical results (see, e.g., [114] and
[17], for two of the most celebrated theoretical results on Lµ) as well as model
checking algorithms [4, 24].
Directed-graph structures are sufficient for modeling concurrent and non-
deterministic programs and computational systems but, of course, they can not
be used to represent other important aspects of computations, such as prob-
abilistic behaviors, timed transitions and other quantitative aspects one might
need to express. To address this limitation, since the late 80’s, a lot of research
has focused on the identification of appropriate structures for expressing these
quantitative aspects (see, e.g., [67], [50] and [9]), and in particular for modeling
probabilistic behaviors. One of the most successful such models is today known
under several names: Segala systems [6], concurrent Markov chains [50], prob-
abilistic automata [101] or simply probabilistic transition systems (PTS). Today
PTS’s are the mathematical structures, generalizing standard transition systems,
most often used for providing an operational semantics to probabilistic and non-
deterministic languages [53, 66, 6]. A PTS is given by a set of states S, and a
transition relation E which relates states s with probability distributions d over
S. The intended interpretation is that the system, at some state s, can evolve by
non-deterministically choosing one of the accessible distributions d, i.e., such that
(s, d) ∈ E, and then continuing its execution from the state s′ with probability
d(s′). PTS’s can be visualized, using graphs labeled with probabilities in a nat-
ural way. For example the PTS having set of states S = {p, q} and accessibility
relation E={(p, d1), (p, d2)}, with d1(q)=d1(p)=
1
2
and d2(q)=1, can be depicted
as in Figure 1.1. This combination of non-deterministic choices immediately fol-
lowed by probabilistic ones, allows the modeling of concurrency, non-determinism
and probabilistic behaviors in a natural way.




















Figure 1.1: Example of PTS
tation, and flexible techniques for defining the operational semantics of languages
in terms of PTS’s are available (see, e.g., [6]), one naturally wants to define log-
ics for expressing interesting properties of such systems. For example one might
want to express the fact that “the program P , no matter how its input is chosen,
always terminates its execution with at least probability 1
2
” or “with probability
1, the system C never reaches bad configurations, no matter how its execution is
driven by external inputs”. In particular, note how in the second specification,
the safety requirement is expressed in terms of a condition which is required to
hold almost surely, but not necessarily surely, thus allowing negligible (i.e., having
probability 0) bad behaviors.
Already by the mid 90’s, the research community had developed the first logics
for expressing properties of PTS’s. These are extensions of standard (i.e., designed
for transition systems) temporal logics, primarily CTL and CTL∗, obtained by
adding to the syntax of the logics threshold operators which allow the specification
of the desired quantitative properties. For instance, P> 1
2
F holds at a state v if for
every possible execution of the system, guided by the non-deterministic and the
probabilistic choices, the probability of observing a computation satisfying F is
greater than 1
2
. This way of extending standard temporal logics to express prop-
erties of PTS’s led to the definition of probabilistic CTL (PCTL) and probabilistic
CTL∗ (PCTL∗), among others [50, 51, 9, 5]. The semantics of a PCTL formula F
is, by analogy with the semantics of CTL formulas, a map JF K :S→{0, 1} spec-
ifying which states of the PTS satisfy the property expressed by F . The logics
PCTL and PCTL∗ are currently among the most well understood and practically
used probabilistic temporal logics for expressing properties of PTS’s [65].
However, a problem with the approach described above, which we shall refer
to as the threshold-based or boolean approach to probabilistic temporal logics, is
that it apparently does not help one define a satisfactory probabilistic extension
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of the modal µ-calculus. The most natural way to attempt to get such an ex-
tension, adopting the boolean approach, is to start with a probabilistic version
of the base modal logic K obtained by replacing the modalities ♦ and  with
decorated (with probabilities) counterparts ♦≥λ and ≥λ, with λ ∈ [0, 1], and
then enrich the logic by adding fixed point operators. The intended interpreta-
tion is that the formula ♦≥λF holds at a state s if there exists some accessible
probability distribution d such that d assigns probability greater or equal than λ
to states satisfying the subformula F . This approach, however, leads to a logic
which can not express many properties of interest. The point is that one is often
interested in expressing conditions over the probabilities associated with long-
term events, while the above described logic can only express local constraints
which are not sufficient, when composed by means of (co)inductive definitions,
to capture the desired global behaviors. Even though PCTL and PCTL∗ are suf-
ficient for most practical purposes, it seems quite important, and not only from
a purely theoretical point of view, to find an appropriate probabilistic variant of
the modal µ-calculus. One hopes to be able to transfer to the probabilistic setting
the elegant mathematical theory of Lµ and, in particular, the flexibility offered
by the possibility of formulating arbitrarily (co)inductive definitions, which allow
the formulation in Lµ of some interesting properties not expressible in CTL and
CTL∗.
One important step towards a satisfactory probabilistic version of the modal
µ-calculus was provided by the insights of M. Huth and M. Kwiatkowska [56]
and, independently, by those of C. Morgan and A. McIver [84]. The main idea
is to move the probabilistic nature of the logic, from the syntax (i.e., the prob-
abilistic thresholds) to the semantics. Indeed, the formulas of the logics consid-
ered in [56, 84] are interpreted, in a PTS with set S of states, as maps of type
JF K :S→ [0, 1], assigning to program states a value in the real interval [0, 1]. The
intended interpretation is that JF K(s) represents the probability of the property
expressed by F to hold at the state s. We shall call this approach to probabilistic
temporal logics the [0, 1]-valued or quantitative approach. The probabilistic vari-
ant of the logic Lµ, proposed in [84] following this approach, in known under the
name quantitative modal µ-calculus. Since the adjective “quantitative” has been
adopted in the literature for other non-probabilistic logics (see, e.g., [35]), in this
thesis we refer to the logic of [84] as probabilistic modal µ-calculus (pLµ).
A central point in the definition of the logic pLµ is the choice for the inter-
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pretations of the conjunction and disjunction operators. Indeed there are several
possible binary operators f : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1] which, when restricted to the two
element set {0, 1}, act as ordinary boolean conjunction, and similarly for disjunc-
tion. As a matter of fact, in [56], the authors study three such operators, namely
⊓ (i.e., the min operation), · (standard multiplication on reals) and ⊖ (defined
as x ⊖ y = max{0, x + y − 1}), arguing in favor of ⊖ on the basis of considera-
tions1 about “mathematical convenience”. On the other hand, the logic pLµ as
defined in [84], and subsequently also in [29], takes the function ⊓ as interpre-
tation for conjunctions. This situation raises an immediate question: if JF K(s)
is supposed to represent the probability of the property expressed by F holding
at s, what, precisely, is the property expressed by F , since it clearly changes if
we modify the semantical interpretation of conjunctions? Indeed, if in boolean-
based logics, such as PCTL, the property associated with a formula F can be
always considered to be well-specified as the set of states {s | JF K(s) = 1}, in
quantitative logics such as pLµ some additional explanation seems to be required.
The situation is even worse when one think about enriching the logic pLµ with







JF ⋆GK(p)=JF K(p)⋆JGK(p), what is the property associated with F ⋆G of which
JF ⋆GK(s) is supposed to be the corresponding probability at the state s? What
we can conclude from this discussion is that the quantitative approach to prob-
abilistic temporal logics requires, in order to be a meaningful tool for expressing
properties of PTS’s, a description for the meaning of formulas going beyond the
mere numerical function corresponding to the denotational semantics.
In order to address this conceptual issue, C. Morgan and A. McIver intro-
duced, in [78], a game semantics for the logic pLµ. As for Lµ, the games are
played by two players named Player 1 and Player 2 by following rules similar
to those for Lµ-calculus games, but unlike in Lµ games, a third agent named
Nature takes part in the game. Nature is a purely probabilistic agent whose role
is to make choices in accordance with certain prescribed probabilities, and this
allows the incorporation of the stochastic choices associated with the PTS. Since
a probabilistic agent is taking part in the game, rather than restricting attention
1Roughly speaking, their observation is based on the fact that, given a measurable space X ,
a probability measure µ on X and two (unknown) measurable sets A and B, x ⊕ y is the best
possible upper-bound for the measure µ(A∪B) when the available information is just µ(A)=x
and µ(B)=y.
2The function ⋆ is known as Frank T-norm with parameter p=7. When restricted to the
set {0, 1} it acts as ordinary boolean conjunction, for every p∈(1,∞).
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just to winning strategies, one more generally considers strategies that guarantee
that the probability of Player 1 winning is above a given threshold. Given a
PTS L with set S of states, the pLµ game semantics of a formula F at a state
s, denoted by LF M(s), is then the best (limit) probability of Player 1 winning
the game GFL starting from a specific game state associated with s. The class of
games used for giving game semantics to pLµ is known in game thoery as that
of two player stochastic parity games, or 21
2
-player parity games for short. Fun-
damental theoretical results about 21
2
-player (parity) games, critically exploited
in the precise mathematical definition of the game semantics for pLµ, were de-
veloped only at the end of the 90’s by remarkable achievements in game theory
of, most notably, Donald A. Martin [74]. One of the most important aspects of
the game semantics of pLµ is that it is a straightforward generalization of that
of Lµ, where the actions of Nature are used to model the probabilistic choices
corresponding to the probability distributions occurring in the PTS. Therefore
the game semantics offers a clear interpretation for the properties associated to
the formulas, explained in terms of the interactions between the controller (Player
1) and a hostile environment (Player 2) in the context of the stochastic choices
occurring in the PTS (Nature).
A main result of [78] is that, as one would hope, the game and denotational
semantics of pLµ coincide on all finite models. One of the contributions of the
present thesis is to generalize this result: as we shall see (Theorem 3.2.14), the
game and denotational semantics for pLµ coincide on all models, whether finite
or infinite. Thus, as for Lµ, one can take the preferred viewpoint when reasoning
about pLµ formulas.
The logic pLµ is, however, not completely satisfactory because it is apparently
not expressive enough to encode other important probabilistic temporal logics
such as PCTL and PCTL∗ and, as observed earlier, one of the crucial features of
Lµ is its ability to encode most other temporal logics for transition systems. This
is due to the fact that the logic pLµ, and its [0, 1]-valued interpretation, can not
describe sets of states (which constitute the interpretations of PCTL formulas)
and is instead limited to quantitative specifications. An important achievement
of the present thesis is to show that this is not an intrinsic limit of the [0, 1]-
valued approach to probabilistic temporal logics, but rather a lack of expressivity
in the logic pLµ which can be overcome by moving to stronger logics. We shall
consider primarily two logics built on top of pLµ: the probabilistic modal µ-
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calculus with independent product (pLµ⊙) and the probabilistic modal µ-calculus
with independent product and truncated sum (pLµ⊙⊕).
The logic pLµ⊙ is obtained from pLµ by adding to the syntax of the logic the
new binary product operator, denoted by the · symbol, and its associated dual
operation, called coproduct and denoted by the ⊙ symbol, whose denotational
interpretations are given as follows: JF ·GK(s)=JF K(s) · JGK(s) and JF ⊙GK(s)=
JF K(s) + JGK(s) − JF K(s) · JGK(s), where the symbols · and + denotes standard
multiplication and sum on reals. As mentioned earlier, these operators have been
already investigated in [56] as alternative interpretations for the pLµ connectives
{∧,∨}. Here, we take the small but apparently novel step of considering the
(co)product operations {⊙, ·} in combination with the lattice operations {⊔,⊓},
which we continue calling ∨ and ∧. The logic pLµ⊙ is very rich and can, for
instance, express the meaning of qualitative modalities à la PCTL such as P>0F
and P=1F which, in turn, allow the encoding of the qualitative fragment of PCTL
into pLµ⊙ (Theorem 7.2.16).
The logic pLµ⊙⊕ is a further extension of pLµ obtained by adding to the syntax
of pLµ⊙ the pair of dual operators ⊕ and ⊖. Once again, these operations were
considered as alternatives to {∨,∧} in [56], and we take the small but novel step of
considering them in combination with the other operations already discussed. The
denotational semantics of pLµ⊙⊕ is, again, straightforwardly specified by extending
the denotational semantics of pLµ⊙ by the following definitions: JF ⊕ GK =
min{1, JF K+JGK} and JF ⊖GK={0, JF K+JGK−1}. This extension is of concrete
interest because it is possible to encode quantitative threshold modalities à la
PCTL such as P> 1
2
F and P≥ 2
3
F which, in turn, allow the encoding of full PCTL
into in pLµ⊙⊕ (Theorem 7.2.16).
While the denotational semantics is straightforwardly defined this way, our
major goal is to define appropriate game semantics for pLµ⊙ and pLµ⊙⊕. As
discussed earlier, we consider this as a fundamental task required in order to un-
derstand the kinds of properties corresponding to formulas. The game-semantics
we build is based on the intuition that JF · GK(s) might be interpreted as the
probability of the property expressed by F and the property expressed by G both
holding at the state s when verified independently. The idea of independent veri-
fication of two properties is captured in the games used to give game semantics to
pLµ⊙ as follows: the formula F ·G is interpreted in the game dynamics as gener-
ating two concurrent sub-games, continuing their executions following the game
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interpretation of F and G respectively. These two sub-games are played indepen-
dently, in the sense that a player acting on the sub-game associated with F has
no information whatsoever about the choices happening in the other sub-game,
and viceversa. Player 1 is declared to have won the game associated with F · G
if they manage to win both generated “concurrent and independent” sub-games.
The dual operator ⊙ is interpreted in a similar way: in the game, the formula
F ⊙G generates two concurrent and independent sub-games, but unlike in F ·G
configurations, Player 1 is declared to have won the F ⊙G game if they manage
to win in at least one of the two generated sub-games.
In the pLµ⊙ games outlined above, a play is not just a sequence of game
states as in most logical games (including Hintikka games for first order logic,
Lµ-games and pLµ-games) but rather a tree structure, which we refer to as a
branching play, where the nodes x having more than one child, which we refer to
as branching states, correspond to game states of the form F · G and F ⊙ G on
which the game splits into two concurrent sub-games, represented in the tree by
the children of x.
The simple and intuitive game-interpretation for the new connectives · and
⊙ of pLµ⊙ formulas provides, building on top of the game-interpretation of the
other connectives as in pLµ games, a satisfactory and straightforward game-
interpretation for the fixed-point-free fragment of the logic pLµ⊙: a play in a pLµ⊙
game associated with a formula without fixed points, can always be seen as a finite
branching play, i.e., a finite tree of degree at most 2, and the winning condition
described above constitute a precise specification for the set of branching plays
which are considered to be winning for Player 1. However, when the full logic
pLµ⊙ is considered, defining precisely the set of branching plays winning for
Player 1 becomes a surprisingly technical undertaking. Indeed, pLµ⊙ games
associated with formulas defined by (co)inductive definitions may generate infinite
branching plays containing infinitely many interleaved occurrences of product and
coproduct operations, so that the simple explanation given above for the winning
condition at such nodes does not suffice. To account for this, branching plays are
themselves considered as ordinary 2-player (parity) games with coproduct nodes
as Player-1 nodes, and product nodes as Player-2 nodes. Player 1’s goal in the
outer pLµ⊙ game is to produce a branching play for which, when itself considered
as a game, the inner game, they have a winning strategy.
In order to formalize these ideas, we introduce a general notion of 2-player
11
stochastic tree game, which generalizes standard 2-player stochastic games by
introducing a new type of game state, the branching states, at which the game
is split into concurrent and independent sub-games. As briefly discussed earlier,
plays in 21
2
-player tree games are tree structures called branching plays, modeling
in a natural way concurrent executions. One of the contributions of this thesis is
the study of some interesting properties of tree games. We show how the simple
form of imperfect information formalized in 21
2
-player tree games, namely the fact
a player can not observe the execution of the game in other concurrent sub-games,
can be used to faithfully model Blackwell games (Theorem 4.2.18), an important
class of games of imperfect information [12, 110, 74]. We also show how some
problems in stochastic games, such as the open problem of qualitative determinacy
of 2-stochastic player parity games [19, 20], can be formulated as appropriate
determinacy problems for non-stochastic 21
2
-player tree games (Theorem 4.4.7).
Although 21
2
-player tree games are interesting in their own right, their in-
troduction is mainly motivated by wanting to provide a mathematically precise
description of the pLµ⊙ games described informally above. To this end, we iden-
tify the class of 2-player stochastic meta-games, consisting of those 21
2
-player
tree games whose set of winning branching plays is described using inner games :
branching plays are themselves interpreted as ordinary 2-player games (referred
to as inner games), and a branching play is declared to be winning for Player 1 in
the meta-game (referred to as the outer game) if Player 1 has a winning strategy
in the inner game. In particular, we identify the class of 21
2
-player meta-parity
games, given by those meta-games whose inner-games are ordinary 2-player par-
ity games. This is the class which we use for providing a precise game semantics
for the logic pLµ⊙.
The main technical achievement of the thesis is a proof of determinacy for 21
2
-
player meta-parity games (Theorem 6.4.2), a property of fundamental interest.
Roughly speaking, determinacy asserts that a player does not gain any advantage
if, when choosing a strategy for playing in a 21
2
-player meta-parity game, they are
informed in advance about the choice made by the adversary. Our proof is novel
in the sense that it can not be obtained from (or at least does not seem straightfor-
wardly reducible to) standard results in game theory, such as the determinacy for
classes of 21
2
-player (Gale–Stewart or Blackwell) games, because we work with the
novel class of 21
2
-player tree games. The general technique we adopt is however,
one that is well established [35, 100]. We reduce the determinacy of a 21
2
-player
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meta-parity game of some given complexity to the determinacy of a 21
2
-player
meta-parity game of lower complexity, and we directly prove that all 21
2
-player
meta-parity games of minimal complexity are determined. Thus our proof is by
induction on the complexity of 21
2
-player meta-parity games. One of the crucial
steps in our proof, is a transfinite (up to the first uncountable ordinal ω1) induc-
tive characterization of the winning sets of 21
2
-player meta-parity games, which
allows us to reason inductively on the sets otherwise defined, somewhat declara-
tively, by means of inner games as discussed earlier. A key observation about the
sets of winning branching plays is that they are quite complicated from the point
of view of descriptive set theory. In general, the winning set of a 21
2
-player meta-
parity game is a ∆12 set, thus neither Borel nor even (co)analytic. Sets of this kind
are quite difficult to work with, especially in the context of measure-theory. For
instance, it is consistent with ZFC3 that there exists a non-Lebesgue-measurable
∆12-set. For this reason our proof is carried out in ZFC extended with an extra
axiom, Martin’s Axiom at the first uncountable cardinal (MAℵ1) [75], which is
known to be equiconsistent with ZFC. Therefore our determinacy result is at
least consistent, i.e., it can not be disproved, within ZFC. We leave open the
question of whether the result is provable in ZFC alone.
Interestingly, 21
2
-player meta-parity games are expressive enough to provide a
game semantics for the extended logic pLµ⊙⊕. The meaning of the pLµ
⊙
⊕ operators
{⊕,⊖} is captured in the game semantics by means of certain infinitary protocols
involving operations of product and coproduct.
A central result of the thesis is the equivalence of the denotational and the
game semantics, given in terms of 21
2
-player meta-parity games, for the logic
pLµ⊙⊕, and thus also for its fragment pLµ
⊙ (Theorem 7.1.10). The proof is ob-
tained by application of the techniques and results developed in the proof of
determinacy for 21
2
-player meta-parity games. Thus the equivalence between the
denotational and game semantics for pLµ⊕⊙ is formally valid in ZFC + MAℵ1 set
theory.
The straightforward game interpretation of the new operations of product (·)
and coproduct (⊙) as generating two concurrent and independent games, and the
description of the winning objective which requires Player 1 to win in both (re-
spectively at least one) generated sub-games at product (respectively coproduct)
3Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the Axiom of Choice: the first-order set theory that forms
the most widely accepted foundation of mathematics.
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configurations, provides a satisfactory interactive or operational description for
the meaning of pLµ⊙ formulas. As for other logics, having two complementary
semantics allows one to pick the preferred viewpoint when trying to prove the
desired property. The game semantics for pLµ⊙ also offers a straightforward in-
terpretation for the meaning of the qualitative threshold modalities {P>0,P=1}.
The formula P>0F is interpreted as generating countably many instances of the
game associated with F , and Player 1 is required to win in at least one generated
sub-game. Similarly, the the formula P=1F is interpreted in the game seman-
tics as generating countably many instances of the game associated with F , and
Player 1 is required to win in all generated sub-games. We shall make full use of
the two complementary semantics for discussing the expressive power of the logic
pLµ⊙ by means of concrete examples. Some of our examples are used to prove
interesting properties of the logic. For instance, we show that there are pLµ⊙
formulas which can be satisfied, with probability one, only by PTS’s having an
infinite state space (Proposition 7.2.5). Thus the logic pLµ⊙ does not satisfy the
the so called finite model property [106].
The game interpretation of the two pLµ⊙⊕ connectives ⊕ and ⊖ is, however,
not as transparent and straightforward as the one given for the connectives · and
⊙. Indeed, as anticipated above, the games for pLµ⊙⊕ capture the operational
meaning of the new connective ⊕ and ⊖ as specific infinitary protocols involving
infinitely many operations of product and coproduct, and thus do not necessarily
provide a clean and intuitive interpretation for the new connectives. Nevertheless
we suggest that our results about pLµ⊙⊕ are interesting, at the very least because
of the following observations. The game semantics for pLµ⊙⊕ is defined in terms
of 21
2
-player meta-parity games, and thus it serves as an expressivity result for
this novel class of games introduced in the present thesis. Secondly, it is certainly
interesting to know that pLµ⊙⊕, and its fragment PCTL, can be given an opera-
tional interpretation in terms of the primitives available in stochastic tree games,
albeit not as transparent as one might hope for.
We conclude this section by recalling, from the second paragraph of the present
introduction, that one of the advantages coming from a formal semantics is the
possibility of being able to formally express interesting properties of systems,
and of formally verifying if a certain property is fulfilled by a given system. In
this thesis, we identify expressive logics for formulating interesting properties of
probabilistic transition systems which, as discussed earlier, are the mathemat-
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ical structures used to give operational semantics for concurrent probabilistic
programs and systems. We entirely focus on the task of providing appropriate
semantics for these logics (pLµ, pLµ⊙ and pLµ⊙⊕) and we succeed in finding in-
teresting game semantics agreeing with the denotational semantics. On the other
hand, we completely ignore the problem of verification. Providing verification
methods for probabilistic concurrent systems using probabilistic µ-calculi is an
interesting area for further research. It seems likely that the semantical founda-
tions laid in this thesis will be of help towards this endeavor.
1.1 Synopsis
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows.
In Chapter 2 we provide the required mathematical background. We cover
the relevant notions and results from order theory, topology, measure theory, set
theory and game theory.
In Chapter 3 we provide the necessary background on program logics. We first
consider temporal logics for Labeled Transition Systems (LTS’s), and in particular
the logic CTL and the modal µ-calculus (Lµ). We then turn our attention to
temporal logics for expressing properties of Probabilistic LTS’s (PLTS’s). We
introduce, delving into the historical and conceptual details, the logics PCTL and
pLµ. We finally start on the novel content of the thesis by introducing pLµ⊙⊕, the
most expressive logic considered in this thesis. We motivate our interest for pLµ⊙⊕
by considering the expressive power of some of its fragments, including the logic
pLµ⊙. We conclude the chapter by discussing, informally, the intuitions which
will lead us toward the definition of appropriate game semantics.
In Chapter 4 we define the class of two player stochastic tree games and study
some of its properties. We prove that every Blackwell game can be faithfully
encoded as a finite 2-player tree game and that 21
2
-player tree games can be
modeled by 2-player (non-stochastic) tree games. The latter fact will be used to
discuss an interesting open problem in the literature: the qualitative determinacy
of standard 2-player stochastic games.
In Chapter 5 we identify a class of 21
2
-player tree games, called 21
2
-player
meta games, whose winning sets are specified by means of inner games. Two
player stochastic meta-parity games, the class of games we use for giving game
semantics to the logic pLµ⊙⊕ and its fragments, have inner games specified as
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standard 2-player parity games.
In Chapter 6 we prove our main technical result: a proof, valid in ZFC +
MAℵ1 set theory, of determinacy for 2
1
2
-player meta-parity games. The proof,
as discussed earlier, is by induction on the complexity, i.e., on the number of
priorities used in 21
2
-player meta-parity games.
In Chapter 7 we give a game semantics for the extended probabilistic µ-
calculi identified in Chapter 3. The game and denotational semantics are proved
to coincide on all models. We consider several examples of formulas expressing
useful properties of PLTS’s, and we show how the logic pLµ⊙⊕, and its fragment
pLµ⊙, can encode the logic PCTL, and its qualitative fragment, respectively.





This chapter provides an introduction to the relevant mathematical notions used
in this thesis. We start, in Section 2.1, by discussing some basic concepts of
lattice theory, topology, measure theory and set theory. In Section 2.2 we focus
on properties of the real unit interval [0, 1] and define a few operations on it which
will be used to give semantics to the probabilistic logics considered in our work.
In Section 2.3 we discuss, in detail, the relevant concepts and results from game
theory.
2.1 Classical Mathematical Background
In this section we discuss some basic notions from lattice theory, topology and
measure theory, which are going to be used in the present thesis. Given the size
and maturity of all these mathematical fields, we limit ourselves to a very concise,
and necessarily limited, presentation which can not be considered, by any means,
as self contained. The mathematics hereafter discussed is valid in ZFC, Zermelo-
Fraenkel Set Theory with the Axiom of Choice [59], which is currently one of the
most common axiomatic systems for the foundations of mathematics. At the end
of this section we shall discuss the extension of ZFC, denoted by ZFC + MAℵ1 ,
obtained by validating an instance of the so-called Martin’s Axiom. Some of the
consequences of ZFC + MAℵ1, relevant for our work, will be discussed.
2.1.1 Basic mathematical notation
In this subsection we summarize the mathematical notation and a few conventions
to which we adhere in this thesis.
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We write N or ω for the set of natural numbers, R for the sets of reals, [0, 1]⊆R
for the unit interval. Given sets X and Y , we denote with |X| the cardinality of
X (often taken as the least ordinal admitting a bijection with X) and with Y X
the set of functions from X to Y . We denote with 2 the two element set {∅, {∅}}
(or more generally any set with two elements) and with 2X , or sometimes with
P(X), the collection of subsets of X , i.e., the set {Y | Y ⊆X}, thus identifying
subsets of X with their characteristic functions. We often think of the space XY
as the set of Y -indexed sequences {xy}y∈Y of elements in X . We write f :X→Y
to specify that f ∈Y X . Given a subset Y of X , we denote with Y its complement,
i.e., the set Y =X \ Y . We denote with X×Y the cartesian product of X and Y ,
and with
∏
iXi the I-indexed cartesian product of the sets Xi, i∈I. Given a set
E⊆X×Y , we denote with E(x)⊆Y the set {y | (x, y)∈E}. We use the greek
letters α, β and γ to range over the well-ordered class of ordinals. We shall in
particular consider the least infinite ordinal ω and the least uncountable ordinal
ω1, which is the limit of all countable ordinals. We use the letter κ to range over
cardinal numbers and the letter ℵ to identify cardinals via their Aleph number.
In particular we shall consider the following cardinals: ℵ0 (the cardinality of ω),
ℵ1 (the cardinality of ω1), and 2ℵ0 the cardinality of the continuum R.
Definition 2.1.1. Given a set X , we say that a function d : X → [0, 1] is a
(discrete) probability distribution on X , if d(x)≥0 for all x∈X and
∑
x∈X d(x)=
1. We denote with supp(d) the necessarily countable set {x | d(x) > 0}. We
denote with D(X) the set of all (discrete) probability distributions on X .
2.1.2 Lattice Theory
In this subsection we follow the excellent introduction of [2, §1], to which we refer
for a much deeper introduction to the topic.
Definition 2.1.2 (Poset). A partially ordered set, or just a poset, is a pair (X,⊑),
where X is a set and ⊑ is a relation on X which is reflexive, antisymmetric and
transitive. The relation ⊑ is called a partial order on the set X .
Definition 2.1.3 (Pointwise ordering). Let (X,⊑) be a poset and I an index
set. The relation  on XI defined as
{xi}i∈I  {yi}i∈I iff ∀i∈ I. xi⊑yi
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is called the pointwise order obtained by lifting ⊑. It is simple to see that (XI ,)
is a poset.
Definition 2.1.4. Given two posets (X,⊑) and (Y,), a function f :X→Y is
monotone if for all x, x′ ∈X , f(x)  f(x′) whenever x ⊑ x′. The function f is
called an order isomorphism if it is bijective and the inverse map f−1 :Y →X is
monotone.
Definition 2.1.5. An ω-chain or an increasing sequence in a poset 〈X,⊑〉 is a
sequence {xn}n∈N such that xn ⊑ xn+1 for every n∈N.
Definition 2.1.6. Given a poset 〈X,⊑〉, an antichain in X is a set A⊆X such
that for all a, b∈A, if a⊑b then a=b.
Definition 2.1.7. A poset (X,⊑) is well-founded if every (strictly) ⊑-descending
chain is finite.
Definition 2.1.8. Given a poset (X,⊑), we say that a subset A⊆X is up-closed
if and only if for all a∈A and b∈X with a⊑ b, it holds that b ∈A. Similarly,
we say that A is down-closed if and only if a ∈ A and b ∈ X with b ⊑ a, it
holds that b∈A. Given an element a∈X , we denote with a ↑ the up-closed set
{b∈X | a⊑b}. Similarly we write a↓ for the the down-closed set {b∈X | a⊑b}.
Given a set A⊆X we denote with A↑ the up-closed set
⋃
{a↑ | a∈A} which we




Definition 2.1.9. Given a poset (X,⊑) and a subset A⊆ X , we say that b∈X is
an upper-bound for A if a⊑b holds for all a∈A. An upper-bound b of A is called
the least upper-bound of A and denoted by
⊔
A, if for any other upper-bound b′
of A the inequality b⊑ b′ holds. Similarly we say that b∈X is a lower-bound for
A if a⊒b holds for all a∈A, and that b is the greatest lower-bound of A, denoted
by
d
A, if for any other lower-bound b′ of A, b⊒b′ holds.
We are now ready to define the notion of lattice.
Definition 2.1.10 (Lattice). A poset (X,⊑) is a lattice if for every x, y ∈ X ,
the two element set {x, y} has a least upper-bound and a greatest lower-bound,
simply denoted by x ⊔ y and x ⊓ y respectively. Furthermore, the poset (X,⊑)
is a complete lattice if every A∈X has a least upper bound (
⊔
A) and greatest
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lower bound (
d
X). In a complete lattice (X,⊑), we denote with ⊤ and ⊥ the








∅ respectively. A lattice
(X,⊑) is bounded if there exists two elements ⊤,⊥∈X such that for all x∈X ,
⊥⊑x⊑ ⊤. Note that every complete lattice is bounded.
Proposition 2.1.11. Let (X,⊑) be a (complete) lattice. Then, for every index
set I, the poset (XI ,), where  is the pointwise order, is a (complete) lattice
and the following equalities hold:













{f(x) | f ∈F}
for every f, g∈XI and F ⊆XI .
An important concept in lattice theory is the so-called principle of symmetry
[2] which we now discuss.
Definition 2.1.12. Given a poset (X,⊑), we defined its dual posed (X,⊑∗) as
follows: x⊑∗ y if and only if y⊑ x. It is immediate to verify that ⊑∗ is indeed a
partial order on X .
Observe that, if the least upper-bound of a set A⊆X exists in (X,⊑), then it
equals the greater lower-bound of the same set in (X,⊑∗) and viceversa. Hence
(X,⊑) is a (complete) lattice if and only if (X,⊑∗) is a (complete) lattice, and
we have







An important result in lattice theory is the fixed-point theorem discovered by
B. Knaster and A. Tarski [61, 108].
Theorem 2.1.13 (Knaster-Tarski). Let (X,⊑) be a complete lattice and f :X→
X a monotone function. Let us denote with Fix(f) the set of fixed points of f
defined as Fix(f) = {x | x = f(x)}. The set Fix(f) equipped with the order ⊑
(restricted to Fix(f)) is a complete lattice. There is thus a least fixed point lfp(f)
and a greatest fixed point gfp(f). Moreover the following equalities hold:
1. lfp(f) =
d
{x | f(x) ⊑ x},
2. gfp(f) =
⊔
{x | x ⊑ f(x)},
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3. lfp(f) =
⊔
{fα | α an ordinal},
4. gfp(f) =
d
{fα | α an ordinal},
where f0 =⊥, fβ+1 =f(fβ) and fλ =
⊔
{fα | α<λ} for every limit ordinal λ, and
similarly, f 0=⊤, fβ+1=f(fβ) and fλ=
d
{fα | α<λ} for every limit ordinal λ.
Definition 2.1.14. Let (X,⊑) be a complete lattice. We say that f : X →




{f(xn)}n∈N, for every ⊑-increasing se-
quence {xn}n∈N. Similarly we say that f is ω-cocontinuous if f(
d
{xn}n∈N) =d
{f(xn)}n∈N, for every ⊑-decreasing sequence {xn}n∈N.
It is simple to verify that if a function f is ω-continuous or ω-cocontinuous
then it is also monotone. For ω-continuous and ω-cocontinuous functions, the
statement of Knaster-Tarski theorem can be strengthened as follows:
Theorem 2.1.15. Let (X,⊑) be a complete lattice and f :X→X a monotone
function. Then the following assertions hold:
1. if f is ω-continuous, then lfp(f) =
⊔
{fn | n<ω}, and
2. if f is ω-cocontinuous, then gfp(f) =
d
{fn | n<ω},
where f0 =⊥, f 0=⊤, fn+1=f(fn) and fn+1=f(fn) for all n∈N.
Proof. See, e.g., Theorem 1.2.14 in [2].
An important operation definable in many interesting lattices, and in partic-
ular in those considered in this thesis, is that of negation or dual operation.
Definition 2.1.16 (Negation). Let (X,⊑) be a lattice. A function η :X→X is
called a negation on X , if it satisfies the following properties:
1. for every x∈X , η(η(x))=x,
2. for every x, y∈X , x ⊑ y implies η(y) ⊑ η(x).
Definition 2.1.17. A lattice (X,⊑) is distributive if it satisfies the two equivalent
conditions:
1. For all x, y, z∈X , x ⊔ (y ⊓ z) = (x ⊔ y) ⊓ (x ⊔ z),
2. For all x, y, z∈X , x ⊓ (y ⊔ z) = (x ⊓ y) ⊔ (x ⊓ z).
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Definition 2.1.18 (De Morgan and Boolean algebras). A bounded (complete)
lattice (X,⊑,⊤,⊥,¬), equipped with a negation ¬ :X →X , is a (complete) De
Morgan algebra if it is distributive. It is a (complete) Boolean algebra if it also
satisfies the equalities x ⊔ ¬x = ⊤ and x ⊓ ¬x = ⊥ for all x∈X .
In complete De Morgan algebras there is an important form of duality relating
least and greatest fixed points of monotone operators.
Theorem 2.1.19. Let (X,⊑,⊤,⊥,¬) be a complete De Morgan algebra. For
every monotone function f :X→X we define its dual, denoted by f :X→X, as
follows: f(x)=¬(f¬(x)). Then the following assertions hold:











Proof. See, e.g., Proposition 1.2.25 of [2].
2.1.3 Topology and Polish spaces
In this section we present the main definitions and concepts from topology which
are going to be used in this thesis. We shall be mainly interested in Polish spaces,
which bridge the world of topology and classical descriptive set theory. We follow
closely the presentation of [60], including many definitions and facts verbatim, to
which we refer for an extensive treatment of the subject.
Definition 2.1.20. A topological space is a pair (X, T ), where X is a set and T
a collection of subsets of X such that ∅, X ∈T , and T is closed under arbitrary
unions and finite intersections. The collection T is called a topology on X and its
members are called open sets. If T is the entire collection of subsets of X , then
T is called the discrete topology on X . The complement of an open set is a closed
set. A subset of X which is both open and closed is a clopen set : ∅ and X are
always clopen sets. Given a point x∈X , an open neighborhood of x is an open
set containing x. A topology is Hausdorff if distinct points in X have disjoint
open neighborhoods. A subset D⊆ X is dense in the topology T , if D∩U 6=∅, for
all U ∈T . A topological space (X, T ) admitting a countable dense set is called
separable. A subspace of (X, T ) consists of a subset Y ⊆X with the relative or
subspace topology T |Y ={Y ∩ U | U ∈T }.
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Definition 2.1.21. Given topological spaces X and Y , a map f :X→Y is:
1. continuous if the inverse image of each open set is open,
2. open (closed), or preserving the open (closed) sets, if the image of each open
set is open (closed),
3. a homeomorphism if it is a continuous bijection such that f−1 is continuous.
We say that X and Y are homeomorphic if there exists a homeomorphism f :
X→Y .
Definition 2.1.22. Given a subspace (Y,S) of (X, T ) we say that a continuous
function f :X→Y is a retraction if, for every y∈Y , f(y)=y.
Definition 2.1.23. A basis B for a topology T on X , is a collection B ⊆ T
with the property that every open set is the union of elements of B (the empty
union gives ∅). A subbasis for T is a collection S ∈T such that the set of finite
intersections of sets in S is a basis for T . For any family S of subsets of a set
X , there is a smallest topology T containing S, called the topology generated by
S, of which S is easily shown to be a sub-basis. A topological space is second
countable if it has a countable basis, and it is 0-dimensional if it is Hausdorff and
has a basis consisting of clopen sets.
Definition 2.1.24. The product
∏
i∈I Xi of a I-indexed family of topological
spaces {Xi}i∈I is the topological space consisting of the cartesian product of the
sets Xi with the topology generated by the following basis consisting of the sets
of the form
∏
i∈I Ui where Ui is open in Xi for all i∈ I and Ui =Xi for all but
finitely many i∈ I. The projection function πi :
∏
i∈I Xi →Xi is continuous and
open, for every i∈I.
The sum
∨
i∈I Xi of an I-indexed family of topological spaces {Xi}i∈I is the
topological space consisting of the disjoint union
⋃
Xi of the sets Xi (which we
can always assume to be disjoint by considering homeomorphic copies) with the
topology defined as follows: U ⊆
⋃
Xi is open iff U ∩Xi is open in Xi, for every
i∈I.
Definition 2.1.25. A topological space (X, T ) is compact if every open cover of
X has a finite subcover, i.e., if {Ui}i∈I is a family of open sets and X=
⋃
i∈I Ui,
then there is a finite J⊆I such that X=
⋃
j∈J Uj . A subset A∈X is compact in
(X, T ) if it is compact in the relative topology.
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The following proposition states important properties of compact sets and
spaces.
Proposition 2.1.26. The following assertions hold:
• Compact subsets of Hausdorff spaces are closed.
• The union of finitely many compact sets is compact. Finite sets are compact.
• The continuous image of a compact set is compact.
• (Tychonoff’s Theorem) Any product of compact spaces is compact.
• The sum of finitely many compact spaces is compact.
• Any compact Hausdorff space X is normal: given disjoint compact sets
A,B⊆X, there exists disjoint open sets U⊇A and V ⊇B.
Proof. For a proof of points 1-5 see, e.g., Proposition 4.1 in [60]. See, e.g., Theo-
rem 32.3 in [85] for a proof of the last assertion.
Definition 2.1.27. A metric space is a pair (X, d), with X a set and d a function
of type d :X2→ [0,+∞) satisfying:
i. d(x, y)=0 if and only if x=y,
ii. d(x, y)=d(y, x),
iii. d(x, y)≤d(x, z) + d(z, y),
for every x, y, z∈X . The function d is called a metric on X . The open ball with
center at x ∈X and radius r ∈ R is defined by B(x, r) = {y ∈X | d(x, y)< r}.
These balls form a basis for a topology on X called the topology of the metric
space, which is clearly Hausdorff. A topological space (X, T ) is metrizable if there
is a metric d on X so that T is the topology of (X, d). In this case we say that
d is compatible with T .
Definition 2.1.28. Let (X, d) a metric space. A Cauchy sequence is a sequence
{xn}n∈N of elements of X such that limm,n d(xn, xm)=0. We call (X, d) complete
if every Cauchy sequence has a limit in X , i.e., an element y ∈X such that for
every ǫ>0 there exists some n∈N such that d(xm, y)<ǫ for all m>n.
2.1. Classical Mathematical Background 25
Definition 2.1.29. A topological space (X, T ) is (completely) metrizable if it
admits a compatible (complete) metric d : X2 → [0,+∞). If X is metrizable,
then X is separable if and only if X is second countable, so we use these terms
interchangeably in this case.
Definition 2.1.30. A topological space (X, T ) is Polish if it is completely metriz-
able and second countable.
Example 2.1.31. The following are important examples of Polish spaces:
1. R, the set of reals numbers with its standard topology generated by the
open intervals with rational endpoints.
2. [0, 1], the unit interval with its standard (subspace) topology.
3. {0, 1}, the two-point set endowed with the discrete topology,
4. N, the set of natural numbers endowed with the discrete topology.
5. The Cantor space {0, 1}N, the space of infinite sequences of elements in
{0, 1}, i.e., functions of type N→{0, 1}, endowed with the product topology.
6. The Baire space N =NN, the space of infinite sequences of natural numbers,
endowed with the product topology.
See, e.g., [60, §3], for the description of the relevant complete metrics.
The following proposition provides useful facts about Polish spaces, and makes
it simpler to recognize the topological spaces that are Polish.
Proposition 2.1.32. The following assertions hold:
1. A closed subspace of a Polish space is Polish.
2. Every countable set endowed with the discrete topology is Polish.
3. The product and the sum of a sequence of Polish spaces are Polish.
4. Every Polish space is homeomorphic to a closed subspace of RN.
Proof. See, e.g., Proposition 3.3 and Theorem 4.17 in [60].
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Note how the fact that [0, 1], R, {0, 1}, N, {0, 1}N and NN are Polish follows
immediately from the previous proposition. A useful technique for proving that
a topological space is Polish X is to find a homeomorphism with a closed subset
of a known Polish space Y .
Definition 2.1.33. A graph, is a pair G= (V,E), where V is a set of vertices
or nodes and E ⊆ X×X is the edge or accessiblity relation. The graph G is
countable if V is a countable set. A finite path in G is a non-empty finite sequence
{v0, . . . , vn}, such that (vm, vm+1)∈E, for all 0≤m<n. The set of finite paths
in G is denoted by P<ωG . Given a finite path ~v={vi}0≤i≤n in G, we denote with
first(~v) and last(~v) the states v0 and vn, which we refer to as the first and last
states of ~v, and we denote with |~v| the length of the path ~v, i.e., the number n+1.
We say that a finite path ~v∈P<ωG is terminated if E(last(~v))=∅. We denote with
P tG the set of terminated paths in G. An infinite path in G is an infinite sequence
{vn}n∈N such that (vn, vn+1)∈E for all n∈N. The set of infinite paths in G is
denoted with PωG. The function first is defined on P
ω
G in the expected way. We
denote with PG the set P tG ∪P
<ω
G which we refer to as the set of completed paths
in G. We say that a finite path {v0, . . . , vn} is a prefix of a completed path {ti}i∈I
if n ∈ I and for all 0 ≤ j ≤ n, the equality vj = tj holds. Given two finite paths
~v = {vi}0≤i≤m and ~t = {ti}0≤i≤n in G, with t0 ∈ E(vm), we denote with ~v.~t the
finite path {h0, . . . hn+m+1}, where hi =vi, for all 0 ≤ i ≤ m, and hi = ti−(m+1), for
all m<i ≤ m+n+ 1. We call the operation associated with the dot symbol, the
concatenation operator on finite paths. The concatenation of a finite path with an
infinite one is defined similarly. We write ~v⊳~t if ~v is a prefix of ~t. Observe that ⊳
is a partial order on P<ωG . Given two finite paths ~v={vi}0≤i≤m and ~t={ti}0≤i≤n
in G, with last(~v) = first(~t), we denote with merge(~v,~t) the path {ui}0≤i≤n+m
where ui = si, for all 0 ≤ i ≤ m, and and ui = ti−m, for all m≤ i ≤ m + n. In
other words merge(~v,~t) is the path obtained by concatenating ~v with ~t merging
the last state of ~v with the first state of ~t. The operation of merging a finite path
with an infinite one is defined similarly. Given a finite path ~v and a set of finite
or infinite paths X = {~tk}k∈K , such that first(~tk) = last(~v), for every k ∈K, we
denote with merge(~v,X) the set {merge(~v,~tk)}k∈K.
We endow the set PG with the topology generated by the basis consisting of
the sets O~v ={~t∈PG | ~v⊳~t} of all completed paths having ~v as prefix, for every
finite path ~v in G.
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Proposition 2.1.34. Let G be a countable graph. The space PG of completed
paths in a graph G is Polish and 0-dimensional.
Proof. To illustrate the technique, we prove the result by finding a homeomor-
phism with a closed subset F of N . Let us consider a bijection b between V and
the set of positive natural numbers N\{0}. Let us define the function g :PG→N
as follows:






Clearly g is injective, hence f = g|F is a bijective function of type PG → F , for
F =g(PG). Note that a sequence {ni}i∈N∈N is not in F if either:





2. there is a prefix {n0, . . . , nk, nk+1}, where nk+1 = 0 is the first occurrence






Thus, N \ F is the union of the open sets O~n, for ~n of the two kinds discussed
above. It follows that F is closed as desired. The fact that f and f−1 are
continuous is easily proved. To show that PG is a 0-dimensional space we just





where ~t ranges over the set of finite paths in G which are prefix-incompatible
with v, i.e., such that ~t is not a prefix of ~v and ~v is not a prefix of ~v. In other
words, the set of completed paths not contained in O~v is given by those paths
that at some finite point deviate from the initial prefix ~v. It then follows that O~v
is closed as desired.
In the rest of the thesis, we will just mention that a given topological space
is Polish or 0-dimensional without providing a formal proof. Without exception,
such a proof can always be obtained following the lines of the one discussed above.
We now define the notion of trees in a graph.
Definition 2.1.35 (Trees in G). A tree in a graph G=(V,E) is a non-empty set
T of finite paths, such that
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1. T is down-closed under ⊳: if ~v∈T and ~v ⊳ ~t, i.e, if ~t is a prefix of ~v, then
~t∈T .
2. T has a root: there exists exactly one finite path {s} of length one in T .
The state s, denoted by root(T ), is called the root of the tree T .
We denote with TG, or just T if G is clear from the context, the set of trees in G.
We consider the nodes ~v of T as labeled by the last function. For ~s,~t∈T , we say
that ~t is a child of ~s in T if ~t = ~s.{last(~t)}, i.e., if ~t is obtained by concatenating
the finite path ~s with just one state.
We now discuss a special kind of trees over a graph.
Definition 2.1.36 (Uniquely and fully branching nodes of a tree). Given a graph
G and a tree T in G, a node ~v∈T is said to be uniquely branching in T if either
E(last(~v)) = ∅ (in which case ~v does not have children in T ) or ~v has a unique
child in T . Similarly, ~v is fully branching in T if, for every t∈E(last(~v)), it holds
that ~v.{t}∈T .
Definition 2.1.37. Given a graph G= (V,E) and a partition (V1, V2) of V , we
define the trees uniquely branching in V1 and fully branching in V2 as the set,
denoted by T (V1,V2)G , of trees T in G such that for every node ~v∈T the following
conditions hold:
1. If last(~s)∈V1 then ~s branches uniquely in T .
2. If last(~s)∈V2 then ~s branches fully in T .
Definition 2.1.38 (Topology on T (V1,V2)G ). Given a finite tree F ∈ TG in G, we
denote with OF the set of trees in T
(V1,V2)
G such that F ⊆ T . The topology on
T (V1,V2)G is generated by the the sets OF , for any finite tree F ∈TG.
Proposition 2.1.39. Let G=(V,E) be a countable graph and (V1, V2) a partition
of V . The topology on T (V1,V2)G is Polish and 0-dimensional. In particular, the
sets OF are clopen, for any finite tree F ∈ TG. Moreover the sets of the form
{O~v↓ | ~v∈P
<ω
G }, with ~v ↓ = {~t | ~t⊳ ~v}, form a sub-basis for T
(V1,V2)
G .
Proof. The proof goes by showing that T (V1,V2)G is homeomorphic to a closed subset
of NN, through an encoding of finite trees as natural numbers.
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Observation 2.1.40. Fix a graph G and a tree T ∈TG. Then T can be seen as
a graph, and indeed as a tree in the sense of Graph Theory, (T,ET ) by defining
(~v,~t) ∈ ET if and only if ~t is a child of ~v in T . We can then talk about finite,
terminated, infinite and completed paths in T . Note that, if T ∈ T (V1,V2)G , given
a completed path {~vi}i∈I in (T,ET ), the sequence {last(~vi)}i∈I is a completed
path in G. Similarly for finite, terminated and infinite paths. We often say that
T contains the completed path {vi}i∈I ∈ PG if {vi}i∈I can be obtained by the
pointwise application of the function last to a path {~ti}i∈I in T starting from the
root of T .
Another example of a Polish space is given by the set of trees over a set.
Definition 2.1.41. Given a countable set Σ, a tree T over Σ is a set T ⊆Σ<N
of finite sequences of elements in Σ which is closed under taking prefixes, i.e.,
if ~s ∈ T and ~t is a prefix-sequence of ~s then ~t ∈ T . In particular ∅ ∈ T if T is
non-empty. We denote with T (Σ) the set of trees over Σ. We endow T (Σ) with
the topology generated by the sets of the form {T | ~s∈T} and {T | ~s 6∈T}, for
every ~s∈Σ<N.
Proposition 2.1.42. For every countable set Σ the space T (Σ) is Polish and
0-dimensional.
Definition 2.1.43. Given a tree T ∈ T (Σ) we say that T is well-founded if
it does not contain infinite branches. Equivalently, T is well founded when the
poset (T,⊳∗) is well founded (see Definition 2.1.7), where ⊳∗ is the reversed prefix
relation over sequences in T . We say that a tree T ∈T is not terminating1 if for
every ~s∈T there is some ~t∈T such that ~s⊳ ~t and ~s 6= ~t.
Descriptive Set Theory is the study of definable sets in Polish spaces [60]. In
this theory, sets are classified in hierarchies, according to the complexity of their
definitions. The two most studied such hierarchies are the Borel hierarchy and
the Projective hierarchy which we now recall.
Definition 2.1.44. Let X be a set. A σ-algebra on X is a collection F of subsets
of X containing the empty set (∅) and closed under complements and countable
unions (so also under countable intersections). Given E ⊆2X , there is a smallest
σ-algebra containing E , called the σ-algebra generated by E and denoted by σ(E).
1The adjective pruned is adopted in [60].
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A measurable space is a pair (X,F) where X is a set and F is a σ-algebra on







iXi is the cartesian product, is generated by the sets of
the form
∏
iAi where Ai∈Si for all i, and Ai=Xi for all but finitely many i.
Definition 2.1.45. Let (X,F), (Y,H) be measurable spaces. A map f :X→Y
is called measurable if f−1(H) ∈ F for every H ∈ H. If H = σ(E) it is enough
to require this for H ∈ E. A measurable isomorphism between X and Y is a
bijection such that both f and f−1 are measurable. Given a set X , a σ-algebra
(Y,S) and a collection F of functions from X to Y , the σ-algebra on X generated
by F is the smallest σ-algebra such that every function f ∈F is measurable.
Definition 2.1.46. Let (X, T ) be a topological space. The collection of Borel




the Borel space of X . Note that, whenever X is second countable,
B(X)=σ(S) for every subbasis S for the topology on X . Given topological spaces
(X, T ) and (X,U), we say that f :Y →X is Borel measurable if it is measurable
with respect to (X,B(X)) and (Y,B(Y )). Clearly every continuous function is
Borel measurable. A function f :X→Y is a Borel isomorphism if it is a bijection
with both f and f−1 Borel measurable.
Theorem 2.1.47 (Lebesgue, Hausdorff). Let X be a Polish space. The class
of Borel measurable functions f : X→R is the smallest class of functions from
X into R which contains all the continuous functions and is closed under taking
pointwise limits of sequences of functions (i.e., if fn :X→ [0, 1] are in the class,
and f(x)=limn fn(x), then f is in the class too).
Proof. See, e.g., Theorem 11.6 in [60].
Definition 2.1.48 (The Borel Hierarchy). Let (X, T ) be a topological space.
We define the classes Σ0α and Π
0
α, for 1≤α<ω1 a countable ordinal, as follows:
• Σ01={U | U is open},
• Π0α =¬Σ
0








βn , βn < α , n∈N
}
, for α > 1.
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Proposition 2.1.49. Let (X, T ) be a topological space. The following assertions
hold:
1. ∆01 and Π
0
1 are the collections of clopen and closed sets in X respectively,
2. Σ0α is closed under countable unions and finite intersections,
3. Π0α is closed under countable intersections and finite unions,
4. ∆0α is closed under finite unions, finite intersections and complements.
















From the last proposition we have that the Borel sets are organized in a
hierarchy of at most ω1 levels.
Not all interesting sets in Polish spaces are Borel. In particular, continuous
images of Borel sets are, in general, not Borel. We now introduce the so-called
projective hierarchy which extends the Borel hierarchy by considering new kinds
of definable sets.
Definition 2.1.50. Let X be a Polish space and let A⊆X . The set A is analytic
if one of the following equivalent condition hold:
• there is a Polish space Y and a continuous map f :Y →X with f(Y )=A,
• there is a Polish space Y and Borel B⊆X×Y with A={x | ∃y.(x, y)∈B},
• there is a closed set F ⊆N with A={x | ∃y.(x, y)∈F}.
We denote with Σ11 the collection of all analytic sets.
Theorem 2.1.51. Let X be a Polish space. The following assertions hold:
1. if X is uncountable, then B(X) ( Σ11,









3. if Y is a Polish space and f :X → Y is Borel measurable, then f(A) and
f−1(B) are analytic, for all A⊆X and B⊆Y analytic.
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Proof. See, e.g., Theorem 14.2 and Proposition 14.4 in [60].
Definition 2.1.52. Let X be a Polish space and let A⊆X . The set A is co-
analytic if one of the following equivalent conditions hold:
• X \A is analytic,
• there is a Polish space Y and Borel B⊆X×Y with A={x | ∀y.(x, y)∈B},
• there is an open set G⊆N with A={x | ∀y.(x, y)∈F}.
We denote with Π11 the collection of all coanalytic sets. The bi-analytic sets are




The following theorem, due to Mikhail Y. Suslin, states that the bi-analytic
sets are precisely the Borel sets.
Theorem 2.1.53. Let X be a Polish space. Then B(X)=∆11.
Proof. See, e.g., Theorem 14.11 in [60].
We are now ready to introduce the Projective hierarchy.
Definition 2.1.54. For each n≥1 we define the projective classes Σ1n(X), Π
1
n(X),
∆1n(X) of sets a Polish space X as follows: we have already defined the Σ
1
1
(analytic), Π1n (co-analytic) and ∆
1
n (bi-analytic) sets. Then we let, in general,
Σ1n+1 =
{
A⊆X | A={x | ∃y.(x, y)∈B} for some B∈Π1n(X ×N )
}
















n+1. The sets in the














are called the projective sets.
Thus the class of projective sets is defined, starting from the Borel sets ∆11
by iterating the operations of projection and complementation.
Proposition 2.1.55. The following assertions hold:
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1. The classes Σ1n are closed under continuous pre-images, countable intersec-
tions and unions, and continuous images. Moreover the collection Σ1n+1 can
be, alternatively, characterized as follows:
Σ1n+1 =
{
f(A) | A∈Π1n(Z) , f :Z→X continuous, X, Y Polish
}
2. The classes Π1n are closed under continuous pre-images, countable inter-
sections and unions, and co-projections (i.e., universal quantification over
Polish spaces).
3. The classes ∆1n are closed under continuous pre-images, countable intersec-
tions and unions, and complements (i.e., they form a σ-algebra).










The organization of definable sets in Polish spaces into hierarchies, such as the
Borel and Projective hierarchies, provides a tool for comparing the complexity of
sets. Another important notion for measuring the relative complexity of sets in
Polish spaces is given by the notion of Wadge reducibility, which we now introduce.
Definition 2.1.56. Let X , Y be topological spaces. We say that a set A⊆X
is Wadge reducible to B ⊆ Y , written as A ≤W B, if there is a continuous map
f : X → Y such that f−1(B) = A, i.e., x ∈ A if and only if f(x) ∈ B. The ≤W
relation is a preorder, i.e., it is transitive and reflexive. Given any collection Γ of
subsets of the Baire space NN, we say that A is Γ-hard if B ≤W A for any B∈Γ.
Moreover if A∈Γ, we say that A is Γ-complete.
If A ≤W B, then A can be considered simpler than B. Moreover, if A is
Γ-complete, for some class Γ of sets in the Baire space, then A is as complicated
as a set in Γ can be. One method for showing that a given set A is not in some
class Γ, is to choose carefully some Γ-hard set B, with B 6∈ Γ, and prove that
B ≤W A.
Theorem 2.1.57. The following assertions hold:
1. The set A⊆T (N) of well-founded trees over N is Π11-complete.
2. The set B⊆T ({0, 1}) of non-terminating trees over {0, 1} not containing
paths with infinitely many 1’s, is Π11-complete.
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where the notion of (well-founded and non-terminating) tree over a set is specified
as in Definition 2.1.41.
Proof. See, e.g., [60, §33.A].
We conclude this section by introducing the notion of partially ordered topo-
logical space, also known as Nachbin’s spaces from the name of the mathematician
Leopoldo Nachbin[88].
Definition 2.1.58 ([1]). A partially ordered topological space, or just pospace,
(X, T ,≤) is a triple where X is a set, T is a topology on X and ≤ is a partial
order on X such that ≤ ⊆X×X is closed in the product topology. Equivalently,
for every x 6≤ y, there are open sets U and V such that x∈U , y∈V , and for all
x′∈U and y′∈Y , x 6≤y. It follows that every pospace is Hausdorff.
Example 2.1.59. An example of pospace is ({0, 1}N, T ,⊑) where ({0, 1}N, T )
is the Cantor space with its standard topology and ⊑ is the pointwise order of
N-indexed sequences of elements in {0, 1} induced by the trivial order 0 ⊑ 1 on
{0, 1}. Clearly the relation ⊑ is closed.
The following is an important property of partially ordered topological spaces.
Theorem 2.1.60 ([88]). In a pospace (X, T ,⊑), the upper-closure set K ↑ =
{y ⊒ x | x∈K} and the down-closure set K ↓ = { y ⊑ x | x∈K} of a compact
set K⊆X are compact sets.
Lemma 2.1.61 (Order Normality [88]). In a compact pospace (X, T ,⊑), let A
and B be disjoint compact sets, where A is upper-closed and B is a down-closed.
Then there exist disjoint open sets U⊇A and V ⊇B where again U is upper-closed
and V is down-closed.
Proof. By normality of compact Hausdorff spaces (see Proposition 2.1.26), there
exist disjoint open sets U ′ ⊇ A and V ′ ⊇ B. Set U = X \
(
(X \ U ′) ↓
)
and
V = X \
(
(X \ V ′) ↑
)
. Clearly U and V are upper-closed and down-closed
respectively, and they are open by Theorem 2.1.60.
We follow closely the presentation of [60], including many definitions and facts
verbatim, to which we refer for an extensive treatment of the subject.
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2.1.4 Measure Theory
The material contained in this section closely follow the presentations of [60] and
[107], including many definitions and facts verbatim.
Definition 2.1.62. Let (X,S) be a measurable space. A measure µ on (X,S)












pairwise disjoint countable family {An}n∈N⊆S. A measure µ on (X,S) is called
σ-finite if X =
⋃
nXn, with Xn ∈ S, and µ(Xn)<∞, finite if µ(X)<∞ and a
probability measure if µ(X) = 1. A set A⊆X is called µ-null if there is B ∈ S
with A ⊆ B and µ(B) = 0. The collection of µ-null sets, which is denoted by
NULLµ is clearly a σ-ideal on X , i.e., it contains the emptyset ∅, it is downward
closed with respect to the ⊆-relation and is closed under countable unions. The
σ-algebra generated by S ∪ NULLµ is called the σ-algebra of µ-measurable sets,
and it is denote by MEASµ. A µ-measurable set is always of the form A∪N , for
A∈S and N ∈NULLµ. The measure µ is extended to a measure µ on MEASµ,
called its completion, by µ(A ∪N)=µ(A).
Definition 2.1.63. An outer measure of a set X is a map µ∗ : 2X → [0,∞] such












set A⊆X is µ∗-measurable if for every E⊆X , µ∗(E) =µ∗(E ∩ A) + µ∗(E \ A).
The µ∗-measurable sets form a σ-algebra, denoted by MEASµ∗ , and µ
∗ restricted
to MEASµ∗ is a measure on (X,MEASµ∗). Every measure µ on (X,S) gives rise
to an outer measure µ∗ defined as follows: µ∗(A)=
d
{µ(B) | B∈S , B⊇A}. If
µ is σ-finite, then MEASµ∗ = MEASµ and the completion of µ and µ
∗ agree on
MEASµ.
Definition 2.1.64. For measurable spaces (X,R), (Y,S) and measure µ on
(X,R), we say that a map f : X → Y is µ-measurable if the inverse image of
a measurable set in Y is µ-measurable. Given a µ-measurable bounded function
f :X → [0, 1], we write
∫
X
f dµ for the its Lebesgue integral.
Definition 2.1.65. Let (X, T ) be a Polish space. A probability (Borel) measure




. We denote with M1(X) the
collection of all probability measures on X . The set M1(X) is endowed with the





, of type M1(X)→ [0, 1],
is continuous for f : X → [0, 1] continuous. This is called the weak topology on
M1(X) [94]. We define the map δ : X → P(X) as δ(x)(A) = 1 if x ∈ A and 0
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otherwise, for all A∈B(X). We often denote with δx the probability measure δ(x),
for x∈X , and call it the Dirac measure with mass at x. If (Y,S) is a measurable





, for all B ∈S. Given a Polish space Y and a Borel function






Theorem 2.1.66. Let (X, T ) be a Polish space. The following assertions hold:
1. M1(X) is Polish.
2. If X is compact so is M1(X).
3. Every µ∈M1(X) is regular and inner regular (or tight), i.e.,
regularity: µ(A)=
⊔
{µ(F ) | F ⊆A , F closed}
=
d
{µ(U) | U⊆A , U open}
inner regularity: µ(A)=
⊔
{µ(K) | K⊆A , K compact}.
for every µ-measurable set A.
4. The sets UO,λ = {µ | µ(O) > λ}, for O∈T and λ∈ [0, 1] rational, form a
subbasis for M1(X).
5. If X is 0-dimensional and B is a countable basis of clopen sets such that,
for every A,B∈B, the set A \B is expressible as a disjoint union of clopen
sets in B, then the sets UB,λ = {µ | µ(B) > λ}, with B ∈B and λ∈ [0, 1] a
rational number, form a subbasis for the weak topology on M1(X).




is generated by the maps of the form λµ.µ(A),






f :X→ [0, 1] Borel measurable.
7. The function δ :X→M1(X) is continuous.
8. For every Polish space Y and continuous (Borel measurable) map f :X→Y
the function M1(f) :M1(X)→M1(Y ) is continuous (Borel measurable).
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with ρA(µ) =µ(A) for all µ∈M1(X), is well defined (i.e., for every Borel
set A, ρA is µ









is a monad on the category Pol of Polish spaces
with continuous maps. For Polish spaces X and Y , we shall consider





X → M1(Y )
)
)






Proof. See, e.g., Theorem 17.22 in [60] for a proof of point 1; Theorem 17.23 in
[60] for a proof of point 2; Theorem 17.10 and Theorem 17.11 in [60] for a proof
of point 3; Lemma A.1.7 and Lemma A.1.8 in the Appendix for a proof of points
4 and 5; Theorem 17.24 in [60] for a proof of point 6. The results of points 7 and
8 follow from Theorem 17.26 in [60]: in particular, see Exercise 17.27, 17.28. For
a proof of point 9 and 10 we refer to Theorem 1 in [44].
In many circumstances a probability measure µ on a measurable space (X,S)
is uniquely determined by the probability assignments on a restricted collection
of elements in S. This is due to the following important theorem.
Definition 2.1.67. For a set X , a boolean algebra of sets on X is a collection
A of subsets of X closed under complements and finite intersections such that
∅∈A. A function µ :A→ [0,∞] is a pre-measure on (X,A) if:
1. µ(∅)=0,












A pre-measure µ on (X,A) is σ-finite if the following condition hold:
1. X can be covered by countably a countable collection {An} of sets in A,
and µ(An) <∞ for all n∈N.
Lastly, a pre-measure µ on (X,A) is a probability pre-measure if µ(X)=1.
Theorem 2.1.68 (Carathéodory’s Extension Theorem). Let (X,A) be a boolean
algebra on X and µ a pre-measure on (X,A). Then there exists a measure ν
on the measurable space (X, σ(A)), where σ(A) is the σ-algebra generated by A,
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extending µ, i.e., such that ν(A) = µ(A) for all A ∈ A. Moreover if µ is a
probability (σ-finite) pre-measure then ν is unique and is a probability (σ-finite)
pre-measure.
Proof. See, e.g., Theorem 1.7.3 in [107].
Carathéodory’s extension theorem is very useful when defining (Borel) prob-
ability measures on spaces (X, T ) having a boolean algebra A ∈ 2X generating
either the topology T (and therefore also the Borel σ-algebra), or just the Borel
σ-algebra B(X). An important example of the first kind is given by 0-dimensional
Polish spaces such as the Cantor space {0, 1}N or the Baire space NN having a
basis of clopen sets constituting a boolean algebra. An example of the second
kind is given by the space of reals R, or the unit interval [0, 1], where the boolean
algebra generating the Borel sets is given by finite unions of semiopen intervals,
i.e., sets of the form (a, b] and [b, a). On such spaces, in order to uniquely specify
a (Borel) probability measure µ it is enough to provide a probability pre-measure
ν on A. The probability measure µ can then be extended to its completion µ on
all µ-measurable sets.
The following definition makes use of Carathéodory’s extension theorem.
Definition 2.1.69 (Product measure). Given a pair (X1,S1) and (X2,S1) of
measurable spaces and probability measures µ1 and µ2 on X1 and X2 respectively,






1 ) · µ2(A
n
2 )
for every finite union B =
⋃





with An1 ∈ S1 and A
n
2 ∈ S2. This kind of sets are closed under complement and
intersection, i.e., they form a boolean algebra of sets on X1×X2 which generates
the product σ-algebra on X1 ×X2. By Carathéodory’s extension theorem, there
is a unique probability measure µ on X1 ×X2 compatible with this specification.
The definition extends as expected to the product measure
∏
0≤k≤n
µk of any finite
collection {µk}0≤k≤n of probability measures on the collection {(Xk,Sk)}0≤k≤n of
measurable spaces.
The following theorem will be useful for specifying probability measures on
product spaces.
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Theorem 2.1.70 (Kolmogorov’s Extension Theorem). For a given index-set I,
let (Xi, Ti) be a Polish space and µi a probability measure on B(Xi), for every i∈I.













with B∈B(Xk), for some k∈J .
Proof. See, e.g., Theorem 2.4.3 in [107, §2.4].
We now turn our attention to the notions of universally measurable sets and
functions.
Definition 2.1.71. Given a Polish space (X, T ), we denote with UM(X) the σ-
algebra consisting of those sets that are µ-measurable for every (Borel) probability





A set A ∈ UM(X) is called a universally measurable subset of X . This is a
good definition as σ-algebras are closed under arbitrary intersections. Given a
measurable space (Y,S) and a function f :X → Y we say that f is universally
measurable if f−1(A)∈UM(X) for all A∈S.
Clearly every Borel set is universally measurable. Moreover, as stated in the
following theorem every (co)analytic set is universally measurable.





⊆UM(X)⊆2X and, if X is uncountable, the inclusions are strict.




i Ti), and {Ei}i∈I , with E ⊆ Xi, is a collection of
universally measurable sets (i.e., Ei∈UM(Xi)), then
∏
iEi∈UM(X),




(UM(X) see, e.g., Propo-
sition B.9 in [8]. The inequality UM(X)(2X follows from the existence of a set
A⊆R which is not µ-measurable, where µ is the standard Lebesgue measure on
R, see e.g. [59]. For a proof of the second assertion see, e.g., [39, 434X(e)].
As we shall see in the next section, it is not possible, in ZFC alone, to show
that universally measurable sets extend any further up the projective hierarchy.
Indeed already the inclusion ∆12(X)⊆UM(X) is not decidable in ZFC set theory.
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The concepts of universally measurable set and universally measurable func-
tion are very useful. Indeed, given a universally measurable set A⊆X , the proba-
bility µ(X)(A) and the integral
∫
X
f dµ are well defined for every µ∈M1(X) and
universally measurable function f :X→ [0, 1]. Moreover universally measurable
functions satisfy several important closure properties which we now discuss.
Theorem 2.1.73. Let X and Y be Polish spaces, and f :X→ Y a universally
measurable map, i.e., such that the inverse image of Borel sets is universally mea-
surable. For every universally measurable W ⊆Y , the set f−1(W ) is universally
measurable.
Proof. See, e.g., Corollary 7.44.1 in [8].
As an immediate consequence of the previous theorem we have the following
fundamental property of universally measurable maps.
Corollary 2.1.74. Given Polish spaces X, Y and Z and universally measurable
maps f : X → Y and g : Y → Z the composition f ◦ g : X → Z is universally
measurable.
Note how, in contrast, the composition f◦g of two Lebesgue (but not univer-
sally) measurable functions f, g : R→R need not be Lebesgue measurable. We
shall also make use of the following closure properties.
Theorem 2.1.75. Let X be a Polish space and f : X → [0, 1] a universally
measurable (respectively Borel measurable) function. Then the map f̃ :M1(X)→
[0, 1], defined as f̃(µ)=
∫
X
f dµ is universally (respectively Borel) measurable.
Proof. By definition of the weak topology on M1(X), the map f̃ is continuous
whenever f is continuous. The desired result for Borel measurable functions
then immediately follows from the fact that, for every Polish space Y , the set
of Borel measurable functions of type Y → [0, 1] is the smallest one containing
the continuous functions and closed under taking bounded pointwise limits of
sequences (see Theorem 2.1.47). For a proof of the analogous result for universally
measurable functions see, e.g., Proposition 7.46 in [8].
Lemma 2.1.76. Let X, Y and Z be Polish spaces, and f : X×Y → Z be a
universally measurable function, where X×Y is endowed with the product topology.
The function fx :Y →Z, defined as fx(y)=f(x, y), is universally measurable for
every x∈X.
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Proof. The result follows by application of Lemma 2.1.73.
Lemma 2.1.77. Let (Xn, Tn) be a countable collection of Polish spaces and fn :
Xn → Yn a universally measurable (respectively Borel or continuous) function,




n Yn, defined as f
(
{xn}n∈N) =
{fn(xn)}n∈N, is universally measurable (respectively Borel or continuous).
Proof. We just need to show that f−1(U) is universally measurable for every set
U ⊆
∏
n Yn of the form U =
∏
n Un, with Un ∈Tn and Un = Yn for all but finitely
many n. The sets U of this shape form a sub-basis for the product topology on
∏
n Yn. The set f
−1(U) is of the form V =
∏
n Vn with Vn = f
−1(Un). Since f
is universally measurable by hypothesis, Vn is universally measurable for every
n∈N. The proof is concluded by application of Theorem 2.1.72(3). The analogous
result for f continuous or Borel measurable is proved in the same way.
We conclude this section by stating two important theorems in measure the-
ory: the monotone convergence theorem and the Fubini theorem.
Theorem 2.1.78 (Monotone Convergence Theorem). Let (X,S) be a measurable
space and {fn}n∈N a sequence of S-measurable functions f :X→ [0, 1] such that
fn⊑fn+1, where ⊑ is the pointwise order, and f=
⊔
n fn the associated least upper




. Then the following
assertions hold:













for every probability measure µ on (X,S).
Theorem 2.1.79 (Fubini’s Theorem). Let (X,R) and (Y,S) be measurable spaces,
and f : X×Y → [0, 1] a measurable map, where X × Y is endowed with the
product σ-algebra. If the functions fx : Y → [0, 1] and fy : X → [0, 1], defined
as fx(y) = f(x, y) = fy(x) for all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y , are R-measurable and S-
measurable respectively, the following assertions hold:
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for every probability measure µ1 on (X,R) and µ2 on (Y,S).
Both theorems can be further generalized to deal with σ-finite measures and
R-valued functions [107].
2.1.5 Set Theory
As we briefly mentioned in the previous sections, there are mathematical state-
ments, such as “∆12⊆UM(X) for all uncountable Polish X”, which neither admit
a proof nor a disproof in ZFC.
Definition 2.1.80. Let us denote with ∆12-UM the assertion: “∆
1
2⊆UM(X) for
all uncountable Polish X”.
Theorem 2.1.81. If ZFC is consistent, the following assertions hold:
1. ZFC 6⊢ ∆12-UM,





Proof. The result of the first assertion is due to Kurt Gödel, see, e.g., Corollary
25.28 of [59]. A proof of the second assertion can be found in, e.g., [75].
These kinds of statements are called undecidable or independent of ZFC. One
of the best known such statements is the so-called Continuum Hypothesis (CH),
originally formulated by Georg Cantor in 1877, which can be formulated as fol-
lows: there is no set whose cardinality is strictly between that of the integers and
that of the real numbers, or more concisely in ZFC [59], as ℵ1=2ℵ0 . The Contin-
uum Hypothesis quickly became one of the most challenging problems in modern
mathematics. It was chosen as the first of the famous 23 problems formulated by
David Hilbert at the beginning of the 20th century [69]. The following theorem
is due to Kurt Gödel (1940) and Paul Cohen (1963):
Theorem 2.1.82. If ZFC is consistent, the following assertions hold:
1. (Gödel) ZFC 6⊢ ¬CH,
2. (Cohen) ZFC 6⊢ CH.
Proof. We refer to [59] for detailed proofs of both theorems.
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Since both CH and its negation ¬CH are not provable in ZFC, several philo-
sophical positions are legitimate: simply dispose of the problem, search for new
convincing axioms to be added to ZFC in order to decide CH or even debate on
the truth of CH or ¬CH by means of some intuitive, yet informal, arguments (see
e.g., [37] for Freiling’s arguments against CH). We refer to [69] for an overview
on these positions.
In the field of set theory, a lot of attention is dedicated to the investigation of
the consequences induced by extensions of ZFC with other axioms, such as CH.
This process, which shed light on the deep implications of the axioms, provides a
lot of useful tools which can sometimes be used to simplify proofs. An important
example is the following. Suppose we want to prove a complicated theorem T ,
and that we realize that T follows simply by one of the consequences of CH; then
we can conclude that ZFC + CH ⊢ T . We would then say that T consistently
holds in ZFC. Note that this implies that ¬T is not provable in ZFC. Of course
it also leaves the question of wether or not T can be proved in ZFC alone, which
could be a much harder question to settle.
As we shall see later in this thesis, the proof of one of our main theorems is
a consistent result, in the sense specified above, and in particular formalized in
ZFC extended with the set-theoretic axiom MAℵ1, introduced by D. A. Martin
and R. M. Solovay in 1970 [75], which we now discuss.
We start with a few preliminary order theoretic definitions.
Definition 2.1.83. Let (X,≤) be a partially ordered set. We say that x1, x2∈X
are compatible if there is some y ∈ X with x1 ≥ y and x2 ≥ y; x1 and x2 are
incompatible otherwise. A nonempty subset D⊆X is dense down-closed if
1. D=D↓, i.e., if x∈D, y∈X and y≤x then y∈D, and
2. for every x∈X there is some y∈D such that x≥y
or, equivalently, if D is a dense and open set in the topology on X generated by
the basic sets {y | y ≤ x}, for x∈X . A subset F ⊆X is a filter on X if:
1. F =F ↑, i.e., if x∈F , y∈X and y≥x then y∈F , and
2. for every x, y ∈F there exists an element z ∈F such that x≥ z and y≥ z,
i.e., all elements of F are compatible.
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A filter F on X is a D-generic filter, for some collection D of dense down-closed
subsets of X , if F ∩D 6=∅, for all D∈D. A forcing antichain2 in X is a set A⊆X
such that for all x, y∈A, x and y are incompatible. We say that (X,≤) satisfies
the countable chain condition (c.c.c.) if every forcing antichain in X is countable.
We are now ready to define the assertion MAκ, for any infinite cardinal κ.
Definition 2.1.84. For any infinite cardinal κ, we denote with MAκ the following
assertion: “If (X,≤) is a partially ordered set satisfying the c.c.c. and D is a
collection of cardinality ≤ κ of dense down-closed subsets of X , then there is a
D-generic filter on X”. We refer to MAκ as Martin’s Axiom at κ. We also define
the assertion MA as “for every infinite cardinal κ, if κ < 2ℵ0 then MAκ holds”,
which we refer to as Martin’s Axiom.
The following theorem provides important information about the consequences
of MAℵ.
Theorem 2.1.85. The following assertions hold:
1. ZFC ⊢ MAℵ0,
2. ZFC ⊢ MAℵ implies ℵ < 2ℵ0,





4. ZFC ⊢ CH implies MA,
5. ZFC ⊢ MAℵ1 implies ¬CH.
Moreover ZFC + MAℵ1 is consistent relative to ZFC, i.e., if ZFC is consistent
then ZFC + MAℵ1 is consistent.
Proof. For a proof of the relative consistency ZFC + MAℵ1 and of Assertion 1,
which is known as Rasiowa-Sikorski Lemma, see e.g., [59]. For a proof of Assertion
2 see, e.g., Theorem 1 in the original paper by Martin and Solovay [75]. The last
three assertions are immediate consequences of the first two.
It is clear, from the results of Theorem 2.1.85, than Martin’s Axiom asserts
properties of cardinals strictly between ℵ0 and the continuum 2
ℵ0 . When the
2The adjective forcing is use to avoid confusion with the standard notion of antichain in
posets as specified in Definition 2.1.6. Forcing antichains are also known as strong antichains.
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Continuum Hypothesis holds, there are no such cardinals, and MA holds by the
first point of Theorem 2.1.85. Therefore Martin’s Axiom becomes interesting
when ¬CH is assumed. In this setting, MA can informally be considered to
say that all infinite cardinals less than the cardinality of the continuum, behave
roughly like ℵ0 [38]. The main consequence of ¬CH + MA, or even of MAℵ1 , that
will be used in this thesis has to do with measure theory and in particular on
closure properties, related to the limit ordinal ω1, of the σ-algebra UM(X) on a
Polish space X .
Definition 2.1.86. Let (X, T ) be a Polish space, and µ∈M1(X) a probability
measure on X . We say that the σ-algebra MEASµ is ω1-complete if the following
condition holds:




Similarly, we say that the σ-ideal NULLµ is ω1-additive if the following condition
holds:




Lastly, if MEASµ is ω1-complete, we say that µ is ω1-continuous if the following
condition holds:

















The notion ω1-continuity is often formulated as ω1-additivity, which asserts that








It is clear that if CH holds then NULLµ is, in general, not ω1-additive: take
for example the unit [0, 1] interval, having cardinality 2ℵ0 , with the standard
Lebesgue measure µ; then µ({r})=0, for all r∈ [0, 1], but µ([0, 1])=1. Similarly,
the σ-algebra MEASµ is not ω1-complete if CH holds.
Theorem 2.1.87 (MAℵ1). Let (X, T ) be a Polish space. For every probability
measure µ∈M1(X), the σ-ideal NULLµ is ω1-additive.
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Proof. See Theorem A.2.2 in the Appendix.
We now list three useful consequences of Theorem 2.1.87.
Proposition 2.1.88 (MAℵ1). The following assertions hold for every Polish
space (X, T ):
1. for every µ∈M1(X), the σ-algebra MEASµ is ω1-complete and the proba-
bility measure µ is ω1-continuous,
2. Σ12-UM holds, i.e., every A ∈ Σ
1
2 is universally measurable and hence, in
particular, every A∈∆12 is universally measurable.
3. the σ-algebra UM(X) is ω1-complete.
Proof. We first prove that the σ-algebra MEASµ is ω1-complete. Let {Aα}α<ω1 a
collection of µ-measurable sets, i.e., Aα∈MEASµ. Recall that Aα=Bα∪Nα, with









Nα, by Theorem 2.1.87
we just need to show that
⋃
α<ω1
Bα is µ-measurable. Without loss of generality we
can assume that the sets {Bα}α<ω1 are pairwise disjoint. To do so, define B
′
α+1 =
















can have measure greater than 0. The desired result then follows trivially from
Theorem 2.1.87.
The fact that µ is ω1-continuous is proved with a similar technique. For every
collection {Aα}α<ω1 of disjoint µ-measurable sets, only countably many of them,
say {Aαn}n∈N can have measure greater than 0. Again, the desired result the
trivially follows from Theorem 2.1.87.
The fact that ∆12-UM holds, follows from the following theorem of Sierpiński:
every Σ12 set A can be expressed as the ω1-union of a collection {Aα}α<ω1 of Borel
sets. See, e.g., Theorem 25.19 in [59].
Lastly, the ω1-completeness of UM(X) follows immediately from the fact that
MEASµ is ω1-complete for every µ∈M1(X).
The assertions of Proposition 2.1.88 are the only consequences of MAℵ1 we use
in the thesis. As a mater of fact, rather than considering Martin’s Axiom at ℵ1,
these consequences follow from the weaker assumption that NULLµ is ω1-additive,
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for every Borel probability measure µ on a Polish space. This is assumption, often
denoted by add(NULL)≥ℵ2, is studied in the theory of cardinal characteristics
of the Continuum (see, e.g., [15]).
2.2 The lattice [0, 1]
In this section we consider in some detail the closed set [0, 1] of reals, with its
standard order, and introduce a few operations on it which will be used extensively
in this thesis. As a starting point, we state the following proposition:
Proposition 2.2.1. The map f : [0, 1] →M1({0, 1}) defined as f(λ) = µλ is a
homeomorphism, where {0, 1} is endowed with the product topology and µλ is the
probability measure assigning probability λ to the set {1}, and 1 − λ to the set
{0}.
Therefore we can look at the real numbers in [0, 1] as probability measures
over the two element set {0, 1}. An important property of the closed set [0, 1]
with its standard order, and the associated operations of meet and join, is the
following:
Proposition 2.2.2. The algebraic structure ([0, 1],⊔,⊓, 0, 1) is a distributive
complete lattice.
The first operation we define on the lattice [0, 1] is the involutive map x 7→1−x,
which we often refer to as the negation operator on [0, 1] and simply denote with
(1−). It is immediate to verify that (1−) is a negation (see Definition 2.1.16)
on the bounded distributive lattice
(
[0, 1],⊔,⊓, 0, 1
)
. Therefore the algebraic
structure
(
[0, 1],⊔,⊓, (1−), 0, 1
)
is a De Morgan algebra (see Definition 2.1.18).
Beside the operations of meet, join and negation on [0, 1] we shall make fre-
quent use of other operators which, when thinking at [0, 1] as a set of quantitative
truth values, have some logical character. As we will discuss at the end of this
section, the mathematical field Fuzzy logic studies appropriate generalizations of
the boolean logical connectives to the real interval [0, 1].
Definition 2.2.3. We define the operations ⊙, ⊕, ⊖ and +λ, for λ∈(0, 1), all of
type ([0, 1]×[0, 1])→ [0, 1], as follows:
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x⊙ y
def
= x+ y − (x · y) binary coproduct on [0, 1]
x⊕ y
def
= min{1, x+ y} truncated sum on [0, 1]
x⊖ y
def
= max{0, x+ y − 1} truncated co-sum on [0, 1]
x+λ y
def
= (λ · x) +
(
(1 − λ) · y
)
binary weighted sum on [0, 1]
where ·, + and − are the standard operations of product (on [0, 1]), sum and
subtraction (on R). The operations of ·, ⊙, ⊕ and ⊖ are clearly commutative and
associative, and thus extend trivially to n-ary operations of type [0, 1]n → [0, 1].




the operations of product and coproduct
having, in general, more than two arguments. The operations of product and
coproduct extend uniquely to infinitary operations of type [0, 1]I→ [0, 1], for any

























j∈J xj denote the
n-ary, for n = |J |, (co)products of the tuple {xj}j∈J . We shall often make use
of an infinitary operation of convex combination as well. We write
∑
i∈I
λi · xi, for
I at most countable, λi∈ [0, 1],
∑
i∈I λi = 1 and tuple {xi}i∈I ∈ [0, 1]
I , to denote
the weighted sum of the tuple {xi}i∈I with the weights {λi}i∈I , defined as the
notation suggests.
The following is an important property of the family of operators introduced
above.
Proposition 2.2.4. The operators ·, ⊙, ⊕, ⊖ and +λ, for λ∈ (0, 1), are mono-
tone and continuous.
Moreover the operators satisfy several De Morgan dualities as we now show
Lemma 2.2.5. The following assertions hold:
I) The operations · and ⊙ are De Morgan duals:
1 − (x⊙ y)=(1 − x) · (1 − y) and 1 − (x · y)=(1 − x) ⊙ (1 − y).
II) The operations ⊕ and ⊖ are De Morgan duals:
1 − (x⊕ y)=(1 − x) ⊖ (1 − y) and 1 − (x⊖ y)=(1 − x) ⊕ (1 − y)
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III) The operation +λ is self dual, for every λ∈(0, 1):
1 − (x +λ y)=(1 − x) +λ (1 − y).
Proof. All assertions are trivial. For illustration we just prove the third one.
(1 − x) +λ (1 − y) = λ · (1 − x) + (1 − λ) · (1 − y)
= λ− (λ · x) + 1 − λ− y + (λ · y)
= 1 − (λ · x) −
(
(1 − λ) · y
)
= 1 − (x +λ y).








































λi · (1 − xi).
Proof. The third assertion is trivial recalling that
∑
i λi=1 by assumption. The
first two follow from the definition of the infinitary operations as the limit of their
finitary counterparts, and application of Lemma 2.2.5.
We now discuss a useful property of the (countably) infinitary operations of
product and coproduct.
Lemma 2.2.7. Let {xi}i∈N be a sequence of real numbers xi ∈ [0, 1], and let













Proof. See Appendix A.3.1
Lemma 2.2.8. Let {xi}i∈N be a sequence of real numbers xi ∈ [0, 1], and let













Proof. See Appendix A.3.2
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The approximations of products described in lemmas 2.2.7 and 2.2.8 are going
to be used so often in the rest of the thesis that we find helpful to introduce a
special notation for the number 22
i+1.
Definition 2.2.9 (Function #). We define the map #:N→N as: #(n)=22
n+1.
This allows us to re-state Lemma 2.2.7 and Lemma 2.2.8 as follows:
Lemma 2.2.10. Let {xi}i∈N be a sequence of real numbers xi ∈ [0, 1], and let

























As a corollary we have the following dual result concerning the approximation
of co-products.
Lemma 2.2.11. Let {xi}i∈N be a sequence of real numbers xi ∈ [0, 1], and let

























Proof. See Appendix A.3.3
We conclude with a brief discussion about the relationship between the ma-
terial presented in this section and the mathematical field known as fuzzy logic
[49]. Fuzzy logic is a form of many-valued logic suited for reasoning about ap-
proximate informations, rather than fixed and exact. In contrast with traditional
logic and its bivalent interpretation, formulas in fuzzy logic are interpreted in a
range of values which is often assumed to be the real interval [0, 1]: the least and
top elements, 0 and 1, play the role of falsity and truth respectively, while the
values in (0, 1) are used to represent some in-between level of truth. Thus the
study of the [0, 1] interval and the operations defined of it, is of great importance
in fuzzy logic. Fuzzy logic have been studied extensively using algebraic tools, in
the style of algebraic logic [49]. The simplest example is the logic associated with
the algebra
(
[0, 1],⊔,⊓, (−1), 0, 1
)
, where ⊔ and ⊓ play the role of disjunction and
conjunction respectively and the operation (1−) is used as negation: the resulting
theory of equality coincides with the so-called Lukasiewicz three-valued logic [41].
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Other operations on [0, 1] can be used as [0, 1]-counterparts of standard conjunc-
tion and disjunction. For example, also the pairs ·/⊙ and ⊖/⊕ are reasonable
generalization of standard conjunction and disjunction known under the name of
product and Lukasiewicz t-(co)norms (see [49] for an extensive treatment of the
subject). The operation of +λ is called a mean operator in [42], and the logic as-
sociated with the algebraic structure
(




In, e.g., [41] and [113], several logics associated to algebraic structures combining
the operators considered in this thesis are studied:
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In this section we introduce the class of Gale–Stewart games, named after David
Gale and Frank M. Stewart who introduced them in [40]. We refer to [60, §20]
and [111] for complementary introductions to the topic.
Gale–Stewart games are infinite duration games of perfect information played
by two players, named Player 1 and Player 2. Given an arbitrary non empty
set X (henceforth endowed with the discrete topology) a Gale–Stewart game is
played as follows: Player 1 starts by choosing an element x0 from X , then Player
2, aware of what Player 1 previously played, chooses an element x1 from X , then
it is again Player 1’s turn to pick an element x2 from X basing their decision on
the list of previously played moves, i.e., (x0, x1), and so on. In general at each
stage 2n of the game, with n∈N, Player 1 chooses an element x2n from X basing
their choice on the list {xi}i<2n of previously played moves, and at each stage
2n+ 1 of the game, with n∈N, Player 2 chooses an element x2n+1 from X basing
their choice on the list {xi}i≤2n of previously played moves. A play of the game,
which can be depicted as follows,
Player 1: x0 x2 x4 . . . x2n . . .
Player 2: x1 x3 x5 . . . x2n+1 . . .
is therefore as an infinite sequence, denoted by ~x ∈ Xω of elements in X . We
endow Xω with the product topology. A Gale–Stewart game is specified by the
set X of playable moves, and by a subset A⊆Xω of plays called the winning set.
The outcome ~x of a play is said to be winning for Player 1 if ~x∈A, and winning
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for Player 2 otherwise. We denote with GS(X,A) the Gale–Stewart game having
X as set of playable moves and A as winning set for Player 1.
In order to formally specify how the two players interact in a Gale–Stewart
game, we need to define the notion of deterministic strategy.
Definition 2.3.1 (Deterministic strategy in a Gale–Stewart game). A deter-
ministic strategy for Player 1 in the Gale–Stewart game GS(X,A) is a function
σGS1 : X
<ω → X . Similarly a deterministic strategy for Player 2 in the Gale–
Stewart game B(X,A) is a function σGS2 : X
<ω → X . A pair of deterministic
strategies (σGS1 , σ
GS
2 ) is called a Gale–Stewart deterministic strategy profile. We
denote with ΣGS the sets of deterministic strategies for Player 1 (and Player 2)
in the game GS(X,A).
Definition 2.3.2 (Topology of ΣGS). For every history h∈X<ω and and element
x∈X , let us denote with Oh 7→x the set of deterministic strategies σGS for Player
1 (and Player 2) such that σGS(h) = x. We fix the topology on ΣGS, generated
by the basis for the open sets given by the sets Oh 7→x, for every pair (h, x) as
defined above. If X is countable, this is a 0-dimensional Polish space. The space
ΣGS × ΣGS of Gale–Stewart deterministic strategy profiles is endowed with the
product topology.
A Gale–Stewart deterministic strategy profile (σGS1 , σ
GS
2 ) induces a unique
play {xn}n∈ω in Xω specified as follows x2n = σGS1 ({xm}m<2n), and x2n+1 =
σGS2 ({xm}m≤2n), for every n ∈ N. We denote with 〈 , 〉
GS : ΣGS × ΣGS → Xω
the function which maps a deterministic strategy profile to its induced play3.










We are now ready to define the concepts of lower and upper values of a Gale–
Stewart game under deterministic strategies.
Definition 2.3.3. Let GS(X,A) be a Gale–Stewart game. We define the lower


























3Note that, although our notion of strategy is quite convenient for its simplicity, it models
some redundant information: Player 1’s choices at odd positions and Player 2’s choices at even
position are never considered by the map 〈 , 〉GS.



























=0. It is clear that if Player 1 has winning strategy,









Definition 2.3.4 (Determinacy). We say that the Gale–Stewart game GS(X,A)
is determined under deterministic strategies, or just determined, if one of the two













to denote its unique value.
One might also be interested in considering the dynamics of the game GS(X,A)
when the two players can use randomized procedures to make their choices. One
of the simplest, yet powerful, scenarios consists in allowing the players to choose
randomly, at the very beginning of the game, which deterministic strategy to use
in the rest of the game. This leads to the notion, standard4 in Game theory, of
mixed strategy which we now formalize.
Definition 2.3.5 (Mixed strategy in a Gale–Stewart game). A mixed strategy
for Player 1 in the Gale–Stewart game GS(X,A) is a probability measure ηGS1 ∈
M1(ΣGS) over ΣGS. Similarly for Player 2. A pair of mixed strategies (ηGS1 , η
GS
2 ),
one for each player, is called a Gale–Stewart mixed strategy profile.
A Gale–Stewart mixed strategy profile (ηGS1 , η
GS
2 ) naturally induces a prob-
ability measure ηGS1 × η
GS





=M1(〈 , 〉GS)(ηGS1 ×η
GS
2 ) over X
ω via the continuous













(S)), on every Borel set S⊆Xω.
When considering mixed strategy profiles, the notions of lower and upper
values of the game under deterministic mixed strategies are replaced by the similar
notions of upper and lower values of the game under mixed strategies.
4Mixed strategies are sometimes defined as functions from finite histories to (discrete) prob-
ability distributions over X . It is possible to show that this definition coincide with ours. See
e.g. [74, 111].
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Definition 2.3.6. Given a Gale–Stewart game GS(X,A), where A is universally
































respectively. Note that this is a good definition since A is assumed to be univer-





When working with Gale–Stewart mixed strategies, we will always assume




represents the limit probability of Player 1 winning the game when they choose
their mixed strategy ηGS1 first, and then Player 2 chooses their mixed strategy
ηGS2 , possibly making their choice based on the strategy η
GS
1 previously cho-




represents the limit probability
of Player 1 winning the game when Player 2 chooses their mixed strategy ηGS2
first, and then Player 1 chooses their mixed strategy ηGS1 , possibly making their










Definition 2.3.7. We say that the Gale–Stewart game GS(X,A) is determined













do denote its unique value.
The following lemma trivially holds:
Lemma 2.3.8. If GS(X,A) is determined under deterministic strategies, then it
is also determined under mixed strategies.
Proof. If Player 1 has a winning strategy σGS1 in GS(X,A), the η
GS
1 defined as the
probability measure δ(σGS1 ) with unit mass at σ
GS


















5Actually, following [111, §5] and [74], one could give meaningful definitions for arbitrary





, in the definitions of MVAL↓ and MVAL↑, with its inner and outer
measures respectively. This generalization goes beyond the purpose of this introductory chapter.
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A natural question is then if the converse of Lemma 2.3.8 holds. The answer
is, rather surprisingly, negative. In [74, §3] a counter-example, credited to Greg
Hjorth, is discussed.
Proposition 2.3.9. There exists a universally measurable set A⊆Nω, such that





not determined under deterministic strategies.
We sketch the main lines of the construction (which uses the Axiom of Choice
in an essential way) and provide the necessary references, which are implicitly
assumed in [74] but not necessarily well-known, in Theorem A.4.1. The result
of Proposition 2.3.9 shows that mixed strategies are stronger, in the sense of
allowing strictly more rational behaviors, than deterministic strategies. As an
immediate reaction to the result of Lemma 2.3.9, one might ask if it possible
to have a Gale–Stewart game GS(X,A) determined under mixed strategies with
MVAL(GS(X,A)) 6∈ {0, 1}. A definitive answer, for the special case X = N, has
been provided by Martin and Vervoort (see [74] and [111, 5.33 in §5]).
Theorem 2.3.10 (0-1 Law for mixed strategies). For every Gale–Stewart game






We are not aware of any generalization of Theorem 2.3.10 to arbitrary sets X
with |X|> ℵ0. We discussed mixed strategies for Gale–Stewart games because
the concept of random behavior which is captured by such strategies, will be
used in several sections to come. However Gale–Stewart games have been deeply
investigated mostly in the context of deterministic strategies, on which we now
focus.
David Gale and Frank M. Stewart themselves proved in their seminal paper
[40] the following theorem:
Theorem 2.3.11. For every set X, with |X| ≥ 2, there exists a set A⊂Xω such
that GS(X,A) is not determined under deterministic strategies.
This negative result makes essential use of the Axiom of Choice, and actually
implies it [72]. On the other hand, in the same paper, the following positive result
is proven:
Theorem 2.3.12. For every set X, if A ⊆ Xω is a closed or open set, then
GS(X,A) is determined under deterministic strategies.
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Also this result makes an essential use of the Axiom of Choice, which is needed
to deal with arbitrary6 sets X , and indeed implies it [72]. These negative and
positive results showed that, even though it is a fact of life7 that not all Gale–
Stewart games are determined, still there exist interesting classes of winning sets
which guarantee determinacy. The quest for finding larger classes of determined
winning sets had begun. In [115] Philip Wolfe showed that every Gale–Stewart
game GS(X,A), with A a Σ02 set, is determined. Only after 10 years, Morton
Davis improved this result by proving that every Gale–Stewart game GS(X,A),
with A a Σ03 set, is determined, and shortly after Jeff B. Paris [92] improved
the result to Σ04 winning sets. In the meanwhile, Mycielski and Swierczkowski
proved in [87] that it is not provable8 in ZFC that every GS(X,A) with A∈Σ11
set, i.e., with A analytical, is determined, even with |X|=2. On the other hand
Donald Martin proved in [71] that, under reasonable set-theoretic assumptions9,
every game GS(X,A) with A∈Σ11 set is determined. Hence we have the following
theorem:
Theorem 2.3.13. If ZFC is consistent, the following assertions hold:
1. ZFC 6⊢ Every GS(X,A) is determined,
2. ZFC + ∃(Measurable cardinal) ⊢ Every GS(X,A) is determined,
where A ranges over Σ11(X).
As a matter of fact, it was later proved by Martin and Steel [76], that the
following stronger theorem holds:
Theorem 2.3.14. If ZFC is consistent and infinitely many Woodin cardinals
exist, then every Gale–Stewart game GS(X,A), with A a projective set, is deter-
mined.
Only in 1975, Donald Martin proved [72] what is widely considered10 the best
result possible in ZFC.
6Indeed if |X |≤ℵ0 the result is provable in ZF alone [73].
7Assuming, of course, that ZFC captures true aspects of life.
8They prove the result working in a model of ZFC + V=L. V=L is known to be consistent
with ZFC, see e.g. [59].
9Assuming the consistency of ZFC+ “there exists a measurable cardinal” [59].
10This sentiment is justified in light of Theorem 2.3.13, which however does not exclude the
possibility of proving determinacy for interesting point-classes including all Borel sets but not
all analytic sets.
2.3. Game Theory 57
Theorem 2.3.15 (Borel Determinacy of Gale–Stewart games). For every set X
and Borel A⊆Xω, the game GS(X,A) is determined.
According to [72, page 368], the proof of determinacy for A∈Σ0n, with n∈N,
only relies on the existence of a well-ordering of X . Hence the Axiom of Choice
is needed in general, but if X=N the proof goes through in ZF alone. This is not
the case if A∈Σ0α, for some infinite countable ordinal α. The Axiom of Countable
Choice is indeed needed [73], for all X with |X|≤ℵ0, to prove the result.
The result of Theorem 2.3.15, henceforth just referred as Borel Determinacy,
constituted a tremendous achievement in Game Theory which required more than
20 years of intensive research, during which theoretical Game Theory became an
important sub-field of Descriptive Set Theory. For instance much study was
devoted to the analysis of extensions of ZFC obtained by axioms expressed in
terms of determinacy of interesting point-classes. We now list a few of these
axioms. For a comprehensive reference to the topic see [59].
Definition 2.3.16 (Axiom of Σ11-Determinacy). The game GS(N, A) is deter-
mined for every A∈Σ11.
More generally we have for each projective point-class Γ1n, with Γ∈{Σ,Π,∆},
the following axiom:
Definition 2.3.17 (Axiom of Γ1n-Determinacy). The game GS(N, A) is deter-
mined for every A∈Γ1n.
Lastly, the following axiom asserts that every projective set is determined.
Definition 2.3.18 (Axiom of Projective Determinacy - PD). The game GS(N, A)
is determined for every A∈Σ1n, with n∈N.
All these axioms, which as a result of theorems 2.3.13 and 2.3.14 follow from
appropriate large cardinal hypothesis, are believed to be true by several set-
theorists11 in name of the so-called principle of definable determinacy, which
asserts that every “definable” subset of Nω is determined12.
We refer to [59] and [60] for detailed analysis of the consequences of these
axioms. Here we just list those that are relevant to our work.
11Of course, this must be understood as a personal feeling about the real nature of the
universe of sets.
12Alexander Kechris [60, §26.B] expresses his position by claiming an overwhelming evidence
in favor of this principle, originally proposed in [86].
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Theorem 2.3.19. The following assertions hold for every Polish space X:
1. ZFC + Σ1n-Determinacy ⊢ Every Σ
1
n+1 set in X is universally measurable.
2. Let f : X → [0, 1] be a function whose graph Gf ⊆ X × [0, 1], defined as
Gf = {(x, y) | f(x)=y}, is a Π
1
n set. Then the following assertion holds:
ZFC + Σ1n-Determinacy ⊢ f is universally measurable.
Proof. See [60, 36.20 in §36.E] for a proof of point 1. For a proof of point 2 it is
enough to observe that f−1(O)={x |∃λ.
(
λ∈O ∧ (x, λ)∈Gf
)
} is a Σ1n+1 set, for
every open set O⊆ [0, 1]. Then the result follows from point 1.
2.3.2 Blackwell Games
In this section we introduce the class of Blackwell games, named after David
Blackwell who introduced them in [10]. We refer to Marco Vervoort’s PhD thesis
[111] for a comprehensive introduction to the topic.
Blackwell games are infinite duration games of imperfect information played
by two players, named Player 1 and Player 2. Given two non-empty finite sets
X and Y (henceforth endowed with the discrete topologies) of moves available
to Player 1 and Player 2 respectively, a Blackwell game is played as follows: at
each stage n ∈ N of the game, Player 1 chooses an element xn from X and,
independently and simultaneously13, Player 2 chooses an element yn in Y . After
these concurrent choices are made the two players synchronize again becoming
aware of the choice made by the opponet, and the same protocol is repeated
forever. A play of the game, which can be depicted as follows,
Player 1: x0 x1 . . . xn . . .
Player 2: y0 y1 . . . yn . . .
is therefore as an infinite sequence, denoted by ~x×~y∈(X×Y )ω of pairs of elements
of Xω and Y ω.
A Blackwell game is specified by a payoff function, which is defined14 to be a
function φ : (X × Y )ω → [0, 1]. In what follows we endow the set (X × Y )ω with
the product topology. Note that, unlikely the Gale–Stewart games considered in
13It is this lack of knowledge about the adversary’s concurrent choice that makes such a
game a game of imperfect information. Blackwell himself describes this class as “games of
slight imperfect information” in [12].
14The definition can be extended to arbitrary R-valued bounded functions.
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Section 2.3.1, Blackwell games deal with payoff functions which express quanti-
tative rewards. This is clearly a generalization, as every set A⊆(X ×Y )ω can be
represented by its characteristic function χA : (X × Y )
ω→{0, 1}. If the outcome
of a play is ~x×~y, Player 1 receives the reward φ(~x×~y). The objective of Player 1
is to maximize their reward, while the dual objective of Player 2 it to minimize
it. We denote with B(X, Y, φ) the Blackwell game having sets of actions X and
Y for Player 1 and Player 2 respectively, and payoff function φ.
In order to formally specify how the two players interact in a Blakwell game,
we need to define the notion of deterministic strategy in a Blackwell game.
Definition 2.3.20 (Deterministic strategy in a Blackwell game).
A deterministic strategy for Player 1 in the Blackwell game B(X, Y, φ) is a func-
tion σB1 : (X × Y )
<ω →X . Similarly a deterministic strategy for Player 2 in the
Blackwell game B(X, Y, φ) is a function σB2 : (X × Y )
<ω → Y . A pair of deter-
ministic strategies (σB1 , σ
B
2 ) is called a Blackwell deterministic strategy profile. We
denote with ΣB1 and Σ
B
2 the sets of deterministic strategies for Player 1 and Player
2 respectively in the game B(X, Y, φ).
We now endow the sets ΣB1 and Σ
B
2 with Polish topologies.
Definition 2.3.21 (Topologies of ΣB1 and Σ
B
2 ). For every history h∈(X × Y )
<ω
and and element x∈X , let us denote with Oh 7→x the set of deterministic strategies
σB1 for Player 1 such that σ
B(h) = x. We fix the topology on ΣB1 , generated by
the basis for the open sets given by the sets Oh 7→x, for every pair (h, x) as defined
above. This is a 0-dimensional Polish space where all basic open sets are clopen.
The set ΣB2 is endowed with the 0-dimensional Polish topology defined in the
similar way. The space ΣB × ΣB of Blackwell deterministic strategy profiles is
endowed with the product topology.
Definition 2.3.22. A Blackwell deterministic strategy profile 〈σB1 , σ
B
2 〉 induces a
unique play {(xn, yn)}n∈ω∈(X × Y )ω specified as follows:
(xn, yn) =
(





for every n∈N. We denote with 〈 , 〉B : (ΣB1 ×Σ
B
2 )→ (X × Y )
ω the function that
maps a Blackwell strategy profile to its induced play. It is clear that 〈 , 〉B is
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Since the payoff of a Blackwell game is, in general, not the characteristic
function of a set, we adapt the notion of lower and upper values of the game
under deterministic strategies given in Definition 2.3.3 for Gale–Stewart games,
as follows:
Definition 2.3.23. Let B(X, Y, φ) be a Blackwell game. We define the lower
and the upper values under deterministic strategies of B(X, Y, φ), denoted as



























Note that when φ is the characteristic function χA of some set A, then the





represents the limit reward assigned to Player
1 when Player 1 chooses its deterministic strategy σB1 first, and then Player 2
chooses its deterministic strategy σB2 , possibly making their choice based on the





the limit reward assigned to Player 1 when Player 2 chooses its deterministic
strategy σB2 first, and then Player 1 chooses its deterministic strategy σ
B
1 , possi-










It is natural, given the above description for the meaning of the lower and
upper values of a Blackwell game under deterministic strategies, to introduce the
notion of ǫ-optimal deterministic strategy.
Definition 2.3.24. A deterministic strategy σB1 for Player 1 in a Blackwell game















− ǫ. Similarly, a determinis-
tic strategy σB2 for Player 2 in a Blackwell game B(X, Y, φ) is called ǫ-optimal,















+ ǫ. A 0-optimal deterministic strategy, for either Player 1 or
Player 2, is simply called optimal.
Clearly ǫ-optimal deterministic strategies for both players always exist for
every ǫ> 0, but not necessarily so for ǫ= 0. We are now ready to introduce the
notion of Blackwell determinacy under deterministic strategies.
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Definition 2.3.25. We say that the Blackwell game B(X, Y, φ) is determined









Unlike Gale–Stewart games, even very simple Blackwell games are not deter-
mined under deterministic strategies. This is because the concurrent choice of
moves, that Blackwell games capture, allows to model games such as the well
known “rock-scissor-paper” game, which are clearly not determined under de-
terministic strategies. We refer to [111] for a detailed exposition of this kind of
example. Blackwell games become more interesting when the two players are al-
lowed to make their choices randomly, according with some probabilistic method
they may adopt. Probabilistic behaviors are formalized, as done for Gale–Stewart
games, by the notion of mixed strategies which we now introduce.
Definition 2.3.26 (Mixed strategy in a Blackwell game). A mixed strategy for
Player 1 in the Blackwell game B(X, Y, φ) is a probability measure ηB1 ∈M1(Σ
B
1 )
over ΣB1 . Simlarly, a mixed strategy for Player 2 in the Blackwell game B(X, Y, φ)
is a probability measure ηB2 ∈M1(Σ
B
2 ) over Σ
B





is called a Blackwell mixed strategy profile. The space M1(ΣB1 ) × M1(Σ
B
2 ) of
Blackwell strategy profiles is endowed with the product topology.
Definition 2.3.27. Every Blackwell mixed strategy profile (ηB1 , η
B
2 ) naturally
determines a probability measure PηB1 ,ηB2 ∈M1
(
(X × Y )ω
)







2 ), or equivalently as the unique probability measure assigning










, to every Borel set S⊆(X×Y )ω. More
concretely, PηB1 ,ηB2 is the unique probability measure induced by the probability
assignment on basic open subsets of (X × Y )ω, specified as follows:













where Oh⊆(X×Y )ω denotes the basic opens set of plays in B(X, Y, φ) having the
finite history h =
(
(x0, y0), ..., (xn, yn)
)
as prefix, and h|i, for 0≤ i≤ n, denotes
the prefix of h of length i, so that h|0 = ǫ and h|n =
(
(x0, y0), ..., (xn−1, yn−1)
)
.
One can calculate PηB1 ,ηB2 (Oh) with the following formula:




ηB1 (Oh|i 7→xi|U{h|j 7→xj}j<i) · η
B
2 (Oh|i 7→xi|U{h|j 7→xj}j<i)








tional probability µ(O|U) is defined as µ(O∩U)
µ(U)
.
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Intuitively, PηB1 ,ηB2 (S), for some PηB1 ,ηB2 -measurable set S⊆(X×Y )
ω, is the prob-
ability of producing a play ~x×~y in the set S, when the two players play according
with the mixed strategies ηB1 and η
B
2 respectively.
As for Gale–Stewart games, when considering Blackwell mixed strategy pro-
files, the notions of lower and upper values of the game under deterministic strate-
gies are replaced by the notions of upper and lower values of the game under mixed
strategies, which we now introduce.
Definition 2.3.28. Given a Blackwell game B(X, Y, φ), where the payoff function
φ is universally measurable, we define its lower and upper values under mixed







































Note that the integrals are well defined since, by definition, φ is a universally
measurable function, hence PηB1 ,ηB2 -measurable. Also observe that if φ is the char-
acteristic function χA, of some universally measurable set A, then this definition
is equivalent to the one adopted for Gale–Stewart games in Definition 2.3.6.
When working with Blackwell mixed strategies, i.e., most of the time, we





represents the limit expected reward assigned to Player 1
when Player 1 chooses their mixed strategy ηB1 first, and then Player 2 chooses
their mixed strategy ηB2 , possibly making their choice based on the strategy η1





expected reward assigned to Player 1 when Player 2 chooses their mixed strategy
ηB2 first, and then Player 1 chooses their mixed strategy η
B
1 , possibly making their










We now introduce the notion of ǫ-optimal mixed strategy, as the natural
modification of the notion of ǫ-optimal deterministic strategy of Definition 2.3.24.
15As already pointed out in Definition 2.3.6, following [111, §5] and [74], one could give
meaningful definitions for arbitrary functions φ. This generalization goes beyond the purpose
of this introductory section.
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Definition 2.3.29. A mixed strategy ηB1 for Player 1 in a Blackwell game B(X, Y, φ)













Similarly, a mixed strategy ηB2 for Player 2 in a Blackwell game B(X, Y, φ) is













A 0-optimal mixed strategy, for either Player 1 or Player 2, is simply called
optimal.
Clearly ǫ-optimal mixed strategies for both players always exist for every ǫ>0,
but not necessarily so for ǫ = 0. We are now ready to introduce the notion of
Blackwell determinacy under mixed strategies.
Definition 2.3.30. We say that the Blackwell game B(X, Y, φ) (with φ assumed
to be universally measurable) is determined under mixed strategies, or just de-














David Blackwell himself proved in 1969 that if φ is the characteristic function
of a Π02 subset of (X × Y )
ω, then B(X, Y, φ) is determined [10, 11]. Much later,
in 1996, Marco Vervoort proved that if φ is the characteristic function of a Σ03
subset of (X × Y )ω, then B(X, Y, φ) is determined [110]. Finally in 1998, Donald
A. Martin proved the following theorem17:
Theorem 2.3.31 (Martin [74]). For every Borel measurable payoff function φ,
the game B(X, Y, φ) is determined.
This result had a tremendous impact on the development of (especially ap-
plied) game theory in the last decade, as we are going to discuss in later sections.
16Note that in the context of Blackwell game we use the word determined as a shorthand for
determined under mixed strategies. This contrasts with the convention adopted in the context of
Gale–Stewart games, and highlights the shift of interest towards mixed strategies when working
with Blackwell games.
17Note that the restriction to finite sets of moves X and Y in Blackwell games in necessary
if one is interested in determinacy results. Indeed it is simple to define a Blackwell game
B(X,Y, φ), with X=Y = N, which is not determined under mixed strategies.
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Martin’s paper [74] is so rich in content that its Theorem 2.3.31 is just one of the
important contributions. One remarkable technical result of [74] is the following
theorem, which improves18 an earlier result of Marco Vervoort [110, Theorem
4.5.7].
Theorem 2.3.32 (Approximation property). For every Borel set A⊆ (X×Y )ω,























where O and C ranges over open and closed subsets of (X×Y )ω, and χS denotes
the characteristic function of S, for S⊆(X × Y )ω.
Proof. See Theorem 5 in [74].
A strengthening of Theorem 2.3.32 allowing the approximation of Borel measur-
able payoffs with simpler payoffs19 is also discussed in [74].
Another important aspect of Martin’s work is that Theorem 2.3.31 was derived
as a consequence of Theorem 2.3.15, i.e., Borel determinacy for Gale–Stewart
games. More generally, as discussed in [74, §3], the following theorem holds:
Theorem 2.3.33. For every Blackwell game B(X, Y, φ) whose payoff function φ
is Σ1n-measurable
20, the following assertion holds:
ZFC + Σ1n-Determinacy ⊢ “ B(X, Y, φ) is determined ”.
Note that, by Theorem 2.3.19, under ZFC + Σ1n-Determinacy the function φ is
universally measurable, thus B(X, Y, φ) is well defined.
We now introduce a useful generalization of Blackwell games, discussed in [74]
and concurrently developed by Ashok P. Maitra and William D. Sudderth in [70],
which allows one to model stochastic games.
A stochastic Blackwell game B(X, Y, Z, φ, ηBN) is similar to an ordinary Black-
well game except that at each step of the game, after Player 1 and Player 2 have
concurrently played their moves in X and Y respectively, another player named
Nature chooses an element z in the finite21 set Z. Thus a play in B(X, Y, Z, φ, ηBN)
can be depicted as follows:
18The result of [110] is valid only for χA with A∈Σ
0
3.
19These simple payoffs are technically called lim-sup and lim-inf payoffs functions. See,
e.g., [22] for a survey.
20By this we mean that φ−1(S)∈Σ1n, for every Borel S⊆ [0, 1].
21As remarked in [74], one can work with countable sets Z without altering, in any significant
way, the theory. However for the sake of uniformity we consider finite sets Z.
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Player 1: x0 x1 . . . xn . . .
Player 2: y0 y1 . . . yn . . .
Nature: z0 z1 . . . zn . . .
The deterministic strategies available to Player 1 and Player 2 become then of
type (X×Y ×Z)<ω → X and (X×Y ×Z)<ω → Y respectively, while the possible
deterministic behaviors of Nature are captured by strategies of type
(
(X × Y ×
Z)<ω × (X × Y )
)
→ Z. The behavior sustained by Nature in the stochastic
Blackwell game B(X, Y, Z, φ, ηBN) is fixed in advance by the mixed strategy η
B
N ,
which is defined as expected, i.e., as a probability measure over deterministic
strategies for Nature. The strategy ηBN is known in advance by Player 1 and Player
2, who can then make their rational choices in accordance with this information.
The payoff function φ in B(X, Y, Z, φ, ηBN) is a universally measurable function of
type (X×Y ×Z)ω→ [0, 1]. The goal of Player 1 in the stochastic Blackwell game
B(X, Y, Z, φ, ηBN) is to maximize the payoff function, while the dual goal of Player
2 is to minimize it, as in an ordinary Blackwell game.
Remarkably, Martin’s proof of Blackwell Borel determinacy under mixed strate-
gies goes through in the stochastic generalization without significant changes.
Theorem 2.3.34. Let B(X, Y, Z, φ, ηBN) be a stochastic Blackwell game where
the payoff function φ is Borel-measurable. Then the following assertion holds:
MVAL↓
(




B(X, Y, Z, φ, ηBN)
)
, where MVAL↓ and MVAL↑
are defined as expected, by adapting Definition 2.3.28 to the new setting.
More generally, the following theorem holds.
Theorem 2.3.35. For every stochastic Blackwell game B(X, Y, Z, φ, ηBN) whose
payoff function φ is Σ1n-measurable, the following assertion holds:
ZFC +Σ1n-Determinacy ⊢ MVAL↓
(




B(X, Y, Z, φ, ηBN)
)
.
Moreover the equivalent of the Theorem 2.3.32 for approximating stochastic
Blackwell games holds as well.
We conclude this section by mentioning some recent developments in the the-
ory of Blackwell games. The fact that Borel-determinacy for Blackwell games
follows from Borel-determinacy for Gale–Stewart games, and more generally the
result of Theorem 2.3.33, are slightly surprising (see, e.g., [57]) as Blackwell games
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intuitively look more complicated than Gale–Stewart games22. A natural ques-
tion is then if Blackwell determinacy-based axioms (defined in analogy with those
formulated in terms of Gale–Stewart games, see e.g. [111, §5], [57] and [74, §3])
imply the corresponding Gale–Stewart determinacy-based axioms such as those
discussed at the end of Section 2.3.1. Donald A. Martin conjectured in [74] that
this should be the case, and suggested possible directions to approach the prob-
lem. However several questions are still open after more than a decade [57, 68].
2.3.3 Generalized Gale–Stewart games
As we saw in Section 2.3.2, Blackwell games B(X, Y, φ) deal with real valued payoff
functions φ : (X × Y )ω → [0, 1] rather than just winning sets, i.e., characteristic
functions χA of subsets of (X × Y )ω. It is then natural to consider Gale–Stewart
games GS(X, φ) having real-valued payoff functions as well. As observed in [74],
a Gale–Stewart game GS(X, φ), having a finite set X of moves, can be seen as a
particular kind of Blackwell game B(X,X, φ′) where the payoff function φ′ ignores
Player 2 moves at even positions, and Player 1 moves at odd positions23. More
formally the Blackwell game B(X,X, φ′) which corresponds to the Gale–Stewart











where y2n = x
1
2n and y2n+1 = x
2
2n+1, for every n ∈ N. As a matter of fact, the
restriction on X being a finite set can be relaxed. Indeed one can encode every
Gale–Stewart game GS(X, φ), with |X|≤ℵ0 as a Blackwell game B(Y, Y, φ′), even
with |Y | = 2. Intuitively it is possible to mimic countable choices by infinite
repetitions of binary choices, and slightly more formally this can be captured by
an appropriate Borel isomorphism between Xω and (Y × Y )ω. We refer to [74]
and [111] for further details.
Gale–Stewart games with real-valued payoff functions can be generalized to
stochastic Gale–Stewart games with real-valued payoffs in a similar way. A
22We refer to Gale–Stewart games GS(X,A), with |X |≤ℵ0, which are indeed those considered
in most determinacy-based axioms.
23One could also see the Blackwell game B(X,X, φ′) as a Gale–Stewart game GS(X,φ′) in
which the set of strategies available to Player 2 is restricted to those which ignore the last move
played by Player 1. Arguably, one could say that a game is of imperfect information whenever
it is not encodable as a standard Gale–Stewart game without restricting the set of strategies
available to the players. Thus Blackwell games are games of imperfect information in this sense.
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stochastic Gale–Stewart game B(X, φ, ηGSN ), with |X| ≤ℵ0, is similar to an ordi-
nary Gale–Stewart game except that after Player 2’s move, Nature (rather than
directly Player 1) makes a move, and then the process is repeated, by allowing
Player 1 to make another move and so on, for ever. Thus a play in GS(X, φ, ηGSN )
can be depicted as follows:
Player 1: x0 x3 . . . x3n . . .
Player 2: x1 x4 . . . x3n+1 . . .
Nature: x2 x5 . . . x3n+2 . . .
The definition of deterministic strategies for Player 1 and Player 2 stay un-
changed, i.e., they are maps Xω → X , and the set of deterministic strategies
for Nature, ranged over by σGSN , is defined in the same way. The map 〈 , 〉
GS
mapping strategy profiles to plays in Xω is extended to 〈 , , 〉GS in the obvious
way in order to cope with Nature’s deterministic strategies. As for stochastic
Blackwell games, the behavior of Nature in the stochastic Gale–Stewart game
GS(X, φ, ηGSN ) is fixed in advance by the mixed strategy η
GS
N , which is defined
as a probability measure over deterministic strategies for Nature. The strategy
ηGSN which is going to be used by Nature in the game GS(X, φ, η
GS
N ) is known in
advance by Player 1 and Player 2, who can then make their rational choices in
accordance with this information. Lastly, the payoff function φ is a universally
measurable function of type Xω→ [0, 1].
Given a pair of deterministic strategies (σGS1 , σ
GS
2 ) in GS(X, φ, η
GS
N ) for Player
1 and Player 2 respectively, a unique probability measure PσGS1 ,σGS2 over X
ω is
induced as follows.







(ηGSN ), or equiva-
lently as the probability measure uniquely specified by the following assignment













on all Borel sets S⊆Nω.
The upper and lower values under deterministic strategies of the game GS(X, φ, ηGSN )
are generalized, in the expected way, as follows:
Definition 2.3.37. We define the lower and upper values VAL↓
(




GS(X, φ, ηGSN )
)
of GS(X, φ, ηGSN ) under deterministic strategies as fol-
lows:
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VAL↓
(




























What makes stochastic Gale–Stewart games (with countable set of moves)
with real valued payoff functions interesting, and not just a natural fragment
of Blackwell games, is that they are determined under deterministic strategies
whenever the payoff function φ is Borel-measurable, as the following theorem,
again due to Donald Martin [74], states.
Theorem 2.3.38. Every stochastic Gale–Stewart game GS(N, φ, ηGSN ), with φ
Borel-measurable, is determined under deterministic strategies, i.e., the follow-
ing equality holds: VAL↓
(




GS(X, φ, ηGSN )
)
.
More generally the following theorem holds [74]:
Theorem 2.3.39. For every stochastic Gale–Stewart game GS(N, φ, ηGSN ) whose
payoff function φ is Σ1n-measurable, the following assertion holds:
ZFC + Σ1n-Determinacy ⊢ VAL↓
(




GS(X, φ, ηGSN )
)
.
where the set-theoretic axiom of Σ1n-Determinacy is formulated as in Definition
2.3.17, i.e., in terms of standard Gale–Stewart games with winning sets.
Moreover the equivalent of the Theorem 2.3.32 for approximating stochastic
Blackwell games holds as well.
We refer to [74] for detailed proofs of these theorems. However we find it use-
ful to explain why these theorems hold for stochastic Gale–Stewart games with
real-valued payoff while they do not hold for general Blackwell games, which
are indeed determined only under mixed strategies. The technical tool adopted
in Martin’s proof for proving determinacy (under mixed strategies) of Blackwell
games consists in constructing an infinite sequence of one-step games, choosing
optimal strategies for each of them, and combining these locally optimal strate-
gies to produce an ǫ-optimal strategy in the original Blackwell game. In the case
general Blackwell games, the one-step games which are considered are concurrent
one-step zero-sum games. These games are known to be determined under mixed
strategies and to admit optimal mixed strategies by Von Neumann’s celebrated
Minimax theorem [89]. That’s why the ǫ-optimal strategy for the Blackwell game,
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which is built from this collection of local mixed strategies, is mixed. Similarly, in
stochastic Blackwell games, the local games are two-steps games, where the first
step is played concurrently by Player 1 and Player 2, and the third step is prob-
abilistic, i.e., made by Nature. Again, these games are known to be determined
under mixed strategies and to admit optimal mixed strategies by Von Neumann’s
theorem. When considering stochastic Gale–Stewart games GS(N, φ, ηGSN ) (seen as
Blackwell games B(X,X,X, φ′, ηBN), with |X|=2, as discussed before), the collec-
tion of local games consists of three-step turn-based games, where the third step is
probabilistic, i.e., made by Nature. These games are known to be determined un-
der deterministic strategies and to admit optimal deterministic strategies. Hence,
the ǫ-optimal strategy for the stochastic Gale–Stewart game, which is built from
this collection of local deterministic strategies, is deterministic as desired. We
remark that even if every stochastic Gale–Stewart game GS(N, φ, ηGSN ) is deter-
mined under deterministic strategies, there may not exist an optimal strategy,
i.e., a 0-optimal strategy in the sense of Definition 2.3.24, for either player.
We conclude this section by remarking, once again, how deep the results of
Donald A. Martin in [74] are. Indeed they provide solid mathematical foundations
for two players games with real-valued payoffs, both for the turn based model
(i.e., Gale–Stewart games) and for the concurrent model (i.e., Blackwell games),
and for their stochastic generalizations. We remark that this theory only copes
with Blackwell games having finite sets of moves available to the players, and
Gale–Stewart games with at most countably many moves.
2.3.4 Two player games on graphs
As discussed in Section 2.3.3, Blackwell and Gale–Stewart games provide a math-
ematical foundation for two player games of infinite duration having real-valued
payoff functions, when the players play their moves concurrently (Blackwell games)
or when they alternate their choices (Gale–Stewart games), and for their stochas-
tic generalizations.
However, it is often quite clumsy to model games directly in terms of abstract
Blackwell games or Gale–Stewart games. Indeed it is often much more convenient
to work with games with rules. Suppose for example that we want to model the
game of Chess as a Gale–Stewart game GS(X, φ), where X is the set of all possible
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moves24, such as “move the piece which is currently in the A4 square to the A8
square”, and the payoff function φ assigns 1 and 0 to all plays which at some point
reach a checkmate position winning for white and black respectively, and 1
2
to all
other plays, thus modeling a draw. To model the game properly we would need
to prevent both players making illegal moves, such as trying to move a piece from
A4 to A8 when A4 is empty, or trying to move an opposite-color piece, etcetera.
This can be done by specifying the function φ to assign rewards 1 and 0 to every
play on which Black or White made the first illegal move, respectively. However,
even if mathematically clean, this way of specifying the payoff functions is quite
indirect. Furthermore, once a checkmate position for either player is reached,
there is little point in carrying on playing an infinity of other moves because the
reward assigned by φ is already fixed.
For these reasons it is often convenient to play the game on a tree or graph
structure rather than just allowing the two players to pick their choices from an
initially given sets of available moves. If the current game-position is at some node
in the game-graph, then the player who ought to move (in a turn based game, say)
has to choose among one of the successor nodes of the current node from which the
rest of the game will continue. If no successor states are available, then the game
just ends. As a matter of fact this way of describing the dynamics of the game is
not only convenient for modeling purposes, but also for establishing theoretical
results. For example all the results of Donald A. Martin in [74], are proven by
working with Blackwell games played on trees. Note that games played on graph
structures can always be converted into games on trees, just by unraveling the
graph into a tree in the obvious way. Thus there is no significant mathematical
difference in the tree and graph models. Graphs, however, are often useful to
describe in a more succinct and informative way the corresponding tree. As an
extreme example, the tree corresponding to a finite graph is, in general, infinite.
We now introduce the graph-based formulation of Gale–Stewart games and
their real-valued payoffs and stochastic generalizations. We refer to [21] for an
exposition of the graph-based formulation of Blackwell games. Before embarking
upon the technical definitions, we remark once again that two player games played
on graphs or trees are just convenient ways to describe the desired Gale–Stewart
or Blackwell game, and all the theoretical results of sections 2.3.1, 2.3.2 and 2.3.3
apply to their graph-based formulations.
24|X | < 642.
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Definition 2.3.40. A two player stochastic game arena, or just a 21
2
-player arena,
is a tuple A= 〈(S,E), (S1, S2, SN), π〉 where S is a countable set of game-states
and E⊆S × S is called the transition relation of A. The sets (S1, S2, SN) form
a partition of S, and π : SN → D(S) is a map assigning to each state in SN
a probability distribution over S. For each s ∈ S, we denote with E(s) the set
{t | (s, t) ∈ E}, and we refer to it as the set of successor states of s in A. The
states s ∈ S such that E(s) = ∅ are called terminal states of A. As a technical
requirement, we impose that E(s)=supp(π(s)), for every s∈SN . Thus, E(s) 6=∅
for all s∈SN . The states in S1 and S2 are called Player 1’s states and Player 2’s
states respectively, and the states in SN are called probabilistic states. We say
that A is a 2-player arena if SN =∅.
Definition 2.3.41 (Paths in A). The sets of finite, terminated, infinite and







respectively, are defined as the corresponding sets of paths in the graph (S,E)
(see Definition 2.1.33). We denote with P<ω1 and P
<ω
2 the sets of finite paths
~s such that last(~s) is in S1 and S2 respectively. We often just write P for PA,
and similarly for the other sets defined on A, if the arena A is clear from the
context. The set P of completed paths in A is endowed with a 0-dimensional
Polish topology specified as in Definition 2.1.33.
Definition 2.3.42 (Two player stochastic game). A two player stochastic game,
or just a 21
2
-player game, is a pair G=〈A,Φ〉, where A is a 21
2
-player game arena
and the payoff function Φ is a universally measurable function of type PA→ [0, 1].
The game G is called a 2-player game if A is a 2-player arena.
A 21
2
-player game played on the arena A, starts at a given state s0 ∈ S. If
the game’s current state is some state s ∈ S1, i.e., under the control of Player
1, then Player 1 has to choose a successor state in the set E(s) from which the
game will proceed. If E(s)=∅, then Player 1 gets stuck, and the game terminates
immediately25. Similarly if s∈S2, then Player 2 has to choose a successor state
in E(s) and if E(s) is empty the game terminated. If the game’s current state is
some probabilistic state s∈SN , then Nature moves to the successor state t with
probability π(s)(t). Note that, since E(s) 6=∅, the game can never terminate at a
probabilistic state. The outcome of a play of the three players in a 21
2
-player game
25It is often useful to work with 2-player games where the player who gets stuck loses, but
this situation is not assumed, nor required, in general.
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is a completed path ~s ∈ PA in A, i.e., either a finite path ending in a terminal
state, or an infinite path. If ~s is the outcome of the game, Player 1 receives the
payoff Φ(~s). The objective of Player 1 in the 21
2
-player game G is to maximize
the payoff function Φ. The dual objective of Player 2 is to minimize it.
To specify formally how Player 1 and Player 2 interact in the 2-player game
G played on the arena A, we define the notion of deterministic strategies.
Definition 2.3.43 (Deterministic strategies). A deterministic strategy σ1 for
Player 1 in A is defined as a function σ1 : P
<ω
1 → S ∪ {•} such that σ1(~s) ∈
E(last(~s)) if E(last(~s)) 6= ∅ and σ1(~s) = • otherwise. Similarly a deterministic
strategy σ2 for Player 2 is defined as a function σ2 :P
<ω
2 →S∪{•}. A pair 〈σ1, σ2〉
of deterministic strategies, one for each player, is called a deterministic strategy
profile and determines the behavior of both players. We denote with Σ1 and Σ2
the set of deterministic strategies available to Player 1 and Player 2 respectively.
Definition 2.3.44 (Topologies on Σ1 and Σ2). Let us denote with O~s 7→s, for
~s∈P<ω1 and s∈S, the set of all strategies σ1 for Player 1 such that σ1(~s)=s. We
fix the topology on Σ1, where the countable basis for the open sets is given by the
clopen sets O~s7→s, for every pair (~s, s) as defined above. This is a 0-dimensional
Polish space. The topology on Σ2 is defined in a similar way.
A particular kind of deterministic strategy is given by the so-called positional
or memoryless strategies which, intuitively, base their choices on a particular
path ~s only considering the last state last(~s) of the path ~s.
Definition 2.3.45. Let σ1 :P
<ω
1 →S ∪{•} be a deterministic strategy for Player





some function f : S1 → S ∪ {•}. A positional strategy for Player 2 is defined in
the analogous way.
It is going to be useful to consider a structure, which we call Markov play26,
that formalizes the notion of outcome of the game up-to the behavior of Nature.
Definition 2.3.46 (Markov play). A Markov play M in a 21
2
-player game arena
A = 〈(S,E), (S1, S2, SN), π〉 is a tree in (S,E) (see Definition 2.1.35) uniquely
branching in S1 ∪ S2 and fully branching in SN , in the sense of Definition 2.1.36.
26We use this terminology because a Markov play is a Markov chain defining a probability
measure over plays. Many authors refer to them simply as Markov chains (see, e.g., see e.g.
[21, 117]).
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The nodes of a Markov play M with more than one child are all labeled with
a state s∈SN and their children represent the possible choices of Nature at that
state. Note that if A is a 2-player arena, the a Markov play M can be considered
as a completed path in PA.
Markov plays are useful structures because it is possible to extract from them
the probability that Nature, with its probabilistic choices, will produce an out-
come contained in some given set of completed paths. This is formally captured
by the following definition.
Definition 2.3.47 (Probability measure P(M)). Every Markov play M deter-
mines a probability assignment PM(O~s) to every basic clopen set O~s ⊆ P, for






π(si)(si+1) | i<n and si∈SN
}
More informally, PM(O~s) is the multiplication of all probabilities labeling, via the
map π, the edges connecting the probabilistic states in ~s with their successors.
The assignment PM on basic clopen sets extends to a unique complete probability
measure PM ∈M1(P).
The value PM(X), for some PM -measurable set X⊆P, models the probability
that the outcome of the game, when M is the result of a play in the 21
2
-player
game up-to the behavior of Nature, is a completed path in X .
As discussed earlier, a Markov play M represents the result of a play of the
two players up to the behavior of Nature. This is made precise by the following
definition:
Definition 2.3.48. Given an initial state s0∈S and a strategy profile (σ1, σ2) a
unique Markov play, denoted by Ms0σ1,σ2 , is determined:
1. the root of M is s0,
2. for every ~s∈Ms0σ1,σ2, if last(~s)=s with s∈S1 not a terminal state, then the
unique child of ~s in Ms0σ1,σ2 is ~s.{σ1(~s)},
3. for every ~s∈Ms0σ1,σ2, if last(~s)=s with s∈S2 not a terminal state, then the
unique child of ~s in Ms0σ1,σ2 is ~s.{σ2(~s)}.
The probability PMs0σ1,σ2 (X), for some (PM
s0
σ1,σ2
)-measurable set X of completed
paths, formally captures the probability that the outcome of the 21
2
-player game
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played on the arena A and starting at s0, is in X , given that Player 1 and Player
2 follow the deterministic strategies σ1 and σ2 respectively.
Definition 2.3.49. Let 〈A,Φ〉 be a 21
2
-player game, and let Ms0σ1,σ2 be the Markov
play induced by the strategy profile (σ1, σ2) when the game starts at s0. The ex-
pected payoff associated with Ms0σ1,σ2 , denoted by E(M
s0





This is a good definition because Φ is assumed to be universally measurable.
Definition 2.3.50. Given a 21
2
-player game G = 〈A,Φ〉, we define its lower and
upper values under deterministic strategies when the game starts at s∈S, denoted
by VALs↓(G) and VAL
s





















We can now state the following theorems.
Theorem 2.3.51. For any 21
2
-player game G=〈A,Φ〉, with Φ a Borel measurable




Theorem 2.3.52. For every 21
2
-player game G=〈A,Φ〉 whose payoff function Φ
is Σ1n-measurable, the following assertion holds:





Both theorems follows from the the corresponding theorems for stochastic
Gale–Stewart with real valued payoff functions of Section 2.3.3. Is it indeed simple
enough to convert a 21
2
-player game G=〈A,Φ〉 into an equivalent stochastic Gale–
Stewart game GS(S, φ, ηN).
2.3.4.1 Two player parity games
Two player (stochastic) games on graphs have found plenty of applications in
computer science in the last decades. One important example arises when the
vertices and edges of the game-graph represent the states and transitions of a
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reactive system, and the two players represent controllable versus uncontrollable
decisions during the execution of the system. A reactive system satisfies a certain
specification if Player 1 has a winning strategy in the corresponding two player,
possibly stochastic, game.
An important class of two player (stochastic) games, which is sufficient to
model many interesting specifications (see, e.g., [21]), is given by those games
G = 〈A, χC〉, whose payoff function χC is the characteristic function of a parity
set C of paths, which we now formally define.
Definition 2.3.53 (Parity assignment). Let A = 〈(S,E), (S1, S2, SN), π〉 be a
21
2
-player arena. A parity assignment, or a priority assignment, for a A is a
function Pr : S → N, such that the set Pr(S) = {n | ∃s ∈ S.Pr(s) = n} is finite.
In other words Pr assigns to each state s ∈ S a natural number, also referred
to as a priority, taken from a finite pool of options {n0, . . . , nk} = Pr(S). We
denote with max(Pr), min(Pr) and |Pr | the natural numbers max{n0, . . . , nk},
min{n0, . . . , nk} and |{n0, . . . , nk}| respectively.
Definition 2.3.54. Let A=〈(S,E), (S1, S2, SN), π〉 be a 2
1
2
-player arena and Pr
a parity assignment for it. Let WPr⊆P be the set of all completed paths ~s∈PA
such that:
1. ~s is a finite terminated path, i.e., ~s ∈P t, and the priority assigned to the




≡1 (mod 2), or
2. ~s is infinite, i.e., ~s∈Pω with ~s={si}i∈N, and the greatest priority assigned







The set WPr is called the parity set induced by the parity assignment Pr. A
subset X⊆P is a parity set if X=WPr for some parity assignment Pr for A.
We are now ready to define the class of two player (stochastic) parity games.
Definition 2.3.55. A 21
2
-player game 〈A, χC〉, where χC : PA → {0, 1} is the
characteristic function of a set C⊆PA, is called a 2
1
2
-player parity game if C=WPr
for some parity assignment Pr for A.
Lemma 2.3.56. Let 〈A,WPr〉 be a 2
1
2
-player parity game, where WPr is the
winning set induced by the parity assignment Pr for A. Then the set WPr is a
∆03 set, hence a Borel set.
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Proof. See e.g. [21].
In particular, parity winning sets are closed under complementation.
Proposition 2.3.57. Let Pr : S→N be a parity assignment on some 21
2
-player
game arena A = 〈(S,E), (S1, S2, SN), π〉 and let ¬Pr be the parity assignment
defined as ¬Pr(s)=Pr(s) + 1. Then the following assertions hold:
1. min(¬Pr)=min(Pr) + 1,
2. max(¬Pr) = max(Pr) + 1,
3. |Pr |= |¬Pr |,
4. W¬Pr =WPr.
As a corollary of Theorem 2.3.51 we have that every 21
2
-player (stochastic)
parity game is determined under deterministic strategies. Moreover the following
stronger theorem holds.
Theorem 2.3.58 (Positional Determinacy). If G is a (possibly infinite) 2-player
(non-stochastic) parity game or a finite 21
2
-player parity game, then Player 1 and
Player 2 have optimal positional strategies (see Definition 2.3.45).
Proof. For a proof of positional determinacy for (possibly infinite) 2-player parity
games see, e.g., [116]. For a proof of positional determinacy for finite 21
2
-player
parity games see, e.g., [117].
Two player (stochastic) parity games received in the past twenty years a lot
of attention for their theoretical as well as practical interest [21, 106, 116, 117].
Moreover, as we shall see in the next section, they provide a game-theoretical
semantics for the modal µ-calculus Lµ. Another important class of winning sets is
given by the so-called prefix-independent winning sets, also known as tail winning
sets [43, 47].
Definition 2.3.59 (Prefix independent set). Let A= 〈(S,E), (S1, S2, SN), π〉 be
a 21
2
-player game arena. A set X⊆PA is a prefix independent set if the following
property holds: if ~s = ~t.~r is a completed path in PA then, ~r ∈X if and only if
~s∈X .
Lemma 2.3.60. If X ⊆ PA is a prefix independent set, then also X is prefix
independent.
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It is immediate to verify that every parity set WPr is a prefix independent set.
Proposition 2.3.61. Let A be a 21
2
-player game arena and Pr a parity assign-
ment for it. The winning set WPr is prefix independent.
Prefix independent sets include many other interesting classes of winning sets.
For instance natural generalizations of the notion of parity set, considering parity
assignments having infinite (rather than finite) range, lead to interesting prefix
independent sets (see e.g. [47]). We remark that prefix independent sets can
be complicated objects. See, e.g., [13] for an example of prefix independent set




This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.1 we provide the necessary
background on temporal logics from Labeled Transition Systems (LTS’s), and in
particular we consider Computation Tree Logic (CTL) and the modal µ-calculus
(Lµ). In Section 3.2 we turn our attention to temporal logics from expressing
properties of Probabilistic Labeled Transition Systems (PLTS’s). We consider
Probabilistic CTL (PCTL) and the probabilistic modal µ-calculus (pLµ). We
define the game and denotational semantics of pLµ as specified in [78], and discuss
a few examples of interesting properties expressed by pLµ formulas. In Section
3.3 we introduce the logic pLµ⊙⊕, the strongest probabilistic logic considered in
this thesis, obtained by extending pLµ with additional connectives. We motivate
our interest for this rich logic by discussing the expressive power of some of
its fragments in terms of the ability to encode useful operators, such as the
qualitative and quantitative modalities. We conclude Section 3.3 by discussing,
informally, the intuitions which will lead us towards the definition of appropriate
game semantics for each of the proposed µ-calculi. Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 are
devoted to the formalization and mathematical development of these ideas.
3.1 Temporal logics
The term temporal logic has been broadly used, during the 20th century, to cover
all approaches to the representation of temporal information within a logical
framework. Of particular interest for our discussion is the so-called modal ap-
proach to temporal logics which dates back to the seminal work of Arthur Prior
[98]. In this approach standard classical (propositional) logic is extended with
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modalities which express temporal statements. After the seminal work of Amir
Pnueli [97], the modal style of temporal logic has found extensive application
in the area of Computer Science concerned with the specification and verifica-
tion of programs, especially concurrent programs in which the computation is
performed by two or more components working in parallel. Programs are rep-
resented by Kripke-structures (or transition systems) which describe the global
state on which they are executed and the way they change. Temporal (modal)
logics can then express properties of programs such as: “in the next state φ
holds”, “in every reachable state, φ holds”, “there is a reachable state on which
φ holds”, etcetera.
During the 70–80’s the theory of process-calculi was being developed, most
notably by Robin Milner [79]. An essential component of this line of work was
the use of labeled Kripke structures, also known as labeled transition systems or
LTS for short, as models for concurrent programs. The labels, which decorate
the transitions of a LTS, describe the type of such transitions, and can be used
to model several aspects of reactive systems, such as interactions occurring on
named-channels, message-passing, actions, etcetera. In [52], Robin Milner and
Matthew Hennessy introduced a primitive modal logic in which the modalities
directly refer to the labels. This logic is today very well known as the Hennessy-
Milner (HML) logic. One of the key aspect of HML is that its induced logical
equivalence coincides1 with the important notion of behavioral equivalence given
by bisimilarity [79]. Thus HML can express enough properties to distinguish
processes that are not behavioral equivalent, and at the same time no HML
formula can distinguish between bisimilar processes. Even though, thanks to this
correspondence, the logic HML is theoretically very interesting, it is not possible
to express, within this minimal modal logic, interesting properties such as liveness
and safety of programs.
In 1983, Dexter Kozen introduced in [62] a logic combining the simple modal-
ities of HML together with fixed-point operators, to provide a form of recursion.
This logic, known as the modal µ-calculus (Lµ), has since then been widely stud-
ied. The modal µ-calculus has a simple syntax and an easily given denotational
semantics, and yet it has a great expressive power. Indeed, most of nowadays
popular temporal logics can be seen as proper fragments of Lµ. This is under-
1The coincidence holds when finite-branching LTS’s are considered. Alternatively, without
restricting the class of transition systems, the equivalence holds consider an infinitary version
of the logic HML.
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lined by the fact that every formula of monadic second order logic over LTS which
does not distinguish between bisimilar models is equivalent to a Lµ formula [58].
An important result in the theory of the modal µ-calculus was obtained in [32] by
E. A. Emerson and C. S. Jutla. They introduced an alternative semantics for Lµ
based on 2-player parity games (see Definition 2.3.55). Providing semantics to
logics in terms of logical games dates back at least to the seminal work of Jaakko
Hintikka [55] and his 2-player game semantics for first order classical logic. Game
semantics for logics, especially temporal logics for program verification (of which
Lµ is an important example), proved to be very useful. Not only do they pro-
vide a different way of thinking about the meaning of formulas, but they suggest
methods for proving interesting results. An important example is the celebrated
theorem of Igor Walukiewicz [114] which establishes the completeness of a de-
ductive system for deriving valid Lµ-formulas using game-based methods. Game
semantics also turned out to be very helpful in designing algorithms for Model
Checking, i.e., for verifying automatically if a given (finitely presentable) model
satisfies a given formula.
The rest of this section is organized as follows: we first introduce the notion of
labeled transition system (LTS) and the syntax and denotational semantics of the
modal µ-calculus (Lµ); then we discuss the game semantics for Lµ of Emerson and
Jutla; lastly we discuss another important temporal logic, computation tree logic
(CTL), and we briefly discuss how CTL can be seen as a proper fragment of Lµ.
This introduction, given the immense literature covering the topic of temporal
logics for verification and the modal µ-calculus, is necessarily very limited. We
suggest [106] and [18] for two extensive introductions to these topics.
3.1.1 Labeled Transition Systems and Modal µ-calculus
We start by defining the notion of labeled transition system (LTS), which is a
mathematical structure often used to model concurrent programs and systems
[79, 95].
Definition 3.1.1. A labeled transition systems, or a LTS for short, is a pair
L = 〈P, {
a
−→}a∈L〉, where P is a set of process states, L is a set of labels, and
the relation
a
−→ ⊆ P ×P is called the a-transition relation, for every a∈L. We
write p
a
−→ q for (p, q) ∈
a
−→. For p, q ∈ P , we say that q is a a-successor of p
if p
a
−→ q. We write p 6
a
−→ if the set of a-successors of p is empty. A labeled
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transition system L is called finite-branching if for every a∈L and p∈P , the set
of a-successors of p is a finite set.
The intended interpretation of a LTS L= 〈P, {
a
−→}a∈L〉 is the following: the
process states p ∈ P represent the possible configurations of the system; at a
process state p, the system can react to an a-action, for a ∈ L, by changing its
state to a process q with p
a
−→ q. In case p has several a-successors, the choice of
which one is reached as a consequence of the a-action is non-deterministic, i.e., not
predictable. Furthermore, if p 6
a
−→, the system gets stuck, or does not respond,
to the a-action. Often the metaphor given by the idea of reacting to an a-action,
is replaced with similar ones, such as: performing an a-action, synchronizing
through the a-channel, etcetera.
We now introduce the syntax of the modal µ-calculus Lµ.
Definition 3.1.2 (Syntax of Lµ). Given a countable set V of variables, the
syntax of the modal µ-calculus formulas is generated by the following context-
free grammar:
F,G ::= X | F ∨G | F ∧G | 〈a〉G | [a]G | µX.F | νX.F
where X ranges over the set V of variables, and a over a fixed set L of labels.
The variable X is bound in µX.F and in νX.F by the fixed point operators µ
and ν. Given an Lµ formula we denote with free(F ) and bound(F ) the sets of
free and bound variables in F defined as usual. We say that an Lµ formula F is
closed if free(F ) = ∅. Adopting standard terminology, we say that two formulas
are α-equivalent, if they are identical up-to renaming of the bound variables.
It is going to be useful to formally define the set of subformulas of a given Lµ
formula.
Definition 3.1.3. The set Sub(F ) of subformulas of a Lµ formula F is defined
by case analysis on F as follow:
Sub(X) = {X}
Sub(F ∨G) = {F ∨G} ∪ Sub(F ) ∪ Sub(G)
Sub(F ∧G) = {F ∧G} ∪ Sub(F ) ∪ Sub(G)
Sub(〈a〉F ) = {〈a〉F} ∪ Sub(F )
Sub([a]F ) = {[a]F} ∪ Sub(F )
Sub(µX.F ) = {µX.F} ∪ Sub(F )
Sub(νX.F ) = {νX.F} ∪ Sub(F )
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A useful syntactical convention consists in restricting our attention to normal
Lµ formulas [106].
Definition 3.1.4 ([106]). A Lµ formula F is normal provided that:
1. If σ1X1.G1 and σ2X2.G2 are distinct sub-formulas of F , for σ1, σ2∈{µ, ν},
then X1 6= X2, and
2. no occurrence of a free variable X is also used in a binder µX or νX in F .
Clearly every Lµ formula can be converted into a α-equivalent normal for-
mula by renaming the bound variables. Working with normal formulas, beside
improving readability, allows us to give the following definition in a simple and
direct way.
Definition 3.1.5 (Variable Subsumption [106]). Given a normal Lµ formula F ,
we say that the variable X subsumes Y in F if:
1. σ1X.G, σ2Y.H ∈ Sub(F ) for σ1, σ2 ∈ {µ, ν}, i.e., both variables appears
bound in F , and
2. σ2Y.H ∈Sub(σ1X.G), i.e., the sub-formula bounded by σ2Y appears in the
scope of the σ1X binder.
The following proposition follows immediately [106].
Proposition 3.1.6. The subsumption relation is a partial order, i.e.,
1. X subsumes X,
2. if X subsumes Z and Z subsumes Y , then X subsumes Y ,
3. if X subsumes Y and X 6= Y , then Y does not subsumes X.
Modal µ-calculus formulas are interpreted over a LTS L= 〈P, {
a
−→}a∈L〉 and
their semantics is a predicate specifying which process states satisfy the given
formula, i.e., a map in the function space {0, 1}P (simply denoted simply as 2P )
assigning to each process state a boolean value in the complete lattice 0⊑1. The
space 2P forms a complete lattice lifting the order on {0, 1} to 2P pointwise.
The denotational semantics is specified compositionally by induction on the
structure of Lµ formulas. In order to do this, we first define the notion of inter-
pretation of the variables.
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Definition 3.1.7. Given a LTS L= 〈P, {
a
−→}a∈L〉, an interpretation of the Lµ
variables V in L is a map ρ :V→2P . Given an interpretation ρ∈ (V→2P ) and a
predicate f ∈2P , we denote with ρ[f/X ], for X∈V, the interpretation defined as
follows:
ρ[f/X ](Y ) ==
{
ρ(Y ) if X 6= Y
f if X = Y
We are now ready to define the denotational semantics of the modal µ-calculus.
Definition 3.1.8. Given a LTS L= 〈P, {
a
−→}a∈L〉, an interpretation ρ∈V→2P
and a Lµ formula F , we define the denotational semantics of F over L as the
map JF KLρ ∈2P , defined by case analysis on F as follows:
JXKLρ (p) = ρ(X)(p)
JG ∨HKLρ (p) = JGKLρ (p) ⊔ JHKLρ (p)





















Note that this is a good definition since the space 2P is a complete lattice and
every Lµ connective is interpreted as a monotone operator. Hence least and
greatest fixed points exist by the Knaster-Tarski theorem. We say that a process
state p∈P is satisfied by the formula F under the interpretation ρ if JF KLρ (p)=1.
We often omit the superscript L in JF KLρ if the LTS L is clear from the context.
The denotational semantics defined above is often presented in a slightly more
readable way, namely looking at 2P as the (isomorphic) set of all subsets of P
ordered by inclusion. Thus one can replace the lattice-operations of meet and
join with the more familiar set-theoretic intersection and union. We opted for the
predicate-inclined presentation of the denotational semantics of Lµ for uniformity
with the way we will discuss the denotational semantics of probabilistic modal
µ-calculi in later sections.
We presented the syntax of Lµ in positive-form, i.e., without including a
negation operator explicitly, in order to simplify the definition of the denotational
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semantics. However a negation operator can be defined by induction of the syntax
of Lµ in a straightforward way, exploiting the dualities between the operators 〈a〉,
∨, (µX.) and [a], ∧, (νX.).
Definition 3.1.9. Given a closed Lµ formula F , we define its dual formula F by
induction on the structure of F as follows:
X = X
F ∨G = F ∧G F ∧G = F ∨G
〈a〉F = [a]F [a]F = 〈a〉F
µX.F = νX.F [X/X ] νX.F = µX.F [X/X ],
where F [X/X ] denotes the Lµ formula F where all occurrences of the (free)
variable X are replaced by X.
Proposition 3.1.10. Given a LTS L, an interpretation ρ and a closed Lµ-
formula F , the following assertion holds: JF KLρ (p)=1 if and only if JF KLρ (p)=0,
for every process state p in L.
Proof. See e.g. [106, §4.6].
3.1.2 Game semantics for Lµ
In this subsection we discuss the game semantics of the modal µ-calculus, which
is given in terms of 2-player parity games, introduced by Emerson and Jutla in
[32]. The main idea is that in order to specify the semantics of a Lµ formula over
an LTS L= 〈P, {
a
−→}a∈L〉 under an interpretation ρ, one adopts game-theoretic
rather than lattice and fixed-point methods: the formula F holds at the process
state p under the interpretation ρ if Player 1 has a winning strategy in a 2-player
parity game G(F, ρ) which is constructed in a canonical way from L, ρ and F .
Otherwise, by the determinacy of 2-player parity games (see Section 2.3.4.1),
Player 2 has a winning strategy and the formula F does not hold at p. The
logical game G(F, ρ) has the set of pairs 〈p,G〉∈P×Sub(F ) as game states and
is played as follows:
• If the current game state is 〈p,X〉, with X∈ free(F ) then the game ends in
favor of Player 1 if ρ(X)(p)=1, and in favor of Player 2 otherwise.
• If the current game state is 〈p,G ∨ H〉, then Player 1 can move either to
the state 〈p,G〉 or to 〈p,H〉.
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• If the current game state is 〈p,G ∧ H〉, then Player 2 can move either to
the state 〈p,G〉 or to 〈p,H〉.
• If the current game state is 〈p, 〈a〉G〉, then Player 1 can move to any state
〈q, G〉, with p
a
−→ q; if p 6
a
−→, then Player 1 gets stuck and the game ends
in favor of Player 2.
• If the current game state is 〈p, [a]G〉, then Player 2 can move to any state
〈q, G〉, with p
a
−→ q; if p 6
a
−→, then Player 2 gets stuck and the game ends
in favor of Player 1.
• If the current game state is 〈p, µX.G〉 or 〈p, νX.G〉, then the game auto-
matically progresses to the state 〈p,G〉.
• If the current game state is 〈p,X〉, with X ∈ bound(F ), then the game
automatically progresses to the state 〈p,G〉, where σX.G is the (unique
since F is normal) sub-formula binding X in F , for σ∈{µ, ν}.
A play of the game G(F, ρ) can either end in a finite time in favor of Player 1 or
Player 2 (if the play reaches a state 〈p,X〉, with X∈ free(F ), or a state 〈p, 〈a〉G〉
or 〈p, [a]G〉, with p 6
a
−→) or can last an infinite number of steps. In the latter case
it is easily verified that the infinite sequence {〈pn, Gn〉}n∈N of visited game states
is such that for infinitely many m∈N, it holds that Gm∈bound(F ). Moreover it
is easy to prove the following lemma [106, page 139]:
Lemma 3.1.11. If {〈pn, Gn〉}n∈N is an infinite length play in G(F, ρ) then there
is a unique variable X∈bound(F ) such that:
1. occurs infinitely often, that is for infinitely many m∈N, X=Gm, and
2. if Y also occurs infinitely often, then X subsumes Y in F .
The variable X is called the dominant variable of the play {〈pn, Gn〉}n∈N.
An infinite play {〈pn, Gn〉}n∈N in G(F, ρ) is won by Player 1 if the dominant
variable X is bound in F by a greatest fixed point operator (νX.), and is won by
Player 2 otherwise, i.e., if X is bound in F by a least fixed point operator (µX.).
The above described winning criterion for the game G(F, ρ) can be formalized
as the parity winning set (see Definition 2.3.54) induced by any parity assignment
Pr :
(
P × Sub(F )
)
→N satisfying the following specification:
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1. If X is a free variable in F then every game state s of the form 〈p,X〉 is
terminal. We then define Pr(s)=ρ(X)(p). By Definition 2.3.54, this implies
that Player 1 wins (loses) when the game reaches states of the form 〈p,X〉
with ρ(X)(p)=1 (ρ(X)(p)=0).
2. If s is a terminal game state of the form 〈p, 〈a〉G〉 then Pr(s)=0 and if s of
the form 〈p, [a]G〉 then Pr(s) = 1. This formalize the idea that the player
who gets stuck choosing a transition loses.
3. Let α : bound(F ) → N an assignment of natural numbers to the variables
bound in F such that: α(X) is odd if X is bound in F by a least fixed point
operator (µX.), α(X) is even if X is bound in F by a greatest fixed point
operator (νX.) and α(X)>α(Y ) if X subsumes Y in F . We then specify
the priority assigned to game states of the form 〈p,X〉, with X∈bound(F ),
as follows: Pr(〈p,X〉)=α(X).
4. Pr(s)=0, for all other game states s∈
(
P × Sub(F )
)
.
It is simple to verify that the parity winning set formally defined as above coin-
cides with the winning criterion of the G(F, ρ), discussed earlier. Thus G(F, ρ) is
a 2-player parity game.
We are now ready to formally define the game semantics of a Lµ formula.
Definition 3.1.12. Given a LTS L=〈P, {
a
−→}a∈L〉, an interpretation ρ∈V→2P
and a Lµ formula F , we define the game semantics of F over L as the map
LF MLρ ∈2P , defined as follows:




i.e., LF MLρ (p) = 1 if and only if Player 1 has a winning strategy in the 2-player
parity game G(F, ρ).
The following fundamental theorem, which establishes the equivalence of the
denotational and game semantics of Lµ, was proved in [32]. We also point to
[106] for a detailed exposition.
Theorem 3.1.13. Given a LTS L=〈P, {
a
−→}a∈L〉, an interpretation ρ∈V→2P
and a Lµ formula F , the following equality holds: JF KLρ = LF MLρ .
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The result of Theorem 3.1.13 allows us to switch freely between denotational
and game semantics, thus adopting the most suitable viewpoint depending on the
context. The denotational semantics is often more suitable, for example, when
one want to reason algebraically about the logic Lµ. On the other hand, the use
of game semantics is often considered convenient for grasping the meaning of a Lµ
formula F by trying to understand it in terms of the dynamics of the game G(F, ρ).
Indeed the game semantics offers an operational (or dynamic) interpretation for
the meaning of Lµ formulas, which can be summarized as follows:
• The formula X holds at p if and only if ρ(X)(p)=1.
• The formula G∨H holds at p if and only if either G holds at p or H holds
at q: this because in the game G(G ∨ H, ρ) Player 1 can choose to move
either to 〈p,G〉 or to 〈p,H〉, from which the rest of the game continues as
in G(G, ρ) or G(H, ρ) respectively.
• Similarly, the formula G ∧ H holds at p if and only if either G holds at
p and H holds at q: this because in the game G(G ∧ H, ρ) Player 2 can
choose to move either to 〈p,G〉 or to 〈p,H〉, from which the rest of the
game continues as in G(G, ρ) or G(H, ρ) respectively. Thus Player 1 can
win the game G(G ∧H, ρ) if and only if they can win in both sub-games.
• With a similar argument, the formula 〈a〉G holds at p if and only if G holds
at q, for some process state q such that p
a
−→ q. In particular if p 6
a
−→ then
〈a〉G does not hold at p.
• Similarly, the formula [a]G holds at p if and only if G holds at q, for all
process state q such that p
a
−→ q. Thus if p 6
a
−→ then [a]G holds at p.
• The formula µX.G holds at p, if G holds at p by unfolding the recursive
definition of G(X) finitely many times. Indeed if in the game G(µX.G),
states of the form 〈q,X〉, for q∈P , are visited infinitely often, then Player
1 loses because Pr(〈q,X〉) is odd by definition and X is the outermost
variable.
• The formula νX.G holds at p, if G holds at p by unfolding the recursive
definition of G(X) possibly infinitely many times. Indeed if in the game
G(µX.G), states of the form 〈q,X〉, for q ∈ P , are visited infinitely often,
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the Player 1 wins because Pr(〈q,X〉) is even by definition and X is the
outermost variable.
In particular the last two points, which provides an operational interpretation
for the meaning of the fixed point constructors, are often useful when tyring to
understand the meaning of complicated formulas with several nested fixed point
operators, and provide some formal support to the well known slogan: “ν means
looping and µ means finite looping”[18].
3.1.3 Computation Tree Logic
Computation Tree Logic (CTL), introduced by Clarke, Emerson and Sistla in
[23], is one of the most studied temporal logics for the specification of properties
of programs [18, 106], and provides the basis for several variants and enrichments,
such as CTL∗[33] and ECTL[109]. In this section, following the presentation of
[106], we formally introduce CTL and we discuss its encoding into the modal
µ-calculus.
A central notion, which is at the basis of the logic CTL, is that of run, also
known as trace, execution or simply path, in a label transition system which is
usually assumed2 to have just one label denoted by the • symbol.
Definition 3.1.14. Let L= 〈P, {
•
−→}〉 be a labeled transition system with just
one label. A run ~r in L is completed path in L (see Definition 2.1.33), i.e., a finite







−→ p3 . . .
with pn ∈ P for n ∈ N, of maximal length. This means that, if a run has finite
length then its final process pn is unable to perform a transition (i.e., p 6
•
−→),
because otherwise, the sequence would be extended. We denote with Run(p), for
p∈P , the set of runs in L having p as first state.
The notion of run in L captures the idea of a possibly infinite computation,
seen as a sequence of actions (described by the unique label •) which induce
changes in the states (the process states) of the system. The syntax of CTL is
specified by a two sorted grammar: state-formulas describe properties of process
2The logic CTL, although originally defined on Kripke structures[23] (i.e., LTS’s with just
one label), can be defined on general labeled transition systems as well, see e.g. [90].
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states (and are interpreted, as for Lµ-formulas, as predicates over process states)
and path-formulas describe properties of runs. The combined use of these two
kind of expressions allow the formulation of numerous properties of systems.
Definition 3.1.15. The syntax of CTL is defined by the following context-free
grammars:
state-formulas: F,G ::= X | tt | F ∨G | ¬F | ∃φ
path-formulas: φ, ψ ::= ◦F | F U G | A F ,
where X range over a countable set V of variables.
The state-formula variables V are often ranged over by the letters P , Q in
the literature (see, e.g., [23, 33]), as they are interpreted as atomic predicates
over states. We opted for the letters X , Y for uniformity with the syntax of Lµ
formulas. The semantics of state-formulas is given as a predicate over states, i.e.,
as maps in 2P , where the boolean connectives are interpreted as usual, and the
new formula ∃φ holds at a state p if there exists a run ~r ∈ Run(p) such that ~r
satisfies the path-formula φ. A run ~r∈Run(p) satisfies ◦F , if ~r has at least length
two and its second state satisfies F ; the run ~r satisfies F U G if at some state
pn∈~r the formula G holds, and all previous states p0, . . . , pn−1 satisfy F ; lastly,
~r satisfies AF if all of its process states (of which there are finitely many if ~r
is finite) satisfy F . The path operators ◦, U and A are respectively called next,
until and always (sometimes denoted by the letter G rather than A).
Definition 3.1.16 (Semantics of CTL). Given an LTS L = 〈P,
•
−→〉 with one
label, an interpretation ρ∈V→2P of the variables into L and a CTL formula F ,
we define the semantics ‖F‖Lρ ∈ 2
P of F by induction on the structure of F as
follows:
‖X‖Lρ (p) = ρ(X)(p)
‖tt‖Lρ (p) = 1
‖G ∨H‖Lρ (p) = ‖G‖
L





1 if ‖G‖Lρ (p)=0





where ‖φ‖Lρ (~r) is defined by case analysis on φ as follows:





−→ p1 . . . , and ‖F‖
L
ρ (p1) = 1
0 otherwise











−→ p2 . . . and ∃i ≥ 0 such that:














As anticipated earlier, we will now discuss how to encode CTL formulas as
Lµ formulas. To do so it is convenient to assume that for each variable X in the
countable set V, there is a dual variable X, such that for every interpretation
ρ ∈ V → 2P into some LTS L, ρ(X)(p) = 1 if and only if ρ(X)(p) = 0, for every
process state p ∈ P . It is then natural to extend the negation operator (see
Definition 3.1.9) to open Lµ formulas by defining (X) =X . It is clear that with
this convention, the property expressed by Proposition 3.1.10 holds for arbitrary
open formulas.
Definition 3.1.17. We define the encoding E from CTL formulas to Lµ formulas,
by induction on the structure of the CTL formula F as follows:
1. E(X) = X ,
2. E(tt) = νX.X ,
3. E(F ∨G) = E(F ) ∨ E(G),
4. E(¬F ) = E(F ),
5. E(∃(◦F )) = 〈•〉E(F ),
















The soundness of the encoding is formalized by the following standard result:
Proposition 3.1.18. Given a LTS L=〈P,
•
−→〉 with one label, an interpretation
ρ∈V→2P of the variables into L, and a CTL formula F , the following equality
holds: ‖F‖Lρ = JE(F )KLρ .
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We refer to, e.g., [18] for a detailed explanation of the encoding. We mention
that Proposition 3.1.18 can be proved in a straightforward way by using the game
semantics of Lµ: it is easy to translate, in both directions, between the properties
of paths described by CTL path formulas and winning strategies in the games
associated with Lµ formulas.
3.2 Probabilistic temporal logics
3.2.1 Probabilistic Labeled Transition Systems
Labeled transition systems allow the description of systems in a qualitative way,
i.e., not considering quantitative details such as: time, probabilistic behavior,
quantities such as energy-level or temperature, etcetera. However these quantita-
tive aspects of reactive systems are often too important to be ignored. For exam-
ple it is often desirable to consider systems that must respond in a fixed amout of
time or, similarly, that must respond, with a high probability, in a small amount
of time. Moreover some problems arising in concurrent systems (such as, e.g,
the dining philosophers synchronization problem [77]), require probabilistic pro-
cedures for a correct solution, which can not be modeled within ordinary labeled
transition systems.
Since the beginning of the 90’s, a lot of research has focused on the iden-
tification of appropriate generalizations of the notion of LTS, with the goal of
modeling quantitative aspects of concurrent computations. In particular, the
problem of modeling probabilistic behaviors has received a lot of interest. Models
of purely probabilistic system evolving during time, such as stochastic processes
and Markov chains, have been intensively studied in probability theory since the
50’s. However models of concurrent probabilistic systems must also crucially
be able to represent the non-deterministic behaviors induced, for instance, by
the unpredictable process-interleaving managed by a scheduler. One of the first
models designed to describe probabilistic and non-deterministic aspects of com-
putations was introduced by K. G. Larsen and A. Skou [67], and is today known
as the reactive model [45], also known as Labeled Markov Processes in case that
the state space is not discrete [91]. Alternative models, such as generative and
stratified models, have been subsequently introduced (see, e.g., [45]). In 1995, R.
Segala introduced in his PhD thesis [101] a new model of concurrent probabilistic
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computation. The model, with its slight variations, has been named in the litera-
ture in several ways: Segala systems [6], probabilistic automata [101], concurrent
Markov chains [50] or just probabilistic labeled transition systems (PLTS). In
what follows we will always refer with PLTS to this class of models. Since its in-
troduction, PLTS’s have been successfully adopted as models for formal languages
describing concurrent probabilistic systems, such as the probabilistic π-calculus
[53], probabilistic mobile ambients [66] and the class of PGSOS languages of [6].
We now formally define the class of probabilistic labeled transition systems.
Definition 3.2.1. A probabilistic labeled transition system, or a PLTS for short,
is a pair L=〈P, {
a
−→}a∈L〉, where P is a set of process states, L is a set of labels,
and the relation
a
−→ ⊆ P ×D(P ), where D(P ) is the set of (discrete) probability
distributions over P , is called the a-transition relation, for every a∈L. We write
p
a
−→ d for (p, d) ∈
a
−→. For p∈P and d∈D(P ), we say that d is a a-successor
distribution of p if p
a
−→ d. We write p 6
a
−→ if the set of a-successor distributions
of p is empty. A PTLS L is called finite-branching if for every a∈L and p∈P ,
the set of a-successor distributions of p is a finite set. Similarly we say that a
PLTS is countably branching if for every a∈L and p∈P , the set of a-successor
distributions of p is countable. Lastly, a PLTS is finite if it is finite-branching
and its set of states P is finite.
The intended interpretation of a PLTS L=〈P, {
a
−→}a∈L〉 is the following: the
process states p∈P represent the possible configurations of the system; at a pro-
cess state p, the system can react to an a-action, for a∈L, by changing its state to
a process q according to some nondeterministically chosen probability distribution
d∈D(P ) such that p
a
−→ d. Thus the kind of non-deterministic probabilistic com-
putation modeled by a PLTS consists in a sequence of non-deterministic choices
(induced by a-actions, for a ∈ L) each immediately followed by a correspond-
ing probabilistic choice (induced by the non-deterministically chosen probability
distribution d).
It is clear, under this interpretation, that an LTS can always be seen as a
particular kind of PLTS where for each process state p and each a-successor
distribution d of p, for a∈L, d is a Dirac distribution over P , i.e., the probabilistic
choice associated with d is actually deterministic. More formally, in what follows,
we will adopt the following convention:
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Convention 3.2.2. We automatically refer to a LTS L= 〈P, {
a
−→1}a∈L〉 as the
corresponding PLTS L= 〈P, {
a
−→2}a∈L〉 defined as follows: p
a
−→1 q if and only
if p
a
−→2 δq, where δq is the unique probability distribution with supp(δq) ={q},
for q∈P . Thus PLTS’s constitute a generalization of standard LTS’s.
An important consequence of modeling, within a PLTS L = 〈P, {
a
−→}a∈L〉,
the probabilistic choices as probability distributions d∈D is that we necessarily
restrict such choices to countable ones. More general choices could be modeled
by working instead with an appropriate generalization of the notion of PLTS,
where the process state space is a (possibly uncountable) measurable-set, and the
a-successors elements are probability measures rather than discrete probability
distributions. Such generalizations, however, introduce significant complications
by involving in a crucial way notions from measure theory. We refer to [91] for
a detailed exposition of a generalization in this direction of the reactive model of
[67].
In this thesis we restrict to the sort of countable probabilistic behaviors which
can be modeled with PLTS’s. Moreover, for uniformity and technical convenience,
we restrict our attention to countably branching PLTS’s, i.e., those having at most
countable non-deterministic choices, having a countable state-space. This class
of models is arguably sufficient for modeling most of the kind of systems arising
in Computer Science. Indeed program-states are generally thought as consisting
of a finite piece of program-code and a finite portion of memory or data. However
further research, following the lines of [91], towards generalizations of the notion
of PLTS modeling uncountable choices, is very likely to be at least useful in order
to model system arising, for instance, from biology and physics.
Assumption 3.2.3. In the rest of the thesis, a PLTS L = 〈P, {
a
−→}a∈L〉 is as-
sumed to have a countable set P of process states, a countable set L of la-






−→ d} to which we refer to as the set of probability distributions
in L.
3Note that there exist PLTS’s with a countable set of process-states which are not countably
branching. This is due to the fact that, when |P |≥2, D(P ) is uncountable.
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3.2.2 Probabilistic CTL
Temporal logics for specification of properties of concurrent programs formalized
as standard LTS’s, such as CTL or Lµ, had become, by the end of the ’80s, one of
the most successful formal methods for the verification of software, with impor-
tant real-world applications [4, 24], as well as a flourishing research community
working on the field. Therefore, with the goal of extending these techniques,
the research community started investigating logics for expressing properties of
probabilistic concurrent programs formalized as PLTS’s. One of the first such
logics, introduced by H. Hansson in [50] and by A. Bianco and L. De Alfaro in
[9], is a probabilistic generalization of CTL and is today well known as Proba-
bilistic CTL, or PCTL for short. The logic PCTL, together with its extensions
(e.g., PCTL∗ [9]), still constitutes nowadays one of the most popular and well
understood logics for probabilistic concurrent programs, with several real-world
applications (see, e.g., the project PRISM [65]).
Following the tradition of CTL, the logic PCTL is interpreted over PLTS’s
having only one label, i.e., with L={•}.
Observation 3.2.4. It is possible to look at a PLTS L=〈P,
•
−→〉 as a countable
graph G(L) =
(
P ∪ D(L), E
)
by defining (p, d) ∈ E if and only if p
a
−→ d and
(d, p)∈E if and only if p∈ supp(d), where the edge connecting d with p can be
thought as labeled with the the probability d(p).
As for CTL (see Section 3.1.3), a key concept at the basis of PCTL is that of
run in a PLTS. The following definition of run in a PLTS is very similar to the
corresponding notion for standard LTS’s.
Definition 3.2.5. Let L = 〈P, {
•
−→}〉 be a PLTS with just one label. A run
~r in L is completed path (see Definition 2.1.33) in L (seen as the corresponding
graph), i.e., a finite or infinite sequence of transitions
p0
•
−→ d1  p1
•
−→ d2  p2
•
−→ d3  p3 . . .
with pn
•
−→ dn+1 and pn+1∈supp(dn+1), for n∈N, of maximal length. We denote
with Run(p), for p∈P , the set of runs in L having p as first state, and with Run
the set of all runs in L. The set Run is endowed with a Polish 0-dimensional
topology defined as in 2.1.33.
In analogy with the definition for LTS’s, the notion of run in a PLTS L
captures the idea of a possibly infinite computation, seen as a sequence of actions
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(described by the unique label •), leading to probabilistic choices (described by
the chosen probability distributions) which lead to possible (in the sense of having
probability of being reached greater than zero) successor states.
However, when working with PLTS’s, another useful concept is necessary to
interpret the probabilistic behavior induced by the random choices following each
action-step. This leads to the notion of Markov run (also frequently called Markov
chain) in a PLTS. A Markov run in a PLTS L can be understood as an ordinary
run up-to the result of the stochastic choices.
Definition 3.2.6 (Markov run). Let L = 〈P, {
•
−→}〉 be a PLTS with just one





2.1.35) uniquely branching in P and fully branching in D(L), in the sense of
Definition 2.1.36.
Every Markov run induces a probability measure over runs.
Definition 3.2.7 (Probability measure P(M)). Every Markov run M determines
a probability assignment PM(O~p) to every basic clopen set O~p ⊆ Run, for ~p =
p0
•
−→ d1  p1
•
−→ d2  p2
•








More informally, PM(O~p) is the multiplication of all probabilities associated with
the random choices necessary for the sequence to have place in the PLTS L. The
assignment PM on basic clopen sets extends to a unique complete probability
measure PM ∈M1(Run).
The value PM(X), for some PM -measurable set X⊆Run, models the proba-
bility that the outcome of the stochastic execution of the PLTS L, formalized as
the Markov run M , is a run in X .
We are now ready to introduce Probabilistic Computation Tree Logic (PCTL).
If CTL can be thought as a logic specifying properties of process states (of a LTS)
in terms of the set of runs, or computations, starting from them, PCTL might be
thought as a logic specifying properties of process states (of a PLTS) in terms of
the set runs, like in CTL, and in terms of the the Markov runs, or probabilistic
computations.
As done for CTL, we specify the syntax of PCTL by a two sorted gram-
mar: state-formulas describe properties of process states (and are interpreted, as
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in standard CTL, as predicates over process states) and path-formulas describe
properties of runs. The novelty introduced in PCTL consists in two new threshold
operators P≥λ and P>λ for state formulas, with λ∈ [0, 1].
Definition 3.2.8. The syntax of the PCTL logic is defined by the following
context-free grammars:
state-formulas: F,G ::= X | tt | F ∨G | ¬F | ∃ψ | P≥λψ | P>λψ
path-formulas: ψ ::= ◦F | F U G | A F ,
where X range over the set V of variables, and λ ∈ [0, 1]. We will refer to the
qualitative PCTL logic, or PCTL{0,1} for short, as the fragment of PCTL where
the allowed threshold modalities in state formulas are P>0 and P=1.
As for CTL, the state-formula variables V are interpreted as atomic predicates
over states. The semantics of state-formulas is given as a predicate over process
states, where the boolean connectives are interpreted as usual and the formula
∃φ, as in CTL, existentially quantifies over runs satisfying the path formula φ.
The important novelty is given by the state formulas P≥λψ and P>λψ. The
PCTL formula P≥λφ holds at a process state p if there exists a Markov play
M ∈MRUN (p) assigning probability greater than λ−ǫ to the set of runs satisfying
the path formula φ, for every ǫ>0. Similarly for P≥λφ. Thus the formulas P≥λψ
and P>λψ are satisfied at a state p if, under an angelic interpretation of the non-
determinism modeled in a PLTS L, the (limit) probability associated with runs
satisfying φ is greater (or equal) than a given threshold. The meaning of the path
formulas operators next, until and always can be understood as in CTL.
We are now ready to formally define the semantics of PCTL.
Definition 3.2.9 (Semantics of PCTL [9]). Given a PLTS L=〈P,
•
−→〉 with one
label, an interpretation ρ∈V → 2P of the variables and a PCTL formula F , we
define the semantics ‖F‖Lρ ∈2
P of F by induction on the structure of F as follows:
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‖X‖Lρ (p) = ρ(X)(p)
‖tt‖Lρ (p) = 1
‖G ∨H‖Lρ (p) = ‖G‖
L





1 if ‖G‖Lρ (p)=0













































−→ d0  p1 . . . , and ‖F‖
L
ρ (p1) = 1
0 otherwise









−→ d0  p1 . . . and ∃i ≥ 0 such that:












It should be noted that the semantic interpretation of the state formulas P≥λφ
and P>λφ is well defined if and only if the set {~r | ‖ψ‖
L
ρ (~r)=1} is PM -measurable
for every path-formula ψ and Markov run M . It is easy to verify that any such
set is in fact Borel, hence universally measurable. We refer to, e.g., [50, 9] for a
detailed proof.
3.2.3 Probabilistic modal µ-calculus (pLµ)
Due to the success of the modal µ-calculus Lµ as a temporal logic for specifying
properties of LTS’s, researchers quickly started searching for probabilistic gener-
alizations of this logic to express properties of PLTS’s. The power of Lµ comes
from the combination of the very simple Hennessy-Milner (HM) modal logic and
the fixed-point constructors. Thus, researchers focused immediately on the prob-
lem of identifying a probabilistic modal logic having some of the key properties
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of Hennessy-Milner logic. One such logic was immediately identified for the reac-
tive model of Larsen and Skou [67] and subsequently extended to the alternating
model [31], a slight variation of the notion of PLTS4. The formulas are generated
by the following syntax: F ::= tt | F ∧ F | ¬F | 〈a〉≥λF | 〈a〉>λF . Thus the
only difference with the HM-logic is that diamonds formulas are decorated with
an inequality with a threshold value λ ∈ [0, 1]. As for PCTL, the meaning of a
formula, provided a PLTS L= 〈P, {
a
−→}a∈L〉, is given as a predicate over states,
i.e., as a map in 2P . The interpretation of the boolean connectives is the usual
one and the formula 〈a〉>λF holds at p if and only if there exists an a-successor
distribution d, i.e., such that p
a
−→ d, assigning probability greater than λ to the
set of process states satisfying F ; similarly for 〈a〉≥λF . This logic shares some
important properties of Hennessy-Milner logic, and in particular its induced log-
ical equivalence coincide with a notion of bisimulation for the alternating model
[31]. However adding fixed-point operators to this modal logic does not yield a
logic expressive enough to specify properties of interest such as those defined by
PCTL formulas: the main issue is concerned with the fact that expressing prob-
ability constraints locally (in the modalities) does not allow the expression of
interesting global properties, concerning probabilistic computations rather than
single transition steps.
Thus a satisfactory probabilistic logic, based on a theory of fixed points, had
to be found by a different path. An important idea was proposed in 1997 by M.
Huth and M. Kwiatkowska [56] (even if conceived for the reactive model of Larsen
and Skou) and independently by C. Morgan and A. McIver [84]: they introduced
logics whose formulas are not interpreted as predicates (i.e., maps from process
states to the two element set {0, 1}), like in PCTL, but as maps from process
states to the real-unit interval [0, 1]. The intended interpretation is that the
property expressed by a formula holds with some probability at a given state,
and that probability constitutes the semantics of the formula at p. Thus there
is a significant shift in the way formulas must be understood: if in predicate-
based probabilistic logics, such as PCTL, formulas directly express properties
involving probability constraints, and therefore just hold or not hold at a given
process state, in [0, 1]-valued predicate logics, formulas describe properties which
4Although the difference between the alternating model of [31] and PLTS’s is apparently
minimal, and indeed one model can faithfully mimic the other [102], the problem of identifying
a satisfactory minimal HM-style modal logic characterizing bisimilarity [101] for PLTS’s is still
an active area of research. See, e.g., [93] and [54] for recent developments.
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have some probability of being satisfied at a given state, and that probability
constitutes their meaning. The quantitative modal µ-calculus of [84] and [56] is a
probabilistic variant of Lµ based of these ideas. Since the adjective “quantitative”
has been adopted in the literature for other non-probabilistic logics (see, e.g.,
[35]), in this thesis we refer to the logic of [84] as probabilistic modal µ-calculus
(pLµ).
Definition 3.2.10. Given a PLTS 〈P, {
a
−→}a∈L〉 we denote with [0, 1]P the space
of maps from process states to the real interval [0, 1]. In the following we refer5
to elements in [0, 1]P as [0, 1]-predicates or quantitative predicates. The space
[0, 1]P forms a complete lattice by extending the linear order on [0, 1] to [0, 1]P
pointwise. Note that the space 2P is a subspace of [0, 1]P .
We are now ready to introduce the probabilistic modal µ-calculus, as in [84].
Its syntax is the same as the one of Lµ (see Definition 3.1.2). The semantics of
pLµ formulas is defined in a similar way to that of Lµ, using the lattice operations
⊔ and ⊓ defined on the new truth-set [0, 1].
Definition 3.2.11. Given a PLTS L= 〈P, {
a
−→}a∈L〉, a [0, 1]-interpretation ρ∈
V → [0, 1]P of the variables and a pLµ formula F , we define the denotational
semantics of F over L as the map JF KLρ ∈ [0, 1]P , defined by case induction on F
as follows:
JXKLρ (p) = ρ(X)(p)
JG ∨HKLρ (p) = JGKLρ (p) ⊔ JHKLρ (p)

















d(q) · JGKLρ (q)
)
JµX.GKLρ (p) = lfp
(
λf ∈ [0, 1]P .JGKρ[f/X]
)
(p)
JνX.GKLρ (p) = gfp
(
λf ∈ [0, 1]P .JGKρ[f/X]
)
(p)
Note that this is a good definition since the space [0, 1]P is a complete lattice and
every constructor is interpreted as a monotone operator, hence least and greatest
fixed points exist by the Knaster-Tarski theorem. We say that a process state
p ∈ P , under the interpretation ρ, satisfies the formula F with probability λ, if
5Elements in [0, 1]P are also known as fuzzy-sets or fuzzy predicates [49].
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JF KLρ (p)=λ. We often omit the superscript L in JF KLρ if the PLTS L is clear from
the context.
The main novelty in the definition of the semantics of pLµ resides in the
interpretation of the modalities 〈a〉 and [a], for a∈L. The definitions resemble the
corresponding ones for Lµ but, crucially, in PLTS’s transitions lead to probability
distributions over processes, rather than processes. The most natural way to
interpret the meaning of a formula G at a probability distribution d is to consider
the expected probability of the formula G holding at a process q, associated by
the random choice over processes induced with d, and this is formalized by the
weighted sums in the definition above.
As an immediate observation, note that for every LTS L, process state p,
standard interpretation of the variables ρ∈V→2P and formula F , the standard
Lµ-semantics of F at p under ρ and the pLµ semantics of F , interpreted in the
PLTS L′ corresponding to L as discussed earlier (see convention 3.2.2), coincide
at p. In other words when considering non-probabilistic PLTS’s (i.e., LTS’s) and
{0, 1}-valued interpretations of the variables, the logic pLµ collapses to the stan-
dard modal µ-calculus Lµ. Therefore pLµ should be considered as a conservative
[0, 1]-generalization of Lµ, pretty much as the concept of PLTS generalize that of
LTS.
Being a conservative generalization of Lµ is certainly a good property for the
logic pLµ. However there are plenty of other possible definitions for a [0, 1]-valued
interpretation of pLµ formulas. For instance one could modify the definitions for
the connectives ∧ and ∨ given above as follows:
JG ∨HKLρ (p) = JGKLρ (p) ⊙ JHKLρ (p)
JG ∧HKLρ (p) = JGKLρ (p) · JHKLρ (p)
or as follows:
JG ∨HKLρ (p) = JGKLρ (p) ⊕ JHKLρ (p)
JG ∧HKLρ (p) = JGKLρ (p) ⊖ JHKLρ (p)
where the pairs of binary (De Morgan dual) operators · with ⊙, and ⊕ with ⊖,
have been defined in Section 2.2. Since all these operations are monotone the
existence of the fixed points is guaranteed by the Knaster-Tarski theorem, thus
these alternative definitions for the semantics of pLµ formulas are well-specified.
Moreover, when restricted to the space 2P , the operators · and ⊖ collapse to
the meet operation ⊓, and ⊙ and ⊕ to the join operation ⊔. Therefore both
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these alternative versions for the semantics of pLµ formulas constitute conserva-
tive generalizations of Lµ. More generally, there are numerous possible monotone
operators, defined on the real interval [0, 1], which might be considered as quan-
titative-generalizations of the classical conjunction and disjunction operators on
the two element boolean lattice {0, 1}. Such generalizations are well known in
field of fuzzy-logic (see, e.g., [49]), and there is no single operator which can be
considered the right generalization for all purposes. As a matter of fact, in the
paper of M. Huth and M. Kwiatkowska, the authors consider all the three pairs
of operators cited above, and suggest that the most mathematically convenient
(see Footnote 1 in Chapter 1) one for a probabilistic temporal logic might be the
pair ⊕ and ⊖.
Justifying the definition of a probabilistic temporal logic, such as the proba-
bilistic modal µ-calculus, just in terms of “mathematical conveniency” is some-
what unsatisfactory. A probabilistic temporal logic should be able to express
properties of interest, and its [0, 1]-semantics should reflect a clear probabilis-
tic interpretation corresponding to the chance of the property specified by the
formula holding at a given state. Fortunately, as we shall see in the next sub-
section, the logic pLµ, and its semantics specified as in Definition 3.2.11, have a
very strong justification provided by a game-theoretic interpretation of the mean-
ing of formulas in terms of 21
2
-player games. However the logic pLµ, as far as
expressivity is concerned, is not completely satisfactory. For example, it is not
possible to encode PCTL formulas in pLµ, and this is quite a severe limitation
since these are the kind of properties mostly used nowadays (for example in the
model checker PRISM [65]).
The [0, 1]-quantitative approach to (temporal) logics is not, by any means, re-
stricted to probabilistic logics and conceived for expressing properties of PLTS’s.
For example, another Lµ-like logic for expressing properties of quantitative-LTS’s,
labeled transition systems whose transitions are decorated with real values rep-
resenting the cost (for instance in terms of energy, or requested time) associated
with that transition, has been defined in [35] and named quantitative µ-calculus.
Again formulas are interpreted as [0, 1]-predicates6, but unlike for the probabilis-
tic logic discussed in this section, the real value represents, roughly speaking,
the long term cost of a computation satisfying the property expressed by the
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tative approach to temporal logics might find interesting application in describing
properties of hybrid systems [36]. Furthermore, [0, 1]-quantitative analogous of
the notion of bisimulation, capturing how much two process states are similar by
means of a (pseudo-)metric have been defined [28, 91].
The growing interest in quantitative logics unavoidably leads to some con-
fusion induced, for example, by the use of the common adjective quantitative
referring to very different interpretations of the formulas. For this reasons we
adopted the adjective probabilistic, rather than the original quantitative, to refer
to the logic pLµ.
We conclude this section by pointing to another promising direction followed,
for instance, in [93], [54] and [30], for the development of a satisfactory proba-
bilistic temporal logics based on a theory of fixed points. The key idea is to define
the semantics of a formula, given a PLTS L=〈P, {
a
−→}〉, not as a [0, 1]-predicate
over processes but as an ordinary predicate over probability distributions over
processes: a map in the function space D(P ) → {0, 1}. The meaning of a for-
mula at a single process state p can be recovered by looking at the meaning of a
formula at the Dirac probability distribution δp with mass at p. Therefore this
approach, like the [0, 1]-quantitative interpretation, can be considered as a con-
servative generalization of the standard predicate-based approach. In accordance
with [54], one of the main advantages of this approach lies in the fact that the
resulting logics (e.g., the fixed point logic proposed in [30]) characterize the stan-
dard notion of bisimilarity for PLTS, in the sense that two processes are bisimilar
if and only if the satisfy the same formulas. However, a possible drawback is that
the properties of probability distributions expressed by formulas can be hard to
understand as concrete properties of process states. For example the formula
⊕
(
λ : F1, 1−λ : F2
)
is satisfied by a probability distribution d if there exist two
probability distributions d1 and d2 such that di satisfies Fi, for i∈{1, 2}, and d is
the weighted combination of d1 and d2. The two distributions d1 and d2 do not
need to appear in the PLTS, in the sense that they might be not reachable by any
process state p in the PLTS. Therefore, when this kind of formulas are used in
recursive specifications using fixed-point operators, it might become difficult to
grasp the meaning of a formula as a property of process states where, as discussed
above, p can be thought as satisfying F if the Dirac distribution δp satisfies F .
Thus, after more than two decades of research, at least three possible ap-
proaches for the identification of a satisfactory probabilistic temporal logic based
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on a theory of fixed points emerged: the standard predicate based interpretation
(à la PCTL) of formulas, the [0, 1]-quantitative interpretation (à la pLµ) and the
interpretation based on predicates over process distributions just mentioned.
3.2.4 Game semantics for pLµ
As briefly discussed in the previous section, the specification of the denotational
semantics for pLµ is a very delicate matter. Logics whose semantics are given
as ordinary predicates over process states are, provided a mathematically sound
definition, always meaningful because the interpretation of a formula is the set
of all processes satisfying the formula which, as a consequence, describe some
property of PLTS’s. Logics whose semantics is given as a [0, 1]-predicate are, on
the other hand, not necessarily meaningful. What might it mean for a process




, say, if the formula F does not spec-




is not naturally assigned a probabilistic
interpretation? At the very basis of the [0, 1]-predicate approach is the assump-
tion that formulas express properties of PLTS’s and their semantics corresponds,
somehow, to the probability of that property being satisfied at a given process
state. Thus, when specifying the [0, 1]-semantics of a logic like pLµ, providing
a clear description of the intended properties specified by formulas is of great
conceptual importance.
We saw in Section 3.1.2, how 2-player parity games offer a dynamic (or oper-
ational) interpretation for the meaning of standard Lµ formulas: a Lµ formula F
holds at a state p under an interpretation ρ if and only if Player 1 has a winning
strategy in the 2-player parity game G(F, ρ). The game-theoretic machinery cap-
tures the idea of a hostile environment (which makes moves as Player 2) and of a
program-controller (Player 1) which tries to satisfy the desired property (modeled
by the winning condition of the game).
In 2003, C. Morgan and A. McIver, introduced a game semantics for the logic
pLµ in terms of 21
2
-player parity games [78]. The game is played by Player 1 and
Player 2 (as in Lµ games) together with Nature, the third agent modeling proba-
bilistic choices. The novelty in pLµ games is that, on configurations 〈p, 〈a〉G〉 and
〈p, [a]G〉, Player 1 and Player 2 respectively can choose a transition p
a
−→d in the
PLTS and move the game to 〈d,G〉. If no a-transition is available, the player who
gets stuck loses. In the configuration 〈d,G〉, d is a probability distribution (this
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is the key difference between pLµ and Lµ games) and the configuration 〈d,G〉
belongs to Nature, who moves on to the next configuration 〈q, G〉 with probability
d(q).
The rules of the pLµ game G(F, ρ) associated with a pLµ formula F and a
[0, 1]-interpretation for the variables into a PLTS L, can be specified by extending
those for Lµ games, as follows:
• at a configuration 〈p,X〉, with X free in F , the game ends in favor of Player
1 and Player 2 with probability ρ(X)(p) and 1 − ρ(X)(p), respectively.
• at 〈p, 〈a〉G〉, Player 1 chooses to move to one of the configurations in
{〈d, F 〉 | p
a
−→ d〉}; if p 6
a
−→, Player 1 gets stuck and loses.
• at 〈p, [a]G〉, Player 2 chooses to move to one of the configurations in
{〈d, F 〉 | p
a
−→ d〉}; if p 6
a
−→, Player 2 gets stuck and loses.
• at 〈d,G〉, Nature moves to the state 〈q, G〉 with probability d(q).
The parity winning set in pLµ games is defined, as for Lµ-games, as the set of
paths of congurations along which the outermost xed point variable X unfolded
innitely often is bound by a greatest fixed point.
Thus, the game semantics for pLµ is a straightforward generalization of that
for Lµ, where the actions of Nature are used to model the probabilistic choices
corresponding to the probability distributions reachable by transitions in PLTS’s.
Therefore the game semantics offers a clear interpretation for the properties as-
sociated to the formulas, explained in terms of the interactions between the con-
troller (Player 1) and an hostile environment (Player 2) in the context of the
stochastic choices modeled by PLTS’s (Nature).
We are now ready to formally define the game semantics of a pLµ formula.
Definition 3.2.12. Given a PLTS L= 〈P, {
a
−→}a∈L〉, a [0, 1]-interpretation ρ∈
V → [0, 1]P and a formula F , we define the game semantics of F over L as the
map LF MLρ ∈ [0, 1]P , defined as follows:








(see Definition 2.3.50) is the (limit) probability of Player 1
winning the 21
2
-player parity game G(F, ρ).
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The following fundamental theorem, which establishes the equivalence of the
denotational and game semantics of pLµ on finite models, was proved by C.
Morgan and A. McIver in [78].
Theorem 3.2.13 ([78]). Given a finite-branching PLTS L= 〈P, {
a
−→}a∈L〉 with
a finite set of states P , an interpretation ρ∈V → [0, 1]P and a pLµ formula F ,
the following equality holds: JF KLρ =LF MLρ .
Theorem 3.2.13 provides a strong justification for the denotational semantics
of Definition 3.2.11, because it coincides with a game-theoretic interpretation
which is arguably the right, straightforward generalization of the game interpre-
tation of Lµ. Thus one can understand the property expressed by a pLµ formula
as for Lµ, and its meaning as the limit probability of a program-controller of sat-
isfying the property against a hostile environment in the context of stochastic
choices.
However, Theorem 3.2.13, from [78], only applies to finite state finite-branching
PLTS’s. One of the results of this thesis consists in proving the generalization of
Theorem 3.2.13 to arbitrary PLTS’s. We now state the general theorem7 whose
proof will be discussed in Chapter 7 (Theorem 7.1.10).
Theorem 3.2.14. Given an arbitrary PLTS L=〈P, {
a
−→}a∈L〉, an interpretation
ρ∈V→ [0, 1]P and a pLµ formula F , the following equality holds: JF KLρ =LF MLρ .
3.2.5 Examples of pLµ formulas
In this section we consider a few examples of interesting pLµ formulas, and discuss
their meaning using both the denotational and the game semantics, thus taking
advantage of the result of Theorem 3.2.14.















= νX.〈a〉1 ∧ [a]X
7The result was announced at the 7th Workshop on Fixed Points in Computer Science
(FICS) [81]. The proof will appear in [82].
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Figure 3.1: Example of PLTS
5. F5
def
= 〈a〉〈a〉1 ∧ [a] [a] 0.
where we denote with 1 and 0 the formulas νX.X and µX.X respectively.
The properties they express can be explained as in the ordinary µ-calculus Lµ
using the game semantics for pLµ. As discussed earlier, we adopt the metaphor
of a controller (Player 1) who tries to satisfy a logical specification against an
hostile environment (Player 2) in the context of the probabilistic choices (Nature)
modeled in PLTS’s.
The formula F1 expresses the possibility of the controller performing two con-
secutive a-steps. Thus in the PLTS of Figure 3.1, at the state p the formula F1
is satisfied with probability 1
2
, because after the first a-step, which is always pos-
sible, the probability of reaching a state where no a-action is available, namely
the state 0, is 1
2
.
Similarly, the formula F2 expresses the possibility of performing an infinite
sequence of a-actions. In the PLTS of Figure 3.1 the probability of satisfying this
property is clearly 0, as the computation will reach the bad state 0 at some finite
stage almost surely.
The third formula F3 expresses the possibility of reaching some state, by
means of a sequence of b-actions, and from there produce an infinite sequence
of a-actions. Thus the formula F3 at the state p in some PLTS is interpreted
as the limit probability of producing a computation of type b∗aω. Note how the
intended interpretation is significantly different from the following similar, but
meaningless, one: the limit probability of reaching, by means of b-actions, a state
where F2 holds. Indeed, as opposed to PCTL-like logics, in pLµ we do not have
any notion of a formula holding at a given state. The right way to understand the
meaning of pLµ formulas is as the limit probability of the controller (i.e., Player
1) satisfying the property against an adversary environment (i.e., Player 2).
For example the meaning of the formula F4, at a given state p of some PLTS, is
the limit probability of the controller being able to perform an a-action after any
possible sequence of a-actions chosen by an adversary environment. As it is easy
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to see in the context of the PLTS of Figure 3.1, JF K(p)=0, because the adversary
environment can just keep making a-actions until the state 0 is reached, and this
will happen with probability 1, and then ask the controller to satisfy their task,
i.e., making an a-action in a state where this is clearly not possible.
Our last example, expressed as formula F5, is useful to expose an important
point: the logic pLµ is not boolean. Indeed the formula F5, or equivalently F1∧F1,
where F1 denotes the negation of the closed formula F1, is not trivially false (i.e.,
with value 0) at avery state of a PLTS. The interpretation of formula F5 at the
state p of the PLTS of figure 3.1, for instance, is 1
2
. Indeed the probability of
satisfying 〈a〉〈a〉1 is, as discussed in the first example, 1
2
. But also the probability
of satisfying [a] [a] 0, i.e., the probability associated to the possible failure of the
environment in producing two consecutive a-steps, is 1
2
. More generally, when the
value of 〈a〉〈a〉1 is λ, the value of [a] [a] 0 is always 1 − λ, since the two formulas
are dual.
Thus when working with the logic pLµ, one should understand the connectives
∨ and ∧ as expressing the properties take the best of the two and take the worst
of the two respectively, forgetting about the (boolean) algebraic properties often
associated with these operators.
3.3 Extensions of the probabilistic modal µ-calculus
In this Section we define several probabilistic modal µ-calculi, each extending the
base [0, 1]-valued logic pLµ introduced in Section 3.2.3, for expressing properties
of PLTS’s. The presentation is based on the denotational semantics of these
logics. Thus the meaning of a formula F , interpreted on a PLTS L=〈P, 〈
a
−→〉a∈L〉,
is a [0, 1]-valued predicate (see Definition 3.2.10) JF KLρ : P → [0, 1] assigning to
each process state p ∈ P a real value in [0, 1], with the intended interpretation
that JF K(p) represents the probability of the formula F holding at the state p,
as discussed in Section 3.2.3. In Section 3.3.3 we shall provide, informally, the
intuitions which will lead us towards the definition of appropriate game semantics
for each of the proposed µ-calculi.
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3.3.1 Formal definitions
We start by defining the most expressive logic considered in this thesis, which we
call the probabilistic modal µ-calculus with independent product, truncated sum
and convex combinations, or just pLµ⊙⊕ for short.
Definition 3.3.1 (Syntax of pLµ⊙⊕). The syntax of pLµ
⊙
⊕ formulas F is given by
the following context free grammar:
F,G ::= X | F ∨G | F ∧G | 〈a〉G | [a]G | µX.F | νX.F
F +λ G | F ⊙G | F ·G | F ⊕G | F ⊖G
where X ranges over the set V of variables, a over a fixed set L of labels and λ is
a real number in the open interval (0, 1).
Thus the logic pLµ⊙⊕ is obtained by extending the logic pLµ with the following
new connectives: ⊙ (coproduct), · (product), ⊕ (truncated sum), ⊖ (truncated co-
sum) and with the family of convex combination operators {+λ}λ∈(0,1).
The notion of subformula of a pLµ⊙⊕ formula is obtained extending Definition
3.1.3 to the new connectives as follows:
Sub(F +λ G) = {F +λ G} ∪ Sub(F ) ∪ Sub(G)
Sub(F ·G) = {F ·G} ∪ Sub(F ) ∪ Sub(G)
Sub(F ⊙G) = {F ⊙G} ∪ Sub(F ) ∪ Sub(G)
Sub(F ⊖G) = {F ⊖G} ∪ Sub(F ) ∪ Sub(G)
Sub(F ⊕G) = {F ⊕G} ∪ Sub(F ) ∪ Sub(G)
We also restrict our attention, as done for Lµ, to normal pLµ⊙⊕ formulas (see
Definition 3.1.4), which are defined as expected. The subsumption relation on
bound variables of pLµ⊙⊕ formulas is defined as in Definition 3.1.5.
Definition 3.3.2. Given a PLTS L = 〈P, {
a
−→}a∈L〉, a [0, 1]-interpretation ρ ∈
V → [0, 1]P of the variables and a pLµ⊙⊕ formula F , we define the denotational
semantics of F over L as the map JF KLρ ∈ [0, 1]P , by extending Definition 3.2.11
as follows:
JF +λ GKLρ (p) = JF KLρ (p) +λ JGKLρ (p)
JF ⊙GKLρ (p) = JF KLρ (p) ⊙ JGKLρ (p)
JF ·GKLρ (p) = JF KLρ (p) · JGKLρ (p)
JF ⊕GKLρ (p) = JF KLρ (p) ⊕ JGKLρ (p)
JF ⊖GKLρ (p) = JF KLρ (p) ⊖ JGKLρ (p)
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where the interpretation for the new connectives is given by the binary operations
of type [0, 1]2→ [0, 1] defined in Section 2.2. Note that this is a good definition
since the space [0, 1]P is a complete lattice and every constructor (see Proposition
2.2.4) is interpreted as a monotone operator, hence least and greatest fixed points
exist by the Knaster-Tarski theorem.
Adopting the terminology already introduced for pLµ, we say that a process-state
p ∈ P , under the interpretation ρ, satisfies the formula F with probability λ, if
JF KLρ (p)=λ.
As discussed in Section 3.2.3, the operations {·,⊙} and {⊖,⊕} were consid-
ered in [56] as alternative interpretations for the pLµ connectives {∧,∨}, thus
not as operations to consider in combination as in pLµ⊙⊕.
We presented the syntax of pLµ⊙⊕ in positive-form, i.e. without including a
negation operator explicitly, in order to simplify the definition of the denota-
tional semantics. As discussed in Section 3.1.1 in the context of the logic Lµ, a
negation operator for pLµ⊙⊕ can be defined by induction on the syntax of closed
formulas in a straightforward way, exploiting the dualities between the opera-
tors {〈a〉,∨, (µX.),⊙,⊕} and {[a] ,∧, (νX.), ·,⊖} and the self-duality of +λ (see
Lemma 2.2.5).
Definition 3.3.3. Given a closed pLµ⊙⊕ formula F , we define its dual formula F
by induction on the structure of F as follows:
X = X
F ∨G = F ∧G F ∧G = F ∨G
〈a〉F = [a]F [a]F = 〈a〉F
µX.F = νX.F [X/X ] νX.F = µX.F [X/X ]
F +λ G = F +λ G
F ⊙G = F ·G F ·G = F ⊙G
F ⊕G = F ⊖G F ⊖G = F ⊕G
where F [X/X ] denotes the pLµ⊙⊕ formula F where all occurrences of the (free)
variable X are replaced by X.
Proposition 3.3.4. Given a PLTS L = 〈P, {
a
−→}a∈L〉, a [0, 1]-interpretation
ρ ∈ V → [0, 1]P of the variables and a closed pLµ⊙⊕ formula F , the following
assertion holds: JF KLρ (p)=1 − JF KLρ .
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Proof. The desired result follows immediately by De Morgan dualities of pLµ⊙⊕
operators. In particular the duality of 〈a〉 with [a] follows from the self-duality of
the (countably indexed) weighted sum operator (see Proposition 2.2.5) and from
the duality of ⊔ (join) with ⊓ (meet).
It is going to be convenient to define the following pLµ⊙⊕ formulas:







= 1 +λ 0.
Note that (0)=1 and (1)=0.
Proposition 3.3.6. For every PLTS L= 〈P, {
a
−→}a∈L〉, [0, 1]-interpretation ρ∈
V→ [0, 1]P of the variables and process state p∈P , the following equalities hold:
J0KLρ (p) = 0 J1KLρ (p) = 1 JλKLρ (p) = λ
We will adopt the following convention, which reduces some annoying bureau-
cracy when dealing with the +λ operator in pLµ
⊙
⊕ formulas.
Convention 3.3.7. We identify the pLµ⊙⊕ formulas F +λ G and G+1−λ F . It is
trivial to verify that the two formulas are semantically equivalent. An immediate
advantage of this convention is that the expected equality (λ)=1 − λ holds.
3.3.2 Fragments of pLµ⊙⊕
As we anticipated in Chapter 1, a central contribution of this thesis is the def-
inition of a game semantics for the logic pLµ⊙⊕ and thus for all its fragments
obtained by dropping some operators. In this section we consider some interest-
ing fragments of the logic pLµ⊙⊕. The classification is based on the features of the
games which are needed to interpret each sub-logic and on the basis of expressiv-
ity considerations. The basic logic pLµ, discussed in Section 3.2.3, is the simplest
such fragment, admitting a game-semantics given in terms of 2-player stochastic
games.
3.3.2.1 Logic pLµ ∪ {+λ}
The logic pLµ∪{+λ}, which we refer to as the probabilistic modal µ-calculus with
convex combinations, is the fragment of the logic pLµ⊙⊕ obtained by removing the
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set of operators {⊙, ·,⊕,⊖}. The logic pLµ ∪ {+λ} is a mild extension of the
basic logic pLµ and, as we shall see discuss in Section 3.3.3, it is simple to extend
the game semantics of pLµ, given in terms of 2-player stochastic parity games,
to interpret the new family of operators {+λ}λ∈(0,1).
These operators are useful for expressing interesting properties of PLTS’s,







whose meaning can be described as the limit prob-
ability the controller have of producing an infinite sequence of a-actions when
sometimes, based on a small probability, the hostile environment is allowed to
choose which a-actions to take.
3.3.2.2 Logic pLµ⊙⊕ \ {+λ}
To the other side of the spectrum we have the logic pLµ⊙⊕ \ {+λ}, which we refer
to as the probabilistic modal µ-calculus with independent product and truncated
sum. As the notation suggests, pLµ⊙⊕ \ {+λ} is the fragment of the logic pLµ
⊙
⊕
obtained by removing the family of operators {+λ}λ∈(0,1).
As observed in Section 2.2, the pairs of operations {⊙,⊕} and {·,⊖} of type
[0, 1]2→ [0, 1], are quantitative generalizations of the standard boolean operations
of join and meet in the two element lattice {0, 1}. As a consequence we can state
the following proposition.
Proposition 3.3.8. Let F be a pLµ⊙⊕ \ {+λ} formula and F ↓ the Lµ formula
obtained from F by replacing every occurrence of the operators {⊙,⊕} and {·,⊖}
with ∨ and ∧ respectively. For every LTS L, process state p and boolean inter-
pretation of the variables ρ∈V→{0, 1}P , the standard Lµ-semantics of F ↓ at p
under ρ and the pLµ⊙⊕ \ {+λ} semantics of F under ρ, interpreted in the PLTS
L′ corresponding to L (see Convention 3.2.2), coincide at p.
Proof. It follows trivially from previous observations and from the fact that
the inductive definition of denotational semantics for pLµ⊙⊕ \ {+λ} preserves
two-valuedness. In particular the interpretations of 〈a〉 and [a] preserve two-
valuedness only when interpreted over LTS’s.
In other words when considering non-probabilistic PLTS’s (i.e., LTS’s) and {0, 1}-
valued interpretations of the variables, the logic pLµ⊙⊕ \ {+λ} collapses to the
standard modal µ-calculus Lµ. Therefore pLµ⊙⊕ \ {+λ} can be considered as a
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conservative [0, 1]-generalization of Lµ.
The presence, or the absence, of the family of operators {+λ} in the fragments
of the logic pLµ⊙⊕ we consider below does not affect the development of their
theory and, in particular, the definition of appropriate game semantics. For this
reasons we shall implicitly assume that the family of operators {+λ}λ∈(0,1) is
always part of the the syntax of the sub-logics we hereafter discuss, and omit to
specify, in their nomenclature, the “with convex combinations” description.
3.3.2.3 Logics pLµ⊙ and pLµ{0,1}
The logic pLµ⊙, which we refer to as the probabilistic modal µ-calculus with
independent product, is the fragment of the logic pLµ⊙⊕ obtained by removing
the pair of operators {⊕,⊖}.
The logic pLµ⊙ turns out to be interesting for its expressive power which
allows the encoding of qualitative threshold modalities, as we now discuss.
Definition 3.3.9. Given a pLµ⊙ formula F , we define the macro formulas P>0F
and P=1F as follows:
P>0F
def
= µX.(F ⊙X) and P=1F
def
= νX.(F ·X).
Note that, when F is closed, P>0F = P=1F and P=1F = P>0F , i.e. the derived
formulas constructors P>0 and P=1, if taken as primitive connectives, are De
Morgan duals.
For the sake of readability, we extend the negation operator to the derived
qualitative modalities.
Definition 3.3.10. Given a closed pLµ⊙ formula F , we define the negation of
the formula P>0F , denoted by P>0F or just P=0F , as P=1F . Similarly we define
the negation of the formula P=1F , denoted by P=1F or just P<1F , as P>0F .
The following lemma captures the denotational semantics of the qualitative
threshold modalities.
Lemma 3.3.11. Given a PLTS L= 〈P, {
a
−→}a∈L〉, a [0, 1]-interpretation of the
variables ρ∈V→ [0, 1]P and a pLµ⊙ formula F , the following assertions hold:
JP>0F K(p)=
{




1 if JF KLρ (p) = 1
0 otherwise
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for every process-state p∈P .
Proof. The map x 7→ λ⊙x, for a fixed λ∈ [0, 1], has 1 as unique fixed point when
λ>0, and 0 as the least fixed point when λ=0. Similarly for the map x 7→ λ · x.
The result then follows trivially.
As an immediate corollary of Lemma 3.3.11 we have the following observation:
Corollary 3.3.12. The denotational interpretation of an open pLµ⊙ formula F
is, in general, not ω-(co)continuous (see Definition 2.1.14) in the free variables,
i.e., the denotation of a formula, seen as a map
(
V → [0, 1]P
)
→ [0, 1] where
(
V → [0, 1]P
)
is ordered pointwise, does not preserve ⊑-increasing (decreasing)
ω-chains.
Proof. Consider the formula P=1X=νY.X ·Y having just one free variable X . We
have that JP=1XKρ(p)=0 if ρ(X)(p)<1 and JP=1XKLρ (p)=1 if ρ(X)(p)=1.
As a consequence, it is not possible to apply, in general, the Kleene fixed
point theorem (see Theorem 2.1.15) for characterizing the value of a fixed point
formula. This contrasts with the fact that the denotations JF KLρ of pLµ formulas,
when interpreted over finite PLTS’s (in the sense of Definition 3.2.1), are (co)-
continuous in the free variables, provided that the interpretation ρ assigns to each
variable a (co)continuous function (see8, e.g., Appendix C in [78]).
As we shall see in Section 7.2, the possibility of encoding the qualitative
threshold modalities allows the expression of many interesting properties, as well
as the encoding of the qualitative fragment of PCTL (see Definition 3.2.8). As a
matter of fact, most of the pLµ⊙ formulas used in this thesis to describe proper-
ties of PLTS’s, are actually definable in the fragment of pLµ⊙ where the use of
the operators {⊙, ·} is restricted to the encodings of the qualitative modalities
{P>0,P=1}. We denote this fragment with pLµ{0,1}.
3.3.2.4 Logics pLµ⊕ and pLµ
[0,1]
The logic pLµ⊕, which we refer to as the probabilistic modal µ-calculus with
truncated sum, is the fragment of the logic pLµ⊙⊕ obtained by removing the pair
of operators {·,⊙}.
8The proof, which can be easily be extended to pLµ ∪ {+λ}-formulas, crucially depends on
the fact that finite 2-player stochastic parity games are positionally determined (See Theorem
2.3.58). Incidentally, the method adopted in [78] for proving the equivalence of the denotational
and game semantics of pLµ is based on the (co)continuity of the denotations, and is thus limited
to finite PLTS’s.
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In the logic pLµ⊕ it is possible to encode the qualitative modalities {P>0,P1}





= νX.(F ⊖ X). However, unlike9 the logic pLµ⊙, in pLµ⊕ it is also
possible to encode quantitative threshold modalities and inequality operators, as
we now discuss.
Definition 3.3.13. Given pLµ⊕ formulas F and G, with G closed and F possibly
open, we define the macro formulas F ≥ G and F > G as follows:
F ≥ G
def
= P=1(F ⊕G) and F > G
def
= P>0(F ⊖G).
Note that we restricted to closed formulas G in order to apply the negation
operator. We also denote with P≥λF and P>λF the pLµ
⊙
⊕ formulas F ≥ λ and
F > λ. Observe that λ is indeed a closed formula.
For the sake of readability, we extend the negation operator to the derived
quantitative threshold modalities.
Definition 3.3.14. Given a closed pLµ⊕ formula F , we define the negation of
the formula P≥λF , denoted by P≥λF or just P<λF , as P>1−λF . More concretely,




⊕ X . Similarly we define the negation of the
formula P>λF , denoted by P=1F or just P≤λF , as P>1−λF . More concretely, we





The following lemma captures the denotational semantics of the quantitative
threshold modalities.
Lemma 3.3.15. Given a PLTS L= 〈P, {
a
−→}a∈L〉, a [0, 1]-interpretation of the
variables ρ ∈ V → [0, 1]P , a closed pLµ⊙⊕ formula G and a (possibly open) pLµ
⊙
⊕
formula F , the following assertions hold:
JF ≥ GK(p)=
{




1 if JF KLρ (p) > JGKLρ (p)
0 otherwise
and in particular
9Although we strongly believe that pLµ⊙ can not encode the quantitative threshold modal-
ities, we could not come up with a proof. We shall go back to this point in Chapter 8.
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JP≥λF K(p)=
{




1 if JF KLρ (p) > λ
0 otherwise
for every process-state p∈P .
Proof. By definition we have that F ≥ G = P=1(F ⊕ G). From the properties
of the negation operator, we know that JGKLρ (p) = 1 − JGKLρ (p) and therefore
JF ⊕ GKLρ (p) = min{1, JF KLρ (p) +
(
1 − JGKLρ (p)
)
}. Thus JG ⊕ F KLρ (p) = 1 if and
only if JF KLρ (p)≥JGKLρ (p). The desired result then trivially follows
By definition we have that F > G=P>0(F ⊖G). We have that JF ⊖GKLρ (p)=
max{0,
(
1 − JGKLρ (p)
)
+ JF KLρ (p) − 1}. Thus JG ⊕ F KLρ (p) > 0 if and only if
JF KLρ (p)>JGKLρ (p).
As we shall see in Section 7.2, the possibility of encoding the quantitative
threshold modalities allows the expression of many interesting properties, as well
as the encoding of full PCTL (see Definition 3.2.8). Most of the interesting
properties of PLTS’s formalized as pLµ⊕ formulas, could be actually specified
in the fragment of pLµ⊕ where the use of the operators {⊕,⊖} is restricted to
the encoding of the quantiative threshold operators {P≥λ,P>λ}. We denote this
fragment with pLµ[0,1].
3.3.3 Towards a game semantics
In the previous sections we introduced the logic pLµ⊙⊕ defining its denotational
semantics and discussing the expressive power of some of its fragments in terms
of the ability to encode useful operators, such as the qualitative and quantita-
tive modalities. However, as discussed in Section 3.2.3, in the [0, 1]-predicate
approach to probabilistic temporal logics, it is of conceptual importance to offer
some interpretation for the meaning of the formulas that goes beyond their mere
denotational meaning, which is potentially just a map in [0, 1]P lacking any useful
probabilistic interpretation. As discussed in Section 3.2.4, an important tool for
providing such an interpretation is given by game semantics : the logic pLµ (a




which allows one to understand the meaning of a formula at a process-state p in
terms of the interactions between the controller (Player 1) and an hostile envi-
ronment (Player 2) in the context of the stochastic choices modeled by PLTS’s
(Nature), as for Lµ formulas.
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The principal task we undertake in this thesis is to extend the game semantics
of pLµ to the richer logics pLµ∪ {+λ}, pLµ⊙ and pLµ
⊙
⊕, where extending means
that the games associated with the pLµ fragment of the richer logics should
coincide with the 21
2
-player parity games for pLµ described in Section 3.2.4.
Extending the game semantics of pLµ to pLµ ∪ {+λ} is quite simple: at the
new kind of states of the form 〈p,G +λ H〉, corresponding to the new operator
+λ, Nature moves and chooses the state 〈p,G〉 with probability λ, and the state
〈p,H〉 with probability 1−λ, whence from the 21
2
-player game continues. Indeed
pLµ ∪ {+λ} seems to be a natural extension of pLµ, importing directly into the
syntax of the logic the probabilistic nature of its game interpretation.
Extending the game interpretation of pLµ to the richer logic pLµ⊙ does not
seem possible working within the framework of 21
2
-player games, and in particular
not in that of 21
2
-player parity games. The denotational semantics of the new
connectives · and ⊙, however, suggests an elementary interpretation for their
meaning: G ·H expresses the probability that both G and H hold when verified
independently, andG⊙H expresses the probability that at least one ofG orH hold
when verified independently. To capture formally this intuition, we will introduce
a game semantics for the logic in which independent play of many instances of
the game is allowed. Our games build on those for pLµ described in Section
3.2.4. Novelty arises in the game interpretation of the game-states 〈p,H1·H2〉 and
〈p,H1 ⊙H2〉: when during the execution of the game one of these kinds of nodes
is reached, the game is split into two concurrent and independent sub-games
continuing their executions from the states 〈p,H1〉 and 〈p,H2〉 respectively. The
difference between the game-interpretation of product and coproduct operators is
that on a product configuration 〈p,H1 ·H2〉, Player 1 has to win in both generated
sub-games, while on a coproduct configuration 〈p,H1⊙H2〉 Player 1 needs to win
just one of the two generated sub-games.
To illustrate the main ideas, let us consider the PLTS of figure 3.2(a) and
the pLµ formula F = 〈a〉〈a〉1 which asserts the possibility of performing two
consecutive a-steps. The probability of F being satisfied at p is 1
2
, since after
the first a-step, the process 0 is reached with probability 1
2
and no further a-
step is possible. Let us consider the pLµ⊙ formula H = µX.F ⊙ X . Figure
3.2(b) depicts a play in the game starting from the configuration 〈p,H〉 (the
fixed-point unfolding step is omitted). The branching points represent places
where coproduct is the main connective, and each Ti represents play in one of
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(b) Branching play rooted in 〈p,H〉
Figure 3.2: Illustrative example
the independent subgames for 〈p, F 〉 thereupon generated. We call such a tree,
describing play on all independent subgames, a branching play. Since all branches
are coproducts, and the fixpoint is a least fixpoint, the objective for Player 1 is




, and there are infinitely many independent such games, almost surely
Player 1 will win one of them. Therefore the game semantics assigns H at p the
value 1. Incidentally the formula H=µX.F ⊙X considered above is P>0F , and
indeed JP>0F Kρ(p)=1.
As a matter of fact, designing a game semantics for the logic pLµ{0,1}, i.e., a
game interpretation for the qualitative modalities P>0 and P=1, does not seem any
simpler than working directly with the more expressive logic pLµ⊙. Moreover, the
operational interpretation of the qualitative modalities one gets from the game
semantics of pLµ⊙ is quite natural. As in the previous example, the formula
P>0F can be thought as generating countably many concurrent and independent
instances of the game associated with F , where Player 1 needs to win in at least
one of them. Similarly, the formula P=1F generates countably many concurrent
and independent instances of the game associated with F , and Player 1 needs to
win in all of them.
Formalizing the pLµ⊙ games outlined above is a surprisingly technical under-
taking. To account for the branching plays that arise, we introduce, in Chapter
4, a general notion of tree game which is of interest in its own right and itself
an inportant contribution of the thesis. Tree games generalize ordinary 21
2
-player
games, and are powerful enough to encode certain classes of games of imperfect
information such as Blackwell games, as we shall discuss in Section 4.2. The
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theory of tree games we are going to develop, will also allow us to formulate
other notions that appear in the literature on ordinary stochastic, games such
as qualitative determinacy, in terms of determinacy of appropriate classes of tree
games, as we shall discuss in Section 4.4.
A further level of difficulty arises in expressing when a branching play in a
pLµ⊙ game is considered an objective for Player 1. This is delicate because
branching plays can contain infinitely many interleaved occurrences of product
and coproduct operations. So the simple explanation of the objective of Player
1 being to win both subgames, in the case of a product, and to win at least
one subgame, in the case of a coproduct, does not suffice. To account for this,
branching plays are themselves considered as ordinary 2-player (parity) games
with coproduct nodes as Player 1 nodes, and product nodes as Player 2 nodes.
Player 1’s goal in the outer pLµ⊙ game is to produce a branching play for which,
when itself considered as an ordinary parity game, the inner game, they have a
winning strategy. To formalize the class of tree games whose objective is specified




Unlike the operators {⊙, ·}, the denotational semantics of the operators {⊕,⊖}
does not suggest any clear probabilistic interpretation. However the following
lemma provides a possible interpretation for these operations in terms of prod-
ucts and coproducts





(x, y) = f(x ⊙ y, x · y) ⊔ x. Then the following equality holds:




x,y, where the increasing sequence {a
n
x,y}n∈N
is defined by mutual induction with the decreasing sequence {bnx,y}n∈N, as follows:














for every x, y∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Note that functional Φ is monotone, where the order on the space of
functionals of the same type of Φ is defined lifting the order on [0, 1] pointwise.
Hence the existence of a least fixed point is guaranteed by the Knaster-Tarski
theorem and lfp(Φ)=
d
{f |f ⊒ Φ(f)}. Note that ⊕ is a fixed point of Φ because
(
(x ⊙ y) ⊕ (x · y)
)
⊔ x= min{1, x + y − (x · y) + (x · y)}= x ⊕ y. Therefore, to
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prove the desired result, we just need to show that for any map f : [0, 1]2→ [0, 1],
such that f ⊒ Φ(f), the inequality ⊕ ⊑ f holds.
Fix some f ⊒ Φ(f). By definition of Φ we have that, for every x, y ∈ [0, 1],
f(x, y)≥x and f(x, y)≥f(x⊙y, x ·y). It then easily follows that, for every n∈N,








x,y are defined as in





every f ⊒ Φ(f).





define the function φ : [0, 1]2→ [0, 1]2 as φ(x, y)=〈x⊙ y, x · y〉. The function φ is


















that the sequences {anx,y}n∈N and {b
n
x,y}n∈N converge, by the monotone conver-
gence theorem. The function φ is continuous, hence limn→∞ φ
n(x, y) is a fixed




















x,y〉 is a fixed
point of φ. As a last observation note that, for every n ∈ N, the equality
anx,y+b
n
x,y =x+y holds. To conclude the proof it is sufficient to observe that the set
of fixed points of φ is precisely {〈w, 0〉 | w∈ [0, 1]} ∪ {〈1, z〉 | z∈ [0, 1]}. It is then









The following dual result follows as a corollary.





(x, y)=f(x · y, x⊙ y)⊓ x. Then the following equality holds: ⊖=




x,y, where the decreasing
sequence {bnx,y}n∈N is defined by mutual induction with the increasing sequence
{anx,y}n∈N, as in Lemma 3.3.16.
On the basis of these result, we will be able to provide a game interpretation to
the operators {⊕,⊖} as follows: at game states of the form 〈p,G⊕H〉 Player 1 can
choose to continue the game from one of the states 〈p, An〉, where the N-indexed
set of formulas {An}n∈N is defined by mutual induction with the N-indexed set
{Bn}n∈N as follows: A0 = G, B0 = H , An+1 = An ⊙ Bn and Bn+1 = An · Bn.
Similarly, at game states of the form 〈p,G⊖H〉, Player 2 can choose to continue
the game from one of the states 〈p, Bn〉, where the N-indexed sets of formulas
{An}n∈N and {Bn}n∈N are defined as above.
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Thus, tree games will also be used to provide an appropriate game semantics
for the full logic pLµ⊙⊕. This semantics is however, in many ways, less satisfactory
than the game semantics for pLµ⊙. Indeed the connectives ⊕ and ⊖ do not have
a clear and direct interpretation, as opposed to the operators · and ⊙ around
which the notion of tree games is conceived, but are instead modeled by a simple,
yet not necessarily illuminating, protocol formalized as an appropriate tree game.
One of our main result, proved in Chapter 7, is the equivalence with respect
to all models, (i.e., including PLTS’s having infinitely many states) of the de-
notational semantics and the corresponding game semantics for the logics pLµ
(result stated earlier as Theorem 3.2.14), pLµ⊙ and pLµ⊙⊕. As anticipated in
Chapter 1, the proof of equivalence for the logics pLµ⊙ and pLµ⊙⊕ is carried out
in ZFC + MAℵ1 set theory, due to the measure theoretic complications arising in
tree games.
3.4 Summary of the chapter
In this chapter we provided the necessary background on program logics. In Sec-
tion 3.1 we considered logics for expressing properties of LTS’s, and in particular
CTL and the modal µ-calculus (Lµ). In Section 3.2 we turned our attention
to logics for expressing properties of PLTS’s. We introduced the logics PCTL
and pLµ. We presented the denotational semantics of pLµ, highlighting the con-
ceptual importance of giving a description, going beyond the mere denotational
interpretation, of the properties expressed by formulas. We then introduced the
game semantics of pLµ as in [78]. This alternative semantics offers a natural
operational interpretation for the properties expressed by pLµ formulas. Lastly,
we discussed the meaning of a few examples of useful pLµ formulas.
The chapter, although mostly based on ideas and results already appeared in
the literature, contains some minor contributions. In Section 3.3 we identified
the logic pLµ⊙⊕ and some of its fragments, including pLµ
⊙. These probabilis-
tic µ-calculi are obtained by extending pLµ with additional connectives. With
the possible exception of the family of operators {+λ}λ∈(0,1), the denotational
interpretations of the new connectives have been already considered in [56] as
alternative interpretations for the pLµ connectives {∧,∨}. Thus, we took the
small but apparently novel step of considering the (co)product operations {⊙, ·}
and the truncated (co)sum operations {⊕,⊖} in combination with ∨ and ∧. In
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the extended logics it is possible to encode useful operators, such as the qual-
itative and quantitative threshold modalities. Another minor contribution lies
in the informal discussion, carried out in Section 3.3.3, of the ideas which will
lead us toward appropriate game semantics for pLµ⊙⊕ and its fragments. The
result of Lemma 3.3.16 is quite useful in this sense, as it offers an interpretation
for the meaning of the {⊕,⊖} connectives in terms of sequences of (co)product
operations. This provides a possible, albeit indirect, reading of the properties
associated with pLµ⊙⊕ formulas containing truncated (co)sum connectives.
Chapter 4
Tree Games
In this chapter we introduce a new class of games which we call two player stochas-
tic tree games, or just 21
2
-player tree games. Two player stochastic tree games
generalize standard two player turn based stochastic games, which we introduced
in Section 2.3.4, by allowing the execution of a play to be split into concurrent
sub-games which continue their execution independently. This is formalized by
introducing a new class of nodes in the game arenas, which we call branching
nodes. When a play reaches one of these nodes, no action from the two players,
or from Nature, is performed. Instead the play is automatically split into sev-
eral subplays, one for each successor node of the current branching node, which
continue their execution independently.
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.1 we formally define the class
of two player stochastic tree games. In Section 4.2 we provide an expressivity
result, showing how the class of Blackwell games, introduced in Section 2.3.2, can
be faithfully encoded in terms of two player tree games. In section 4.3 we identify
an interesting class of winning sets, which we call subtree-monotone winning sets,
and study some of their properties. In Section 4.4 we show how 2-player tree
games can faithfully model 21
2
-player tree games. Thus, from a foundational
point of view, stochasticity in tree games is not of fundamental importance. This
result is used to discuss an interesting open problem in the field of ordinary
21
2
-player games known as strong qualitative determinacy.
The idea of concurrent and independent execution of sub-games, upon which
tree games are defined, is inspired by the considerations about the logic pLµ⊙
discussed in Section 3.3.3. Nevertheles this section, although mainly motivated
and inspired by our study of probabilistic µ-calculi, can be read without any
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knowledge of the topics discussed in Chapter 3. We do assume, on the other
hand, knowledge of the basic topics of game theory discussed in Section 2.3.
4.1 Formal definitions
In this section we formally introduce the class of two player stochastic tree games.
Most of the definitions and several key concepts coincide or generalize those
discussed in Section 2.3.4 for standard 21
2
-player games.
Two player stochastic tree games are infinite duration games played by Player
1, Player 2 and a third probabilistic agent named Nature, on a Arena A =
〈(S,E), (S1, S2, SN , B), π〉, where (S,E) is a directed graph with countable set
of vertices S and transition relation E⊆S ×S, the tuple (S1, S2, SN , B) is a par-
tition of S and π :SN →D(S) assigns a probability distribution to every Nature
state.The states in S1, S2, SN and B are called Player 1 states, Player 2 states,
probabilistic states and branching states respectively. Thus a 21
2
-player tree game
arena generalizes a standard 21
2
-player game arena, as defined in Section 2.3.4,
by allowing the new kind of branching state. We denote with E(s), for s∈S, the
set {s′ | (s, s′) ∈ E}, which we refer to as the set of successor states of s, and as
a technical constraint1, we require that supp(π(s)) ⊆ E(s), for every s∈SN .
A tree game played on some arena A, starts at a given state s0 ∈ S, and
proceeds as an ordinary 21
2
-player game until a branching state is reached, i.e.,
Player 1 and Player 2 choose how to move on states in S1 and S2 respectively, and
Nature moves2, in accordance with the probability distribution π(s), a successor
when the current state is some state s∈SN . The novelty in tree games arises when
the current state is some state s∈B, i.e., a branching state of the game. In this
case no action is performed by any agent, since the game is split automatically
into I-many concurrent sub-games, where E(s) = {si}i∈I , each continuing its
execution from the state si. Note that if E(s)=∅, then no sub-game is generated
and the game terminates immediately at the state s.
The result of a play, i.e., the result of the choices made by the two players
and Nature at the respective points, is therefore not just a path, as in standard
1The requirement supp(π(s)) =E(s) might seem more natural and in line with Definition
2.3.40. However, in Section 6.2 and 6.3, it will be technically convenient to work with arenas
having the strict inclusion supp(π(s)) ( E(s). We shall discuss these advantages in the relevant
sections.
2Note that the constraint supp(π(s))⊆E(s) guarantees that Nature moves to states t∈E(s)
even though, when supp(π(s))(E(s), some states in E(s) are never chosen by Nature.
4.1. Formal definitions 125
21
2
-player games, but a tree, having nodes with more than one child occurring
at states in the game where the current state was a branching state, and several
sub-games were generated. We call this class of games tree games, to highlight
the nature of its set of outcomes.
To formalize this idea, we need to define the notions of paths and trees in the
arena A. Paths in a 21
2
-player tree game arena and the associated operations are
specified as in Definition 2.3.41 for standard 21
2
-player game arenas. The set PA
is endowed with a Polish 0-dimensional topology specified as in Definition 2.1.33.
An outcome of the game in A, which we call a branching play, is a tree T in
A (see Definition 2.1.35) defined as follows:
Definition 4.1.1 (Branching play in A). A branching play in the arena A is a
tree T in A which is uniquely branching in S1 ∪ S2 ∪ SN and fully branching in
B (see Definition 2.1.37). We denote with BPA, or just BP if A is clear from the
context, the set of branching plays T in the arena A.
A branching play T represents a possible execution of the game from the
state s labeling the root of T . The nodes of T with more than one child are
all labeled with a state s ∈ B and are the branching points of the game; their
children represent the independent instances of play generated at the branching
points. The set BPA is endowed with a 0-dimensional Polish topology specified
as in Definition 2.1.38.
As usual when working with stochastic games, it is useful to look at the
possible outcomes of a play up to the behavior of Nature. In the context of
standard two player turn based stochastic games we considered, in Section 2.3.4,
the notion of Markov play. In the new setting the following definition of Markov
branching play is natural:
Definition 4.1.2 (Markov branching play in A). A branching play in the arena
A is a tree M in A which is uniquely branching in S1 ∪S2 and fully branching in
SN ∪B. We denote with MBPA, or just MBP if A is clear from the context, the
set of branching plays T in the arena A. We look at a Markov Branching play
M , as a tree whose edges are labeled with probabilities. This labeling is given by
a function πM :EM → [0, 1], where EM ⊆M×M , is the set of edges in the tree M ,
formally defined as EM = {(~s,~t) | ~t is a child of ~s in M}. The labeling function
πM associated with the Markov branching play M , is defined
3 as follows:
3Note even if, in general, supp(s)( E(s) (see Footnote 1) the probability distribution π(s)(t)
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πM (~s,~t) =
{
π(s)(t) if s= last(~s), s ∈ SN , and ~t=~s.{t}
1 otherwise
The set MBPA is endowed with a 0-dimensional Polish topology specified as in
Definition 2.1.38.
A Markov branching play, is similar to a branching play except that the
probabilistic choices of Nature have not been resolved. Such a structure is useful
because it is possible to extract from it the probability that Nature, with its
probabilistic choices (modeled by the labeling of edges of the Markov branching
play), will produce an outcome contained in some given set of branching plays.
This is formally captured by the following definition.
Definition 4.1.3 (Probability measure P(M)). Every Markov branching play M
determines a probability assignment PM(OF ) to every basic clopen set OF ⊆BP
of branching plays, for F a finite tree (we can assume that every node of ~s∈F






{πM(~s,~t) | ~s,~t∈F and ~t is a child of ~s in M} if F ⊆M
0 otherwise
The assignment PM on basic clopen sets extends to a unique (Borel) probability
measure PM ∈M1(BP), whence to a (unique) complete probability measure on
BP which we also denote with PM . We denote with P : MBP → M1(BP) the
function defined as P(M)=PM .
The above definition implements the probabilistic independence of the sub-
branching plays generated at some branching node in a 21
2
-player tree game.
Importantly, tree games exhibit also an epistemic independence between the sub-
branching plays which will be implemented in the notion of strategy.
An important property of the above defined construction is exposed by the
following lemma.
Lemma 4.1.4. The function P :MBP → M1(BP) is continuous.
Proof. By Theorem 2.1.66(5), we just need to show that for each sub-basic open
set U ⊆M1(BP), i.e., each set of the form U = {µ∈M1(BP) | µ(OF ) > λ} for
some finite tree F in A and λ ∈ (0, 1), the set P−1(U) is open in MBP . The
is well defined on all states s∈S, and π(s)(t)=0 for all states t 6∈supp(π(s)).
4.1. Formal definitions 127
set P−1(U) consists of all Markov branching plays M such that PM(OF ) > λ,
where OF is the basic open set of branching plays containing the finite tree F .
By definition of PM , we have that PM(OF ) =PN(OF ) for every M,N ∈P−1(U).
Thus either P−1(U) is empty, hence trivially open, or it is the set of all Markov
branching play containing the finite tree F (because λ>0 and every M ∈MBP
not containing F is such that PM(OF )=0 by definition), i.e., it is the basic open
set OF of Markov branching plays.
It is appropriate at this time to highlight the fact that, if there are no branch-
ing nodes in A, i.e., if B = ∅, then a 21
2
-player tree game A is just a standard
21
2
-player game arena. This intuition is formalized, in a slightly more general
way, as follows:
Definition 4.1.5. A 21
2
-player tree game arena A=〈(S,E), (S1, S2, SN , B), π〉 is
called a non-branching 21
2
-player tree game arena, if for every b∈B, |E(b)|≤1.
The notion of non-branching 21
2
-player tree game arena captures the collection
of 21
2
-player tree game arenas on which the game is never split into (more than
one) concurrent sub-games. The intuition that any such arena is just a standard
21
2
-player game arena is captured by the following lemma:




tree game arena, then the following assertions holds:
• The spaces PA and BPA are homeomorphic via the function f(~s)=~s↓,
• the definition of Markov branching play coincides with that of Markov play
(see Definition 2.3.46).
As for standard 21
2
-player games, a 21
2
-player tree game is specified by a 21
2
-
player tree game arena A and a payoff function Φ, which maps each possible
outcome to a corresponding reward for Player 1 in the real interval [0, 1]. Since
the outcomes of 21
2
-player tree games are branching plays, it is natural to give
the following definition of two player stochastic tree games.
Definition 4.1.7 (Two player stochastic tree game). A two player stochastic tree
game (or a 21
2
-player tree game) is given by a pair 〈A,Φ〉, where A is a stochastic
tree game arena as described above, and Φ : BP → [0, 1], which is called the
payoff function for Player 1, is a universally measurable function. If Φ is the
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characteristic function of some (universally measurable) set X⊆BP , then we just
refer to Φ as the winning set for Player 1. A 21
2
-player tree game G=〈A,Φ〉 such
that the set SN of probabilistic states in the arena A=〈(S,E), (S1, S2, SN , B), π〉
is empty, is called a two player tree game, or just a 2-player tree game.
As usual the intended interpretation is that Player 1 receives the reward Φ(T ),
if T is the final outcome a play in G. Player 1 wants to maximize their reward,
while Player 2 tries to minimize it. The final outcome T of a play of the game
will be determined probabilistically according to the probability measure on the
Markov Branching Play generated by the players’ moves. Since there can in
principle be an arbitrarily complex set of such probability measures, and the
function Φ needs to be evaluated (integrated) with respect to all of them, universal
measurability is the natural assumption for the payoff function Φ.
Definition 4.1.8 (Expected value of a probability measure over BP). Let 〈A,Φ〉
be a 21
2
-player tree game, and µ∈M1(BP) a probability measure over branching





This is a good definition since Φ is universally measurable, hence µ-measurable.
If Φ is a winning set, then the above definition coincides with E(µ)=µ(Φ).
The expected reward assigned to Player 1 when the Markov branching play
is the outcome of the game up to the behavior of nature can therefore be defined
as follows:
Definition 4.1.9 (Expected value of M). Let 〈A,Φ〉 be a 21
2
-player tree game,
and M a Markov branching play in A. We define, with a slight abuse of notation,





where P :MBP→M1(BP) specified as in Definition 4.1.3.
Up to this point, we have described how the players behave in a two player
stochastic tree game, adopting the informal idea of concurrent and independent
execution of the sub-games generated at the branching nodes. To formalize this
intuition we define the notion of (deterministic) strategy, which captures the way
in which the players can actually behave, exactly as in Definition 2.3.43. Hence
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both players when acting on a given instance of the game, know all the history
of the actions happened on that sub-game, but have no knowledge of the evolu-
tion of the other independent parallel sub-games. Thus, this form of epistemic
independence completes the already implemented stochastic independence.
Definition 4.1.10 (Topologies on Σ1 and Σ2). Let Γ={~si}0≤i≤n be a collection
of n paths in P<ω1 and let ∆={si}0≤i≤n be a collection of n states in S, for some
n∈N. Let us denote with OΓ7→∆ the set of all strategies σ1 for Player 1 such that
σ1(~si) = si, for every 0≤ i≤ n. We fix the topology on Σ1, where the countable
basis for the open sets is given by the clopen sets OΓ7→∆, for every pair (Γ,∆)
as defined above. This is a 0-dimensional Polish space. The topology on Σ2 is
defined in a similar way.
Note how the definition of the topologies on Σ1 and Σ2 slight differs from the
corresponding one, given in the context of standard 21
2
-player games, in Definition
2.3.44.
As discussed earlier, a Markov branching play M represents the result of a
play of the players up to the behavior of Nature. This is made precise by the
following definition.
Definition 4.1.11 (Ms0σ1,σ2). Given an initial state s0∈S and a strategy profile
〈σ1, σ2〉 a unique Markov branching play, denoted by Ms0σ1,σ2, is determined:
1. the root of M is the path {s0} of length one,
2. for every ~s∈Ms0σ1,σ2, if last(~s)=s with s∈S1 not a terminal state, then the
unique child of ~s in Ms0σ1,σ2 is ~s.{σ1(~s)},
3. for every ~s∈Ms0σ1,σ2, if last(~s)=s with s∈S2 not a terminal state, then the
unique child of ~s in Ms0σ1,σ2 is ~s.{σ2(~s)}.
The Markov branching play Ms0σ1,σ2 is then determined uniquely because Markov
branching plays branch fully on probabilistic and branching states. Given a state
s0∈S, we denote with 〈 , 〉s0 : Σ1×Σ2→MBP, or just with 〈 , 〉 if s0 is clear
from the context, the function defined as 〈σ1, σ2〉s0 =Ms0σ1,σ2 .
The following property about the function 〈 , 〉s0 is immediate to verify.
Lemma 4.1.12. For every state s∈S, the function 〈 , 〉s0 : Σ1×Σ2→MBP is
continuous.
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We introduce, in order to improve readability, the following notation.
Definition 4.1.13. We denote with Ps0σ1,σ2 ∈M1(BP), for every s∈S and every
strategy profile 〈σ1, σ2〉, the probability measure P(〈σ1, σ2〉s0), where the contin-
uous function P : MBP →M1(BP) is specified as in Definition 4.1.3. We also
denote, for s∈S, with Ps :Σ1×Σ2→M1(BP) the continuous function defined as
Ps=P ◦ 〈 , 〉s.
For any universally measurable set X⊆BP , the value Psσ1,σ2(X) is the prob-
ability that a branching play T ∈X is the outcome of the 21
2
-player tree game,
when the game starts at s and Player 1 and Player 2 follow the deterministic
strategies σ1 and σ2 respectively. Similarly the value E(Psσ1,σ2) is the expected
reward assigned to Player 1 when the game starts at s and Player 1 and Player
2 follow the deterministic strategies σ1 and σ2 respectively.
We now define the notions of lower and upper values of 21
2
-tree games, when
the players use deterministic strategies.
Definition 4.1.14 (Upper and lower values of G under deterministic strategies).
Let G=〈A,Φ〉 be a 21
2
-player tree game. We define the lower and upper values of
G at the state s, when players use deterministic strategies, as the values denoted
by VALs↓(G) and VAL
s














As usual VALs↓(G) represents the limit expected reward assigned to Player 1,
when the game begins at s, Player 1 chooses its deterministic strategy σ1 first,
and then Player 2 chooses their deterministic strategy σ2, possibly making their
choice based on the strategy σ1 previously chosen by Player 1. Similarly for





In the special case (not true in general) that this inequality is an equality, we
say that the game G at s is determined under deterministic strategies, or just
determined.
The notion of deterministic strategy defined earlier, models the behavior of
players which make deterministic moves based on the history of visited states.
However, as already discussed in Section 2.3.1, in game theory one often wants to
model the behavior of players which can use randomized procedures to make their
decisions. This is formalized by the concept of mixed strategy, which captures
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the ability of the players to randomly choose a deterministic strategy at the very
beginning of the game.
The following definition closely follows the corresponding ones given in Section
2.3 for Gale–Stewart and Blackwell games.
Definition 4.1.15 (Mixed strategies). A mixed strategy η1 for Player 1 in A is
defined to be a probability measure η1∈M1(Σ1). Similarly, a mixed strategy σ2
for Player 2 in A is defined to be a probability measure η2 ∈M1(Σ2). A pair
〈η1, η2〉 of mixed strategies, one for each player, is called a mixed strategy profile,
and induces the product measure η1×η2 on the space Σ1×Σ2 endowed with the
product topology.
The choice of interpreting a mixed strategy profile 〈η1, η2〉 as the product
measure η1×η2 captures the intuitive idea that the probabilistic choices made by
the two players at the beginning of the game, about the deterministic strategy to
use in the rest of the game, are done independently.
Given an initial state s in A, a mixed strategy profile induces in a natural
way a probability measure over branching plays, which we formalize as follows.
Definition 4.1.16. For every state s ∈ S, we define the probability measure
Psη1,η2∈M1(BP) over branching plays induced by a mixed strategy profile 〈η1, η2〉









(Σ1 × Σ2) → M1(BP)
)
)
→ M1(BP) is the bind
operation associated with the Giry monad M1 (see Theorem 2.1.66(10)), and
Ps : Σ1 × Σ2 → M1(BP) is specified as in Definition 4.1.13. Equivalently, Psη1,η2












where ρA(µ)=µ(A), for every Borel set A⊆BP .
Another approach for capturing probabilistic behaviors of the players , widely
used in the context of standard 21
2
-player games, can be formulated in the context
of 21
2
-player tree games as follows:
Definition 4.1.17 (History-based random strategy). A history-based random
strategy γ1 for Player 1 is a map P
<ω
1 → D(S)×{•} such that γ1(~s) = • if
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E(last(~s)) = ∅ and d ∈ D(E(last(~s)) otherwise. A history-based random strat-
egy γ2 for Player 2 is defined as a map P
<ω
2 →D(S)×{•} in a similar way. A pair
of history-based random strategies 〈γ1, γ2〉 for Player 1 and Player 2 respectively
is called a history-based random strategy profile.
The intuition about history-based random strategies, is that both players are
not committed to choosing randomly, once and for all at the very beginning of
the game, which deterministic strategy to use, but they can instead make proba-
bilistic choices, when making their moves, at every step of the game based the full
history of previously played moves. In the context of 21
2
-player games, history-
based random strategies capture the same probabilistic behaviors4 allowed by
random strategies. Interestingly, in the context of 21
2
-player tree games, history-
based random strategies allow fewer probabilistic behaviors than mixed strate-
gies. Rather than defining formally the probability measure on BP induced by
a history-based random strategy profile, we show by means of a simple example,
why history-based random strategies are not as expressive as mixed strategies.
Example 4.1.18. Let us consider the 2-player tree game arena A specified by
the tuple 〈(S,E), (S1, S2, SN , B), π〉 defined as follows:
• S={b, s, t, 0, 1},
• E(b)={s, t}, E(s)=E(t)={0, 1}, and E(0)=E(1)=∅,
• S1={s, t, 0, 1}, S2=SN =∅ and B={b},
• π is just the empty function since SN =∅







The game, starting at b, can be informally described as follows: at the beginning
the game is split in two concurrent and independent sub-games, one continuing
its execution at the state s and the other at the state t. In both sub-games,
Player 1, who is the only participant of the game, chooses whether to move to
4See, e.g., Footnote 4 in Section 2.3.1.
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the state 0 or 1. For the point we want to make, we shall only be interested in
the dynamics of the game played on the arena A, thus we do not specify any re-
ward function Φ. Suppose now that Player 1, in the game starting at b, wants to
behave probabilistically in such a way that with probability 1
2
they will choose to
move to the state 0 in both generated sub-games, and with probability 1
2
they will
choose to move to the state 1, again in both generated sub-games. This behavior
can be captured by the mixed strategy η1 which chooses to behave as the deter-
ministic strategy σ0 with probability
1
2
or as the deterministic strategy σ1 with
probability 1
2
, where the strategy σx, for x∈{0, 1} is defined as: σx({b.s})=x and
σx({b.t})=x. On the other hand this probabilistic behavior can not be captured
by any history-based random strategy γ1. Suppose indeed that γ1({b.s})=d1 and
γ1({b.t}) = d2, with d1, d2 ∈D({0, 1}), di(0) = λi, di(1) = 1 − λi, with i∈ {1, 2}.
Then, intuitively, Player 1 following the strategy γ1 will choose to move to 0 or
1 from s with probability λ1 and 1 − λ1 respectively, and similarly will choose
move to 0 or 1 from t with probability λ2 and 1 − λ2 respectively. Observe how,
crucially, the choices made by Player 1 in the two concurrent sub-games at the
states s and t, are made (probabilistically) independently one from the other.
Therefore Player 1, following the strategy γ1, will make different choices in the
states s and s with probability λ1 · (1 − λ2) + λ2 · (1 − λ1). Thus, no matter
how the strategy γ1 is specified, Player 1 following γ1 can not reproduce the same
probabilistic behavior as that induced by the mixed strategy η1.
We will use in the rest on the thesis only mixed-strategies because they are
strictly more powerful (it is well known how to model history-based random
strategies by means of mixed strategies, see e.g., [74]) and at the same time simpler
to analyze for our purposes. Nevertheless history-based random strategies, and
their induced probabilistic behaviors, constitute a natural class which, we suggest,
might be worth further investigations.
The notions of lower and upper values of a of 21
2
-player tree game, when
players use mixed strategies, can be defined as follows.
Definition 4.1.19 (Upper and lower values of G under mixed strategies). Let
G = 〈A,Φ〉 be a 21
2
-player tree game. We define the lower and upper values of
G at the state s, when players used mixed strategies, as the values denoted by
MVALs↓(G) and MVAL
s
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Again, for every s, the following inequality trivially holds: MVALs↓(G) ≤
MVALs↑(G). In the special case (not true in general) that this inequality is an
equality, we say that the game G at s is determined under mixed strategies.
We now define the concept of ǫ-optimal (deterministic or mixed) strategy, in
accordance with the corresponding notions (see Definition 2.3.24) introduced in
the context of Blackwell and standard 21
2
-player games.
Definition 4.1.20 (ǫ-optimal strategies). Let G = 〈A,Φ〉 be a 21
2
-player tree
game. We say that a deterministic strategy σ1 for Player 1 in G is ǫ-optimal, for






Similarly we say that a deterministic strategy σ2 for Player 2 in G is ǫ-optimal,






In a similar way, we say that a mixed strategy η1 for Player 1 in G is ǫ-optimal,






and we say that a mixed strategy η2 for Player 2 in G is ǫ-optimal, for ǫ≥ 0, if






Clearly ǫ-optimal (mixed and deterministic) strategies for Player 1 and Player 2
always exist for every ǫ>0, but not necessarily so for ǫ=0.
We now propose a few simple examples of a 21
2
-player tree games, in order to
fix some ideas and show that not all tree games are determined under determin-
istic or mixed strategies.
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where b is a branching state and the state s1 and s2 are under the control of
Player 1 and Player 2 respectively. Since the states 0 and 1 are terminal, it
is irrelevant to specify their membership in B, S1 or S2. The game, starting
at b, can be informally described as follows: at the beginning the game is split
in two concurrent and independent sub-games, one continuing its execution at
the state s1 and the other at the state s2. In these sub-games, Player 1 and
Player 2 respectively choose, independently to each other, to move on the state
0 or 1. Note again how this independence is modeled by the chosen notion of
(deterministic) strategy. Once the choices are made, the game ends since both 0
and 1 have no successors.
When the game starts at b, the following four branching plays, denoted by





















The branching play records the choices of the players in all generated sub-games,
of which, in this case, there are just two, and also records the points in which the
game was split into two independent sub-games.
Let us now define an payoff function Φ for the arena A. An interesting example
is given by the winning set5 Φ = {T00, T11}. The game G=〈A,Φ〉 can be described
as the simple game, where the two players choose independently to play a even or
odd number (represented here by 0 and 1 respectively). Player 1 wins if the sum
of the chosen numbers is even, and Player 2 wins otherwise. This is a well known
example in game theory of a game not determined under the use of deterministic
strategies. It is trivial to verify that VALb↓(G) = 0 while VAL
b
↑(G) = 1. However,
as everyone who played this game would probably know, if the players pick their
numbers at random tossing a fair coin, the probability of winning the game is 1
2
, no
matter what the other player does. This is formalized in our setting by observing





. It is easy to verify that both players have 0-
optimal mixed strategies in G, formalizing the coin tossing strategy informally
discussed above.
We now propose a simple modification of the previous game G, which is not
5To be precise we should say that Φ is the characteristic function Φ:BP→{0, 1} associated
of the set {T00, T11}, but as announced earlier, we will often avoid this level of formality.
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determined even under the use of mixed strategies.






where b is a branching state, Player 1 controls the states S1 = {s1} ∪ Evens and
Player 2 controls the states S2={s2}∪Odds, where Evens and Odds are the sets
of even and odd natural numbers respectively. The set of branching plays in A






Let us fix as payoff for the game the winning set of branching plays Φ =
{Tn,m | n > m}. The game G = 〈A,Φ〉 can be described as the game, where
the two players choose independently to play two natural numbers n and m
respectively. Player 1 wins if n > m and Player 2 wins otherwise. This is a
popular example of game not determined even under the use of mixed strategies.
Indeed it is trivial to check that MVALb↓(G)=0 while MVAL
b
↑(G)=1.
The previous example shows that there exists a 21
2
-player tree game not de-
termined under the use of mixed strategies. However, since the game arena A
considered in the previous example is infinite, one might wonder if there exists
a 21
2
-player tree game with a finite arena which is not determined under the use
of mixed strategies. We provide a positive answer to this question, by a slight
modification of the previous example.
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where b is a branching state and the states s1 and s2 are under the control of
Player 1 and Player 2 respectively. The game played on the arena A, starting at
b, can be informally described as follows: at the beginning the game is split in
two concurrent and independent sub-games, one continuing its execution at the
state s1 and the other at the state s2. In these sub-games, Player 1 and Player
2 respectively choose, independently to each other, either to loop n ∈ N times
through the state s1 (s2 respectively) and finally move to the terminal state 1,
or to loop forever through the state s1 (s2 respectively). In the first case we say
that Player 1 played the number n+ 1, while in the case of an infinite loop we say
that Player 1 played the number 0, and similarly for Player 2.
By fixing, as winning set for the game, the set of branching plays such that
Player 1 plays n and Player 2 played m, with n>m, we get a two player tree-game,
with a finite arena, which is essentially the game described in the previous exam-
ple. It follows by the same kind of arguments, that the game is not determined
by the use of mixed strategies. We omit the routine details.
The above discussed examples show that there exist 2-player tree games with
finite game arenas, which are not determined under deterministic strategies, nor
under mixed strategies. Notwithstanding these simple negative examples, the
thesis will later contribute some positive determinacy results.
We conclude this section with some remarks on the concept of concurrent and
independent execution of sub-games captured by 21
2
-player tree games. Look-
ing at Player 1 (respectively Player 2) as a human might generate a little bit of
confusion, as the idea that Player 1 acts on a given generated sub-game indepen-
dently on how they themself play on the other generated sub-games is a bit odd.
Looking at Player 1 as a human might be reasonable in the context of standard
21
2
-player games6. Still, game theorists are used to thinking in a slight different
way. We quote a paragraph from [14], which describes David H. Blackwell point
of view on the matter7:
Imagine that you are to play the white pieces in a single game of chess,
and that you discover you are unable to be present for the occasion.
There is available a deputy, who will represent you on the occasion,
and who will carry out your instructions exactly, but who is absolutely
unable to make any decisions of his own volition. Thus, in order to
guarantee that your deputy will be able to conduct the white pieces
6Although the idea of a human playing a game of infinite duration is already hard to imagine.
7The author found this wonderful passage in M. R. Vervoort PhD’s thesis [111].
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throughout the game, your instructions to him must envisage every
possible circumstance in which he may be required to move, and must
specify, for each such circumstance, what his choice is to be. Any such
complete set of instructions constitutes what we shall call a strategy.
Therefore we should not look at Player 1 directly as the chess player. Rather,
Player 1 is just a deputy who blindly follows somebody else’s instructions. This
metaphor fits perfectly with the notion of concurrent and independent execution
of sub-games modeled by 21
2
-player tree games. When, at some branching state,
the game is split in concurrent and independent sub-games, Player 1 calls enough
new available deputies, communicates them the instructions received from the
chess player, and all together they keep playing, independently, in the several sub-
games. We suggest that our definition of 21
2
-player tree game faithfully models
this scenario. Also the notion of mixed strategy, formalized in Definition 4.1.15,
is compatible with this picture: the chess player chooses randomly a strategy,
before the start of the game, and communicate it to the deputies.
4.2 Encoding of Blackwell games
The examples of 21
2
-player tree games discussed in Section 4.1 show that 21
2
-
player tree games can be used to model simple examples of games, such as the
“even-odd number” game of Example 4.1.22. In this section we show that 21
2
-
player tree games can actually model the wide class of Blackwell games, which
we introduced in Section 2.3.2. Our results suggest that the simple form of
concurrent and independent execution of sub-games, modeled by 21
2
-player tree
games, is surprisingly a powerful abstraction.
Let us fix an arbitrary Blackwell game B(X, Y, φ), where X={x0, . . . , xm} and
Y = {y0, . . . , yn}, for m,n∈N+, and φ : (X × Y )ω → [0, 1] is a (universally) mea-
surable payoff function. We are going to construct a two player (non-stochastic)
tree game G = 〈A,Φ〉 which encodes B(X, Y, φ) in a sense we will make precise
later on. The game G, which can be depicted as follows,


















is formally defined by the finite arena A=〈(S,E), (S1, S2, SN , B), π〉 specified as:




E(〈x, ?〉)={〈x, y〉}y∈Y , for every x∈X ,
E(〈y〉)=∅, for every y∈Y , and
E(〈x, y〉)={b}, for every x∈X and y∈Y .
• S1={s1}
S2={s2} ∪ {〈x, ?〉}x∈X ∪ {〈x, y〉}x∈X,y∈Y ∪ {〈y〉}y∈B
SN =∅,
B={b}.
• π is just the empty function since SN =∅.
As a first observation, note that since SN =∅, there are no states under the control
of Nature in A. This means that every Markov branching play in A is actually a
branching play, i.e., MBP=BP . For this reasons we will just denote with Tσ1,σ2
the (Markov) branching play induced by a deterministic strategy profile 〈σ1, σ2〉
in A from the state b, i.e., Tσ1,σ2 = 〈σ1, σ2〉
b, and we will directly write Φ(T bσ1,σ2)
in place of E(T bσ1,σ2). Secondly, the states of the form 〈y〉, for y∈Y , are terminal
because they have no successors in A, and the states of the form 〈x, y〉, for x∈X
and y ∈ Y have only one successor, namely the state b. These states have been
defined to be in S2, i.e., under the control of Player 2, by convention.
The tree game played on the arena A starting at b, can be described as follows.
At the initial step the game is split in two concurrent and independent sub-games,
one continuing its execution from the state s1 and the other from the state s2.
In the sub-game starting at s2 Player 2 chooses to move to one of the states 〈y〉,
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b
s1 〈x0, ?〉 〈x0, y0〉 b












Figure 4.1: Shape of a branching play T in A rooted at b
with y∈Y , on which the sub-game terminates. We say that Player 2 plays y as
their side move. In the sub-game starting at s1 Player 1 has to choose to move
to one of the states of the form 〈x, ?〉, for x∈X . We say that Player 1 plays x as
their main move. Once the state 〈x, ?〉 is reached, Player 2 has to choose a state
〈x, y〉, for y∈Y . We say that Player 2 plays y as their main move in response to
x. From the state 〈x, y〉 Player 2 has only one forced move to the state b, after
which the process is repeated again and again as described above.
Given this description, every branching play in the arena A, starting at b, can
be depicted as in Figure 4.1(a), or using a more succinct representation, as in
Figure 4.1(b), where we denoted with xn, yn and yns , for all n∈N, the main move
of Player 1, the main move of Player 2 in response of xn and the side move of
Player 2, at the n-th stage of the game, respectively. Note how from the succinct
representation one can reconstruct the explicit shape of any branching play T in
A in the obvious way.
The intuition behind the construction of A is that we want to model a play
((x0, y0), . . . , (xn, yn), . . . ) in the Blackwell game B(X, Y, φ) as a branching play
in A having xn = xn and yn = yn, using the notation introduced above, for
every n ∈N. However, while in the Blackwell game B(X, Y, φ), at any stage n,
Player 1 and Player 2 have to choose concurrently and independently their moves
xn+1 and yn+1, basing their decision on the previous history of played moves
h = ((x0, y0), . . . , (xn, yn)), in the tree game A, Player 1 is forced to choose a
move xn+1 based on the history h (as in B(X, Y, φ)), but Player 2, can choose
their yn+1 move based on h and on the move xn+1 made by Player 1. This clearly
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introduces an advantage for Player 2. In order to fix this asymmetry in the roles
of the two players, we introduced in A the structure necessary to model the side
moves of Player 2. Player 2, when choosing their side move at the n-th stage of
the game, can base their decision only on the history h= ((x0, y0), . . . , (xn, yn)),
without knowing what Player 1 will play as n+1-th move. If Player 2 were forced
to play in such a way that yn=yns , for all n∈N, we would re-establish the original
symmetry between the two players that we had in the Blackwell game B(X, Y, φ).
An infinite branch in a branching play T in A, for which yn=yns for all n∈N, thus
faithfully models a play in the game B(X, Y, φ). This idea will be fully formalized
in the rest of this section.
We start by defining the set Fair of branching plays in A on which Player 2
respects the policy of playing identical main moves and side moves, at each stage
of the game.
Definition 4.2.1. Let us define the set Fair ⊆ BP of branching plays in the
arena A as the set of branching plays T that, once represented as in Figure
4.1(a), satisfy the following property: ∀n ∈ N. yn = yns . If a branching play T is
in Fair we say that T is a fair branching play. It is simple to check that Fair is
open, being the union of all branching plays having, at some point, distinct main
and side moves. Hence Fair is a closed set.
As discussed above, each play in B(X, Y, φ) will be represented faithfully by
the (unique) infinite path ((x0, y0), . . . , (xn, yn), . . . ) of a fair branching play. We
denote with inf (T ) the infinite path in the fair branching play T . Note that
inf is a bijection between Fair and (X×Y )ω. Moreover, fixing the topology
on Fair as the subspace topology induced by the topology on BP , the map
inf :Fair→ (X × Y )ω and its inverse inf −1 are continuous, which means that inf
is a homeomorphism between (X×Y )ω and Fair .
We now specify the payoff function Φ for the arena A.








if T ∈ Fair
1 otherwise
Lemma 4.2.3. The function Φ is universally measurable.
Proof. We just need to show that, for every rational λ∈ [0, 1), Φ−1(λ, 1] is uni-
versally measurable. We have that





= Fair ∪ Φ|−1Fair (λ, 1],
where Φ|Fair denotes the function Φ restricted to the set Fair . This is obvious
since Φ(T )=1 for all T ∈Fair , by definition of Φ. As observed above, since Fair is





versally measurable, follows from the hypothesis that φ is univerally measurable,
inf is continuous as observed before, and the fact that composition of universally
measurable functions is universally measurable (see Corollary 2.1.74).
Remark 4.2.4. In the context of Blackwell games, one often8 says that φ is open9,
closed, Σ0α, Π
0
α, etc., if for all rationals λ∈ [0, 1), φ
−1((λ, 1]
)
is open, closed, Σ0α,
Π0α, etc. By inspecting the proof of Lemma 4.2.3, and by recalling that Fair
is open, one can easily show that φ and Φ have the same complexity, except in
the simple case when φ is closed, in which case Φ would be in ∆02, the smallest
class in the Borel hierarchy which contains all Boolean combinations of closed









∆0β respectively, for every α and every β>1.
Intuitively, it is the choice of the function Φ that discourages Player 2 from
playing main moves different from side moves, because any unfair branching play
is maximally rewarded in favor of Player 1 by Φ. This suggests that Player 2
does not want to play unfairly, where the notion of unfair strategy for Player 2
is formally defined as follows:
Definition 4.2.5 (Unfair strategy for Player 2 in A). Let ~s be a finite path in
A such that last(~s)=b, and let x∈X . We say that a strategy σ2 for Player 2 in
A is (~s, x)-unfair, if
1. σ2(~s.s2) = 〈y1〉, with y1∈Y
2. σ2(~s.s1.〈x, ?〉) = 〈x, y2〉, with y2∈Y
3. y1 6= y2.
Note that the set of (~s, x)-unfair strategies is a basic open in Σ2, and it is denoted
here by O~s,x. We define the set Σ
unfair
2 of unfair strategies for Player 2 in A, as
the union of the sets O~s,x, for every pair (~s, x) as described above. It follows
that Σunfair2 is open and its Σ
fair
2 , which we refer to as the set of fair strategies for
Player 2, is closed.
8This convention is, for instance, followed in [74] and [111].
9Note that open payoffs are not open functions in the topological sense.
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Note that a branching play resulting from any play in A, where Player 2
follows a fair strategy, is fair. Further, an equivalent characterization for Σfair2 is
as the set of all strategies for Player 2 for which no counter-strategy for Player
1 can induce an unfair branching play. The fact, informally stated earlier, that
Player 2 does not want to play unfair strategies, is formalized by the following
lemma.
Lemma 4.2.6. Given an arbitrary strategy σ2 for Player 2 in G=〈A,Φ〉, define














〈x, y〉 if ~s = ~t.b.s1.〈x, ?〉 for some x∈X and σ2(~s.b.s2)=〈y〉
σ2(~s) if last(~s)=s2
b if last(~s)=〈x, y〉, for some x∈X, y∈X
• if last(~s)=〈y〉, for some y∈Y








Proof. It is easily seen that σf2 is well-defined and is always a fair strategy. Let
us fix an arbitrary strategy σ1 for Player 1. We need to show that the inequality





) holds. If T bσ1,σ2 ∈ Fair , then the inequality trivially holds,
since by definition Φ(T bσ1,σ2) = 1. Suppose then that T
b
σ1,σ2
∈ Fair . It is easy to





. This is because a play never reaches an
history ~s, at some n-th stage of the game, in which σ2 plays different side and
main moves, and the decisions taken by σ2 and σ
f
2 on all histories ~s (of the first
two cases presented in the definition above), where σ2 behaves fairly, coincide.






In other words, however Player 1 plays, the fair strategy σf2 always performs
at least as well, from Player 2’s prospective, as σ2.
Definition 4.2.7. We denote with fair : Σ2 → Σ
fair
2 the function defined by
fair(σ2) = σ
f
2 . Note that fair , restricted to the set Σ
fair
2 is just the identity
function. Moreover the map fair is clearly continuous.
We next show that the sets of strategies for Player 1 and Player 2 in B(X, Y, φ)
coincide with the set of strategies for Player 1 in G and the set of fair strategies
for Player 2 in G respectively.
Definition 4.2.8. Let ΣB1 and Σ1 denote the sets of strategies in the Blackwell
game B(X, Y, φ) and in the tree game G = 〈A,Φ〉 respectively. We define the
function code1 :Σ
B
1 → Σ1 as follows:
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code1(σ
B
1 )(~s) = 〈σ
B
1 (main(~s)), ?〉
where ~s ∈ P<ω1 , which in the context of the arena A implies last(~s) = s1, and
main(~s) :P<ω1 → (X×Y )
<ω extracts the sequence of main moves played by Player
1 and Player 2 in the history ~s.
Lemma 4.2.9. The function code1 defined above is a homeomorphism between
ΣB1 and Σ1.
Proof. Straightforward.
Definition 4.2.10. Let ΣB2 denote the set of strategies for Player 2 in the Black-




















〈x, σB2 (main(~t))〉 if ~s = ~t.〈x, ?〉 for some x∈X
〈σB2 (main(~s))〉 if last(~s) = s2
b if last(~s) = 〈x, y〉, for some x∈X , y∈Y
• if last(~s) = 〈y〉, for some y∈Y
where ~s∈P<ω2 , which in the context of the arena A implies that ~s is in exactly
one of the four cases considered in the definition, and main is specified as in
Definition 4.2.8. Note that in the last two clauses, the definition is forced by the
structure of A, and in the third clause the definition is automatically induced by
the first clause, because, as specified by its codomain, code2 has to map strategies
in σB2 into fair strategies.





It is worth observing how the strategy code2(σ
B
2 ), when making a decision after
one of Player 1’s main moves x (see first clause in Definition 4.2.10), ignores the
information about x and just bases their decision on the previous game-history.
This, together with the fact that Σfair2 is homeomorphic (via code2) to Σ
B
2 provides
a formal statement of the fact that Player 2 when playing fairly in A, really does
act as if they were playing in B(X, Y, φ).
Definition 4.2.12. We define the function code : (ΣB1 × Σ
B
2 ) → (Σ1 × Σ
fair
2 )
as code(σB1 , σ
B




2 )〉. The map code is clearly a homeomor-
phism.
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The following equation, which will be useful later on, follows trivially from
the definitions of code and inf .
inf ◦ 〈 , 〉b ◦ code=〈 , 〉B (4.1)
where 〈 , 〉b and 〈 , 〉B are specified as in definitions 4.1.11 and 2.3.22 respec-
tively.
So far we have established a correspondence between deterministic strategy
profiles in B(X, Y, φ) and fair deterministic strategy profiles in G, via the homeo-
morphism code. We now carry on by providing a correspondence between mixed
strategies for Player 1 and Player 2 in the Blackwell game B(X, Y, φ) and in G.
Recall, from definitions 2.3.26 and 4.1.15, that a mixed strategy ηB1 for Player




1 ), while a mixed
strategy η1 for Player 1 in G is a probability measure over Σ1, i.e., η1∈M1(Σ1).
Definition 4.2.13. We define the function mcode1 : M1(ΣB1 ) → M1(Σ1) from
mixed strategies for Player 1 in B(X, Y, φ) to mixed strategies for Player 1 in
G, as mcode1 = M1(code1), or equivalently as the probability measure uniquely
specified on every Borel set S⊆Σ1 as follows:
mcode1(η
B







It follows from the fact that M1 is a functor on Polish spaces, that mcode1
is a homeomorphism between M1(ΣB1 ) and M1(Σ1). Thus we have established
a correspondence (via mcode1) between mixed strategies for Player 1 in the two
games. We now turn our attention to Player 2’s mixed strategies. We first define
the notion of fair mixed strategy for Player 2 in the game G as follows:
Definition 4.2.14 (Fair mixed strategy). We define a fair mixed strategy for
Player 2 in G as a probability measure ηf2 ∈ M1(Σ2) over the space of mixed





In other words a mixed strategy η2 for Player 2 is fair if it chooses randomly
to behave almost surely as a fair strategy. Clearly fair mixed strategies are in
1-1 correspondence with probability measures on the subspace Σfair2 , thus we just
look at ηf2 as an element in M1(Σ
fair
2 ).
Definition 4.2.15. We define the function mcode2 :M1(ΣB2 )→M1(Σ
fair
2 ) from
mixed strategies for Player 1 in B(X, Y, φ) to fair mixed strategies for Player 1 in
G, as mcode2 =M1(code2), or equivalently as the probability measure uniquely
specified on every Borel set S⊆Σfair2 :
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mcode2(η
B







It follows, again from the fact that M1 is a functor on Polish spaces and the
fact that Σ2 and Σ
fair
2 are homeomorphic via code2, that mcode2 is a homeomor-
phism between M1(ΣB2 ) and M1(Σ
fair
2 ).
We now prove the analogue of Lemma 4.2.6 for fair mixed strategies for Player
2 in A, i.e., we formalize the intuition that Player 2 does not want to play unfair
mixed strategies.
Lemma 4.2.16. Let us fix an arbitrary mixed strategy η2 for Player 2 in G. Then




(η2) is such that for every mixed strategy
η1 for Player 1 in G, E(Pbη1,ηf2
)≤E(Pbη1,η2) holds.
Proof. The mixed strategy ηf2 ∈ M1(Σ2) can be more explicitly defined as the






on all Borel subsets S of Σ2. Thus it is obvious that η
f
2 is indeed a fair mixed
strategy. Let us fix an arbitrary mixed strategy η1 ∈M1(Σ1) for Player 1 in G.













The desired result then trivially follows from Definition 4.1.8.
In other words, however Player 1 plays, the fair mixed strategy ηf2 always
performs at least as well, from Player 2’s prospective, as η2.
Definition 4.2.17. We define the function mcode, mapping Blackwell mixed























Thus mcode is clearly a homeomorphism between the two spaces.
We are now finally ready to state our main theorem which formally proves
that G=〈A,Φ〉 is a faithful encoding of B(X, Y, φ).
































where in the first two assertions ηf2 ranges over the set M1(Σ
fair
2 ) of fair mixed
strategies for Player 2 in G.

















respectively. Then the first two assertions trivially follow from Lemma 4.2.16.



































































The equality E1 follows from the first assertion of the theorem which allow us to
restrict to fair mixed strategies ηf2 for Player 2. Equality E2 holds because every
fair mixed strategy σf2 assigns probability 1 to the set Σ
fair
2 of fair deterministic
strategies for Player 2. Since we restricted our attention to fair strategies for
Player 2, which necessarily induces fair branching plays, the equality E3 holds by
Definition 4.2.2 of the payoff function Φ. Lastly, E4 follows from the simple high-
level observation that given Polish spaces A, A′, B and B′ and homeomorphisms














h ◦ (f−1×g−1) d(µ′×ν ′)
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where h :A×B→ [0, 1] is universally measurable and µ, ν, µ′ and ν ′ range over
the set of probability measures over A, B, A′ and B′ respectively. In our case,
A, B, A′ and B′ are the spaces ΣB1 , Σ
B
2 , Σ1 and Σ
fair
2 , and the homeomorphisms
are the maps code1 and code2. The proof then follows taking h = φ ◦ 〈 , 〉
B
and from the fact, which is an immediate consequence of Equation 4.1, that
h ◦ (code−11 ×code
−1
2 )=φ ◦ inf ◦ 〈 , 〉
b.
The proof of the fourth assertion of the theorem is similar.
Corollary 4.2.19. If the payoff function of the Blackwell game B(X, Y, φ) is
Borel measurable, then MVALb↓(G)=MVAL
b
↑(G).
Proof. An immediate consequence of theorems 4.2.18 and 2.3.31.
4.3 Subtree-monotone winning sets
We introduce in this section useful structures, called branching pre-plays and
Markov branching pre-plays, which will be useful for analyzing properties of 21
2
-
player tree games in later sections, and will allow us to identify an interesting
class of winning sets for 21
2
-player tree games.
Definition 4.3.1 (Antichain of finite paths in A). Given a 21
2
-player tree game
arena A, an antichain S of finite paths in A is an antichain (see Definition 2.1.6)
in the poset (P<ωA ,⊳), i.e., a possibly empty subset S={~sj}i∈J ⊆P
<ω, such that
for every i 6= j∈J , ~si /⊳~sj and ~sj /⊳~si. Note that since P
<ω is countable, so is the
index set J of every antichain in A. Thus we shall always assume that J⊆N.
Definition 4.3.2 (Branching pre-play). Let G=〈A,Φ〉 be a 21
2
-player tree game,
with A = 〈(S,E), (S1, S2, SN , B), π〉, and let us fix an antichain S = {~sj}j∈J of
finite paths in A. We denote with sj the state last(~sj), for j ∈ J . Let T ∈ BP
be a branching play in the arena A, and let I ⊆ J be the index set of all paths
{~sj}j∈J ∩ T . Let us denote with Ri, for i∈I, the set of paths defined as follows:
{si}∪{~r | ∃~t ∈ T.~t= ~si.~r}. The set Ri is a branching play rooted at si, as it is
the sub-branching play of T rooted at the path ~si. The branching play T can be
depicted as in Figure 4.2(a), where the triangle on the left represents the set of
paths in T not having any path in S as prefix, the edge labeled with ~si represents
the path ~si whose last state is si, and the triangle labeled with Ri represents the






















(c) Branching play T [Ti]i∈I
Figure 4.2: Branching plays and branching pre-plays
sub-branching play Ri, for i ∈ I 10. We define the branching pre-play obtained
by pruning T with the antichain S, denoted by T [xi]i∈I , as the tree which can be
depicted as in Figure 4.2(b), i.e the set of finite paths formally defined as follows:




{~t∈T | ~si⊳~t ∧ ~t 6=~si }
)
.
In other words T [xi] is the tree T where the subtrees Ri (except their roots si),
for i∈I, have been removed.
In what follows, we shall consistently use the letters J and I to denote the
entire index set of an antichain and the the set of indexes of those paths that lie
in an already identified branching play, respectively.
Definition 4.3.3. Let G = 〈A,Φ〉 be a 21
2
-player tree game, and S= {~sj}j∈J an
antichain of finite paths in A. We denote with BP|S the set of all branching
10The picture is quite simplistic. For example there are, in general, (infinite) paths in T not
belonging to any subtree Ri, for i∈I, that nonetheless branch away from the path ~si, for i∈I,
somewhere between the root s and the last state si of ~si, whereas the picture depicts all such
branches as branching away immediately at the root s.
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pre-plays obtained by pruning some branching play T ∈BP with the antichain S.
We denote with π|S :BP →BP|S the function mapping a branching play T ∈BP
to the corresponding branching pre-play T [xi]i∈I obtained by pruning T with S.
We now endow the set BP|S with a topology, similar to the one defined on
the set BP of branching plays (see Definition 2.1.38).
Definition 4.3.4 (Topology on BP|S). Given a finite tree F in A, we denote
with OF the set of all branching pre-plays T [xi]i∈I ∈ BP|S containing the finite
set of paths F . The topology on BP|S is generated by the basis consisting of all
sets OF , for F a finite tree in A. This is a 0-dimensional Polish space. Note that
the map π|S is continuous with respect to this topology.
The notation adopted for branching pre-plays is motivated by the use we make
of them. We consider a branching pre-play T [xi]i∈I ∈BP|S as a context on which
we can plug in, at the holes i∈ I, other branching plays. We now formalize this
idea.
Definition 4.3.5. Let S= {~sj}j∈J be an antichain of finite paths in A. We say
that a branching play T ∈BP in A is compatible with sj, with j∈J , if and only
if root(T ) = last(~sj). The basic open set of all branching plays compatible with
~sj is denoted with BP j. We denote with BP
S ⊆ BPJ , the set of all J-indexed
sequences of branching plays {Tj}j∈J , such that Tj∈BP j, and we refer to this set
as the set of S-compatible sequences of branching plays. Recall that the index-set
J is at most countable.
Definition 4.3.6 (Topology of BPS). Each set BP j , for j ∈ J is endowed with
the subspace topology from BP . The set BPS is then endowed with the product
topology from BP j, for j ∈ J . More concretely, given a K-indexed collection
~Fk ={Fk}k∈K of finite trees in A, with K a finite subset of J , we denote with O~Fk
the set of all tuples {Tj}j∈J ∈BP
S such that Fk ⊆Tk, for every k∈K. This is a
0-dimensional Polish space.
We are now ready to describe how the holes of a branching pre-play can be
filled by other branching plays.
Definition 4.3.7. Let S= {~sj}j∈J be an antichain of finite paths in A, and let
T [xi]i∈I ∈BP|S, for I⊆J , be a branching pre-play in A, i.e., a branching pre-play
obtained by pruning some T ∈ BP with S. Let {Tj}j∈J ∈ BP
S be a compatible
4.3. Subtree-monotone winning sets 151
sequence of branching plays. We then denote with T [Ti]i∈I , the branching play
which can be depicted as in Figure 4.2(c), i.e the branching play formally defined
as follows:






where merge(~si, Ti), specified as in Definition 2.1.33, is the set of finite paths
obtained by concatenating ~si with every path ~t ∈ Ti, by merging the last state






eration defined as: fillS
(
T [xi]i∈I , {Tj}j∈J
)
=T [Ti]i∈I . The function fillS is clearly
continuous.
Note that given a branching pre-play T [xi]i∈I ∈BP|S, there are in general many
compatible sequences {Tj}j∈J ∈BP
S such that fillS
(
〈T [xi]i∈I , {Tj}j∈J〉
)
= T , for
a given T ∈BP (this is always the case when I ( J , and some of the branching
plays in {Tj}j∈J cannot be filled in T [xi]i∈I). Observe that fillS is surjective.
Moreover note that:
1. if T = fillS(〈T [xi]i∈I , {Tj}j∈J〉), then π|S(T ) = T [xi]i∈I , i.e., if a branching
play T is obtained by filling a branching pre-play T [xi]i∈I with some com-
patible branching plays, then the branching pre-play obtained by pruning
T with S is indeed T [xi]i∈I .
2. Fixed a branching pre-play T [xi]i∈I , the branching play fillS(〈T [xi]i∈I , {Tj}j∈J〉)
obtained by filling T [xi]i∈I with a sequence {Tj}j∈J ∈BP
S is determined only
by the fillable components (Ti for i∈I) and does not depend on the others
(Tj for j∈J \ I).
3. The branching play fillS(〈T [xi]i∈I , {Tj}j∈J〉) itself uniquely determines, not
only the branching pre-play T [xi]i∈I as observed earlier, but also the I-
indexed collection of fillable branching plays Ti.
Given the above, we can unambiguously write T =S T [Ti]i∈I to denote the
decomposition of T into its induced branching pre-play T [xi]i∈I and its collection
of compatible branching plays {Tj}i∈J , since the branching plays Tj with j ∈ J\I
play no role in the substitution.
We are now ready to introduce the central notion of this section.
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Definition 4.3.8 (Subtree-monotone winning sets). Let G = 〈A,Φ〉 be a two
player stochastic tree-game, in which the payoff Φ is a winning set, i.e., a (uni-
versally meaurable) function Φ :BP →{0, 1}. We say that G, or more precisely
the winning set Φ of G, is subtree-monotone if, for every antichain of finite paths




Φ(Ti)≤Φ(Ri) ⇒ Φ(T [Ti]i∈I)≤Φ(T [Ri]i∈I),
for every collection of S-compatible branching plays {Rj}i∈J and {Tj}i∈J in BP
S.
In other words the winning set Φ of G satisfies the subtree-monotonicity
property when, for every branching play T =S T [Ti]i∈I , if one replaces the sub-
branching play Ti with Ri, for i∈I, taking care of substituting winning branching
plays with winning branching plays, then T [Ri]i∈I is in Φ whenever the original
T [Ti]i∈I is.
We now discuss another way to formulate the notion of subtree-monotonicity
of a winning set Φ (Lemma 4.3.12 below) which is going to be useful later on.
The payoff function Φ:BP→{0, 1} can be lifted to a function Φ̂ of type (BP|S×
BPS)→{0, 1} using the fillS map: Φ̂=Φ ◦ fillS. It follows from the continuity of
fillS and the universal measurability of Φ, that the lifted function Φ̂ is universally
measurable. Given a branching pre-play T [xi]i∈I , it is useful to denote with
Φ̂T [~xi] :BP
S →{0, 1} the function Φ̂T [~xi]({Tj}j∈J) = Φ̂(T [xi]i∈I , {Tj}j∈J), i.e., the
map obtained from Φ̂ by fixing the first component to T [xi]i∈I .
Lemma 4.3.9. For every branching pre-play T [xi]i∈I ∈BP|S, the function Φ̂T [~xi]
is universally measurable.
Proof. This follows from the application of Lemma 2.1.76.
Note that, by previous considerations about the filling operation fillS, the
function Φ̂T [~xi] :BP
S→{0, 1} ignores the k-th component of its input {Tj}j∈J , for
k∈J \ I.
Let us further define the function ΦS : BPS → {0, 1}J defined by pointwise
application of Φ to the J-indexed sequences of compatible branching plays in BPS,




={Φ(Tj)}j∈J . The space
{0, 1}J is a pospace (see Definition 2.1.58), where the topology is the product
topology (with {0, 1} endowed with the discrete topology), and the order on
J-indexed sequences is is defined pointwise from the order 0⊑1.
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Observation 4.3.10. Note that the map ΦS is, in general, not surjective. How-
ever, as we now discuss, ΦS factors through a surjective (universally measurable)
map to a closed subset BS of {0, 1}J and a (continuous) map γS : BS →{0, 1}J .
Let us define, for every j ∈ J , the set bj ⊆ {0, 1} as bj = {0} if BPj ∩ Φ = ∅,
bj = {1} if BPj ⊆ Φ, and bj = {0, 1} otherwise. We denote with BS the product
space
∏
j bj , where each bj is given the discrete topology. Note that B
S is indeed
a closed sub-pospace of {0, 1}J . The function φS, of type BS→{0, 1}J , is defined
as the identity and is trivially continuous, by definition of subspace topology (see
Definition 2.1.20). It is easy to verify that ΦS ranges over the restricted codomain
BS and therefore is surjective
Lemma 4.3.11. The function ΦS is universally measurable. Moreover, when the
codomain is narrowed to its range BS, ΦS preserves the open sets, i.e., ΦS(U) is
open in BS for every open set U ∈BPS.
Proof. The universal measurability follows by application of Lemma 2.1.77 and
the assumption that Φ is universally measurable. For the second point, since
direct images preserve arbitrary unions, we just need to prove that ΦS(U) is open
for every basic open set U ⊆ BPS, i.e., every set of the form U = {Uj}j∈J with
Uk ⊆BPk for some finite set K ⊆ J and Uj =BP j for all j ∈ J \ K. Since Φ is
surjective, as observed earlier, the set f(U) is of the form {Φ(Uk), Uj}k∈K,j∈J\K.
The desired result then follows from the fact Φ(Uk) is open for every k ∈ K,
because every subset of every subset of bk is open.
We can now rephrase Definition 4.3.8 as follows:
Lemma 4.3.12. Let G = 〈A,Φ〉 be a two player stochastic tree-game, in which
Φ :BP →{0, 1} is a winning set. Then Φ is subtree-monotone if and only if for
every antichain of finite paths S={~sj}j∈J in A and for every branching pre-play
T [xi]i∈I ∈BP|S, the following property is satisfied:
Φ̂T [~xi] =φT [~xi] ◦ Φ
S
for some monotone map (relative to the pointwise ordering) φT [~xi] :B
S→{0, 1}.
Proof. We first prove that if Φ̂T [~xi] = φT [~xi] ◦ Φ
S then Φ is subtree monotone.
Consider two S-compatible sequences {Tj}j∈J and {Rj}j∈J of branching plays
and suppose Φ(Ti)≤Φ(Ri), for every i∈ I. We need to show thet Φ(T [Ti]i∈I)≤
Φ(T [Ri]i∈I). From the assumptions it follows that the i-th component of the
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sequence ΦS({Tj}j∈J) is less or equal than the i-th component of ΦS({Tj}j∈J), for
i∈I. By previous considerations we know that Φ̂T [~x] ignores the j-th component of
its input, for j∈J \I. It then follows from the assumption that Φ̂T [~xi] =φT [~xi]◦Φ
S,
that φT [~x] ignores the j-th component of its input, for j∈J\I, as well. The desired
result then follows by monotonicity of φT [~x].
Suppose now that Φ is subtree monotone. This means that for every branch-
ing pre-play T [xi]i∈I and every S-compatible sequences {Tj}j∈J and {Rj}j∈J of
branching plays such that Φ(Ti)≤Φ(Ri), the inequality Φ(T [Ti]i∈I)≤Φ(T [Ri]i∈I)
holds. Recall that T [Ti]i∈I denotes the branching play fillS
(
T [xi]i∈I , {Tj}j∈J)
which does not depend on the j-th component of {Tj}j∈J , for j∈J \ I. From the
definition of Φ̂T [~x], we have that Φ(T [Ti]i∈I) = Φ̂T [~x]
(
{Tj}j∈ J), and Φ̂T [~x] ignores
the j-th component of its input, for j ∈ J \ I. Therefore Φ̂T [~x] : BP





−→ {0, 1} for some monotone f . In other words, the map
ΦS restricts the information contained in the input {Ti, Tj}i∈I,j∈J\I to the relevant
one. The proof is concluded by taking φT [~xi]=f .
Note that Lemma 4.3.12 does not assert any measurability property of φT [~xi].
The following property will be useful in the proof of the main result of this section
(Theorem 4.3.17 below).
Lemma 4.3.13. Given a probability measure µ∈M1(BP
S), let φT [~xi] :B
S→{0, 1}






Proof. Since {0, 1} is endowed with the product topology, it is sufficient to show
that the set C=φ−1T [~xi]({1}) is ν-measurable. Note that Φ
S−1(C) is µ-measurable,
because φT [~xi] ◦ Φ
S =Φ̂T [~x] is universally measurable, by Lemma 4.3.9. The result
then follows from the fact that ΦS :BPS→BS is surjective, preserving the open sets
(Lemma 4.3.11) and by application of Lemma A.5.2, taking f=ΦS, X=ΦS
−1
(C)
and Y =C in the statement of the lemma.
Let us now turn our attention to Markov branching plays. The same kind
of constructions, namely the notion of Markov branching pre-play M [xi]i∈I (for
some I ⊆ J), S-compatible sequence of Markov branching plays {Mj}j∈J , the
topological spaces MBP|S, MBP
S, and the continuous map MfillS : MBP|S×
MBPS→MBP can be defined as for their branching play counterparts, just by
replacing in the definitions the word “branching play” with “Markov branching
play”.
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denotes the product measure having P(Mj) as j-th compo-
nent for every j∈J .
It follows from Lemma 2.1.77 and from the fact that P is continuous (see
4.1.4), that PS is continuous as well.
Definition 4.3.15. We define P|S :MBP|S→ M1(BP|S) as the probability mea-




(OF ) on basic clopen
sets OF ⊆ BP|S defined as:
{ ∏
{πM [~xi](~s,~t) | ~s,~t∈F and ~t is a child of ~s in M [xi]i∈I ]} if F ⊆M [xi]i∈I
0 otherwise
where the function πM [~xi] labeling the edges in M [xi]i∈I with probabilities, is
induced from the arena A, as described in Definition 4.1.2.



















Proof. In what follows we just write M [Mi]i∈I , or just M , to denote the Markov
branching play MfillS
(
〈M [xi]i∈I , {Mj}j∈J〉
)
, which does not depend on the j-th
component, for j ∈ J \ I, of {Mj}j∈J . We shall keep the notation consistent by
always writing M [xi]i∈I to denote the Markov branching pre-play of M [Mi]i∈I .























Recall that OF is the set of branching plays containing the finite tree F in A.
Let us define, from the set (of finite paths in A) F , the sets G and {Gj}j∈J as
follows: G= {~t ∈ F | ∀~sj ∈ S. ~sj 6⊳~t}, and Gj = {~t ∈ F |~sj ⊳ ~t}, for every j ∈ J .
Recall from the Definition 2.1.33 that the relation ⊳ is not strict, hence ~sj can be
contained in both G and in Gj . Note that, since F is finite, only finitely many of
these partitioning sets are non-empty, and G is necessarily not empty. Moreover
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each of these non-empty sets is ⊳-down closed and has a minimal element: the
minimal element of G is root(F ) and indeed G is a finite tree in A, and the
minimal element of Gj is ~sj. Let us define for each Gj the set Hj as follows:
Hj = {last(~sj)} ∪
{
~r | ~t=~sj .~r for some ~t∈Gj
}
Then Hj is a finite tree in A rooted at sj . Therefore OHj is a basic open subset
in BP j , the space of branching plays in A rooted at sj , for every j ∈ J . In
particular, if Gj =∅ or Gj ={~sj} for some ~sj∈S, then OHj =BP j , for every j∈J .
Note that G can not be non-empty because it contains the path root(F ). When
root(F )=sj, for some ~sj ={sj} in S, then G={~sj} and OG =BPj .
Let us now turn our attention to the Markov branching play M =M [Mi]i∈I
obtained by filling M [xi]i∈I with {Mi}i∈I . It easily follows from earlier definitions
of the sets G and Hj, for j ∈J , that fill
−1
S (OF ) = {〈T [xl]l∈L, {Tj}j∈J | T [xl]l∈L ∈
OG and ∀j ∈ J. Tj ∈OHj}, where T [xl]l∈L (and the associated index set L⊆ J)
ranges over Markov branching pre-plays. Therefore, by definitions of P|S, PS and




























), by Definition of 4.1.3 we have










{πM(~s,~t) | ~s,~t∈Gj and ~t is a child of ~s in M} if Gj ⊆M
0 otherwise




(OG). Note that if G 6⊆




(OG) = 0 and the desired result immediately follows.





(OG)=0 if G contains any path ~sk∈S, for some k 6∈ J \ I. Let
us then assume that G does not contain any path ~sk∈S, with k∈J \ L. For any
such k∈J \L, by definition of Gk, we have that Gk =∅ and as observed earlier this




(OHk) = λGk , for every k ∈ J \ L, because
the empty product has value 1. To conclude the proof we just need to show that





(OHi) = λGi , for every i ∈ I. This follows immediately from definition of
Hi and Definition 4.1.3 of P(Mi) because Mi is exactly, by Definition 4.3.2, the
sub-Markov branching play of M rooted at ~si∈S.
We are now ready to state the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 4.3.17. Let G = 〈A,Φ〉 be a two player stochastic tree game in which
Φ is a winning set. If Φ is subtree-monotone then, for every antichain of finite
paths S={~sj}j∈J in A and for every Markov branching pre-play M [xi]i∈I ∈BP|S,







⇒ E(M [Mi]i∈I)≤E(M [Ni]i∈I) + ǫ,
for every S-compatible sequences {Mj}j∈J , {Nj}j∈J ∈MBP
S of Markov branching
plays in A, where # : N→N is specified11 as in Definition 2.2.9. For ǫ= 0 the





⇒ E(M [Mi]i∈I)≤E(M [Ni]i∈I),








Recall that M [Mi]i∈I =Mfill
(
M [xi]i∈I , {Mi, Rj}i∈I,j∈J\I}
)
, i.e., it is the Markov
branching play obtained by filling the holes in the Markov branching pre-play
M [xi]i∈I with the S-compatible sequence of Markov branching plays {Mi, Rj}i,j,
where the choice of Rj , for j∈J \I, is arbitrary because the function Mfill ignores
the components which can not be filled into M [xi]i∈I . Similarly for M [Ni]i∈I .
From Lemma 4.3.16, we know that the equalities:























hold. In what follows we just write {Mi, Rj}i,j and {Ni, Rj}i,j to refer to the
S-compatible sequences {Mi, Rj}i∈I,j∈J\I and {Ni, Rj}i∈I,j∈J\I respectively. By
















11Recall from Definition 4.3.1, that the index sets J , and therefore also I ⊆ J , are always
assumed to be a subset of N.
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Observe that the outer integrals of both equalities coincide in form. Let us
consider the inner integrals. Since Φ is by hypothesis subtree-monotone, we
know from Lemma 4.3.12 that the function Φ̂T [~yk] is of the form φT [~y] ◦ Φ
S. Thus
we can rewrite both inner integrals as
∫
BPS



































respectively, for some monotone φT [~yk] : {0, 1}
J → {0, 1}. By Lemma 4.3.13, this
is a valid step because the function φ[T [~y] is measurable with respect to the two
relevant probability measures.











assigns probability P(Mi)(Φ), or equivalently E(Mi), to the basic open subset of
BS ⊆ {0, 1}J having i-th component equal to 1, for every i∈ I, and probability
P(Rj)(Φ) to every the basic open set subset of {0, 1}J having j-th component










is the product probability measure over
BS having as i-th (respectively j-th) component the probability measure over
bj ⊆{0, 1} (see Observation 4.3.10) corresponding to the probability of hitting a
winning branching play (i.e., in the set Φ) induced via P by the Markov branching





the two probability measures coincide in the j-th component for j∈J \ I.


















































The desired result E(M [Mi]i∈I)≤E(M [Ni]i∈I) + ǫ then trivially follows from the
fact, highlighted before, that the two outer integrals coincide in form.
The result of Theorem 4.3.16 can be understood as follows: given a Markov
branching play M [Mi]i∈I , if one replaces the sub-Markov branching play Mi with
Ni, for i ∈ I, taking care to pick Ni with an expected probability of hitting Φ
lower or equal than that of Mi plus
ǫ
#(i)
, then the resulting Markov branching
play M [Mi]i∈I has an expected probability of hitting Φ lower or equal than that
of M [Mi]i∈I plus ǫ. Thus Theorem 4.3.16 establishes a sort of continuity result
of the expected value of Markov branching plays: small changes in the (expected
value of) sub-Markov branching plays Mi produce small changes in the compound
Markov branching play M [Mi]i∈I .
As we shall see in the rest of this chapter, subtree monotone winning sets
constitute an interesting class of objectives in 21
2
-player tree games. They might
be considered a natural generalization of the notion of prefix-independent winning
sets (in ordinary 21
2
-player games) to the context of 21
2
-player tree games. In
particular, standard 21
2
-player games with prefix independent winning sets, when
considered as 21
2
-player tree games without branching states (see Definition 4.1.5),
are subtree monotone.
Lemma 4.3.18. Let G = 〈A,Φ〉 a standard 21
2
-player game with a prefix inde-
pendent winning set Φ. Then Φ is subtree monotone.
Proof. Since the game arena A does not contain branching plays, the set of
branching plays in A coincides with the set of completed paths in A (see Lemma
4.1.6). Thus the branching pre-play, obtained by pruning a branching play (i.e.,
a completed path ~r) with an antichain S of finite paths in A, is either:
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• a finite path ~si ∈S, if ~r=~si.~t: in this case the branching pre-play has just
one hole waiting to be filled in by a branching play (i.e., a completed path)
starting at last(~si);
• or ~r itself: in this case the branching pre-play has no holes.
We need to prove that, given Φ prefix independent, Φ is subtree monotone. In the
context of a game arena A without branching states, all we need to prove is that,
for every finite path ~s and for every pair of completed paths ~r and ~t, if Φ(~r)≤Φ(~t)
then Φ(~s.~r)≤ Φ(~r.~t). This implication trivially follows from Definition 2.3.59 of
prefix independent set.
Another important (informal) viewpoint, which actually originally inspired
the definition of subtree-monotonicity, is the following. In a 21
2
-player tree game
G = 〈A,Φ〉 with Φ subtree monotone, both players would not get any advantage
if they were allowed to “observe” the execution of other concurrent sub-games
which might have been generated during a play. Indeed suppose that T [T1, T2]
(i.e., a branching play with two sub-branching plays T1 and T2), was the final
outcome of the game and Player 1, say, observed the execution of the sub-game(s)
corresponding to the sub-branching play T1 in order to improve their play in the
sub-game(s) which ended up in T2. Since Φ is subtree-monotone, Player 1 could
have just played their best in the second sub-game(s), ignoring how the first
sub-game(s) were progressing, inducing a winning sub-branching play T ′2 as least
as good as T2. The resulting T [T1, T
′
2] is winning whenever T [T1, T2] is winning.
This is deliberately a very vague property about subtree-monotone winning sets.
Formalizing it precisely might be an interesting direction of future work.
We now state two questions about subtree-monotone winning sets.
Question 4.3.19. Every 21
2
-player tree game G=〈A,Φ〉 with Φ a Borel subtree
monotone winning set is determined under deterministic strategies.
More generally,




player tree game G = 〈A,Φ〉 with Φ a Γ1n-measurable subtree monotone winning
set is determined12 under deterministic strategies.
12Note that, in accordance with Definition 4.1.7, the winning set of a tree game must be
universally measurable. It follows from Theorem 2.3.19 that, under Γ1n-determinacy, every set
in Γ1n is universally measurable.
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These results, which we were not able to prove in this thesis work, would have
important implications in the theory we will develop in later sections.
We conclude this section by presenting a useful generalization of Theorem
4.3.17.
Definition 4.3.21. Let G=〈A,Φ〉 be a two player stochastic tree-game, in which
the payoff Φ is a winning set, i.e., a (universally meaurable) function Φ∈{0, 1}BP .
For every universally measurable set Ψ ∈ {0, 1}BP and antichain of finite paths
S is A, we say that Φ is
(
S,Ψ)-subtree monotone if for every branching pre-play





⇒ Φ(T [Ti]i∈I)≤Φ(T [Ri]i∈I),
for every collection of S-compatible branching plays {Rj}i∈J and {Tj}i∈J in BP
S.
It then follows that the subtree monotonicity property of Definition 4.3.8 can be
rephrased as follows: Φ is subtree monotone if and only if it is (S,Φ)-subtree
monotone for every antichain of finite paths S is A.
Theorem 4.3.22. Let G = 〈A,Φ〉 be a 21
2
-player tree game in which Φ is a
winning set. If Φ is (S,Ψ)-subtree monotone then, for every Markov branching







⇒ E(M [Mi]i∈I)≤E(M [Ni]i∈I) + ǫ,
for every S-compatible sequences {Mj}j∈J , {Nj}j∈J ∈MBP
S.
This theorem is proved by checking that the proof of Theorem 4.3.22 applies
mutatis mutandis to the new situation. Our reason for not proving the result at
this greater level of generality is to avoid inessential notational complications in
a proof that is already technically quite involved.
4.4 De-randomization of 21
2
-player tree games
Stochastic games, such as standard 21
2
-player games or 21
2
-player tree games, are
played by Player 1 and Player 2 together with a third agent, named Nature,
which models the randomized choices occurring in the game. As we shall see in
this section, the concept of concurrent and independent execution of sub-games is
expressive enough to model stochastic behavior without the need of introducing
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The idea is quite simple: in a 21
2
-player tree game, although branching plays
should be considered as the final outcomes of the game, Markov branching plays
are the objects used to model the stochastic execution of the game induced by
the strategies of Player 1 and Player 2 up-to the behavior of Nature. Branch-
ing plays and Markov branching plays are quite similar objects, the main dif-
ference being that in branching plays only branching game-states branch fully
(i.e., they can have more than one child, see Definition 2.1.36), while in Markov
branching plays also probabilistic-states branch fully. Given a 21
2
-player tree
game arena A= 〈(S,E), (S1, S2, SN , B), π〉, the two player tree game arena Ad =
〈(S,E), (S1, S2, ∅, B ∪ SN)〉, obtained by defining the probabilistic states in A as
branching states in Ad, is such that its set of branching plays BPAd coincides
with the set of Markov branching plays MBPA in A.




arena. The 2-player tree game arena Ad = 〈(S,E), (S1, S2, ∅, B ∪ SN), π′〉, where
π′ :∅→D(S) is trivially the empty function, is called the de-randomization of A.
Proposition 4.4.2. Let A be a 21
2
-player tree game arena and Ad its de-randomized
2-player tree game arena. The set of deterministic strategies Σ1 and Σ2, for
Player 1 and Player 2 respectively, in the two tree game arenas coincide. More-
over the sets MBPA of Markov branching plays in A and BPAd of branch-
ing plays in Ad coincide. In particular, given any deterministic strategy profile
〈σ1, σ2〉 ∈ Σ1×Σ2, the Markov branching play Mσ1,σ2 in A corresponds to the
branching play Tσ1,σ2 in A
d.
Proof. Follows immediately from the definitions of deterministic strategies, branch-
ing plays and Markov branching plays: see Section 4.1.
The result of Proposition 4.4.2 can be informally stated as follows: Player 1
and Player 2 have the same kind of possible behaviors in the tree games played on
the arena A and its derandomization Ad. In order to model a 21
2
-player tree game
〈A,Φ〉 as a 2-player tree game played on the de-randomized arena Ad, we have
to find an appropriate payoff function Φd : BPAd → [0, 1] such that E(Mσ1,σ2) =
Φd(Tσ1,σ2) for every strategy profile 〈σ1, σ2〉, where E(Mσ1,σ2) is the expected
payoff associated with the Markov branching play Mσ1,σ2 in A, as specified in
Definition 4.1.9.
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Lemma 4.4.3. Let 〈A,Φ〉 be a 21
2
-player tree game and Ad the de-randomization
of A. The payoff function Φd : BPAd → [0, 1] specified as Φ
d(Tσ1,σ2) =E(Mσ1,σ2)
is continuous (respectively Borel and universally measurable) if Φ is continuous
(respectively Borel and universally measurable).
Proof. By definition of the function E :MBPA→ [0, 1], we have that Φd(Tσ1,σ2)=
∫
BPA Φ dP(Mσ1,σ2), where P : MBPA → M1(BPA) is the continuous function
mapping Markov branching plays in A to the corresponding probability measures
over branching plays in A, as specified in Definition 4.1.3. Equivalently, Φd =
Φ̃ ◦ P, where Φ̃ :M1(BPA)→ [0, 1] is defined as Φ̃(µ)=
∫
BPA Φ dµ. Note that Φ̃ is
well defined, since Φ is always assumed to be universally measurable. The desired
result then follows from Lemma 2.1.75
Thus, the function Φd, which assigns to the branching play Tσ1,σ2 in A
d the
same expected payoff assigned to the Markov branching play Mσ1,σ2 in A by Φ,
has, roughly speaking, the same complexity of Φ. Thus we have that the 21
2
-
player tree game 〈A,Φ〉 is equivalent to the 2-player tree game 〈Ad,Φd〉 in the
following formal sense:
Lemma 4.4.4. Let G = 〈A,Φ〉 be a 21
2
-player tree game and G = 〈Ad,Φd〉 its






Proof. The equalities follows immediately from Lemma 4.4.2, Lemma 4.4.3 and
definitions 4.1.14 and 4.1.19.
These results show that, from a foundational point of view, we can restrict
our attention to the class of 2-player (non-stochastic) tree games, and motivate
further research of the concept of concurrent and independent execution of the
game, upon which tree games are designed. Stochasticity, anyway, remains an
important and intuitive concept, and very often it is more convenient to work with
21
2
-player tree games, rather that with 2-player tree games with complex payoff
functions. This is the case in particular when the objective of the 21
2
-player tree
game is a winning set, rather than a general [0, 1]-valued payoff function.
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In the rest of this section we use the result about de-randomization of 21
2
-
player tree games, and the results of Section 4.3 about subtree monotone tree
games, to discuss an open problem in the literature about standard 21
2
-player
games. Although we do not solve the problem, our approach is interesting in
several ways which will be discussed at the end of this section.
We start by defining the concept of strong determinacy in standard 21
2
-player
games, as formulated in, e.g., [19] and [20].
Definition 4.4.5 (Strong Determinacy). Let G=〈A,Φ〉 be a standard 21
2
-player
game, where Φ is a Borel winning set, i.e., a Borel measurable function Φ:BPA→
{0, 1}. We say that G is strongly (⊲λ)-determined, if one of the following two
mutually exclusive conditions holds:
1. ∃σ1.∀σ2.E(Mσ1,σ2)⊲ λ,
2. ∃σ2.∀σ1.E(Mσ1,σ2) 6⊲λ
where λ ∈ [0, 1], ⊲ ∈ {>,≥}, and σ1 and σ2 range over the set of deterministic
strategies for Player 1 and Player 2 respectively. We say that G is strongly deter-
mined if G is strongly (⊲λ)-determined, for all λ∈ [0, 1] and ⊲∈{>,≥}. Lastly
we say that G is qualitatively strongly determined if G is strongly (>0)-determined
and (=1)-determined.
The notion of strong determinacy have not been studied extensively in the
literature, despite its naturalness. To the knowledge of the author, the only works
which address some questions about strong determinacy for standard 21
2
-player
games are [19] and [20], already cited above. In [7], qualitative determinacy is
investigated but in the context of stochastic games with signals, a class of partial
information games.
The question of which classes of standard 21
2
-player games are strongly deter-
mined, or qualitative strongly determined is quite subtle. From the determinacy
(under deterministic strategies) of standard 21
2
-player games with Borel winning
sets we can immediately deduce that if both players have optimal, i.e., 0-optimal,
strategies, then the game is ⊲λ determined, for all λ∈ [0, 1] and ⊲∈{>,≥}, i.e.,
the game is strongly determined. However, although each player have a ǫ-optima
strategy, for every ǫ> 0, optimal strategies do not necessarily exists. Therefore,
the only problematic case is (⊲λ)-determinacy in standard 21
2
-player games G
(with Borel winning sets) whose value VAL(G) is exactly λ. In [19] the authors
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show that, in general, 21
2
-player Borel games are not strongly determined. Strong
qualitative determinacy, on the other hand, holds in the games considered in
[19]: infinite state standard 21
2
-player reachability games (i.e., with a open win-
ning set), such that every game-state has only finitely many successors. However
it is unknown if strong qualitative determinacy holds in more general settings.
We now state the problem(s) precisely.
Open problem 4.4.6. Let G=〈A,Φ〉 be a standard 21
2
-player game, where the
payoff function Φ is a winning set. The state of the following questions, each
generalizing the previous, is currently unknown:
1. is G strongly qualitatively determined when Φ is a reachability winning set,
even if the game-states of G have countably many successors?
2. Is G strongly qualitatively determined when Φ is a parity (see Definition
2.3.54) winning set?
3. Is G strongly qualitatively determined when Φ is a prefix independent (see
Definition 2.3.59) Borel winning set?
4. Is G strongly qualitatively determined when Φ is a general Borel winning
set?
We could not provide a full answer to the problem. However we are able to
prove point 3 under the hypothesis that Question 4.3.19 has a positive answer.
Theorem 4.4.7. Let G = 〈A,Φ〉 be a standard 21
2
-player game, with Φ a prefix
independent Borel winning set. Assume Question 4.3.19 has a positive answer.
Then G is strongly qualitatively determined.
Proof. We shall look at G as a 21
2
-player tree game without branching states, and
in particular we shall refer to paths and Markov plays in G, as branching plays
and Markov branching plays respectively. From Proposition 4.3.18 we know that
Φ is subtree monotone.
The game G is strong (=1)-determined if either Player 1 has a deterministic
strategy σ1 such that E(Mσ1,σ2) = 1 for every strategy σ2, or if Player 2 has a
deterministic strategy σ2 such that E(Mσ1,σ2)<1 for every strategy σ1. In other
words, either Player 1 has a strategy which ensure that the outcome Markov
branching play M is such that E(M)=1, or Player 2 has a strategy which ensures
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that the outcome M is such that E(M)<1. Let us denote with M=1⊆ MBPA
the set of Markov branching plays M in A such that E(M)=1. Let us consider the
de-randomized game arena Ad. The set BPAd of branching plays in A
d coincides
with the set MBPA of Markov branching plays in A. Note that the set M
=1 is
Borel measurable, as the map E :MBP→ [0, 1] is Borel measurable whenever Φ
is Borel measurable (see Lemma 4.4.3). We will now show that the 2-player tree
game 〈Ad,M=1〉 is subtree monotone. This will conclude the proof since every 2-
player tree game, with a Borel subtree monotone winning set, is determined under
deterministic strategies because, by assumption, Question4.3.19 has a positive
answer. We need to show that for every antichain of paths S in Ad (and thus also
in A) and branching pre-play M [xi]i∈I , and for every S-compatible sequences of
branching plays (i.e., Markov branching plays in A) {Mi}j∈J and {Nj}j∈J such
that for every i∈I, Mi∈M
=1 implies Ni∈M
=1, the implication M [Mi]i∈I ∈M
=1
implies M [Ni]i∈I ∈M=1 holds. Suppose M [Mi]i∈I ∈M=1. Then it is simple to
verify that, for all i∈I, Mi∈M=1 observing that every sub-Markov (branching)
play Mi is reachable from the root of M [Mi]i∈I by following the path ~si ∈ S,
and that each edge in ~si has an associated positive probability
13, by Definition
2.3.46. It then follows from the hypothesis, that Ni ∈ M=1 for every i ∈ I.
Since Φ is subtree monotone, it follows from Theorem 4.3.17 that E(M [Mi]i∈I)≤
E(M [Ni]i∈I). Thus M [Ni]i∈I ∈M=1 as desired.
By Lemma 2.3.60 we know that the complement set Φ is prefix independent.
Then the game 〈A,Φ〉, where the game arena A is obtained from A just by
swapping the role of the two players, is such that VAL(G)=1−VAL(G). We refer
to Lemma 5.1.16 in Section 5.1.1 for a (generalized) proof of this standard fact.
Then G is (= 1)-determined by previous considerations, and it is immediate to
verify that this implies that G is strong >0-determined as desired.
As a consequence of Theorem 4.4.7, if Question 4.3.19 has a positive answer,
all 21
2
-player parity games are qualitatively strongly determined.
This result is quite interesting for at least two reasons: its generality, com-
pared with previous results of [19] and [20], abundantly motivates further research
towards a (dis)proof of Question 4.3.19; secondly, it is interesting to observe that
the problem of qualitative strong determinacy has been reduced to a problem,
determinacy of all 2-player (non-stochastic) tree games with subtree monotone
Borel winning sets, which has apparently nothing to do with probability and
13Note that, by definition 2.3.40, supp(s)=E(s) for every probabilistic state s∈SN .
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stochasticity. This is, arguably, further evidence for the potential importance of
tree games in the field of theoretical Game Theory.
4.5 Summary of results
We conclude this chapter with a quick summary of its content.
In Section 4.1 we discussed a novel class of games named 21
2
-player tree games.
Tree games generalize standard 21
2
-player tree games with the concurrent execu-
tion of independent sub-games generated at the so called branching states. The
underlying idea is thus natural and straightforward and, in our opinion, inter-
esting in its own right. In Section 4.1 a few important preliminary results are
discussed, namely the fact that certain 2-player tree games are not determined
under deterministic strategies, nor under mixed strategies.
Our study of tree games continued in Section 4.2, where we showed that
the simple form of concurrency modeled by tree games is sufficient for encoding
the class of partial information games of Blackwell games, introduced in Section
2.3.2. This is an important expressiveness result, further supporting the primitive
notion of concurrent and independent execution of sub-games.
In Section 4.3 we developed the technical machinery associated with the no-
tion of (Markov) branching pre-play, and used it to identify an important class of
winning sets named subtree monotone. Beside the concepts introduced, the main
result of Section 4.3 is Theorem 4.3.16, which can be read as a sort of continu-
ity property of the expected values of Markov branching plays in terms of the
expected values of their sub-Makrov branching plays. This result will have an
important role in later chapters.
In Section 4.4 we proved another interesting results about tree games: 2-player
tree games can faithfully model 21
2
-player tree games. Unlike Gale–Stewart games
or Blackwell games, whose stochastic counterparts are based on the introduction
of a third player named Nature, 2-player tree games can mimic probabilistic be-
havior just with appropriate payoff functions: this is yet more evidence for the
expressive power of the concept of concurrent and independent execution of tree
games. The result is used to prove an interesting result: the (open) problem of
strong qualitative determinacy in ordinary 21
2
-player games with prefix indepen-
dent winning Borel sets, can be reduced to the determinacy of the class of 2-player
tree games with Borel winning sets which are subtree monotone (Question 4.3.19).
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As already observed, this is interesting in many ways: the problem is reduced to a
question about determinacy for games which have apparently nothing to do with
probability, and the notion of subtree monotone winning sets seems to capture
the relevant properties of Markov runs in games with prefix-indepenent winning
sets.
Chapter 5
Two player stochastic meta-games
In sections 4.2 and 4.3 we identified important classes of 21
2
-player games, namely
the encodings of Blackwell games and 21
2
-player tree games with subtree monotone
winning sets. In this chapter we introduce another class of two player stochastic
tree games, which we call two player stochastic meta-games, and study some of
their properties. Two player stochastic meta-games will be used in later sections,
to give game-semantics to the probabilistic modal µ-calculi introduced in Section





Two player stochastic meta-games are 21
2
-player tree games G=〈A,Φ〉 for which
the winning set Φ, i.e., the set of branching plays T ∈BP which are considered
to be winning for Player 1, is defined indirectly as follows: T ∈Φ if and only if
a two player turn based game of infinite duration (see Section 2.3.4) GT , which
is played on the tree structure T , admits a winning strategy for Player 1. Before
entering into the details of how the game GT is constructed, when Player 1 and
Player 2 win in GT etcetera, let us observe that the 2
1
2
-player meta-game G can be
thought as a game of transfinite duration, precisely of ω+ω duration: in the first
ω-moves Player 1, Player 2 and Nature play on G producing a unique branching
play T as outcome of their play; after this stage, the game takes place in T itself
interpreted as the arena for a new game GT , where Player 1 and Player 2 play
another ω-sequence of moves. Player 1 wins in G if and only if Player 1 wins
the second stage of the game, i.e., in the game GT . We often refer to the first
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stage of the game, played by Player 1, Player 2 and Nature on the arena A, as
the outer-game of G and we refer to the second stage of the game, played on T
by Player 1 and Player 2, as the inner-game of GT associated with the branching
play T .
We now proceed with the formal definitions:
Definition 5.1.1. A two player stochastic meta-game specification is a pair
〈A, (P l,W)〉, where A=〈(S,E), (S1, S2, SN , B)), π〉 is a 2
1
2
-player tree game arena
and the pair (P l,W) consists of a function P l :B→{1, 2} which assigns a player
identifier to each branching state b∈B, and a set W⊆PA of completed paths in
A, which we often refer to as the meta-winning set of the specification. We say
that 〈A, (P l,W)〉 is a Borel meta-game specification if W is a Borel set.
It is the player assignment P l which, together with the meta-winning set W,
allows us to define the game GT and its associated winning criterion, for every
branching play T in a 21
2
-player tree game arena. This is formalized by the
following definition.




〈A, (P l,W)〉. The game GT is a 2-player game played on the tree T , starting
from root(T ), where Player 1 and Player 2 move at vertices ~s∈T with P l(s)=1
and P l(s)=2 respectively, for s= last(~s). By definition 4.1.1, all other vertices ~s
(i.e., with last(~s)∈S1 ∪ S2 ∪ SN) have at most one child ~t in T . At these nodes
the game automatically progresses to ~t. The result of a play of the two players in
GT is a sequence {~si}i∈I⊆N of nodes in T , either finite and ending in a leaf of T ,
or infinite. Every such sequence induces a completed path ~s={last(~si)}i∈I⊆N in
A. For simplicity we will often refer to ~s as an outcome of the game GT . Player
1 wins in the game GT if and only if the outcome of the play is a completed path
~s∈W. Player 2 wins otherwise.
The notions of strategies available to Player 1 and Player 2 in the game GT
are defined in the standard way, i.e., as in Definition 2.3.43 of Section 2.3.4. We
denote with ΣT1 and Σ
T
2 the sets of strategies for Player 1 and Player 2 in the inner
game GT , respectively. The sets ΣT1 and Σ
T
2 are endowed with a 0-dimensional
Polish topology as specified in Definition 2.3.44.
Adopting standard terminology (see Definition 2.3.3) we say that Player 1 has
a winning strategy in GT if and only if ∃σ1∀σ2.~sσ1,σ2 ∈W. Similarly we say that
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Player 2 has a winning strategy in GT if and only if ∃σ2∀σ1.~sσ1,σ2 6∈W. The set
of winning branching plays associated with a 21
2
-player meta-game specification
is defined as follows.
Definition 5.1.3. Given a two player stochastic meta-game 〈A, (P l,W)〉 speci-
fication, we denote with ΦW ⊆BP , or just with Φ if W is clear from the context,
the set defined as:
ΦW = {T | Player 1 has a winning strategy in GT}.
We are now ready to define the class of 21
2
-player meta-games.
Definition 5.1.4. A 21
2
-player meta-game specified by the pair 〈A, (P l,W)〉 is
formalized as the 21
2
-player tree game G=〈A,ΦW〉.
Note that not all 21
2
-player meta-game specifications can be formalized as tree
games. Indeed if the set ΦW is not universally measurable then, in accordance
with Definition 4.1.7, ΦW is not a valid winning set. Thus, when working with
21
2
-player meta-games 〈A,ΦW〉 we shall always implicitly assume the universal
measurability of ΦW . We now discuss the precise strength of this assumption.
We know from Theorem 2.3.15, i.e., from the determinacy (under deterministic
strategies) of all standard two player turn based games with Borel winning sets,
that either Player 1 or Player 2 have a winning strategy in GT , for every branching
play T of a 21
2
-player meta-parity game 〈A,ΦW〉 with W Borel.
Lemma 5.1.5. Given a 21
2
-player Borel meta-game specification 〈A, (P l,W)〉,
the following equality holds:
BP\ΦW = {T | Player 2 has a winning strategy in GT }.
Moreover BP \ΦW is the winning set induced by the specification 〈A, (P l,W)〉,
where P l is defined as: P l(s)=1 if and only if P l(s)=2, for all branching states
b∈B.
Proof. Note that the set of completed paths contained in T , for any branching
play T ∈BPA, is a closed subset of P. Thus the winning set of any inner-game
GT is Borel. The result then follows immediately from the determinacy (under
deterministic strategies) of all 2-player games on graphs with Borel winning sets
(Theorem 2.3.15).
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Of course the same property holds for 21
2
-player meta-games 〈A, (P l,W)〉 with




The next technical lemma provides an upper bound on the descriptive com-
plexity of the the set ΦW .
Lemma 5.1.6. Given a two player stochastic meta-game specified by 〈A, (P l,W)〉
with W∈∆1n, the following assertion is valid in ZFC:
ZFC + ∆1n-determinacy ⊢ ΦW ∈∆
1
n+1.
where ∆1n-determinacy, for n∈N
+, is defined as in Definition 2.3.17.
Proof. Let us denote with P<ωB1 the set of finite paths ~s ∈ P
<ω in A such that
last(~s) ∈ B and P l(last(~s)) = 1. Similarly P<ωB2 denotes the set of finite paths
~s∈P<ω in A such that last(~s)∈B and P l(last(~s)) = 2. Let us consider the set
Σ1 of functions P
<ω
B1
→P<ω∪{•}. This set contains all the strategies available
to Player 1 in every game GT , for T ∈ BP , seen as functions f ∈ Σ1 restricted
to T . Similarly for the set Σ2 of functions P
<ω
B2
→ P<ω ∪{•}. We endow Σ1
with the Baire space-like topology, where for every pair (x, y), with x∈P<ωB1 and
y ∈ P<ω∪{•}, the set Ox,y of all functions f ∈ Σ1 such that f(x) = y is a basic
open set. This is a 0-dimensional Polish space. Similarly for Σ2.
Let us now consider the subset of BP × Σ1 × Σ2, denoted by T , consisting
of all triples (T, σ1, σ2) such that the strategies σ1 and σ2 are valid strategies in
GT , i.e., σ1 ∈ ΣT1 and σ2 ∈ Σ
T
2 . It is easy to see that T is a closed subset of
BP × Σ1 × Σ2 (endowed with the product topology). Indeed, the set of triples
which do not belong to T is open, because one can tell if one of the two strategies
σ1 and σ2 is not valid in the inner game GT , i.e., it makes choices which are not in
T , just by looking at finite information about T , σ1 and σ2. Hence T is a Polish
space, as it is a closed subset of the Polish space BP × Σ1 × Σ2.
Let us denote with out :T → PA the function which maps a triple (T, σ1, σ2)
to the induced play in GT , i.e., to the completed path ~sσ1,σ2 . The function out
is continuous. In order to determine any finite amount of information about the
induced completed path, one just needs to look at finite amount of information
about the input triplet.
Let us now consider the set A⊆T defined as the set of triples (T, σ1, σ2) such
that the game GT is won by Player 2 when the two players follow the (valid for GT )
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strategies σ1 and σ2 respectively, i.e., the set formally defined as A= out
−1(W).
Since out is continuous and W is a ∆1n set, it follows that W is ∆
1
n set and, by
application of Theorem 2.1.55, we have that A is a ∆1n set too.
Let us now define the set B⊆BP×Σ1 as follows:
B = {(T, σ1) | ∃σ2∈Σ2.(T, σ1, σ2) ∈ A}.
In other words the set B is the set of all pairs (T, σ1), such that Player 2 has a
strategy σ2 in the game GT winning against σ1, i.e., such that the strategy profile
(σ1, σ2) induces in GT a completed path in W. The set B is Σ
1
n set by Proposition
2.1.55. Observe that the set B is the set of all pairs (T, σ1) such that Player 2
does not have a strategy σ2 for the game GT which is winning against the strategy
σ1 for Player 1, or equivalently by ∆
1
n-determinacy (see Theorem 2.3.17), σ1 is a
winning strategy for Player 1 in GT . By construction the set B is a Π
1
n set.
We can now define the set ΦW ⊆BP of all branching plays T where Player 1
has a winning strategy in GT as follows:
ΦW = {T | ∃σ1∈Σ1.(T, σ1)∈B}.
It then follows that, by construction, ΦW is a Σ
1
n+1 set.
The result then follows by observing that ΦW is also a Σ
1
n+1 set. This is
because ΦW is the winning set associated with the specification 〈A, (P l,W)〉,
and W∈∆1n.
Corollary 5.1.7. Given any 21
2
-player meta-game specified by 〈A, (P l,W)〉, with
W a Borel set, the set ΦW is a ∆
1
2 set.
Proof. It follows from Theorem 2.3.15 and the fact ∆11 is the class of Borel sets
(Theorem 2.1.53).
We shall see, in Chapter 6 (Theorem 6.4.3), that the result of the previous
corollary is tight, i.e., there exists a 21
2
-player meta-game specification 〈A, (P l,W)〉,
with W Borel, such that ΦW is neither a Σ
1
1 nor a Π
1
1 set.
In the rest of this chapter we restrict our attention to 21
2
-player meta-game
Borel specifications 〈A, (P l,W)〉, i.e., by the previous corollary, to 21
2
-player
meta-games 〈A,ΦW〉 with ΦW ∈∆
1




omitting the “Borel” adjective.




meta-game is universally measurable. Indeed it is consistent with ZFC that not
all ∆12 sets are universally measurable (see Theorem 2.1.81).
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Definition 5.1.8. Let mG-UM be the following assertion:
“The winning set ΦW of any 2
1
2
-player meta-game is universally measurable”
We also define mG-UM(Γ) to be the following assertion:
“The winning set ΦW of any game G ∈Γ is universally measurable”
where Γ is a collection of 21
2
-player meta-games.
Clearly, given the result of Lemma 5.1.6, the set-theoretic assertion ∆12-UM
defined in the introduction (see Definition 2.1.80) implies mG-UM. However we
do not know if the converse implication holds. We leave this as a question:
Question 5.1.9. Does mG-UM imply ∆12-UM ?
Anyway, since ∆12-UM is consistent with ZFC, as shown in Theorem 2.1.81,
we know that mG-UM is consistent with ZFC as well. Note that if mG-UM(Γ)
does not hold, there exist two player stochastic meta-game specifications in Γ
which are not definable, in accordance with Definition 4.1.7, as 21
2
-player tree
games because their winning sets are not universally measurable. Therefore when
working with some class Γ of 21
2
-player meta-games, we will always implicitly
assume mG-UM(Γ).
Before developing the theory of 21
2
-player meta-games any further, it is useful
to remark the following two points.
Remark 5.1.10. The notion of 21
2
-player meta-game is not necessarily confined
to 21
2
-player tree games having payoff functions which are winning sets. In-
deed one could give a meaningful definition of 21
2
-player meta-games specified
by 〈A, (P l, φ)〉, with φ a Borel-measurable function φ : P → [0, 1], in terms of
21
2
-player tree games as well. The inner games GT associated with branching
plays in A would then become standard 2-player turn based games with real-
valued payoff function φ, as defined in Section 2.3.3. One can then generalize
the winning set ΦW to the real-valued payoff function Φφ as Φφ(T ) = VAL(GT ),
where VAL(GT ) is well defined because, from Theorem 2.3.38, every 2-player turn
based game with Borel-measurable payoff function is determined under deter-
ministic strategies. It is also simple to adapt the proof of Lemma 5.1.6, to prove
that Φφ is a ∆
1
2-measurable function. Indeed it follows from Theorem 2.3.37,




, for every λ ∈ [0, 1), can be characterized as the set
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{
T | ∃σ1.∀σ2.φ(~sσ1,σ2)>λ in GT
}





able) intersection1 of the sets
{
T | ∃σ2.∀σ1.φ(~sσ1,σ2) < λ + ǫ in GT }, for every
rational ǫ∈(0, 1]. One can then show that each of these sets is a Σ12 set by trivial
modifications of the proof of Lemma 5.1.6. By recalling that the collection of Σ12









is also a Π12 and this concludes the proof.
Remark 5.1.11. Meta-games whose game arenas are not stochastic, i.e., such that
SN =∅, can be reduced to ordinary 2-player games. Indeed consider a meta-game
G = 〈A,ΦW〉 specified by 〈A, (P l,W)〉, with A= 〈(S,E), (S1, S2, ∅, B), π〉 and π
the trivial empty function. The game G is equivalent to the standard 2-player
turn-based game G ′ =〈A′,W〉 played on the arena A′=〈(S,E), (S1∪B1, S2∪B2)〉,
where B1 = P l
−1({1}) and B2 = P l−2({2}), in the sense that Player 1 has a
winning strategy in G if and only if they have a winning strategy in G ′, and
similarly for Player 2. Intuitively, the game G ′ is played as G but in just one,
rather than two, stages. By Borel determinacy of standard 2-player turn-based
games, the game G ′ is determined under deterministic strategies. It is easy to
see that a winning strategy σ for Player 1, say, in the game G ′ provides the
information necessary to construct a pair of strategies 〈σI1, σ
II
1 〉 for Player 1 in
G, where σI1 is a winning strategy for Player 1 in the outer game, and σ
II
1 a
winning strategy for Player 1 in any inner game GT associated with a play T in
G compatible with σI1. In other words, without stochasticity, a player does not
get any advantage when delaying their choices in the outergame.
It will be often convenient to describe a 21
2
-player meta-game specified by
〈A, (P l,W)〉 and played on the arena A=〈(S,E), (S1, S2, SN , B), π〉, by including
the information provided by the player assignment P l directly in the structure of
the arena by means of a partition of the set of branching states B. More formally
we define the notion of two player stochastic meta-game arena as follows:
Definition 5.1.12 (Two player stochastic meta-game arena). A two player stochas-
tic meta-game arena is a tuple A=〈(S,E), (S1, S2, SN , B1, B2), π〉. The states in
B1 are called Player 1’s branching states, and similarly the states in B2 are called
Player 2’s branching states. Clearly any 21
2
-player meta-game arena induces a
unique 21
2
-player tree game arena and player assignment P l as follows:
1This is necessary as σ2 might not have a 0-optimal strategy in GT , for some T with
VAL(GT )=λ, as discussed in Section 2.3.3.
176 Chapter 5. Two player stochastic meta-games













From now on, we will always denote the two player stochastic meta-game
specification 〈A, (P l,W)〉, with 〈B,W〉, where B is the two player stochastic
meta-game arena corresponding to A and to the player assignment P l, as de-
scribed above.
We introduce the following terminology to classify 21
2
-player meta-games.
Definition 5.1.13. Let G=〈A,ΦW〉 be a 2
1
2
-player meta-game with meta-game
arena A= 〈(S,E), (S1, S2, SN , B1, B2), π〉. We say that G, or more precisely the
arena A of G, is:
• finitely branching in A, for some A⊆S, if for all s∈A, the set E(s) is finite,
• finitely branching in the player nodes if G is finitely branching in S1 ∪ S2,
• finitely branching in the branching nodes if G is finitely branching in B1∪B2,
• uniquely branching in A, for some A⊆S, if for all s∈A, the set E(s) ≤ 1,
• finite if S is a finite set.
Clearly if A is finite, it is also finitely branching in the branching nodes and
finitely branching in the player nodes. Moreover if A is uniquely branching in
both B1 and B2, then the arena A is a non-branching 2
1
2
-player tree game arena
in the sense of Definition 4.1.5.
Lemma 5.1.14. Let G=〈A,ΦW〉 be a 2
1
2
-player meta-game. Then the following
assertions hold:
1. if A is uniquely branching in B1 then ΦW is a Π
1
1 set.
2. if A is uniquely branching in B2 then ΦW is a Σ
1
1 set.
3. if A is a non-branching 21
2
-player tree game arena, then ΦW is a Borel set.
Hence ZFC ⊢ mG-UM(ΓB1≤1 ∪ ΓB2≤1) holds, where we denoted by ΓBi≤1 the
collection of 21
2
-player meta-games uniquely branching in Bi, for i∈{1, 2}.
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Proof. The proof, which follows the same lines of that of Lemma 5.1.6, is based
on the fact that if A is uniquely branching in B1 then for each branching play
T ∈BP , Player 1 has a just one valid strategy in the inner game GT , i.e., Player
1 does not have an active role in GT . Similarly, if A is uniquely branching in
B2 then for each branching play T ∈BP , Player 2 has a just one valid strategy





1 is precisely the collection of all Borel sets (Theorem 2.1.53). Lastly,
by application of Theorem 2.1.72, mG-UM(ΓB1≤1 ∪ ΓB2≤1) holds.
As we shall see in Chapter 6 (Lemma 6.1.5) these upper bounds are strict.
We now introduce a useful construction on 21
2
-player meta-games.
Definition 5.1.15. Let G = 〈A,ΦW〉, be a two player stochastic meta-game
with A= 〈(S,E), (S1, S2, SN , B1, B2), π〉. We define the negation of the game G,
denoted by ¬G, as the 21
2
-player meta-game ¬G = 〈¬A,ΦW〉, where the arena
¬A is defined as ¬A= 〈(S,E), S2, S1, SN , B2, B1), π〉 and ΦW is the winning set
induced by the meta-winning set of completed paths W . Thus,
1. if a state s is under the control of Player 1 in A, then the same state is
under the control of Player 2 in ¬A,
2. if a state s is under the control of Player 2 in A, then the same state is
under the control of Player 1 in ¬A,
3. if a state s is a branching state under the control of Player 1 in A, then the
same state is a branching state under the control of Player 2 in ¬A,
4. if a state s is a branching state under the control of Player 2 in A, then the
same state is a branching state under the control of Player 1 in ¬A,
and a completed path ~s is winning for Player 1 in any inner-game GT of ¬G if and
only if the same completed path is winning for Player 2 in the same inner-game
GT of G. Observe how the probabilistic states, are identical in the two games G
and ¬G, as it is the function π which assigns them probability distributions over
the set of game-states..
We will often refer to the game ¬G as the dual game of G. This choice of
terminology is justified by the following lemma.
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Lemma 5.1.16. Let G = 〈A,ΦW〉 be a 2
1
2
-player meta-game with arena A =
〈(S,E), (S1, S2, SN , B1, B2), π〉 and let ¬G = 〈¬A,ΦW〉 be its dual. Then the fol-
lowing assertions
1. ΦW =ΦW , and








Proof. Both points are trivial. The main observation is that the graph structure
of A and ¬A are identical. Therefore the set P of completed paths, the set
BP of branching plays and the set MBP of Markov branching plays in the two
games coincide. Moreover, since the function π is identical in the two games, the
probability measure P(M) over branching plays induced by a Markov branching
play is the same in both games. The result then follows by observing that the role
of the two players, both in the outer and in the inner games, have been swapped
and the meta-winning set dualized.
5.2 Prefix independent 21
2
-player meta-games
In this section we consider the class of 21
2
-player meta-games G=〈A,W〉, which we
shall call prefix independent 21
2
-player meta-games, whose set of completed paths
W satisfies the prefix independence property, specified as in Definition 2.3.59. As
done in the second part of the previous section, we restrict our attention to Borel
prefix-independent meta-winning sets W.
Convention 5.2.1. When working with prefix independent 21
2
-player meta games
G= 〈A,W〉 played on some arena A= 〈(S,E), (S1, S2, SN , B1, B2), π〉, we will al-
ways respect the following convention: for every terminal node s∈S, if {s}∈W
then s ∈ S2∪B2, and if {s} 6∈ W then s ∈ S1∪B1. Observe that this is not
a significant restriction, since the ownership of terminal states have no impact
whatsoever in the way the game G is played.
By Definition 2.3.59 every terminated completed path ~s, i.e., every finite path
whose last state s= last(~s) is terminal in A, is in W if and only if {s}∈W. Thus,
by following Convention 5.2.1, we model the fact that the player who gets stuck in
the inner-game loses. Note that, by Lemma 2.3.60, this convention is preserved by
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the negation operator (¬) on 21
2
-player meta-games: for every prefix-independent
meta-game G satisfying Convention 5.2.1, the game ¬G is a prefix-independent
meta-game and satisfying Convention 5.2.1.
Our first result about prefix-independent 21
2
-player meta-games shows that
their winning sets satisfy the subtree-monotone property of Definition 4.3.8.
Proposition 5.2.2. Let G = 〈A,ΦW〉 a 2
1
2
-player meta-game whose set of com-
pleted paths W satisfies the prefix independence property. Then the set ΦW of
winning branching plays satisfies the subtree-monotone property.
Proof. Let us fix an arbitrary antichain S={~sj}j∈J of finite paths (see Definition
4.3.1) in A, a branching play T =S T [Ti]i∈I ∈ BP , and a collection {Rj}j∈j of
branching plays compatible with S (see Definition 4.3.5) such that assumption of
Definition 4.3.8 holds, i.e., for all i ∈ I, if Ti ∈ ΦW then Ri ∈ ΦW . We need to
show that if T [Ti]i∈I ∈ΦW , then T [Ri]i∈I ∈ΦW as well.
If T [Ti]i∈I ∈ΦW then, by definition, Player 1 has a winning strategy σ1 in the
inner game GT [Ti]i∈I . Similarly, Player 1 has a winning strategy σ
i
1 in each inner
games GRi , for all i ∈ I such that Ti∈ΦW . We need to prove that Player 1 has a
winning strategy σ∗1 in GT [Ri]i∈I as well. We prove this by using a strategy stealing
argument, i.e., we construct a winning strategy σ∗1 for Player 1 in GT [Ri]i∈I using
the strategies σ1 and σ
i
1, for all i ∈ I such that Ti∈ΦW .
Denote with si, for i ∈ I, the state last(~si). Note that, in the inner game
GT [Ti]i∈I , if Player 1 uses the strategy σ1 then, if a state si is ever reached following
the path ~si∈S, it must be the case that Ti∈ΦW . Suppose otherwise. Then, since
Player 2 has a winning strategy in Ti, Player 2 could force the outcome of the
inner game to be a completed path with a losing (for Player 1) tail (i.e., a path
~t= ~si.~r with ~r 6∈W). By prefix independence of W this implies that ~t 6∈W and
therefore Player 1, using the strategy σ1 would be losing, which is a contradiction.
The strategy σ∗1 can be described as follows: at the beginning of the game
GT [Ri]i∈I the strategy σ
∗
1 behaves as σ1 in GT [Ti]i∈I . This is possible since GT [Ti]i∈I
and GT [Ri]i∈I are identical up to the states si reached following a path ~si ∈ S, or
equivalently, they have the same branching pre-play T [xi]i∈I induced by S. If a
state si is ever reached following a path ~si∈S, with i ∈ I, then Ti is necessarily in
ΦW by our previous observation. The strategy σ
∗
1 then plays the rest of the game
in GT [Ri]i∈I as the winning strategy σ
i
1 would play in GRi . Since σ
i
1 is winning
by hypothesis, the result of the play is a completed path of the form ~t = ~si.~r,
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with ~r∈W, and by the prefix independence of W, ~t∈W and thus Player 1 wins
in T [Ri]i∈I . If instead no state si is ever reached following some path ~si ∈ S,
then the completed path resulting as outcome of the game GT [Ri]i∈I is winning,
because the same completed path is a possible play in GT [Ti]i∈I under the winning,
by assumption, strategy σ1.
Observation 5.2.3. Note that the Axiom ∆12-determinacy (see Definition 2.3.1)
implies that:
1. Every ∆12 set is universally measurable (Theorem 2.3.19), hence mG-UM(Γp.i.)




meta-games 〈A,ΦW〉 with W Borel.
2. If Question 4.3.20 has a positive answer for ∆12 winning sets, every G∈Γp.i.
is determined under deterministic strategies.








with A = 〈(S,E), (S1, S2, SN , B1, B2), π〉. Let T ∈ BP be a branching play in A
and let s ∈ S be the state labeling the root of T . Then the following assertions
hold:
1. if E(s)=∅ then T ∈ΦW if and only if s∈{S2 ∪ B2},
2. if s ∈ S1 ∪ S2 ∪ SN , with E(s) = {ti}i∈I, then s has a unique child labeled




where T i is the sub-branching play of T rooted at ti. Then T ∈ΦW if and
only if T i∈ΦW .
3. if s∈B1 ∪ B2 with E(s) = {ti}i∈I, then the set of children of s in T is the
set of nodes {ti}i∈I . In other words T can be depicted as follows:










where T i is the sub-branching play of T rooted at ti. Then the following
assertions hold:
• if s∈B1, then T ∈ΦW if and only if ∃i∈I. (Ti∈ΦW), and
• if s∈B2, then T ∈ΦW if and only ∀i∈I. (Ti∈ΦW).
Proof. The first case follows by Convention 5.2.1. The second case is straightfor-
ward: in the inner-game GT , at the first move, the game evolves automatically to
the state ti which is the root of T
i. Since W is prefix independent, Player 1 have
a winning strategy in GT if and only if they have a winning strategy in GT i .
Suppose T is of the third kind, i.e., s∈B1∪B2 with E(s) 6=∅. We just consider
the case s∈B1 because the case s∈B2 is similar. In the inner game GT , the state
s is under the control of Player 1 who can choose to move to some state ti with
ti∈E(s). The proof goes by a strategy-stealing argument. Suppose T i ∈ ΦW . Let
σi1 be a winning strategy for Player 1 in the inner-game GTi. Define the strategy
σ1 in GT by σ({s})1 = ti and σ1(s.~t)= σi1(~t). This is winning because W is prefix
independent, hence T ∈ΦW . Similarly, assume T ∈ΦW and let σ1 be a winning
strategy for Player 1 in GT . Let ti be the choice made by σ on the first move, i.e.,
ti =σ({s}). Define σi1 by σ
i
1(ti.~t)=σ(s.ti.~t). Again, this is winning because W is
prefix independent, hence T i∈ΦW .
The previous result expresses a fixed point property of winning sets of prefix
independent 21
2
-player meta-games which we now formalize.
Definition 5.2.5. Given a prefix independent 21
2
-player meta-game G=〈A,ΦW〉
we define the function WG : 2BP →2BP as follows: a branching play T ∈BP is in
WG(X) when the following (mutually disjoint) conditions hold:
1. If root(T )=s, with E(s)=∅, then T ∈WG(X) if and only if s∈S2 ∪ B2.
2. If root(T )=s, with s∈S1 ∪ S2 ∪ SN and E(s) 6=∅, then T can be depicted
as follows:




where E(s)={ti}i∈I , and T ti is a branching play rooted at ti for some i∈I.
Then T ∈WG(X) if and only if T ti ∈X .








where E(s) = {ti}i∈I , and T ti is a branching play rooted at ti. Then T ∈
WG(X) if and only if there is some i∈I such that T ti ∈X .








where E(s)={ti}i∈I , and T ti is a branching play rooted at ti, for every i∈I.
Then T ∈WG(X) if and only if for all i∈I, it holds that T ti ∈X .
The function WG is clearly monotone with respect to the pointwise (inclusion)
order.
Lemma 5.2.6. Given a prefix independent 21
2
-player meta-game G = 〈A,ΦW〉,
let WG be defined as in Definition 5.2.5. Then ΦW is a fixed point of WG.
Proof. It follows immediately from Lemma 5.2.4.
Lemma 5.2.7. If X⊆Φ then also W(X)⊆Φ.
Proof. Follows immediately by application of Lemma 5.2.4.
The following technical result will be useful in Section 6.1.
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Lemma 5.2.8. For every prefix independent 21
2
-player meta-game G= 〈A,ΦW〉,
if X ⊆ BPA is a Borel (universally measurable) set, then WG(X) is a Borel
(universally measurable) set. Moreover, if A is finitely branching in B2 (see
Definition 5.1.13) and X⊆BPA is an open set then W(X) is an open set.
Proof. The set W(X) is the set of branching plays which satisfy the conditions
1-4 of Definition 5.2.5. Let us consider, one by one, the set of branching plays Cn
included in W(X) by the case n∈{1, . . . , 4} of Definition 5.2.5:
C1: This is the set of branching plays rooted at some terminal state s∈S. Thus,
C1 is the union of the basic open sets O{s}, for s a terminal state. It then
follows that C1 is open.
C2: This is the set of branching plays T
s.ti rooted at some non-terminal state
s∈S1 ∪ S2 ∪ SN , such that the root s has as unique child in T the state ti,
for some ti∈E(s), and the sub-branching play T
ti of T s.ti rooted at ti is in
X . Let us denote with BPs.ti and BPti the set of branching plays rooted
at s and having as unique child of s the state ti, and the set of branching
plays rooted at ti respectively, where s ∈ S1 ∪ S2 ∪ SN and ti ∈E(s). Let
us define the function m(s,ti) : BPs.ti →BPti defined as m(s,ti)(T
s.ti) = T ti ,
where T ti is the sub-branching play of T s.ti rooted at ti. It is clear that
this function is a homeomorphism between BPs.ti and BP ti . Observe that
a branching play in T ∈BPs.ti is in C2 if and only if T ∈m
−1
(s,ti)
(X ∩ BP ti).
Note that since m is continuous, and BP ti open, T ∈m
−1
(s,ti)
(X ∩ BP ti) is
Borel (universally measurable, open) if X is Borel ((universally measurable,
open). The proof is concluded by observing that C2 is the union of the sets
T ∈m−1(s,ti)(X ∩ BP
ti), for every pair (s, ti) of a state s∈S1 ∪ S2 ∪ SN with
E(s) 6= ∅ and ti ∈ E(s), and the fact that the collection of such pairs is
countable.
C3: This is the set of branching plays T
s rooted at some non-terminal state
s ∈B1 such that there exists an i ∈ I, where E(s) = {ti}i∈I , and the sub-
branching play T ti of T s rooted at the child ti is in X . Let us denote
with BPs and BP ti the set of branching plays rooted at s, and the set of
branching plays rooted at ti respectively, where s∈B1 and ti ∈E(s). Let
us define the function ms :BPs→
∏
i∈I BP ti , defined as ms(T
s) = {T ti}i∈I ,
following the (graphical) notation adopted in Definition 5.2.5. Again it is
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straightforward to check that ms is a homomorphism between BPs and
∏
i∈I BP ti endowed with the product topology. Observe that a branching

















the index-set I is countable and BP ti is open for every ti, it follows that
∨
i∈I(X ∩ BP ti) ⊆ ×i∈IBP ti is Borel (universally measurable, open) if X
is (universally measurable, open). From this observation and the fact that





i∈I(X ∩ BP ti)
)
is Borel (universally
measurable, open) if X is Borel. The proof is concluded by observing that







, for every state
s∈B1 with E(s) 6=∅.
C4:: This is the set of branching plays T
s rooted at some non-terminal state
s ∈ B2, with E(s) = {ti}i∈I , such that for all i ∈ I the sub-branching
play T ti of T s rooted at ti is in X . Let us define the homeomorphism
ms : BPs →
∏
i∈I BP ti as in the previous point. In this case we have that












i∈I(X ∩ BP ti)
)
is Borel if X is Borel. By application of Theorem
2.1.73 and Theorem 2.1.72(3) it also follows that m−1s
(
∏
i∈I(X ∩ BP ti)
)




i∈I(X ∩ BP ti)
)
is open, when X is open, if and only if the
I-indexed product is finite. This is the case precisely when A is finitely
branching in B2. The proof is completed, as in the previous case, observing





i∈I(X ∩ BP ti)
)
, for every state
s∈B1 with E(s) 6=∅, and the fact that this collection is countable.
We now turn our attention to Markov branching plays in prefix independent
21
2
-player meta-games. As a consequence of Proposition 5.2.2, we have that every
Markov branching play M in a prefix independent 21
2
-player meta-game satisfies
the properties stated in Theorem 4.3.17. We now prove a useful lemma capturing








with A= 〈(S,E), (S1, S2, SN , B1, B2), π〉. Let M ∈MBP be a Markov branching
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play in A and let s ∈ S be the state labeling the root of M . Then the following
assertions hold:
1. if E(s)=∅ then PM(ΦW)=1 if s∈{S2∪B2} and PM(ΦW)=0 if s∈{S1∪B1}.
2. if s ∈ S1 ∪ S2, with E(s) = {ti}i∈I, then s has a unique child labeled with




where M i is the sub-Markov branching play of M rooted at ti. Then the
equality PM(ΦW)=PM i(ΦW) holds.
3. if s ∈ SN , with E(s) = {ti}i∈I, then then the set of children of s in M is









where M i, for i ∈ I, is the sub-Markov branching play of M rooted at ti.




π(s)(ti) · PM i(ΦW)
)
holds.
4. if s ∈ B1 ∪ B2 with E(s) = {ti}i∈I, then the set of children of s in M is









2The edge connecting s with ti has been dashed to highlight that s is a probabilistic node
and the edge carries a probability weight, namely π(s)(ti).
3The edge connecting s with ti has not been dashed to highlight that s is a branching node.
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where, for each i∈ I, M i is the sub-Markov branching play of M rooted at
ti. Therefore the edge connecting s with ti does not carry any probability
weight. The following assertions hold:












refer to (possibly infinitary) product and coproduct opera-
tions (see Definition 2.2.3).
where PM and PM i denotes the probability measures on the set of branching plays
BP in G induced by M and M i as described in Definition 4.1.3.
Proof. The first case follows by Convention 5.2.1. We prove points 3 and 4,
because point 2 is simpler and can be proved with the same techniques.
Let us consider the case when M is of the third kind, i.e., when s∈SN . We
can restrict attention, for what concerns the probability measure PM , to the set of
branching plays ∪i∈IBPs.i, where BPs.i denotes the set of branching plays rooted
at s and having ti as immediate children of s, since the set of all other branching
plays in G gets assigned probability 0 by PM . Similarly we can restrict, for what
concerns PM i , to the set BP i of branching plays rooted at ti. We can depict the






where we use T i to range over the set of branching plays in G rooted at ti. We
denote with T s.i the branching play on the left, if T i is its sub-branching play
rooted at ti. By Lemma 5.2.4 we know that T
s.i∈ΦW if and only if T i∈ΦW .




π(s)(ti) · PM i(ΦW)
)
. As a first
observation note that for every i 6=j, BPs.i ∩BPs.j =∅. Hence the value PM(ΦW)
satisfies the following equality: PM(ΦW) =
∑
i∈I
PM(ΦW ∩ BPs.i). Therefore we
need to show that, for every i∈I, the equality PM(ΦW∩BPs.i)=λi·PM(ΦW∩BP i)
holds, where λi
def
= π(s)(ti). Define m :BP i→BPs.i as m(T i)=T s.i. The map m is
easily seen to be a homeomorphism. We now show that PM i(X)=λi ·PM(m(X)),
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for every measurable X . By regularity of the two measures (see Theorem 2.1.66)
we just need to prove that for each basic open set OF ⊆BP i, where F is finite tree
rooted at ti, the equality PM i(OF )=λi ·PM(m(OF )) holds. By definition m(OF )=
Os.F , where the set s.F is defined as {s.~t | ~t∈F}. The desired equality then follows
from Definition 4.1.3, because the edge connecting s with t is probabilistic and
carries the probability π(s)(ti).
Let us consider the case when M is of the fourth kind, i.e., when s∈B1 ∪B2.
For what concerns PM , we can restrict attention to the set of branching plays
BPs, where BPs denotes the set of branching plays rooted at s, since the set of
all other branching plays in G gets assigned probability 0 by PM . Similarly, when
considering PM i, we can restrict to the set BP i of branching plays rooted at ti.











where we use T i to range over the set of branching plays in G rooted at ti. We de-
note with s[Ti]i∈I the branching play on the left. Let
∏
i BP i be the product topol-
ogy. Define m :
∏
i BP i →BPs as m({Ti}i∈I) = s[Ti]i∈I . It is easy to verify that
m is a homeomorphism. Consider the product measure
∏
i∈I PM i ∈M1(
∏
i BP i).
We now show that
∏
i∈I PM i(X)=PM(m(X)), for every measurable X⊆
∏
i BP i.
Again, by regularity of the two measures, we just need to prove that each basic
open set O⊆
∏
i BP i the equality
∏
i∈I PM i(O)=PM(m(O)) holds. The set O is of
the form OF0×. . .×OFk×
∏
i>k BP i with OFn ⊆BPn, for some k∈N and 0 ≤ n ≤ k.
As usual, OFn denotes the basic open set of branching plays containing the finite






n=0 PM i(OFn) =PM(m(O)) then
follows by definition of m and Definition 4.1.3 of the probability measures PM
and PM i .
Suppose first that s∈B2. The desired result is derived as follows:
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where equation E1 follows by Lemma 5.2.4. If instead s∈B1 the result is derived
as follows:




i∈I(ΦW ∩ BP i))
)


























where equation E1 follows by Lemma 5.2.4 and equation E2 holds because m is
a homeomorphism, hence m(X)=m(X) for every measurable X .
We are now ready to prove following theorem which captures a useful property
of the lower and upper values of a prefix independent 21
2
-player meta-game.































































Proof. The fact that FG is monotone with respect to the pointwise order is triv-





(s) holds, for every s ∈ S. The case for VAL↑(G) can
be proved in a similar way. The proof follows in a simple way from Lemma 5.2.9.
5.2. Prefix independent 21
2
-player meta-games 189
We just sketch how to prove the cases for s∈S1, s∈SN and s∈B1, as the cases
for s∈S2 and s∈B2 are similar.
Case s∈ S1: If E(s) = ∅ the result follows by Convention 5.2.1. So assume
E(s) 6=∅. We need to prove that VAL↓(G)(s)=
⊔
t∈E(s) VAL↓(G)(t). We prove this
equality showing that the two inequalities
VAL↓(G)(s)≤
⊔
t∈E(s) VAL↓(G)(t) and VAL↓(G)(s)≥
⊔
t∈E(s) VAL↓(G)(t)
















. The proof goes by
a strategy stealing argument. For every σ1 let n be the state chosen by σ1 at
s, i.e., the state σ1({s}). Define τn1 as τi(tn.~t) = σ1(s.tn.~tn). In other words τ
n
1
(starting from tn) behaves as σn (starting at s) after the first move from s to tn






E(M tnτn1 ,τ2) is then simple to show by
applying the result of Lemma 5.2.9.
Let us consider the second inequality: VAL↓(G)(s)≥
⊔
t∈E(s) VAL↓(G)(t), which















. Suppose, by contradiction, that the inequality does














We derive the desired contradiction using, again, a strategy stealing argument.





E(M tnτn1 ,τ2) is then simple to show by applying the result of
Lemma 5.2.9.
This result can be understood as follows. If VAL↓(G)(tn) is λ then, for every
ǫ>0, Player 1 has a ǫ-optimal strategy τn1 which guarantees probability of winning
greater than λ−ǫ when the game starts at tn. When the game starts at s, consider
the strategy s.τn1 which chooses to move from s to tn and play the rest of the
game as τn1 . Then s.τ
n
1 guarantees probability of winning greater than λ − ǫ.
Moreover, every strategy σ1 for the game starting at s is of the form s.τ
n
1 . Hence,
for every ǫ > 0, there is a tn∈E(s) such that VAL↓(G)(tn)≥VAL↓(G)(s) − ǫ.

















E(s)={ti}i∈I and λi =π(s)(ti). At the state s Nature chooses to move to ti with
probability λi. The desired result can be proven as follows. If VAL↓(G)(ti) is γi,
Player 1 has a ǫi optimal strategy τ
i
1, for ǫi> 0, which guarantees probability of
winning greater than γi− ǫi when the game starts at ti. When the game starts at




1 behaving as τ
i
1 once the game reaches the state ti after the initial




1 guarantees probability of winning greater than
(
∑






i ǫi. Of course
∑
i ǫi can be made as small




1 . Hence, for every ǫi > 0,
∑
i λi · VAL↓(G)(ti)≥VAL↓(G)(s) − ǫ.















holds. Let E(s) = {ti}i∈I . At
the state s the game is split in I-many subplays continuing their execution from
the states ti. If VAL↓(G)(ti) is γi, Player 1 has a ǫi optimal strategy τ
i
1, for
ǫi > 0, which guarantees probability of winning greater than γi − ǫi when the
game starts at ti. When the game starts at s, define σ
∏
i
1 behaving as τ
i
1 in the
subplay continuing its execution from ti, generated after the first game-step at




probability of winning greater than
∐
i(γi − ǫi). Clearly
∐
i(γi − ǫi) can be made
arbitrarily close to
∐
i γi by appropriate choices of ǫi. As in the previous cases,
every strategy σ1 for the game starting at s is of the form σ
∏
i
1 . Hence, for every
ǫi > 0,
∐
i VAL↓(G)(ti)≥VAL↓(G)(s) − ǫ.
5.3 Two player stochastic meta-parity games
In this section we focus on a particular class of prefix independent two player
stochastic meta-games, which we call two player stochastic meta-parity games.
This is the class of games we will use to give game semantics to the probabilistic
modal µ-calculi introduced in Section 3.3. The adjective parity describes the
inner games, which are parity games.
A parity assignment for a two player stochastic meta-game arena A, is a
function Pr : S → N specified as in Definition 2.3.53. Every parity assignment
induces a set WPr of completed paths in A, specified as in Definition 2.3.54. Recall
from Definition 2.3.54 that a set X ⊆ P of completed paths in A is a parity set
if X=WPr for some parity assignment in A, and that every every parity set is a
prefix independent Borel set (see Proposition 2.3.61).
We now introduce the class of two player stochastic meta-parity games.
Definition 5.3.1. A 21
2




parity game if and only if the meta-winning set W is a parity set induced by some
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parity assignment Pr on A, i.e., if W =WPr. We often denote with 〈A,ΦPr〉 the
21
2
-player meta-parity game 〈A,ΦWPr〉.
Observation 5.3.2. Consider a 21
2
-player meta-parity game G = 〈A,ΦPr〉, with
A = 〈(S,E), (S1, S2, SN , B1, B2), π〉. By Definition 2.3.54, the path {s} is con-
tained in ΦPr if and only if Pr(s) = 1. Therefore G satisfies Convention 5.2.1 if
and only if for all terminal states s, if Pr(s) is odd then s∈S2 ∪ B2 and if Pr(s)
is even then s∈S1 ∪ B1.
We shall always consider 21
2
-player meta-parity games satisfying Convention 5.2.1.
Since every 21
2
-player meta-parity game is a prefix independent 21
2
-player
meta-game, all the results of Section 5.2 apply. Recall from Proposition 2.3.57,
that the complement of a parity winning set WPr is the parity winning set W¬Pr,
with ¬Pr(s)
def
= Pr(s) + 1. Hence the negation of a 21
2
-player meta-parity game




¬G = 〈¬A,ΦW¬Pr〉, or more succinctly ¬G = 〈¬A,Φ¬Pr〉. Thus the lower and
upper values (under deterministic strategies) of the 21
2
-player meta-parity game
G=〈A,ΦPr〉 and its negation ¬G=〈¬A,Φ¬Pr〉 are related as the result of Lemma
5.1.16 shows.
We now discuss some examples of 21
2
-player meta-parity games to provide
some intuitions and fix the main ideas.
Example 5.3.3. Let us consider the 21
2
-player meta-parity game 〈A,Pr〉 defined
as follows:
• The arena A=〈(S,E), (S1, S2, SN , B1, B2), π〉 is defined as:
– S={b, x, y,⊤,⊥},
– E(b)={x, y}, E(x)=E(y)={⊤,⊥}, E(⊤)=E(⊥)=∅,






• and the priority assignment Pr :S→N is defined as:
– Pr(⊤)=1, Pr(⊥)=0 and Pr(x)=Pr(y)=Pr(b)=0.
The 21
2
-player meta-parity game 〈A,Pr〉 can be depicted as follows:
























The conventions we will use in depicting our examples are the following. All
states in S1 and in B1 are labeled with a diamond, but they are distinguishable
by the fact that the edges leaving states in S1 are depicted as single lines, while
those leaving states in B1 are doubled. Similarly all states in S2 and in B2
are labeled with a rectangle, but they are distinguishable by the fact that the
edges leaving a state in S2 are depicted single lines, while those leaving a state
in B2 are doubled. Observe that by the Convention 5.2.1 introduced earlier, all
terminal states labeled with diamonds have assigned an even priority, while all
the terminal states labeled with rectangles have assigned an odd priority. Lastly
all probabilistic states s ∈ SN are labeled by circles, and the edges connecting
s with each t ∈E(s) are depicted with single lines labeled with the probability
π(s)(t).
As a first observation about the game G, note that the only agent taking part
in the outer-game is Nature, since S1 and S2 just contain terminal states. This
means that, from each starting state, there exists a unique Markov branching play
M in G. When the game starts at b, the following four branching plays, denoted
by T⊤⊤, T⊤⊥, T⊥⊤ and T⊥⊥, are the possible outcomes of the game generated by





























respectively, by the probability
measure PMb associated with the unique Markov branching play M
b rooted at b.
Let us consider, for instance, the inner-game GT⊤⊥ associated with the branching
play T⊤⊥. Since b is a state in B1, i.e., under the control of Player 1 in the inner
game GT⊤⊥ , Player 1 can simply choose to move to x at the first move, and then
reach the terminal state ⊤, which has assigned odd priority. The path resulting
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as a play from this strategy is therefore b.x.⊤, which is winning for Player 1 in
the inner game GT⊤⊥ . This implies that Player 1 has a winning strategy in GT⊤⊥ ,
which means that GT⊤⊥ ∈Φ. By similar arguments it is easy to check that also
the inner games associated with T⊤⊤ an T⊥⊤ are winning for Player 1, i.e., they




which is the value of the game G at b, since there are no strategies to consider in
the outer-game.
Example 5.3.4. The second example we consider is a slight variation of the
previous one. Let us consider the 21
2
-player meta-parity game 〈A,Pr〉 which can
























where Pr(⊤) = 1, Pr(⊥) = 0 and Pr(x) = Pr(y) = Pr(b) = 0. Compared to
the Example 5.3.3, the state b is in S1 instead of B1. This modification makes
significant changes in the way the game G is played. When the game starts at b,
Player 1 has to make a choice, in the first stage of the game (i.e., in the outer-
game of G) between the successor states x and y, from which the rest of the game
continues as in Example 5.3.3. Therefore, from the state b, there are two possible
Markov branching plays Mx and My capturing the outcome of the (outer) game


















Let us consider, for instance, the Markov branching play Mx. The probability






the branching plays Tx⊤ and Tx⊥ which can be depicted as follows:







The two inner-games associated with the branching plays Tx⊤ and Tx⊥ are triv-
ial, as there are no choices to be made by Player 1 or Player 2. And, as it is
easy to observe, only the inner game associated with Tx⊤ is winning for Player
1, i.e., Tx⊤∈Φ and Tx⊥ 6∈Φ. Therefore we have that PMx(Φ) =
1
3




as well. Since Mx and My are the only possible Markov




Examples 5.3.3 an 5.3.4 are helpful useful because they highlight the main
difference between states in S1 and states in B1: at all states s ∈ S1, Player 1
is committed to make an immediate choice among the successor states of the
state s, while on all states s ∈B1 Player 1 delays their choice, which will later
be made in the second stage of the game, i.e., in the inner-game resulting from
the outer-game of G. Both players prefer to delay their choices, since this allows




-player meta-parity game of Example 5.3.3 could be informally de-
scribed as the game in which Player 1 can toss two (biased) coins, and only after
the outcome is revealed, they win if they can choose among the two tossed coins,
one which turned out to be ⊤. The game proposed in Example 5.3.4, on the other
hand, forces Player 1 to choose between one of the two (biased) coins before the
outcome of the random events is revealed; Player 1 wins if and only if when toss-
ing the chosen coin, ⊤ is the outcome. As a result of the different game-dynamics
implemented in the two examples, the value (i.e., the probability of winning for
Player 1) of the game of Example 5.3.3 is 5
9
while the value of the game presented
in Example 5.3.4 is just 1
3
.
We now consider two slightly more complex examples, in order to settle the
intuitions about the different behaviors of states is S1 (respectively S2) and states
in B1 (respectively B2).
Example 5.3.5. Let us consider the 21
2
-player meta-parity game 〈A,Pr〉 which
can be depicted as follows:















where Pr(⊤) = 1, Pr(⊥) = 0 and Pr(x) = Pr(y) = Pr(b) = 0. Observe that, as in
Example 5.3.3, the only agent taking part in the outer-game is Nature, since S1
and S2 just contain terminal states. This means that, from each starting state,
there exists a unique Markov branching play M in G. The Markov branching





























The Markov branching play M b induces a probability measure PMb over the set
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where the set of labels ni, for i∈N, range over the two elements set {⊤,⊥}. Let
us now consider the inner game GT associated with a branching play T rooted
at b induced by the behavior of Nature. Since the only nodes in T with more
than one successors are labeled by the state b, which is a state in B2, only Player
2 can actively play in the inner game GT , by making their choices at the nodes
labeled with b. By definition of WPr, i.e., the set of paths winning for Player
1 in the inner game GT , the only completed paths winning for Player 2 in GT ,
i.e., those completed paths ~s 6∈WPr, are the terminated paths ~s ∈ P such that
last(~s) =⊥. This is because any terminated path ~s with last(~s) =⊤ is in WPr,
since Pr(⊤) = 1, and because the only infinite path ~s in T just contains states
having assigned even priority (namely b and y, which have assigned priority 0),
and therefore it is by definition in WPr. Therefore Player 2 has a winning strategy
in the inner game GT associated with the branching play T , i.e., T 6∈ Φ, if and
only if Player 2 can find a path terminating at the state ⊥ in T . By observing
that PMb assigns probability 1 to the set of branching plays T having at least one
path terminating in the state ⊥, we can concluded that the value of the game G
is 0, i.e., Player 2 wins almost surely the game G.
The game G of Example 5.3.5 can be described informally as follows: Player
2 can toss a (biased) coin; if the result turns out to be ⊥, Player 2 immediately
wins; otherwise Player 2 repeats the process and toss another (independent) coin,
and so on. Player 2 wins if and only if at some point (i.e., after a finite amount
of trials) the outcome of the toss is ⊥; Player 2 loses otherwise. It is clear that
Player 2 wins in the game almost surely because the coin will, with probability
1, turn ⊥ at some point.
Example 5.3.6. Let us consider the 21
2
-player meta-parity game 〈A,Pr〉 which
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with Pr(⊤)=1, Pr(⊥)=0 and Pr(x)=Pr(y)=Pr(b)=0. Compared to the game
of Example 5.3.5, the state b is in S2 rather than in B2, i.e., under the control of
Player 2 in the outer game of G and not in the inner game. This means that both
Nature and Player 2 have an active role in the outer game of G. In particular
Player 2 has ω-many strategies, which we denote with σi2, for i∈N, and σ
ω
2 , to
play in G starting at b. The strategy σi2, from the starting state b, chooses to move
to the state y and from there (necessarily) back to b, i-many times, after which it
chooses to move to x, from which the rest of the outer-game is independent of the
choices of Player 2. The strategy σω2 instead, always chooses to move from b to
y, infinitely many times. If Player 2 uses the strategy σω2 the Markov branching
play M bω rooted at b, which can be depicted as follows, is generated:
b y b y b y . . .
The Markov branching play M bω is also a branching play T
b
ω, which means that
it is the result of a play in the outer-game of G in which Nature didn’t have any
active role. The resulting inner game GT bω associated with T
b
ω is trivial, as neither
Player 1 nor Player 2 have an active role in it, and is winning for Player 1, since
all states in the infinite path b.y.b.y. . . are labeled with the even priority 0 by Pr.
If Player 2 uses the strategy σi2 instead, the Markov branching play M
b
i rooted
ab b, which can be depicted as follows, is generated:







The Markov branching play M bi induces a probability measure PMbi , which assigns
probability 1
3
to the branching play T bi,⊤ which can be depicted as follows:




to the branching play T bi,⊥, which can be depicted as follows:
b y b y . . . b y b x
⊥
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The inner games associated with the branching plays T bi,⊤ and T
b
i,⊥ are both triv-
ial. In particular Player 1 has winning strategy in GT bi,⊤ , i.e., T
b
i,⊤∈Φ, and Player
2 has a winning strategy in T bi,⊥, i.e., T
b
i,⊥ 6∈ Φ. Therefore if Player 2 uses the
strategy σω2 they surely lose, i.e., Player 1 surely wins, and if they use the strat-
egy σi2 they win with probability
2
3
, i.e., Player 1 wins with probability 1
3
. From
this we can conclude that the value of the game G is 1
3
.
The game G of Example 5.3.6 can be described informally as follows: Player
2, at the state b, can either choose to toss a (biased) coin, in which case they win
if and only if the outcome of the toss is ⊥, or to procrastinate the choice (which is
modeled in the game, by the possibility of moving to the state y and return, after
a step, to the state b). Player 2 loses if they procrastinate their choice infinitely
many times. It is clear that Player 2 has no advantage in procrastinating at all,
and therefore the whole game just reduces to a (biased) coin toss. Note how the
dynamics of the game of Example 5.3.5 differ from those of Example 5.3.6. In the
latter, Player 2 is forced to make a choice in the outer game, and this drastically
reduces (from 1 to 2
3
) their chances to win.
The examples discussed in this section are intentionally very simple and, as
we have shown, determined under deterministic strategies. As we shall see in
the next chapter, every 21
2
-player meta-parity game is determined under mixed
strategies under the set-theoretic assumption MAℵ1 . We shall see more interesting
example in Chapter 7, where 21
2
-player meta-parity games will be used to give
game semantics to the probabilistic µ-calculi defined in Section 3.3.
5.4 Summary of results
In this chapter we identified a useful class of 21
2
-player tree games which we named
21
2
-player meta-games. In 21
2
-player meta-games the set of winning branching
plays is described, somewhat declaratively, by means of inner games which are
standard 2-player turn-based games played on branching plays. As we discussed
in Section 5.1, 21
2
-player meta-games can be understood as games played in two
(infinite) stages: the 21
2
-player outer tree game and the standard 2-player inner
game. The key idea is that, in the inner games, both players can base their moves
on the choices made by the opponent and by Nature in the outer game. As we
observed in Remark 5.1.11, if the outer game is not stochastic, then the division
5.4. Summary of results 199
of the game in two stages does not provide any gain to the two players, which
can indeed play as if they were competing in a standard 2-player game. This
fact highlights the important feature of 21
2
-player meta-games. At player states
(i.e., in S1 or S2), Player 1 and Player 2 have to make their choices assuming
all possible random behaviors of Nature. At branching states (i.e., in B1 or B2),
Player 1 and Player 2 can instead delay their choices and, only once the moves
of Nature become known, declare their choices in the second stage of the game.
In Section 5.1 we discussed how working with 21
2
-player meta-games (with
Borel meta-winning sets) is technically problematic because their winning sets
are, in general, ∆12-sets, hence not necessarily universally measurable. Thus we
defined the assertion mG-UM(Γ), for a collection Γ of meta-games, which is the
minimal assumption necessary for dealing with the games G∈Γ. As we discussed,
mG-UM(Γ) is consistent with ZFC because, for instance, it follows from ∆12-UM
which is one of the consequences of Martin’s Axiom at ℵ1 (see Theorem 2.1.87).
In Section 5.2 we focused on 21
2
-player meta-games G = 〈A,ΦW〉 with W a
(Borel) prefix-independent set. We derived useful properties of this class of meta-
games, which will be used later on in Chapter 6. Interestingly, another useful
metaphor, for the game interactions, is available for prefix-independent 21
2
-player
meta-games. At player states, Player 1 and Player 2 have to make their choices
assuming all possible random behaviors of Nature, as already discussed earlier.
At branching states s∈B1, the game can be thought of as generating a collection
of independent subplays, one for each successor state of s, and Player 1 wins if
and only if the outcome of at least one subplay is winning for them (thus ignoring
the prefix by which the play arrived at the current state). Similarly, at branching
states s∈B2, a collection of independent sub-plays is generated and Player 1 wins
if and only if the outcome of all subplays is winning for them. These existential
and universal conditions match the roles of Player 1 and Player 2 in the inner
games. Moreover the winning condition expressed just in terms of the outcomes
of the generated sub-plays, and thus not on the previous history of the game, is
justified by the prefix-independency of the meta-winning sets.
In Section 5.3 we focused on 21
2
-player meta-parity games, having a parity
meta-winning set. As we shall see in Chapter 7, 21
2
-player meta-parity games will
be used to give a game semantics to the probabilistic modal µ-calculi discussed
in Section 3.3. The above discussed metaphor for the interactions occurring in
21
2
-player meta-parity games matches exactly the informal description of pLµ⊙
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games given in Section 3.3.3. The result of Theorem 5.2.10 constrains the value of
21
2











are the basic operators used in the denotational semantics of pLµ⊙. For 21
2
-
player meta-parity games, the value is indeed well defined because, as we shall
see in the next Chapter, every 21
2
-player meta-parity game is determined under
deterministic strategies, at least in ZFC + MAℵ1 set theory. Lastly, Remark
5.1.11, which reduces non-stochastic meta-games to ordinary 2-player games, can
be thought as a game-counterpart of Proposition 3.3.8, which reduces a pLµ⊙⊕
formula to an equivalent, when interpreted on ordinary LTS’s, modal µ-calculus
formula.
We conclude this summary section by pointing to a possibly fruitful connection
between 21
2
-player meta-parity games and what A. Arnold and D. Niwinski call
game tree languages in [3]. A game tree language Wi,k, for i, k∈N and i ≤ k, is the
set of trees T over the finite alphabet {1, 2}×{i, . . . , k} (see Definition 2.1.41) such
that, when interpreted as 2-player parity games (a node 〈p, j〉 in T , for p∈{1, 2}
and j ∈ {i, . . . , k}, is under the control of Player p and is labeled with priority
j), Player 1 has a winning strategy. There is an obvious relation between the
assertion “Wi,k is universally measurable for every i≤k” and mG-UM(Γp), where
Γp is the collection of all 2
1
2
-player meta-parity games. Some deep properties of
game tree languages are known. For instance, the sets W0,n, for n ∈ N, form
a strictly ≤W -increasing chain in the Wadge order (see Definition 2.1.56). We
refer to [3] for a very concise proof of this fact. However, to our knowledge, the
measurability problem has not been studied in the literature. We think it is quite
plausible that mG-UM(Γp) holds in ZFC alone. We leave this as an interesting




We develop in this Chapter our main result about 21
2
-player meta-parity games.
We prove that every 21
2
-player meta-parity game G = 〈A,ΦPr〉 is determined un-
der deterministic strategies, in the sense of Definition 4.1.14. This is proven by
induction on |Pr |, i.e., on the number of priorities assigned to states in A by the
priority assignment Pr. Proving results about parity games1 by induction on the
number of priorities is not a novel idea. Indeed this (high-level) proof technique
is known under the name of unfolding or unravelling method, ascribable to the
proof technique developed in [72] by Donald A. Martin (see, e.g., [60, Ch. 20]),
and developed in the context of parity games in the works of Luigi Santocanale
[100] and Erich Grädel [46] among others. The unfolding method is also the main
technique adopted in [35] to prove the equivalence of the denotational and game
semantics of what the authors call quantitative modal µ-calculus, a recently in-
troduced fixed-point modal logic for expressing properties of quantitative labeled
transition systems2. The techniques adopted in [46] and [35] greatly inspired the
development of the results of this chapter. However, in the context of 21
2
-player
meta-parity games several complications arise, and our proofs require a significant
technical effort. Thus we believe the present proof, beside establishing an impor-
1Here the term parity game ranges, informally, over any game whose winning condition is
specified by some sort of parity assignment on the game arena.
2The game semantics is given in terms of standard 2-player turn based games with real-
valued payoffs. Thus their determinacy follows by standard results (Theorem 2.3.37). The
models are (non probabilistic) LTS’s whose transitions are decorated with real-values. The
calculus of [35] is different from the µ-calculi discussed in Section 3.3. We used the adjective
“probabilistic” to highlight this difference.
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tant result, constitutes a significant contribution to applicability of the general
unfolding method proof technique.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.1 we prove that every 21
2
-
player meta-parity game G = 〈A,ΦPr〉 with |Pr | = 1 (see Definition 2.3.53) is
determined under deterministic strategies. This result is the base of our induc-
tive proof. In Section 6.3 we prove that, under appropriate assumptions coming
from the inductive hypothesis, every 21
2
-player meta-parity game G = 〈A,ΦPr〉,
with |Pr |= N + 1 priorities, is determined under deterministic strategies. This
is proven by reducing the problem, using the unfolding method, to the determi-
nacy under deterministic strategy of a 21
2
-player meta-parity game with just N
priorities. In Section 6.2, we develop the technical machinery associated with the
unfolding procedure. In Section 6.4 we compose the results of sections 6.1, 6.2
and 6.3 and prove that every 21
2
-player meta-parity game is determined. Due
to the complexity of the winning sets of 21
2
-player meta-parity games, and the
associate measure theoretic issues, our proof is carried out in ZFC + MAℵ1 set
theory. The proof is heavily based on the machinery developed on Section 4.3.
The technology we introduce for proving the main theorem, i.e., determinacy un-
der deterministic strategies of all 21
2
-player meta-parity games, will allow other
interesting properties of 21
2
-player meta-parity games to be proven. In Section
6.5 we summarize the results obtained in this chapter.
6.1 21
2
-player meta-parity games with one priority
Let us fix an arbitrary 21
2
-player meta-parity game G=〈A,ΦPr〉, where the arena
A is specified as A= 〈(S,E), (S1, S2, SN , B1, B2), π〉, and such that |Pr |=1. We
denote in this section with p the unique priority assigned by Pr to states in S.
We denote with Φ the winning set of the game G, i.e., the set ΦPr. We denote
with P<ω, P, BP , MBP the sets of finite paths, completed paths, branching
plays and Markov branching plays in A, respectively.
We first prove our results assuming that p is an odd number. The case for p
even will be considered at the end of this section.
We want to show that, for every s ∈ S, VALs↓(G) = VAL
s
↑(G). By Theorem
5.2.10 we know that both VAL↓(G) : S→ [0, 1] and VAL↑(G) : S→ [0, 1] are fixed
points of the functional FG specified as in Theorem 5.2.10. Moreover we know
that VAL↓(G)⊑VAL↑(G). We are going to prove the desired result showing that
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VAL↑(G)⊑ lfp(FG), where lfp(FG) denotes the least fixed point of the functional
FG. This clearly implies the desired result. In order to do this, we obtain an
inductive characterization of the winning set Φ which allows us to prove the
desired inequality by an inductive argument.




meta-parity game G, as specified in Definition 5.2.5.
Corollary 6.1.1. By the Knaster-Tarski theorem, WG has least and greatest






where α ranges over the ordinals, and the sets WαG are defined, for each ordinal





The operator WG is of our interest because it allows to provide an inductive
characterization for the winning set Φ.





G we already know, by application of Lemma 5.2.7,
that lfp(WG)⊆Φ. Therefore we just need to show that lfp(WG)⊇Φ. We prove
the desired result showing that for every T ∈ lfp(WG), Player 2 has a winning
strategy in the inner game GT . Observe that, since Pr assigns the odd priority
p to every state s∈S, no terminal state in A is in S1 ∪ B1 by Convention 5.2.1.
Moreover it follows by Definition 2.3.54 that the set WPr of winning paths for
Player 1 in the inner games GT , for T ∈ BP , is exactly the set of terminated
paths, i.e., the set of completed paths ending in a terminal state. Thus, every
infinite completed path is winning for Player 2. A winning strategy for Player 2
in the inner game GT is therefore a strategy that can force a play in GT through
an infinite path. We now show how player 2 can force the play in the inner-game
GT to be an infinite path, for any T ∈ lfp(WG), by following the rules considered
below.
1. Every branching play T ′ whose root(T ′) is a terminal state in not in lfp(WG)
by Definition 5.2.5 of WG. So assume that root(T ) is not terminal in the
following cases.
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2. If s= root(T ) ∈ S1 ∪ S2 ∪ SN , then s has a unique child ti in T , for some
ti∈E(s). It follows, by definition of WG, that the branching play T i, which
is the sub-branching play of T rooted at ti, is in lfp(WG) as well, because T
would be in lfp(WG) otherwise. The move in the game GT from the state s
to the state ti is forced, and Player 2 can proceed in the rest of the sub-game
GT i, iterating the same protocol, and thus forcing the game into an infinite
path.
3. If s=root(T )∈B1, with E(s)={ti}i∈I then, by the same kind of argument,
for each i∈I, the sub-branching play T i of T rooted at ti is in lfp(WG). In
the game GT the state s is under the control of Player 1 who can move to a
state ti, for i∈I. If player 1 chooses to move to the state ti, then Player 2
play in the rest of the sub-game GT i, iterating the same protocol, and thus
forcing the game into an infinite path.
4. If s = root(T ) ∈ B2, with E(s) = {ti}i∈I then there must exist some i ∈ I
such that the sub-branching play T i of T rooted at ti is in lfp(WG). In the
game GT the state s is under the control of Player 2 who can move to the
ti, and play in the rest of the sub-game GT i, iterating the same protocol,
and thus forcing the game into an infinite path.
The following is an immediate consequence of Lemma 6.1.2 and Lemma 5.2.8.
Lemma 6.1.3. If A is finitely branching in B2, then the winning set Φ is open.




G, and from Lemma 5.2.8, W
α
G
is open for every ordinal α.
Lemma 6.1.3 implies that mG-UM(Γ) (see Definition 5.1.8) holds in ZFC,
when Γ is set of all 21
2
-player meta-parity games with just one odd priority having
an arena finitely branching in B2.
The next lemma provides useful information about the number of iterations
necessary to reach the least fixed point of WG .
Lemma 6.1.4. If the 21
2
-player meta-parity game G=〈A,ΦPr〉 is finitely branch-
ing in B2 (see Definition 5.1.13), then the operator WG reaches its fixed point in




G. If G is not finitely branching in
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Proof. Let us first consider the case when G is finitely branching in B2. We show
that for all T ∈BP , if T ∈Wω+1G then T ∈W
ω
G . Assume T ∈W
ω+1
G . Then one of
the points 1-4 of Definition 5.2.5 hold.
1. In this case T ∈WG(W
ω1
G ) because T is the branching play T = {s} rooted
at some terminal state s∈S. Thus T ∈W1G as desired.
2. In this case T ∈ WG(WωG) because T is a branching play rooted at s ∈
S1 ∪ S2 ∪ SN , with E(s) 6=∅, and the sub-branching play T ti rooted at the






G, we have that
T ti ∈WαG for some α<ω. But then T ∈W
α+1
G , and α+ 1 < ω as desired.
3. In this case T ∈WG(WωG) because T is a branching play rooted at s∈B1,
with E(s)={ti}i∈I 6=∅, and there exists an i∈I such that the sub-branching
play T ti of T is in WωG . Again, as for the previous case, T
ti ∈WαG for some
α < ω and T ∈Wα+1G as desired.
4. In this case T ∈WG(WωG) because T is a branching play rooted at s∈B2,
with E(s) = {ti}i∈I 6= ∅, and for all i∈ I the sub-branching play T ti of T is
in WωG . By considerations analogous to previous ones, each branching play
T ti is contained in WαiG for some αi<ω, for every i∈ I. Since A is finitely
branching in B2, the set I indexing the successors states of s is finite. Let
us define the ordinal β=
⊔
i∈I αi. Then β < ω, since I is finite, and we have
T ∈Wβ+1G as desired.
Let us now consider the general case, when G is not finitely branching in B2. The
proof technique we adopt is similar. Assume T ∈Wω1+1G . The first two points
handled as before.
4. In this case T ∈WG(W
ω1
G ) because T is a branching play rooted at s∈B2,
with E(s) = {ti}i∈I 6= ∅, and for all i ∈ I the sub-branching play T ti of T
is in Wω1G . By considerations analogous to previous ones, each branching
play T ti is contained in WαiG for some αi < ω1, for every i ∈ I. Thus the
ordinal β=
⊔
i∈I αi < ω1 is countable, because I is countable. Then we have
T ∈Wβ+1G , and β + 1 < ω1, as desired.
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We now prove that if A is not finitely branching in B2 then, in general, the
winning set Φ is not Borel.
Lemma 6.1.5. There exists a 21
2
-player meta-parity game with just one odd
priority such that its winning set Φ is not Borel.
Proof. We provide a concrete example by constructing a 21
2
-player meta-parity
game G=〈A,ΦPr〉 with just one odd priority such that:
1. BPA is Borel isomorphic to T (N) (see Definition 2.1.41), and
2. ΦPr⊆BPA is Borel isomoprhic to the set of well-founded trees over T (N).












where the branching state i has countably many successors states {sn}n∈N. We
now show that the set BP i of branching plays rooted at the state i is homeomor-
phic to T (N). The tree over N corresponding to the branching play T = {~s}i∈I
contains the finite sequence a0.a1 . . . ak of natural numbers if and only if T
contains the path i.sa0 .i.sa1 .i . . . i.sak .i. Moreover the sequence a0.a1 . . . ak is a
leaf, in the tree corresponding to T , if and only if T contains the set of paths
{i.sa0 .i.sa1 .i . . . i.sak .i.sn. ⋆ | n∈N}.






























where ~ti= i.sa0 .i.sa1 .i . . . i.sak .i if ~ni=a0.a1 . . . ak, and L⊆I is the set of (indexes




is indeed a branching
play in G and that f is a bijection. It also immediate to see that f is continuous
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(the inverse image of every sub-basic open set O~s is a sub-basic open set in T (N)
and its inverse f−1 is Borel measurable (the inverse under f−1 of a sub-basic open
set {T | ~n 6∈T} is closed).
Let us now consider the winning set ΦPr of the game G. Since an odd priority
is assigned to each state s∈S by Pr, the set WPr of winning paths for Player 1
in any inner game GT , for T ∈BP i, is the set of all terminated completed paths,
which in this context, is the set of all completed paths ending in the terminal
state ⋆. Moreover, since every branching state in A is under the control of Player
2, it follows that a branching play T ∈BP i is winning for Player 1 if and only if
there are no infinite paths in the inner game GT . Given this description for the set
Φ, it is simple to see that T ∈Φ, if and only if f−1(T )∈WF, where WF⊆T (N)
is the set of all well-founded trees on N.
Note that the example proposed in Lemma 6.1.5 is uniquely branching in B1,
in the sense of Definition 5.1.13. This means that the upper bound, provided
in Lemma 5.1.14, on the complexity of winning sets of 21
2
-player meta-games
uniquely branching in B1, is strict.
As another consequence of Lemma 6.1.5, we have that the upper bound pro-
vided by Lemma 6.1.4 on the number of iterations needed to reach the least fixed
point of the operator WG is tight.
Corollary 6.1.6. There exists a 21
2
-player meta-parity game with just one odd
priority such that for every countable ordinal α, WαG 6=W
ω1
G .
Proof. Consider the game G defined in the proof of Lemma 6.1.5. Recall from
Lemma 6.1.2 that Φ =
⋃
β<ω1
WβG where Φ is the winning set of G. For each
countable ordinal α, the set WαG is Borel by application of Lemma 5.2.8.
We are now ready to prove the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 6.1.7. Let, G = 〈A,ΦPr〉 be a 2
1
2
-player meta-parity game, with A =
〈(S,E), (S1, S2, SN , B1, B2), π〉, having just one odd priority, i.e., such that min(Pr)=
1 and min(Pr)=p for some odd number p. Then the following assertions hold
ZFC ⊢ V als↑(G)≤ lfp(FG)(s), if G is finitely branching in B2
ZFC + MAℵ1 ⊢ V al
s
↑(G)≤ lfp(FG)(s)
for every s ∈ S. Moreover if A is finitely branching in S2, then Player 2 has a
optimal positional strategy (see Definition 2.3.45).
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Proof. As a first observation, note that the two assertions are well-defined only
under the hypothesis mG-UM(ΓB21 ) and mG-UM(Γ1) respectively, with Γ
B2
1 being
the class of all 21
2
-player meta-parity games finitely branching inB2 (see Definition




games with one odd priority. However, by applications of Lemma 6.1.3 we know
that ZFC ⊢ mG-UM(ΓB1 ) holds. Moreover ZFC + MAℵ1 ⊢ mG-UM(Γ1) holds, by
Lemma 2.1.88 and the observations following Definition 5.1.8. Thus we omitted
the hypotheses mG-UM(ΓB1 ) and mG-UM(Γ1) from the statements.
We will prove the two assertions together in a uniform way, specifying when
we use the set-theoretic assumption MAℵ1 in the general case, i.e., when G is not
finitely branching in B2.
Since p is odd, it follows from Convention 5.2.1 that there are no terminal

























































We just denote with F the functional FG in what follows.
Let us fix an arbitrary state s∈S. We prove the inequality V als↑(G)≤ lfp(F)(s)




E(Msσ1,σ2) ≤ lfp(F)(s) + ǫ
holds, for all states s ∈ S. This clearly implies the desired result. Let us an
arbitrary ǫ>0.
Let us first assume that the game arena A is finitely branching in S2 (see
Definition 5.1.13). In this restricted case, we can define for every non terminal
state s ∈ S2 a successor state ts ∈ E(s) which satisfies the following property:
lfp(F)(ts) =
d
t∈E(s) lfp(F)(t) = lfp(F)(s). In other words t
s is a successor state of
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s which minimize lfp(F). We then define the strategy σ2 as σ2(~s.s)= ts, for every
non-terminal state s ∈ S2, and σ2(~s.s) = {•} for every terminal state s ∈ S2. In
other words the strategy σ2 always picks the successor state (if there is any) which
minimizes the function lfp(F). Note that the so defined strategy σ2 is positional.
We could now prove that σ2 satisfies the desired inequality. However, because
of the restriction on the set of the arenas, namely the finitely branching in S2
ones, we would have to prove the desired result for the general case separately.
In particular the conceptual difference, when working with general arenas, is
that Player 2, at some non-terminal state s∈S2, might not have an optimal, in
the sense of minimizing lfp(F), successor state to pick. Intuitively an ǫ-optimal
strategy for Player 2 in such a state would just choose an almost optimal, say
ǫ
2
-close to lfp(F)(s), successor t∈E(s) of s. However after this choice, Player 2
will have, on subsequent choices, to improve their decisions further, i.e., they will
have to chose successors closer than ǫ
2
to lfp(F). Matters are further complicated
by the different behaviors that Player 2 might need to sustain in different sub-
games. This said, it is clear that an ǫ-optimal strategy for Player 2 in a general
arena, constructed following the previous informal discussion, crucially bases its
choices on the history of the previously played moves.
Let us consider a numbering of all finite paths in A, i.e., an injective map
e : P<ω → N\{0} which satisfies e(~s) < e(~t) whenever ~s is a proper prefix of




• only if E(last(~s))=∅
t only if E(last(~s)) 6=∅, t∈E(s) and lfp(F)(t)≤ lfp(F)(s) + ǫ
#(e(~s))
for all histories ~s ending at some state s ∈ S2, where the function # : N → N
is defined as in Definition 2.2.9. By previous observations, a strategy σe2 always
exists. Note how σe2 uses the information contained in the history ~s in a simple,
but crucial way. Moreover observe that, if A is finitely branching in S2, then
the positional strategy we discussed earlier, satisfies the above specification for
every numbering e defined as above. This allows us to cover the cases of finitely-
branching in S2 arenas and general arenas at the same time.
Let us define, for every numbering e defined as above and for every state s∈S,
the numbering s.e as follows:






e(~s) if first(~s) 6∈E(s)
It is immediate to observe that, for every ~t∈P<ω , e(~t)≤s.e(~t). This definition is
useful because it allows us to characterize the behavior of a strategy σe2 as
σe2({s}) =
{
• only if E(last(~s))=∅
t only if t∈E(s) and lfp(F)(t)< lfp(F)(s) + ǫ
#(e({s}))
(6.1)




2 (~t) for all other
histories ~s with last(~s)∈S2.
We are now going to show that any strategy σe2 which follows the above
specification for some numbering e, satisfies the desired inequality: for all s∈S,
⊔
σ1
E(Msσ1,σe2) ≤ lfp(F)(s)+ǫ. We do this by proving a stronger property, namely
that for all s∈S,
⊔
σ1
E(Msσ1,σe2) ≤ lfp(F)(s) +
2·ǫ
#(e({s})) .
Let us fix an arbitrary strategy σ1 for Player 1 in G. We need to show that
E(Msσ1,σe2)≤ lfp(F)(s)+
2·ǫ




where Psσ1,σe2 denotes the probability measure over BP induced by the Markov
branching play Msσ1,σe2 , and Φ ⊆ BP is the set of winning branching plays for
Player 1 in G.




G. Let us now consider separately
the cases when A is finitely branching in B2 and when A is instead general.










(WαG). If instead the arena A is not finitely branching in B2, we
know, again from Lemma 6.1.4, that Φ =
⋃
α<ω1






G) (see Theorem 2.1.87 and Proposition 2.1.88).







holds, even if in the general case we need to invoke MAℵ1 .
This equality allows us to set up a proof, by transfinite induction over ordinals,
of the desired inequality E(Msσ1,σe2) ≤ lfp(F)(s) +
2·ǫ
#(e({s})) . We are going to show
that for every countable ordinal α, the inequality
Psσ1,σe2(W
α




holds. This clearly implies the desired inequality.
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Suppose, by induction hypothesis, that the inequality 6.2 holds for every β<α.
Let us consider the possible shapes of the Markov branching play Msσ1,σe2 .
1. If s is a terminal state, i.e., if E(s) = ∅, then by Convention 5.2.1, s is in
the set S2 ∪B2 because Pr(s)=p is odd. In this case, by definition of F, we
have that Fα(s)=1 and the result trivially holds.




where ti is the state chosen by σ1 at the initial state s, i.e., ti = σ1({s}),
and the sub-Markov branching play M tiσ∗1 ,σs.e2 of M
s
σ1,σe2
is induced by the
strategy σs.e2 (because once reached the state ti, σ
e
2 starts behaving as σ
s.e
2 ,
as observed earlier) and σ∗1, where the strategy σ
∗
1 for Player 1 in G follows
the behavior of σ1 after the state ti is reached, and is defined as follows:
σ∗1(~s)=σ1(s.~s), if the first state of ~s is ti.
The Markov branching playsM tiσ∗1 ,σs.e2 and M
s
σ1,σe2
induce the probability mea-
sures Ptiσ∗1 ,σs.e2 and P
s
σ1,σe2
on the set of branching plays BP , respectively. We
can restrict attention, when considering Ptiσ∗1 ,σs.e2 , to the set BPti of branch-
ing plays rooted at ti, since all other sets of branching plays get assigned




the set BPs.ti of branching plays rooted at s and having ti as unique child







where we use T ti to range over BPti and just T to range over BPs.ti. It
follows from the definition of WG, that T ∈WαG if and only if T
ti ∈WβG , for
some β < α, with T and T ti as depicted above. From this observation we
have that the following equality holds:
























for all β<α. Moreover it follows from the definition of s.e that s.e({ti})=
e(s.{ti}), and by our definition of numbering we have that e({s}.{ti}) >
























where ti is the state chosen by σ
e
2 at the initial state s (and this implies,
by Equation 6.1, that lfp(F)(ti)≤ lfp(F)(s) +
ǫ
#(e({s})) ) and the sub-Markov
branching play M tiσ∗1 ,σs.e2 of M
s
σ1,σe2
is induced by the strategy σs.e2 (because
once the state ti is reached, σ
e
2 starts behaving as σ
s.e
2 , as observed earlier)
and σ∗1, where the strategy σ
∗
1 for Player 1 in G follows the behavior of σ1
after the state ti is reached, and is defined as follows: σ
∗
1(~s)=σ1(s.~s) if the
first state of ~s is ti. By arguments similar to the ones used in the previous
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holds as well. Since, as observed above, by definition of σe2 we have that
lfp(F)(ti) ≤ lfp(F)(s) +
ǫ










holds. It follows easily from Definition 2.2.9 of # : N→ N, #(n) = 22
n+1,



































for i∈I, is induced by the strategy σs.e2 (because once the state ti is reached,
for any i∈I, σe2 starts behaving as σ
s.e
2 , as observed earlier) and σ
i
1, where
the strategy σi1 for Player 1 in G follows the behavior of σ1 after the state
ti is reached, and is defined as: σ
i
1(~s) = σ1(s.~s) if the first state of ~s is










and Psσ1,σe2 on the set of branching plays BP ,




, for i∈ I,
to the set BPti of branching plays rooted at ti. Similarly, we can restrict,
when considering Psσ1,σe2 , to the set ∪i∈IBPs.ti , where BPs.ti denotes the set
of branching plays rooted at s and having ti as unique child of s. These
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We use T ti to range over BPti and T
s.ti to range over BPs.ti. It follows from
the definition of WG , that T s.ti ∈WαG if and only if T
ti ∈WβG , for some β<α,
with T s.ti and T ti as depicted above. From this observation, and from the
fact that Psσ1,σe2(BPs.ti)=π(s)(ti) by Definition 4.1.3 of P
s
σ1,σe2
, we have that
the following equality holds:
Psσ1,σe2(W
α












From this, and from the fact that for all i, j∈I, BPs.ti ∩BPs.tj =∅, we have









































































= lfp(F)(s) + 2·ǫ
#(e({s}))
The third equality follows from the definition of F. The fourth inequality
follows by observing that 2·ǫ
#(s.e({ti})) ≤
2·ǫ
#(e({s})) holds because s.e({ti}) ≥
e({s}). The last equality follows from the fact that
∑
i∈I π(s)(ti) = 1 and
0≤π(s)(ti)≤1.
5. The cases for s∈B1 ∪B2 are treated in a similar way. We just consider the
case s∈B1. In this case Msσ1,σe2 can be depicted as follows:
6.1. 21
2





















for i∈I, is induced by the strategy σs.e2 (because once the state ti is reached,
σe2 starts behaving as σ
s.e
2 , as observed earlier) and σ
i
1, where the strategy
σi1 for Player 1 in G follows the behavior of σ1 after the state ti is reached,
and is defined as follows: σi1(~s)=σ1(s.~s), for all histories ~s starting at ti.









and Psσ1,σe2 on the set of branching plays BP ,





BPti of branching plays rooted at ti. Similarly, we can restrict, when con-
sidering Psσ1,σe2 , to the set BPs, where BPs denotes the set of branching plays











We use T ti to range over BPti and T
s to range over BPs. Since s∈B1 it
follows, from the definition of WG , that T s∈WαG if and only if there exists
an i ∈ I such that T i ∈WβG , for some β < α, with T
s and T ti as depicted
above. From this observation, and by adapting the result of Lemma 5.2.9,
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Let ni be the (positive) natural number s.e({ti})− e({s}). Note that, since
e and s.e are injective by definition, for every i 6= j, the inequality ni 6=nj
holds. By definition of the function #: N→N, specified as #(n)=22
n+1, it
is simple to prove that #(n+m) ≥ #(n) · #(m), for every pair of positive
naturals n and m. Therefore we have that #(s.e({ti})) ≥ #(e({s})) ·#(ni).



























= lfp(F)(s) + 2·ǫ
#(e({s}))
holds.
As an immediate corollary of Theorem 6.1.7 and Theorem 5.2.10 we have that
all 21
2
-player meta-parity games with just one odd priority are determined under
deterministic strategies.
Corollary 6.1.8. Let, G = 〈A,ΦPr〉 be a 2
1
2
-player meta-parity game, with A=
〈(S,E), (S1, S2, SN , B1, B2), π〉, having just one odd priority, i.e., such that Pr(S)=
{p} for some odd p∈N. Then the following assertions hold
ZFC ⊢ V als↓(G)=V al
s
↑(G), if G is finitely branching in B2






Proof. Both V als↓(G) and V al
s
↑(G) are fixed points of FG (see Theorem 5.2.10).
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Therefore we just write VAL(G) to denote the lower and upper values of G.
We will always assume the set-theoretic assumption MAℵ1 when using the value
VAL(G) of a G having arena A not finitely branching in B2.
An important aspect of Theorem 6.1.7 is the existence of optimal positional
strategies (see Definition 2.3.45) for Player 2 in every 21
2
-player meta-parity game
with one odd priority and finitely branching in S2. It is then interesting to seek
the weakest conditions under which also Player 1 is guaranteed to have a optimal
positional strategy. Unfortunately, as our next lemma shows, these conditions
are necessarily very strong.
Lemma 6.1.9. There exists a 21
2
-player meta-parity game G = 〈A,Pr〉 with one
odd priority and finite arena A, such that Player 1 does not have an optimal
positional strategy.
























where Pr(s) = 1 for all states s. In the game G there are only two positional
strategies σb1 and σ
c
1 available to Player 1: the strategy σ
b
1 chooses to move always
from the state a to the state b, i.e., σ1(~s)=b, for every history ~s with last(~s)=a;
the strategy σc1 chooses instead to move from the state a to the state c, i.e.,
σ1(~s)= c, for every history ~s with last(~s)=a. We leave the reader to verify that
E(Ma
σb1
) = 0 and E(Maσc1) =
1
2
, i.e., the expected values of the game starting at
a when Player 1 plays in accordance with the strategies σc1 and σ
b
1 are 0 and
1
2
respectively. However VALa(G)=1. To see this, by application of Theorem 6.1.7 it







as this is sufficient for the desired result and simple to verify with a few iterations





















An optimal strategy for Player 1 in G requires at least on bit of information.
Define σ1 as σ1({s})=b and σ~s.s=c for all ~s containing at least one occurrence of
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s. In other words, the strategy σ1 first chooses to move to b, thus generating an
infinite sequence of subplays continuing their execution from s, and then always
chooses to move to c. Each subplay starting at c ends up in a win for Player 1
with probability 1
2
. Thus Player 1 wins the game almost surely when following
the strategy σ1, because b ∈ B1 is a state under the control of Player 1 in the
inner-game.
Although positional strategies for Player 1 do not exist in general, we leave
open the following interesting problem.
Question 6.1.10. Is there a function m :N→N such that, for every 21
2
-player
meta-parity game G=〈A,ΦPr〉 with finite A=〈(S,E), (S1, S2, SN , B1, B2), π〉 and
just one odd priority, Player 1 has an optimal strategy requiring only f(|S ⊎E|)
bits of memory?
We conclude this section by considering the class of 21
2
-player meta-parity
games with just one even priority. By applications of Lemma 5.1.16 and Lemma
2.3.57, the duals of the results concerning 21
2
-player meta-parity games with just
one odd priority hold, if an even priority is considered instead. We summarize
in the following lemma the interesting results about 21
2
-player meta-parity games
with just one even priority.
Lemma 6.1.11. Let G=〈A,ΦPr〉 be a 2
1
2
-player meta-parity game with just one
even priority, i.e., such that |Pr |= 1 and max(Pr) = min(Pr) is even. Then the
following assertions holds:
1. the winning set ΦPr of G can be characterized as the greatest fixed point of
the monotone operator WG (see Definition 5.2.5), i.e., ΦPr =gfp(WG),









G), for α, β and γ
ordinals.
• ΦPr is a closed set.
• ZFC ⊢ VALs↓(G)=VAL
s
↑(G)=gfp(FG)(s).
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• ΦPr is, in general, not a Borel set.





4. If A is finitely branching in S1 then Player 1 has an optimal strategy in G,
where the the function gfp(FG) denotes the greatest fixed point of the functional
FG specified as in Theorem 5.2.10.
Proof. The main observation is that ΦPr = Φ¬Pr, where the assignment ¬Pr,
specified as in Definition 2.3.57, assigns odd priority to all states in S. The result
follows by routine application of Theorem 5.1.16.
6.2 Unfolding of 212-player meta-parity games
In the previous section we proved that any two player stochastic meta-parity
game with just one priority is determined under deterministic strategies. In this
section we develop the technical machinery which shall allow us, in section 6.3
and 6.4, to prove that every 21
2
-player meta-parity game with N + 1 priorities,
for N>0, is determined.
We introduce the following convention on 21
2
-player meta-parity games to
which we shall adhere in the rest of this chapter.
Convention 6.2.1. Let G = 〈A,ΦPr〉 be a two player stochastic meta-parity
game, and let p=min(Pr). The game G is such that:
1. There is a designated terminal state s (i.e., E(s) = ∅) in A and Pr(s) = p.
The state s is denoted by ⊤ if p is odd and by ⊥ if p is even.
2. There is a designated self-loop state t (i.e., E(t)={t}) in A and Pr(s)=p.
The state s is denoted by ⊤ if p is even and by ⊥ if p is odd.
Clearly every 21
2
-player meta-parity game can be transformed into one satis-
fying the above convention by adding, if necessary, two new states. Note that
the states ⊤ and ⊥ are winning states for Player 1 and Player 2 respectively,
i.e., VAL⊤↓ (G) = VAL
⊤
↑ (G) = 1 and VAL
⊥
↓ (G) = VAL
⊥







-player meta-parity games the payoff function is a winning set, i.e., a
function Φ : BP → {0, 1}. However, consider any state s in a 21
2
-player meta-
parity game G=〈A,ΦPr〉 which can be depicted as follows:









At the state s the game G ends in favor of Player 1 and Player 2 with probability
λ and 1−λ respectively. We now introduce some notation for game states of this
form.
Definition 6.2.2. Let G=〈A,ΦPr〉 be a two player stochastic meta-parity game,
with A= 〈(S,E), (S1, S2, SN , B1, B2), π〉. A state s∈SN is called a λ-valued leaf,
for λ∈ [0, 1], if:
• Pr(s)=min(Pr),
• E(s) = {⊤,⊥},
• π(s)(⊤)=λ and π(s)(⊥)=1 − λ.
Note that, by definition of tree game arena (see Section 4.1), the set supp(π(s))
is just required to be a subset of E(s). When λ∈{0, 1}, we have indeed a strict
inclusion supp(π(s)) ( E(s). In this case one of the two states {⊤,⊥} is not
reachable in any play in G, because Nature will never choose it. Nevertheless it
is going to be technically convenient to work with E(s) = {⊤,⊥}, i.e., including
an edge labeled with probability 0 in the graph structure. We shall remark
the advantages of this technical assumption when we use it. Another useful
observation is that, for every λ-valued leaf s, there is only one Markov branching
play in G rooted at s. We denote it with Msλ. Lastly, the priority assigned to
the state s is not important, because once the game reaches the λ-valued leaf s,
it progresses to the (morally) terminal states ⊤ and ⊥ with probability λ and
1 − λ respectively. The choice of assigning minimal priority to λ-valued leaf is
arbitrary and technically convenient.
It is clear that [0, 1]-valued leaves can be used to encode simple forms of [0, 1]-
valued payoffs for 21
2
-player meta-parity games. Given a 21
2
-player meta-parity
game G and a terminal state s in G, one can simulate a quantitative reward
λ∈ [0, 1] for Player 1 when the state s is reached, by changing the game structure
of G and making s a λ-valued leaf3. Note that turning a terminal state into a
3This fact can be seen as a game-counterpart of Definition 3.3.5, where we used the operator
+λ to define the formula λ=1 +λ 0 whose semantics is the constant function mapping process
states to λ (see Proposition 3.3.6).
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λ-valued leaf does not increase, and possibly decreases, the number of priorities
used in the game.




parity game with A=〈(S,E), (S1, S2, SN , B1, B2), π〉. Let {sn}n∈N be a collection




player meta-parity game obtained from G by turning the state sn into a γn-valued
leaf, for γn ∈ [0, 1] and n ∈ N. We say that G is leaf monotone if the following
implication holds:










Lemma 6.2.4. Let G = 〈A,ΦPr〉 be a 2
1
2
-player meta-parity game with just one
priority p=min(Pr). Then the following assertions hold:
ZFC ⊢ If A is finitely branching in Bi then
G satisfies the leaf monotonicity property.
ZFC + MAℵ1 ⊢ G satisfies the leaf monotonicity property.
where i=2 if p is odd, and i=1 otherwise.
Proof. We just consider the case when min(Pr) is odd. The other case follows









G′(t) hold. The desired result can be proved by showing that
FαG(t)≤F
α
G′(t), for every t∈S, by transfinite induction on the ordinals, where the
interesting case is for α=1.
The technique we adopt in the next sections for proving that every 21
2
-player
meta-parity game G with N+1 priorities is determined under deterministic strate-
gies is to reduce the problem to the determinacy of a 21
2
-player meta-parity game
G ′ having N priorities. In the rest of this section we describe the construction of
the game G ′.
Let us fix an arbitrary 21
2
-player meta-parity game G = 〈A,ΦPr〉 with A =
〈(S,E), (S1, S2, SN , B1, B2), π〉 and |Pr |=N + 1, for some N > 0. In the rest of
this section we denote with P<ω, P, BP , MBP and Φ the sets of finite paths,
completed paths, branching plays, Markov branching plays and the winning set
of the game G=〈A,ΦPr〉 respectively. Let Pr(S)={p1, . . . , pN+1} be the ordered
list of priorities assigned to states in A by Pr, i.e., such that pi < pj for all
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1 ≤ i<j≤N + 1. Let Smax be the set of states in A which get assigned maximal
priority by Pr, i.e., the set Smax=Pr
−1(pN+1).
Remark 6.2.5. Note that, by Convention 6.2.1 and Definition 6.2.2, the states
⊤ and ⊥ and the λ-valued leaves can not be states in Smax, because they are
assigned minimal priority by Pr.
Convention 6.2.6. In what follows we will also assume that every state s∈Smax
in A is in SN (hence not terminal) and has a unique successor state. This conven-
tion, which allows a slightly simpler and more transparent proof, gives no loss of
generality. Suppose indeed that the game arena A=〈(S,E), (S1, S2, SN , B1, B2), π〉
of G=〈A,ΦPr〉 is not in this form. Then we can consider the game G ′=〈A′,ΦPr′〉,
obtained from G by the following operations:
1. if s∈Smax and E(s) = ∅, then s is a terminal state. If pN+1 is odd then s
is a winning state for Player 1 in G. In this case turn s into a probabilistic
state in A′ and add one edge (carrying probability 1) from s to the state
⊤. Similarly, if pN+1 is even, turn s into a probabilistic state in A′ and add
one edge (carrying probability 1) from s to the state ⊥.
2. if s ∈ Smax and E(s) = {ti}i∈I with |E(s)| > 1, then we could depict this
state as follows:
t1 . . . ti . . .
s
aa >>
Add I-many new states {si}i∈I in A′ and define E ′(s) = {si}i∈I , and for
each i∈ I, E ′(si) = {ti}. Moreover we set si∈S ′N for every i∈ I. Thus we
can depict s in A′ as follows:
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Lastly, we define Pr′(s)=pN , and Pr
′(si)=pN+1, for every i∈I. This change
does not affect the game in any way: the step from s to ti is simulated by
the two steps from s to si and from si to ti, and each time the game reaches
the state s, then a state of maximal priority pN+1 is visited, when the game
progresses to si, for some i∈I.
It is clear that G ′ is in the desired form. Moreover it is straightforward to verify
that the sets P, BP and MBP in G are homeomorphic to the sets P ′, BP ′ and
MBP ′ in G ′ and that V al↓(G) =V al↓(G ′) and V al↑(G) =V al↑(G ′). We omit the
routine details.
We are now ready to describe our reduction from G, a 21
2
-player meta-parity
game with N+1 priorities, to a 21
2
-player meta-parity game with just N priorities.
Definition 6.2.7. A function ρ :Smax→ [0, 1] is called a value assignment to the
states in Smax.
Definition 6.2.8 (Unfolding of G). Given a value assignment ρ to the states
Smax, we define the two player stochastic meta-parity game G−ρ = 〈A
−,ΦPr−〉,
which we call the unfolding of G with ρ, as the game obtained from G as follows:
1. remove the unique (by Convention 6.2.6) outgoing edge of si, for si∈Smax.
2. Turn si, for every si∈Smax, into a λi-valued leaf with λi=ρ(s), i.e., add two
edges to the states ⊤ and ⊥ (see Convention 6.2.1), define π′(s)(⊤) = λi,
π′(s)(⊤)=1 − λi and set Pr
′(s)=min(Pr).
Clearly max(Pr′)≤N .
Observe that the two games G−ρ1 and G
−
ρ2
, for two distinct value assignment ρ1
and ρ2, are structurally identical and differ only on the assignments of probability
distributions to the states s∈Smax.
Remark 6.2.9. Note how this structural identity holds because, as observed ear-
lier, the strict inclusion supp(si)(E(si) is allowed in 2
1
2
-player tree game arenas.
Working with the constraint supp(si) =E(si) would break the property. Indeed
a state s ∈ Smax could have only one child in G−ρ , say ⊤, when ρ(s) = 1. This
would be, of course, a minor technical issue, but dealing with it would make
our argument slightly heavier. This is why we opted for the weak constraint
supp(si)(E(si) on two player tree games in Section 4.1.
224 Chapter 6. Determinacy of 21
2
-player meta-parity games
We now consider an example to illustrate the construction of the game G−ρ .
Example 6.2.10. Let us consider the two player (non stochastic) meta-parity




























where Pr(3) = 3, Pr(2) = 2 and Pr(s) = 1 for all s ∈ {⊤,⊥, s, a, b, c}. Thus
Smax = {3}. Note how G satisfies conventions 5.2.1, 6.2.6 and 6.2.1. For a value



























with Pr(3) = 1, Pr(2) = 1 and Pr(s) = 1 for all s ∈ {⊤,⊥, s, a, b, c}. Note that
G−ρ does not satisfy anymore Convention 6.2.6, because the state 2, which is of
maximal priority in G−ρ , is not probabilistic. If desired, the game G
−
ρ can be
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with Pr(3)=1, Pr(2)=2 and Pr(s)=1 for all s∈{⊤,⊥, s, a, b, c}, which satisfies
conventions 5.2.1, 6.2.6 and 6.2.1.
The intuition about the construction of G−ρ is the following: the states s∈Smax,
which are the most important ones (in the obvious sense) in the game G, are
reduced to λ-valued leaves. A play in G−ρ proceeds as in G until one state s∈Smax
is reached. In the game G the play progresses to the unique successor state of s,
while in G−ρ the game ends in favor of Player 1 with probability ρ(s). The main
idea is that, by careful choices of ρ, we will be able to simulate a play in the game
G with a (simpler) play in G−ρ .
Let us define the set Sm of finite paths in G as follows: Sm ={~s | last(~s)∈Smax}.
It is clear that Sm = {~sj}j∈J is an antichain of finite paths in G (see Definition
4.3.1). We denote with sj the state last(~sj)∈Smax, for every j∈J .
Remark 6.2.11. We now list a few useful properties of the game G−ρ .
1. The two 21
2
-player meta-parity game arena A and A− have the same set of
states.
2. Every finite path ~s={s0, . . . , sk} in A such that sn 6∈Smax for all 0≤n<k,
is also a finite path in A−. In particular all finite paths in the antichain Sm
in A are finite paths in A−, and vice versa. Therefore Sm is also antichain
of finite paths in A−.
3. Every infinite path ~s in A without any occurrence of states s∈Smax is also
an infinite path in A− and vice versa.
4. For every s ∈ Smax, there are exactly two4 branching plays rooted at s in






We denote with T s⊤ the branching play on the left and with T
s
⊥ the one on
the right, for s∈ Smax. It is clear, by Convention 6.2.1, that T s⊤ ∈Φ
− and
T s⊥ 6∈Φ
−, where Φ− =ΦPr− denotes the winning set of G
−
ρ .
4Again, this follows from the fact that E(s)={⊤,⊥} even when supp(s)({⊤,⊥}.
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5. Since every state s∈Smax is a ρ(s)-valued leaf in A−, as we observed earlier,








We denote it with Msλ, where λ = ρ(s). It is clear that the probability
measure over branching plays in A− induced Msλ, assigns probability λ to
the winning branching play T s⊤, i.e., PMsλ(Φ
−)=λ.
6. As a consequence of the previous observations, note that the sets PA− ,
BPA−, MBPA− and Φ
− =ΦPr− in the unfolded game G
−
ρ do not depend on
any particular choice of ρ. However the probability measure PM over BPA−
induced by a Markov branching play M ∈MBPA− crucially depends on the
value assignment ρ of G−ρ .
An important consequence of the first observation, is that every branching
pre-play T [xi]i∈I (see Section 4.3) in A (obtained by pruning some T ∈BP with
Sm) is also a branching pre-play in A− (obtained by pruning some T ∈ BPA−
with Sm). In particular any branching play T ∈ BPA− is uniquely of the form
T [Ti]i∈I for some branching pre-play T [xi]i∈I in A− (which is also a branching pre-
play in A) and some I-indexed collection of compatible branching plays {Ti}i∈I
in BPA−. From the third observation and by Definition 4.3.5, any such Ti is
either T si⊤ or T
si
⊥ . This allows us to state the following useful lemma relating
winning branching plays in G and winning branching plays in G−ρ , for every value
assignment ρ :Smax→ [0, 1].
Lemma 6.2.12. Let T [T sbi ]i∈I be a branching play in G
−
ρ , with bi ∈ {⊤,⊥} for
i ∈ I, and T [Ti]i∈I a branching play in G having the same branching pre-play
T [xi]i∈I . Then the following assertion holds:
∀i∈I.
(
Ti∈Φ iff bi =⊤
)





Proof. It follows from the fact that winning set of every prefix-independent 21
2
-
player meta game is subtree monotone (see Proposition 5.2.2), and Definition
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4.3.8. Technically speaking, we cannot directly apply the property of Definition
4.3.8, because it just relates branching plays in the same game arena, whereas
we are comparing branching plays of the two different arenas A and A−. This
bureaucratic issue is, however, easily circumvented. For instance, instead of work-
ing with A, consider the 21
2
-player meta-parity game arena B obtained from A





where t is the unique successor state of s. The arena B is obtained by re-







where s′ is new state under the control of Player 2, say, and uλ is ρ(s)-valued
leaf in B, i.e., it is identical to the state s in A−. In the arena B there are
more branching plays, and in particular both T [T sbi ]i∈I and T [Ti]i∈I are branching
plays in B (up to routine modifications). The result then follows immediately by
Definition 4.3.8.
The result of Lemma 6.2.12 can be described as follows. If a branching play
T [T sbi]i∈I in G
−
ρ is identical to a branching play T [Ti]i∈I in G up to the first occur-
rences of states in Smax (i.e., the two branching plays have the same branching
pre-play) and if, for every reached si∈Smax, the sub-play continuing its execution




mimics T [Ti]i∈I is a faithful way, in the sense that T [T
s
bi
]i∈I is winning for Player
1 in G−ρ if and only if T [Ti]i∈I is winning for Player 1 in G. This is quite an
intuitive result, given that 21
2
-player meta-parity games are prefix independent.
Lemma 6.2.12 exposes a fixed-point property of the winning set Φ of G which
we now formalize.
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Definition 6.2.13. For every set X ⊆ BPA and j ∈ J (the index set of the














⊥ are the only two branching plays in BPA− rooted at sj, as
observed in Remark 6.2.11. We just write T∈jX for (∈jX)(T ).
Definition 6.2.14. We define the function W−G :2
BPA → 2BPA as follows:
W−G (X) =
{
T [Ti]i∈I | T [Ti∈
iX ]i∈I ∈ Φ
−}
Note that this is a good definition since, as observed earlier, every branching
play T ∈BPA, is uniquely of the form T [Ti]i∈I for some branching pre-play T [xi]i∈I
obtained by pruning T with Sm and some I-indexed collection {Ti}i∈I of branching
plays, with each Ti rooted at si, for some index set I. Furthermore T [Ti∈
iX ]i∈I
uniquely defines a branching play in BPA− , as the branching pre-play T [xi]i∈I is,
as observed earlier, also a branching-pre play in A−, and the I-indexed collection
of branching plays {Ti∈iX}i∈I is compatible with Sm, because root(Ti) = si, by
definition of (∈iX). More informally, a branching play T [Ti]i∈I ∈BPA, which can








is in W−G (X) if and only if the branching play T [Ti∈









where bi =⊤ if Ti∈X and bi =⊥ otherwise, is in Φ−. Note in particular that, for
every T ∈BPA rooted at some state sj = last(~sj), for some ~sj ∈Sm, the following
assertion holds: T ∈W−G (X) if and only if T ∈Φ.
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Lemma 6.2.15. The function W−G is monotone.
Proof. Fix X⊆Y ⊆BPA. Assume T [Ti]i∈I ∈W
−
G (X), i.e., T [Ti∈
iX ]i∈I ∈ Φ−. We
need to prove that T [Ti∈iY ]i∈I ∈ Φ− too. The result then follows from the fact
that Φ− is a subtree monotone winning set (see Lemma 5.2.2) and by Definition
4.3.8 of subtree monotonicity.
Lemma 6.2.16. The winning set Φ of the 21
2
-player meta-parity game G is a
fixed point of W−G .
Proof. We need to prove that W−G (Φ)
def
= {T [Ti]i∈I | T [Ti∈iΦ]i∈I ∈Φ−} = Φ. This
follows immediately from Lemma 6.2.12.




The following property of the function W−G will be useful in the next section.
Lemma 6.2.18. If X ⊆ BPA is a Borel (universally measurable) set then, if
Φ− is a Borel (universally measurable) set, also W−G (X) is a Borel (universally
measurable) set.
Proof. For notational convenience, define RX : BPA → BPA− as R(T [Ti]i∈I) =
T [Ti∈iX ]i∈I . By definition of W
−
G , the set W
−1
G (X) is Borel (universally measur-
able) if and only if R−1X (Φ
−) is Borel (universally measurable).
We show that the inverse image under RX of any sub-basic open sets O~s↓
in BPA− (see Proposition 2.1.39) is a Borel (universally measurable) subset of
BP . This will immediately prove the desired result for the “Borel”case. The
“universally measurable” case follows by application of Theorem 2.1.73. There
are three interesting cases: ~s= ~si.⊤, ~s= ~si.⊥, for ~si ∈ Sm, and ~s not of the two
previous shapes.
If ~s=~si.⊤ then R
−1




T i ∈ X
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In other words R−1X (O~s) is the set of all branching plays containing the path ~si
and such that the sub-branching play T i rooted at ~sj is in X . Let use define
the function f :O~si →O{si}, from branching plays in BP containing the path ~si
to branching plays in arena rooted at the state si, as f(T ) = T
i, where T and
T i are as in the image above. It is immediate to verify that f is continuous,
where O~si and O{si} are endowed with the subspace topologies. By the previous
observation, we have that R−1X (O~s) = f
−1(X ∩ O{si}). Then, by continuity of f ,
the set R−1X (O~s) is Borel if X is Borel and, by application of Theorem 2.1.73,
R−1X (O~s) is universally measurable if X is universally measurable.
The case for ~s=~si.⊥ is treated similarly, observing that X is Borel (universally
measurable) if X is Borel (universally measurable).
If ~s is not in the two previous forms, then it follows by definition of RX that
R−1X (O~s) =O~s, i.e., R
−1
X (O~s) is the set of all branching plays containing ~s. This
set is open.
Another useful consequence of the observations of Remark 6.2.11 is the fol-
lowing.
Lemma 6.2.19. LetM [Msiλi ]i∈I be a Markov branching play in G
−
ρ andM [Mi]i∈I a
Markov branching play in G having the same Markov branching pre-play M [xi]i∈I
induced by Sm. Then, for every ǫ>0, the following assertions hold:
∀i∈I.
(















⇒ PM [Mi](Φ) ≥ PM [Msiλi ]
(Φ−) − ǫ.
Proof. The proof follows again (up to the same routine observations made in the
proof of Lemma 6.2.12) from the fact that winning set of every prefix-independent
21
2
-player meta game is subtree monotone (see Proposition 5.2.2), and Theorem
4.3.17.
The result of Lemma 6.2.19 can be described as follows. If a play in G is
played by the two players as a play in G−ρ up to the first occurrences of states
in Smax, and if each sub-play continuing its execution from si ∈ Smax in G ends
up in a victory for Player 1 with probability close enough to ρ(si) (which is, by
previous observations, the probability of a sub-play continuing its execution from
6.2. Unfolding of 21
2
-player meta-parity games 231
si in G−ρ ending in a victory for Player 1) then the play in G is guaranteed to be
winning for Player 1 with the same probability, up to ±ǫ, of the play in G−ρ .
These results suggest that G−ρ , the unfolding of G with ρ, can be used to
simulate plays in G with appropriate choices of value assignments ρ. We now
make this intuition precise.
Definition 6.2.20. Given a function f :S → [0, 1], we define the value assignment
ρf : Smax → [0, 1] as ρf(s) = f(t), where t is the unique (in accordance with
Convention 6.2.6) successor state of s in A.
Definition 6.2.21. Let HG : [0, 1]S → [0, 1]S be the functional defined as follows:
HG(f)(s)=VAL
s(G−ρf ).
Remark 6.2.22. Note that HG is well defined only if the game G−ρ is determined
under deterministic strategies, for every value assignment ρ. In the rest of this
section we work under the hypothesis that G−ρ is determined under deterministic
strategies and satisfied the leaf monotonicity property of Definition 6.2.3.
From this definition we clearly have that a function f : S → [0, 1] is a fixed
point of the functional HG if and only if VAL(G−ρf )=f .
Lemma 6.2.23. The functional HG is monotone.
Proof. Fix two functions f, g : S → [0, 1] such that f ⊑ g. Then ρf ⊑ ρg holds.
Note that G−ρf and G
−
ρg are identical, except that every state s∈Smax is a ρf (s)-leaf
in G−ρf and a ρg(s)-leaf in G
−
ρg . Since G
−
ρf
and G−ρg satisfy the leaf monotonicity
property, by Remark 6.2.22, it follows that VALs(G−ρf ) ≤ VAL
s(G−ρg), for every
s∈S.
Theorem 6.2.24. The functions VAL↓(G) : S → [0, 1] and VAL↑(G) : S → [0, 1]
are fixed points of the functional HG.
Proof. We just prove that VAL↑(G) is a fixed point of HG . The proof for VAL↓(G)
is similar. Let us denote with f the function VAL↑(G) = λs.VAL
s
↑(G). We then




holds. We prove this by showing that the two inequalities VAL↑(G−ρf ) ≤ f and




proof readily applies to the oder inequality.
By definitions, we need to prove that, for every s∈S, the inequality














holds, where PMsτ1,τ2 is the probability measure associated with the Markov branch-
ing play in Msτ1,τ2 in G
−
ρf
and, similarly, PMsσ1,σ2 is the probability measure associ-
ated with Msσ1,σ2 in G. It is enough to show that for any strategy τ2 for Player 2








PMsσ1,σ2 (Φ) − ǫ holds for every s ∈ S. The
strategy σ2 is constructed from τ2 as follows:
σ2(~s) =
{
τ2(~s) if ~s does not contain any state in Smax
σj2(~r) if ~s=~sj .~r with ~sj∈Sm
where σj2 is a
ǫ
#(j)
-optimal strategy for Player 2 in G, which exists since ǫ > 0.







PMsσ1,σ2 (Φ) − ǫ holds,
we just need to show that for each strategy σ1 for Player 1 in G there exists a
strategy τ1 for Player 1 in G−ρf such that the inequality
PMsτ1,τ2 (Φ
−)≥PMsσ1,σ2 (Φ) − ǫ (6.3)
holds. The strategy τ1 is constructed from σ1 as follows: τ1(~s) = σ1(~s) if ~s does
not contain states in Smax. If a play eventually reaches a state s∈ Smax in G−ρf ,
the rest of the play is independent on the strategy τ1. Furthermore we define
the strategy σj1, for j ∈ J , following the behavior of σ1 when a state s∈ Smax is
reached following some path ~sj ∈Sm, as follows: σ
j
1(~r) =σ1(~sj .~r), for every path
~r such that ~sj.~r is a valid path in A. We shall not be interested in the choices of
σj1 on histories ~r not of this form, thus we avoid a complete specification. Hence
the strategy σ1 can be characterized as follows:
σ1(~s) =
{
τ1(~s) if ~s does not contain any state in Smax
σj1(~r) if ~s=~sj .~r with ~sj∈Sm
Given the definitions of σ2, σ
j
2, τ1 and σ
j
1 and the characterization of σ1




the Markov branching play Mσ1,σ2 are identical up to the first occurrences of
states in Smax. This means that Mτ1,τ2 and Mσ1,σ2 induce the same Markov










1. the Markov branching play Msiλi is the unique Markov branching play rooted
at si ∈Smax in G−ρf . It models a play where Player 1 wins with probability
λi=ρf(si)=f(si)=VAL
si
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is rooted as si and is induced by the
strategy profile (σi1, σ
i


















(Φ) ≤ VALsi↑ (G) +
ǫ
#(i)
, for every i∈I. The inequality 6.3
PMτ1,τ2 (Φ
−) + ǫ ≥ PMσ1,σ2 (Φ)
then follows by Lemma 6.2.19
The result of Theorem 6.2.24 can be described as follows. Playing the game
G−ρ is like playing the game G until some state s∈Smax is reached. Once such a
state is reached, the game G−ρ ends up, by means of the choice made by Nature, in
favour of Player 1 with probability ρ(s), and in favour of Player 2 with probability
1−ρ(s). In the game G instead, the play progresses to the unique (by Convention
6.2.6) successor state t of s. From t, Player 1 will be able to force the game to
end up in their favour with limit probability VALt↓(G) and similarly, Player 2 will
be able to bound the limit probability, of the game ending up in favour of Player
1, to VALt↑(G). Therefore, if ρ = ρVAL↓(G), i.e., if at the state s Nature chooses
to end up the game G−ρ if favour of Player 1 with probability VAL
t
↓(G), Player 1
can force a winning outcome in the two games with the same limit probabilities.
Similarly, if ρ=ρVAL↑(G), i.e., if at the state s Nature chooses to end up the game
G−ρ if favour of Player 1 with probability VAL
t
↑(G), Player 2 can bound, with the
same limit probabilities, the possibility of the game ending up in favour of Player
1 in the two games.
Note how the results of Lemma 6.2.16 and Theorem 6.2.24 constitute useful
improvements of the similar results of Lemma 5.2.6 and Theorem 5.2.10.
6.3 212-player meta-parity games with N+1 priorities
In Section 6.1 we proved that any two player stochastic meta-parity game with
just one priority is determined under deterministic strategies. In Section 6.2 we
showed how, from every 21
2
-player meta-parity game with N + 1 priorities, one
can construct the associated game G−ρ , having only N priorities, by means of a
procedure which we call unfolding.
In this section we will prove than every two player stochastic meta-parity game
G=〈A,ΦPr〉 with N+1 priorities, i.e., such that |Pr |=N+1, is determined under
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deterministic strategies assuming that the function HG specified in Definition
6.2.21 is well defined (see Remark 6.2.22).
The general shape of our proof closely resembles the proof, given in Section
6.1, of determinacy of 21
2
-player meta-parity game with just one priority. The
main difference is that we base our arguments on top of the results of Lemma
6.2.16 and Theorem 6.2.24 obtained in Section 6.2, whereas in Section 6.1 we
invoked the results of Lemma 5.2.6 and Theorem 5.2.10, obtained in Section 5.2.
Let us fix an arbitrary 21
2
-player meta-parity game G=〈A,ΦPr〉 having N + 1
priorities, i.e., such that |Pr | = N+1 for some N > 1, and satisfying, without loss
of generality, Convention 5.2.1, Convention 6.2.1 and Convention 6.2.6. Following
the same notational choices adopted in the previous section, we denote with P<ω,
P, BP , MBP and Φ the sets of finite paths, completed paths, branching plays,
Markov branching plays and the winning set of G, respectively. Let Pr(S) =
{p1, . . . , pN+1} be the ordered list of priorities assigned to states in A by Pr. We
denote with Smax the set Pr
−1(pN+1). The antichain Sm of finite paths in A is
defined, as in the previous section, as Sm = {~s | last(~s)∈Smax}. We denote with
sj the state last(~sj)∈Smax, for every j∈J .
Remark 6.3.1. Without any loss of generality we will assume that pN is odd if
pN+1 is even, and similarly pN is even if pN+1 is odd. Suppose indeed that pN
and pN+1 are both even or odd numbers, and consider the priority assignment





Since pN and pN+1 are both even (or odd) priorities greater than all other priorities
assigned to states in A, it is the immediate to verify that WPr =WPr′ , where the
sets of winning paths WPr and WPr′ induced by the priority assignments Pr
and Pr′ respectively, are specified as in Definition 2.3.54. It then follows from
Definition 5.3.1, that 〈A,ΦPr〉 and 〈A,ΦPr′〉 are identical and the game 〈A,ΦPr′〉
uses just N priorities.
We assume from now on that pN+1 is odd, and thus pN is even. The case
for max(Pr) even will be considered at the end of this section. Given a value
assignment ρ :Smax→ [0, 1] (see Definition 6.2.7), we denote with G−ρ = 〈A
−,Pr−〉
the unfolding of G with ρ (see Definition 6.2.8). We shall often denote, for nota-
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MBP− and Φ−, respectively. As observed in Remark 6.2.11, these sets do not
depend on the particular choice of ρ.
Our first result provides an inductive characterization of the winning set Φ of
G. From Lemma 6.2.15, we know that the function W−G is monotone.
Corollary 6.3.2. By the Knaster-Tarski theorem, W−G has least and greatest
fixed points. In particular the least fixed point of W−G , denoted by lfp(W
−
G ), can






where α ranges over the ordinals, and the sets W−G
α











Lemma 6.3.3. The equality Φ=lfp(W−G ) holds.
Proof. We know, from Lemma 6.2.16, that Φ is a fixed point of W−G . Hence
lfp(W−G )⊆Φ. We prove the desired result by showing that for every T ∈BPA, if
T 6∈ lfp(W−G ) then T 6∈Φ. This is done by constructing a winning strategy σ
T
2 for
Player 2 in the inner-game GT associated with T .
For every branching play T =Sm T [Ti]i∈I in A let us denote with T
− the
branching play T [Ti ∈i lfp(W
−
G )]i∈I in A
− as specified in Definition 6.2.14. By
Definition 6.2.14 of W−G , we know that T 6∈ lfp(W
−
G ) if and only if T
− 6∈ Φ−. A
branching play T−∈A− is not in Φ− if and only if Player 2 has a winning strategy
in the inner-game GT− associated with T
−. Let us denote this strategy with τT
−
2 .
For every branching play T ∈ BPA such that T 6∈ lfp(W
−
G ) we define the
strategy σT2 as follows. The strategy σ
T
2 behaves like τ
T−
2 until a state si, for
si = last(~si) with ~si ∈Sm, is reached. Note that this is a good definition since T
and T− are identical up to this kind of states, as observed in Remark 6.2.11. If
eventually a state si is reached following the path ~si, then Ti (the sub-branching
play of T = T [Ti]i∈I) is necessarily not contained in lfp(W
−
G ). This is because,
otherwise the game GT−, played by Player 2 in accordance with the strategy τ
T−
2 ,





= ⊤. Thus Player 2 would be losing playing in accordance with a
winning strategy. A contradiction. We define the strategy σT2 to keep playing in
the sub-game GT ′ as the strategy σT
′
2 (note the inductive definition), forgetting
about the past history.
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We now prove that, for every branching play T 6∈ lfp(W−G ), the strategy σ
T
2 is
winning for Player 2 in the inner game GT . The game GT , played by Player 2 in
accordance with σT2 , ends up in a completed path ~s in T such that:
1. Either ~s contains infinitely many occurrences of states sj . In this case Player
2 wins because Pr(sj)=pN+1 by definition of Sm, and pN+1 is odd.
2. Or ~s contains only a finite number of occurrences of states si, i.e., it is of the
form ~si1. . . . .~sik .~t where ~si1 , . . . , ~sik ∈Sm and ~t does not contain occurrences
of states si. Let sk be the last state of ~sik . Then, by definition of σ
T
2 ,
the completed path ~t is also a possible outcome of a play in GT−
k
played
in accordance with the strategy τ
T−
k
2 , for some branching play Tk 6∈ lfp(W
−
G )
rooted at sk. Since τ
T−
k
2 is by construction a winning strategy for Player 2 in
GT−
k
, the path ~t is necessarily winning for Player 2. It then follows from the
fact that parity winning sets are prefix independent, that also ~si1. . . . .~sik .~t
is a winning path for Player 2 in GT .
Therefore σT2 is a winning strategy for Player 2 in the inner game GT , for every
T 6∈ lfp(W−G ), as dedired.











(Φ, is easily seen to be not subtree monotone. However the
following weaker property holds.











monotone (see Definition 4.3.21).
Proof. For notational convenience let us denote the set W−G
α
with Uα, for every
ordinal α. We need to prove that given two branching plays T =Sm T [Ti] and














T [Ti]i∈I ∈Uα ⇒ T [Ri]i∈I ∈Uα
)
.




Φ−. The desired result the follows immediately by the fact that Φ− is subtree
monotone by Proposition 5.2.2.
As a result, the following lemma, analogous to Lemma 6.2.19, holds.
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Lemma 6.3.5. Let M [Msiλi ]i∈I be a Markov branching play in G
−
ρ and M [Mi]i∈I a
Markov branching play in G having the same Markov branching pre-play M [xi]i∈I































α) ≥ PM [Msλi ]
(Φ−) − ǫ.
where Uγ denotes the set W−G
γ
for every ordinal γ.
Proof. The proof follows from Theorem 4.3.22. Again, as for the proofs of Lemma
6.2.19 and Lemma 6.2.12, we have to deal with the bureaucratic issue that Theo-
rem 4.3.22 only relates properties of Markov branching plays in the same A. This
issue can be easily circumvented, as discussed in the proof of Lemma 6.2.12).
We now prove a result about W−G , similar to the one of Lemma 6.1.4 about
WG, which provides bounds the number of iterations necessary to reach the least
fixed point of W−G .







Proof. For notational convenience we just write Uα to denote W−G
α
, for every
ordinal α. Fix any T [Ti]i∈I ∈Uω1+1. We need to prove that T [Ti]i∈I ∈Uω1. By
definition of W−G we have that T [Ti]i∈I ∈U
ω1+1 if and only if T [Ti ∈i Uω1 ]i∈I ∈Φ−.
Recall that the index set I is necessarily countable, since every antichain of paths
in A is countable. Let K ⊆ I, be the collection of indexes associated with sub-




play Tk is in Uβ(k), for some countable ordinal β(k)<ω1. Let β=
⊔
k∈K β(k) be
the supremum of the {β(k)}k∈K collection of countable ordinals. The ordinal β
is countable. It follows that T [Ti]i∈I ∈ W
−
G (U
β)=Uβ+1, since T [Ti ∈i Uω1 ]i∈I and
T [Ti ∈i Uβ]i∈I are identical by construction, because the two functions ∈iUω1 and
∈iUβ (see Definition 6.2.14) coincide on all branching plays Ti, for i ∈ I. The
proof is concluded by observing that β + 1<ω1 because β is a countable ordinal
and ω1 is the smallest uncountable ordinal.
238 Chapter 6. Determinacy of 21
2
-player meta-parity games
In Section 6.1 we proved that, when considering two player stochastic meta-
parity games with just one odd (even) priority finitely branching in B2 (B1)
(see Definition 5.1.13), the least fixed point of the operator WG (which played
in Section 6.1 a role similar to the operator W−G considered in this section) is
reached in just ω steps. We will show that this is not the case when considering
two player stochastic meta-parity games using more than one priority.
We first prove that there exists a two player stochastic meta-parity game with
a finite arena and just two priorities whose winning set is not Borel.
Lemma 6.3.7. There exists a two player stochastic meta-parity game G=〈A,ΦPr〉
with finite arena A and just two priorities, i.e., |Pr |=2, such that ΦPr, the win-
ning set of the game G, is Π11-complete.
Proof. We provide a concrete example by constructing a 21
2
-player meta-parity
game G=〈A,ΦPr〉 with just two priorities such that:
1. BPA is homeomorphic to the set NT⊆T ({0, 1}), which is clearly closed, of
non-terminating trees over {0, 1} (see Definition 2.1.41), and
2. ΦPr ⊆ BPA is homeomorphic to the set A⊆ NT of non-termintating trees
not containing infinite branches with infinitely many 1’s.
The result then follows by application of Theorem 2.1.57. The game G can be















with Pr(1) = 1 and Pr(s) = 0 for all other states. We now define a bijective map
f :NT→BP i, where BP i is the set of branching plays in G rooted at i. Rather
than providing a formal definition, we find it clearer to describe it by means of
an example, from which the formal definition is evident. The function f maps
the following tree τ ∈NT
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It is clear that f is continuous, and indeed it is easy to prove that the spaces NT
and BP i are homeomorphic via f .
Let us now go back to the game G. Since every branching node in G is under
the control of Player 2, it follows that a branching play T ∈BP i is winning for
Player 2, i.e., Player 2 has a winning strategy in the inner game GT , if and only
if T contains an infinite path having infinitely many occurrences of the state 1.
This is because the state 1 is the only state which get assigned an odd priority
by Pr in G, and by Definition 2.3.54 of WPr, every infinite path containing only
finitely many states of odd priority is winning for Player 1. After this observation
is clear that ΦPr, the set of branching plays winning for Player 1, is the set of
branching plays not containing infinite paths with infinitely many occurrences of
1’s, i.e., ΦPr =f(A). This concludes the proof.
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Lemma 6.3.7 allows us to prove that, in general, the upper bound on the
number of iterations required to reach the least fixed point of W−G provided in
Lemma 6.3.6 is tight, even when considering two player stochastic meta-parity
games with finite arenas.
Lemma 6.3.8. There exists a 2-player (non stochastic) meta-parity game G =
〈A,ΦPr〉 with finite arena A and just two priorities, i.e., |Pr |= 2, such that for




Proof. Let us consider the game G proposed in Lemma 6.3.7, and let us denote
with Φ its winning set ΦPr. By Definition 6.2.8, we have that G−ρ has a finite
arena (thus trivially finitely branching in the branching nodes) and just one even
priority. Thus, the winning set Φ− of the game G−ρ is, by application of Lemma
6.1.11, a Borel set. Hence, by application of Lemma 6.2.18, for every countable
ordinal α, the set W−G
α
is Borel. From the result of Lemma 6.3.7 we know that
Φ is not a Borel set, hence not of the form W−G
α
for any countable ordinal α.
Even if Lemma 6.3.7 and Lemma 6.3.8 imply that an analogue of Lemma 6.1.3
for two player stochastic meta-parity games with more than one priority does not
hold, we can prove the following weaker property.
Lemma 6.3.9. If A is a standard two player stochastic game arena, in the sense
of Definition 4.1.5, then Φ=W−G
ω
.
Proof. Following the same argument used in the proof of Lemma 4.3.18, we know
that a branching pre-play, obtained by pruning a branching play (i.e., a completed
path ~r) with an antichain S of finite paths in A, is either:
• a finite path ~si ∈S, if ~r=~si.~t: in this case the branching pre-play has just
one hole waiting to be filled in by a branching play (i.e., a completed path)
starting at last(~si);
• or ~r itself: in this case the branching pre-play has no holes.
Thus we have that W−G
n
, for 0<n<ω is the set of all completed paths ~s in A
such that
1. ~s does not contain states in Smax and ~s is winning in G−ρ and, by Remark
6.2.11, also in G, or
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It follows that W−G
ω
is the set of completed paths having a winning tail without
occurrences of states in s ∈ Smax. This is precisely the winning set ΦPr = WPr,
because every completed path with infinitely many occurrences of states s∈Smax,
i.e., states labeled with maximal odd priority pN+1, is losing for Player 1 by
Definition 2.3.54.
We are now ready to prove the main technical result of this section.
Theorem 6.3.10. Let G = 〈A,ΦPr〉 be a 2
1
2
-player meta-parity game, with A=
〈(S,E), (S1, S2, SN , B1, B2), π〉, having N+1 priorities and maximal odd priority,
i.e., such that |Pr |=N + 1 and max(Pr) is odd. Assume the function HG of Def-
inition 6.2.21 is well defined (see Remark 6.2.22). Then the following assertions
hold for every s∈S:




ZFC + MAℵ1 ⊢ V al
s
↑(G)≤ lfp(HG)(s).
Proof. The proof technique we adopt closely resembles the one used to prove
Theorem 6.1.7. As a first observation, note that the two assertions are well-
defined only under the hypothesis mG-UM(ΓN+1) and mG-UM(∆N+1) (see Def-




games with a standard 21
2
-player arena (see Definition 4.1.5), N + 1 priorities




parity games with N + 1 priorities and maximal odd priority. However, by
application of Lemma 5.1.14 we know that ZFC ⊢ mG-UM(ΓN+1). Moreover
ZFC + MAℵ1 ⊢ mG-UM(∆N+1) holds, by Lemma 2.1.88 and the observations
following Definition 5.1.8. Thus we omitted the hypotheses mG-UM(ΓN+1) and
mG-UM(∆N+1) from the statements.
We will prove the two assertions together in a uniform way, specifying when




Let us fix an arbitrary state s ∈ S. We prove the inequality V als↑(G) ≤
lfp(HG)(s) holds by constructing, for every ǫ > 0 a strategy σǫ2 for Player 2
in G such that the inequality
⊔
σ1
E(Msσ1,σǫ2) ≤ lfp(HG)(s) + ǫ
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holds. This clearly implies the desired result. In what follows we simply denote
with H the function HG , and with ρ the value assignment ρlfp(H) (see Definition
6.2.20). As observed after Definition 6.2.21, the equality lfp(H)=VAL(G−ρ ) holds.
The strategy σǫ2 is constructed using the collection of δ-optimal strategies τ
δ
2 ,
for δ > 0 for Player 2 in the game G−ρ . Thus the strategy τ
δ
2 is such that, for






) ≤ lfp(H)(s) + δ.


















2 (~t) if ~s=~sj.~t for some ~sj∈Sm
for every finite path with last state in S2, where the function #:N→N is specified
as in Definition 2.2.9. Note how this inductive definition is well specified, since
by Convention 6.2.6, last(~sj) 6∈S2 and every finite path ~s not containing any state
in Smax is necessarily not of the form ~s=~sj.~t, for ~sj∈Sm.
We are now going to show that, for every ǫ > 0, the strategy σǫ2 satisfies the
desired inequality: for all s ∈ S,
⊔
σ1
E(Msσ1,σe2) ≤ lfp(H)(s) + ǫ. Let us fix an
arbitrary strategy σ1 for Player 1 in G. We need to show that the equality
E(Msσ1,σǫ2)≤ lfp(H)(s) + ǫ (6.4)
holds. Recall that, by definition, E(Msσ1,σe2)=P
s
σ1,σǫ2
(Φ), where Psσ1,σǫ2 denotes the
probability measure over BP induced by the Markov branching play Msσ1,σǫ2 , and
Φ denotes the set of winning branching plays for Player 1 in G, i.e., the set ΦPr.






. In what follows, for the sake
of readability, we just denote with Uα the set W−G
α
, for every ordinal α.
Let us now consider separately the cases when A is a standard 21
2
-player
arena and when A is general instead. If A is a standard 21
2
-player arena we
know, from Lemma 6.3.9, that Φ =
⋃
α<ω U
α. Therefore by ω-continuity of all





(Uα). If instead the
arena A is not a standard 21
2

















α), even if in the general case we need to invoke MAℵ1 .
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This equality allows us to set up a proof by transfinite induction for the
desired inequality 6.4. We are going to show that for every countable ordinal α,
the inequality
Psσ1,σǫ2(U
α) ≤ lfp(H)(s) + ǫ (6.5)
holds.
Suppose, by induction hypothesis, that inequality 6.5 holds for every ordinal
β<α. Let us define, for every ~sj∈Sm, the strategy σ
j
1 which follows the behavior





for every ~s with last state in S1. Moreover we define the strategy τ1, which
behaves in G−ρ as σ1 until a state in Smax is reached, as follows: τ1(~s) = σ1(~s) if
~s does not contains states in Smax. Note that once a state s ∈ Smax is reached
in G−ρ , the rest of the play does not depend on Player 1’s choices, because s is a
ρ(s)-valued leaf in G−ρ (see Definition 6.2.8). Therefore we can characterize the
strategy σ1 as follows:
σ1(~s) =
{
τ1(~s) if ~s does not contain states in Smax
σj1(~t) if ~s=~sj.~t for some ~sj∈Sm
Given this characterization for σ1 and the definition of the strategies σ
ǫ
2, we have
that for every s∈S, Msσ1,σǫ2 =Sm M [Mi]i∈I , where the sub-Markov branching play







2 ) for every i∈I. By

























. Furthermore note that M [Msiλi ] (for
λi = ρ(si)), the unique Markov branching play in G
−
ρ having the same Markov











optimal strategy for Player 2 in G−ρ , that the following inequality holds:





or equivalently, from definitions of H and ρ,
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Recall, from Remark 6.2.11, that the expected value E(Msiλi) of the sub-Markov
branchig play Msiλi in the game G
−
ρ is λi = ρ(si) = lfp(H)(si). Thus, by equation









































and this concludes the proof.
Corollary 6.3.11. Let G = 〈A,ΦPr〉 be a 2
1
2
-player meta-parity game, with
A = 〈(S,E), (S1, S2, SN , B1, B2), π〉, having N + 1 priorities and maximal odd
priority, i.e., such that |Pr |=N + 1 and max(Pr) is odd. Assume the function
HG of Definition 6.2.21 is well defined (see Remark 6.2.22). Then the following
assertions hold:
ZFC ⊢ G is determined, if A is a standard 21
2
-player arena
ZFC + MAℵ1 ⊢ G is determined.
Proof. By Theorem 6.2.24 we know that VAL↓(G) and VAL↑(G) are both fixed
points of HG . The result then trivially follows from Theorem 6.3.10.
We now prove that every 21
2
-player meta-parity game with N+1 priorities and
maximal odd priority satisfy the leaf monotonicity property of Definition 6.2.3.
Lemma 6.3.12. Let G = 〈A,ΦPr〉 be a 2
1
2
-player meta-parity game, with A =
〈(S,E), (S1, S2, SN , B1, B2), π〉, having N+1 priorities and maximal odd priority,
i.e., such that |Pr | = N + 1 and max(Pr) is odd. Assume the function HG
of Definition 6.2.21 is well defined (see Remark 6.2.22), and that G−ρ satisfies
the leaf monotonicity property for every value assignment ρ. Then the following
assertions hold:
ZFC ⊢ If A is a standard 21
2
-player arena, then
G satisfies the leaf monotonicity property.
ZFC + MAℵ1 ⊢ G satisfies the leaf monotonicity property.
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Proof. Let {sn}n∈N be a collection of λn-valued leaves in G, with λn∈ [0, 1]. Let
{γn}n∈N such that γn ≥ λn and let L be the game G where the leaf sn is turned
in a γn-valued leaf, for every n ∈ N. We need to prove that VAL(G) ≤ VAL(L).
Let us consider the unfolded games G−ρ and L
−
ρ , for some value assignment ρ.
Note that every state sn is a λn-valued (γn-valued) leaf in G−ρ (L
−
ρ ). This is
because the unfolding of a game can only introduce new leaves. Moreover note
that L−ρ is precisely the game G
−
ρ where the every sn leaf is turned in a γn-
valued leaf. By hypothesis G−ρ and L
−
ρ satisfies the leaf monotonicity property.
Therefore the inequality VAL(G−ρ )≤VAL(L
−
ρ ) holds for every value assignment ρ.
Let us define f=lfp(HG) and g=lfp(HL). By application of Theorem 6.2.24 and
Corollary 6.3.11 we have that VAL(G)=f and VAL(L)=g. We also know, by the




We conclude this section by considering the class of 21
2
-player meta-parity
games with N + 1 priorities, having maximal even priority. By applications of
Lemma 5.1.16 and Lemma 2.3.57, the duals of the results concerning 21
2
-player
meta-parity games having maximal odd priority hold, if an even priority is con-
sidered instead. We summarize in the following lemma the interesting results
about 21
2
-player meta-parity games having maximal even priority.
Lemma 6.3.13. Let G = 〈A,ΦPr〉 be a 2
1
2
-player meta-parity game, with A =
〈(S,E), (S1, S2, SN , B1, B2), π〉, having N+1 priorities and maximal even priority,
i.e., such that |Pr |=N + 1 and max(Pr) is even. Then the following assertions
holds:
1. the winning set ΦPr of G can be characterized as the greatest fixed point of
the operator W−G :2
BP →2BP , i.e., ΦPr =gfp(W
−
G ),
2. if A is a standard 21
2
-player game arena and the function HG of Definition
6.2.21 is well defined, then














), for α, β and γ
ordinals.
• ZFC ⊢ VALs↓(G)=VAL
s
↑(G)=gfp(HG)(s).
• If G−ρ satisfies the leaf monotonicity property for every ρ, then
ZFC ⊢ G satisfies the open leaf property.
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3. if A is not a standard 21
2
-player game arena and the function HG of Defi-
nition 6.2.21 is well defined, then











• If G−ρ satisfies the leaf monotonicity property for every ρ,
ZFC + MAℵ1 ⊢ G satisfies the open leaf property.
Proof. As is the proof of Lemma 6.1.11, the main observation is that ΦPr =Φ¬Pr,
where the assignment ¬Pr, specified as in Definition 2.3.57, assigns odd priority
to all states in S. The result follows by routine application of Theorem 5.1.16.
6.4 Conclusion of the inductive proof
In this section we summarize and conclude the inductive proof carried out in the
previous sections.
Theorem 6.4.1. For every 21
2
-player meta-parity game G=〈A,ΦPr〉 with a stan-
dard 21
2
-player arena A, the following assertions hold:
1. VAL↓(G) = VAL↑(G),
2. if |Pr |=1, then
(a) if max(Pr) is odd, then VAL(G) = lfp(FG),
(b) if max(Pr) is even, then VAL(G) = gfp(FG),
3. if |Pr |>1, then
(a) if max(Pr) is odd, then VAL(G) = lfp(HG),
(b) if max(Pr) is even, then VAL(G) = gfp(HG),
4. G satisfies the leaf monotonicity property of Definition 6.2.3.
Proof. In accordance with Definition 4.1.5 and Definition 5.1.13, a standard 21
2
-
player arena is both finitely branching in B1 and in B2. It then follows by Corol-
lary 6.1.8 and Lemma 6.1.11 that if G has only one priority, i.e., if |Pr |=1, then
it is determined under deterministic strategies in ZFC-alone and, similarly, we
know from Lemma 6.2.4 that G satisfies the leaf monotonicity property. Suppose
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by induction that both properties hold for every 21
2
-player meta-parity game G
with a standard 21
2
-player arena A having N>1 priorities. Consider a 21
2
-player
meta-parity game G = 〈A,ΦPr〉 with a standard 2
1
2
-player arena A and N + 1
priorities. It is immediate to observe that, for every value assignment ρ (see Def-
inition 6.2.7), the game G−ρ is a 2
1
2
-player meta-parity game G = 〈A,ΦPr〉 with a
standard 21
2
-player arena and just N priorities. Therefore the function HG is well
defined (see Remark 6.2.22) by inductive hypothesis, and G−ρ satisfies the open
monotonicity property for every value assignment ρ. The desired result then
follow by application of Corollary 6.3.11, Lemma 6.3.12 and Lemma 6.3.13.
Recall from Definition 4.1.5 that 21
2
-player meta-parity games with standard
21
2
-player game arenas are just ordinary 21
2
-player parity games. Thus the first
point of Theorem 6.4.1 follows already from the determinacy results of [74], as
discussed in Section 2.3.4.1. However our proof is interesting because we char-
acterize the values of a 21
2
-player parity game as least (greatest) fixed point of
appropriate operators. This useful result will be exploited in the next Chapter.
Theorem 6.4.2 (MAℵ1). For every 2
1
2
-player meta-parity game G = 〈A,ΦPr〉,
the following assertions hold:
1. VAL↓(G) = VAL↑(G),
2. if |Pr |=1, then
(a) if max(Pr) is odd, then VAL(G) = lfp(FG),
(b) if max(Pr) is even, then VAL(G) = gfp(FG),
3. if |Pr |>1, then
(a) if max(Pr) is odd, then VAL(G) = lfp(HG),
(b) if max(Pr) is even, then VAL(G) = gfp(HG),
4. G satisfies the leaf monotonicity property of Definition 6.2.3.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 6.4.1.
The following is a useful result which proves that the upper-bound on the
complexity of winning sets in 21
2
-player meta-games given in Corollary 5.1.7 is
strict.
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Theorem 6.4.3. There exists a 21
2
-player meta-parity game G= 〈A,ΦPr〉 whose
winning set ΦPr is neither a Σ
1
1 nor a Π
1
1 set.
Proof. We now, by Lemma 6.3.7, that there exists a finite 21
2
-player meta-parity
game GA = 〈AA,ΦPrA〉 whose winning set (and in particular the set of winning
branching plays rooted at a designated state sA) is Π
1
1-complete. Thus, by Lemma
5.1.16 and the fact that 21
2
-player meta-parity games are closed under the nega-
tion operation of Definition 5.1.15, there exists a 21
2
-player game GB =〈AB,ΦPrB〉
whose winning set (and in particular the set of branching plays rooted at a des-
ignated state sB) is Σ
1
1-complete. Suppose without loss of generality that the set
of states of the two arenas AA and AB are disjoint. Consider the game arena A
obtained by merging AA and AB and adding a new branching state s under the
control of Player 2 having sA and sB as successor states. Define Pr(s)=PrA(s) if
s is in AA, Pr(s) = PrB(s) if s in is AB and Pr(s0) = 0. Then the set of winning






It is then trivial to prove that ΦPrA ≤W ΦPr and ΦPrA ≤W ΦPr, where ≤W is the
Wadge order specified as in Definition 2.1.56. The result then follows.
6.5 Summary of results
We conclude this chapter by summarizing and commenting on the obtained re-
sults.
All the results of this chapter converges into Theorem 6.4.2, which states
that every 21
2
-player meta-parity game is determined under deterministic strate-
gies. Moreover the value VAL(G), of a 21
2
-player meta-parity game G, is the
least (greatest) fixed point on an appropriate monotone endomap. This is one
of the main results of the thesis, and constitutes an important starting point,
for future work, towards the study of other theoretically interesting classes of
21
2
-player meta-games such as prefix independent 21
2
-player meta-games or, more
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generally, the larger class (see Proposition 5.2.2) of all 21
2
-player tree games with
subtree-monotone winning sets (see, e.g., Question 4.3.19).
However note that the general result has been proven only working within ZFC
set theory extended with Martin’s Axiom at ℵ1 (MAℵ1), thus not in a conventional
mathematical setting. This is quite uncommon practice in theoretical computer
science, as opposed to several fields of mathematics where consistency results are
often discussed. It is thus quite important to discuss why, and how, the non-
standard axiom MAℵ1 is used in our proof. There are essentially two distinct
uses we make of MAℵ1 . The first one is to ensure that the assertion mG-UM(Γp)




Indeed, as a consequence of lemmas 5.1.6 and 2.1.88, MAℵ1 is sufficient to prove
that the winning set of every 21
2
-player meta-game is universally measurable. As
already discussed in last paragraph of Section 5.4, we do not know if mG-UM(Γp)
holds in ZFC alone, even though we think this is quite plausible. The second use
we make of MAℵ1 is required by the kind of proof technique we developed, which
is based on a transfinite induction up to the first uncountable ordinal ω1. The




player meta-parity game as the ω1-limit of a chain of approximants (WαG and
W−G
α
in Lemma 6.1.2 and Lemma 6.1.2, respectively). We crucially use MAℵ1 to







, where µ is the probability measure
associated with a Markov branching play. This equality is indeed one of the
consequences MAℵ1 (see Proposition 2.1.88).
While the validity of mG-UM(Γp) is necessary, simply to make sense of the
general notion of 21
2
-player meta-parity games, the condition of ω1-continuity on
probability measures is, in principle, just required to support the inductive proof
we developed. In particular, from our result, one should not derive any sort of
(necessary) connection between determinacy of 21
2
-player meta-parity games and
the set theoretic axiom MAℵ1 , or the negation of the Continuum Hypothesis, one
of its consequences. As a matter of fact, if Question 4.3.20 has a positive answer
for ∆12 sets, then every prefix independent 2
1
2
-player meta-game, and thus every
21
2
-player meta-parity game, is determined under the set-theoretic assumption of
∆12-determinacy. It is known that ZFC + ∆
1
2-determinacy does not imply CH.
Even though the axiom MAℵ1 is required in our proof, in the general case, we
identified classes of 21
2
-player meta-parity games for which Theorem 6.4.2 could
be proved in ZFC alone:





-player meta-parity games with just one odd (even) priority (see Theorem








In particular the second point, stated formally as Theorem 6.4.1, constitutes an
interesting result, because our proof does not invoke the general determinacy
axioms of [74], and provide useful information about the values of the games.
An important observation about 21
2
-player meta-parity games is that they are
not, in general, determined under positional strategies, even when the 21
2
-player
game arena is finite (see Lemma 6.1.9). This result contrasts with the corre-
sponding one for standard 21
2
-player parity games, which are indeed positionally
determined when played on finite arenas (see, e.g., [78] or [117]).
Perhaps the lack of positional determinacy, together with the technical efforts
necessary to deal with 21
2
-player meta-parity games, constitute a manifestation of
the complexity of this class of games. Formally, this is partially captured by some
of our side-results obtained from the inductive characterization of the winning sets
ΦPr. In particular, in Theorem 6.4.3, we gave an example of 2-player meta-parity
game whose winning set is strictly in ∆12 in the Projective hierarchy. Clearly ∆
1
2
sets can be extremely complex (see, e.g., Lemma 2.1.81), and in particular are
far more complex than standard 21
2
-player parity winning sets which are ∆03 sets
(see Lemma 2.3.56), quite low in the Borel hierarchy.
Chapter 7
Game Semantics
In Chapter 4 we defined the class of 21
2
-player games, and in Chapter 5 we iden-
tifed an interesting sub-class of tree games named 21
2
-player meta-games. In
Chapter 6 we proved that every 21
2
-player meta-parity game is determined. We
shall now use these results to define a game semantics, in terms of 21
2
-player
meta-parity games, for the probabilistic modal µ-calculi of Section 3.3.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 7.1 we define the game se-
mantics for pLµ⊙⊕ and its fragments and prove that the denotational and game
semantics coincide on all models. In Section 7.2 we discuss a few examples of
interesting pLµ⊙ formulas, using the denotational or the game semantics to ex-
plain their meaning, thus taking advantage of the results of Section 7.1. The
examples show how important properties of PLTS’s can be expressed in our new
logic pLµ⊙, or actually in its fragment pLµ{0,1}, and provide important justifi-
cations for all our work. Some examples will also be used to expose interesting
properties of the logic, such as the failure of the so called finite model property.
We conclude Section 7.2 by proving that the qualitative fragment of PCTL and
full PCTL (see Definition 3.2.8) can be encoded in the logics pLµ{0,1} and pLµ[0,1]
respectively. In Section 7.3 we summarize and comment on the results obtained
in this chapter.
7.1 Formal definitions and main result
As for the logics Lµ and pLµ (see sections 3.1.2 and 3.2.4), the game semantics of
the logic pLµ⊙⊕ and its fragments is defined, given a PLTS L=〈P, {
a
−→}a∈L〉, an
interpretation of the variables ρ and a formula F , by constructing a game G(F, ρ)
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and defining LF MLρ : P → [0, 1] as assigning to the state p ∈ P the value of the
game G(F, ρ) at the game state 〈p, F 〉. In the case of the logic Lµ, G(F, ρ) is an
ordinary 2-player parity game. In the case of the logic pLµ (and as we shall see
also of pLµ∪ {+λ}), G(F, ρ) is an ordinary 2
1
2
-player parity game. In the case of
pLµ⊙⊕ and its fragments pLµ
⊙, pLµ⊕, pLµ




The class of 21
2
-player meta-parity games has been designed to match the
informal and intuitive description of the game semantics for pLµ⊙ given in Section
3.3.3. The result of Theorem 5.2.10 immediately suggests the game interpretation
of the pLµ⊙ operators {∨,∧,+λ,⊙, ·} as Player 1 nodes (S1), Player 2 nodes (S2),
probabilistic nodes (SN ), Player 1 branching nodes (B1) and Player 2 branching
nodes (B2), respectively. These states can be represented as follows:









〈p, F 〉 〈p,G〉
〈p,F∧G〉
aa ==















〈p, F 〉 〈p,G〉
〈p,F ·G〉
\d :B
Note that, in the particular case when F =G, the game states 〈p, F ⊙ G〉 and
〈p, F · G〉 have only one child: 〈p, F 〉. This implies, in light of the result of
Theorem 5.2.10, that the game interpretation of the formula F ⊙ F does not
agree with the corresponding denotational meaning. This small issue can be
easily circumvented by, e.g., working with 21
2
-player meta-parity games whose
transition relations are multisets. In what follows we solve this problem in a
different, and possibly simpler, way by restricting our attention to a class of
formulas where this problem cannot arise.
Definition 7.1.1. A pLµ⊙⊕ formula F is in product simple form if every subfor-
mula G∈Sub(F ) of the form G1 ⋆ G2, with ⋆∈{⊙, ·,⊕,⊖}, is such that G1 6=G2,
i.e., the two subformulas G1 and G2 are syntactically different. Every pLµ
⊙
⊕
formula F can be transformed in a semantically equivalent formula in product
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simple form by, e.g., inductively replacing a subformula of the form G1 ⋆G1 with
the (semantically) equivalent formula G1 ⋆ (G1 ∨G1).
In what follows we restrict our attention, without any loss of generality, to
normal pLµ⊙⊕ formulas (see Definition 3.1.4) in product simple form.
The game interpretation of the modalities {〈a〉, [a]} is given as in pLµ games
(see Section 3.2.4) and the role of the fixed point operators {(µX.), (νX.)} is
captured in the game semantics by appropriate parity assignments. As discussed
in Section 3.3.3, although the pLµ⊙⊕ operators {⊕,⊖} do not seem to have a
clear probabilistic meaning, they satisfy the useful property expressed by Lemma
3.3.16. This allows us to interpret the operators {⊕,⊖} as game states under the
control of Player 1 and Player 2 respectively, depicted as follows:









〈p, B0〉 〈p, B1〉 . . . 〈p, Bn〉 . . .
〈p,F⊖G〉
hh aa ;;
where the formulas An and Bn are defined by mutual induction as follows: A0=F ,
B0 = G, An+1 = An ⊙ Bn and Bn+1 = An · Bn. It then follows that the game
associated with a pLµ⊙⊕ formula F contains, in general, states of the form 〈p,G〉
with G 6∈ Sub(F ). In the following definition we describe the set of formulas,
denoted by Sub⊕,⊖(F ), which can appear in the game associated with a pLµ⊙⊕
formula F .
Definition 7.1.2. Given a pLµ⊙⊕ formula F we denote with Sub
⊕,⊖(F ) the small-
est set of pLµ⊙⊕ formulas containing Sub(F ) and such that if G⊕H or G⊖H are in
Sub⊕,⊖(F ) then the set of formulas {AG,Hn , B
G,H
n }n∈N is contained in Sub
⊕,⊖(F ),
where the N-indexed set of formulas {AG,Hn }n∈N is defined by mutual induction
with {BG,Hn }n∈N as follows: A
G,H
0 = G, B
G,H











n . It is going to be useful to the define the following partial
order on Sub⊕,⊖(F ):
1. G,H⊑G ⋆ H , for ⋆∈{∨,∧,⊙, ·},
2. AG,Hn , B
G,H
n ⊑G ⋆ H , for all n∈N and ⋆∈{⊕,⊖}.
3. G⊑〈a〉G and G⊑ [a]G,
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4. G⊑µX.G and G⊑µX.G.
It is clear that (Sub⊕,⊖(F ),⊑) is well-founded (see Definition 2.1.7). Note that
if F is in product simple form, then Sub⊕,⊖(F ) does not contain formulas of the
form G ·G or G⊙G.





⊕ formula F and a [0, 1]-interpretation of the variables
ρ, is constructed.
Definition 7.1.3 (pLµ⊙⊕ Games). Let L= 〈P, {
a
−→}a∈L〉 be a PLTS, F a pLµ
⊙
⊕
formula and ρ a [0, 1]-interpretation of the variables. The game G(F, ρ) is a 21
2
-
player meta-parity game 〈A,ΦPr〉, with A = 〈(S,E), (S1, S2, SN , B1, B2), π〉, de-
fined as follows. The set S is defined as S={⊤,⊥} ∪
(
(P ∪ D(L))×Sub⊕,⊖(F )
)
,
where D(L) is the set of probability distributions in L (see Definition 3.2.3) and
{⊤,⊥} a distinct pair of states which we introduce for technical convenience.
Thus note that, in general, the set S is countably infinite even when L is fi-
nite (see Definition 3.2.1). The game states {⊤,⊥} are terminal in G(F, ρ), i.e.,
E(⊤) =E(⊥) = ∅. As in pLµ games, the states of the form 〈d,G〉, for d∈D(L),
are in SN , i.e., under the control of Nature which moves to the state 〈q, G〉 with
probability d(q). This is formalized by specifying π(〈d,G〉)(〈q, G〉) = d(q). The
states of the form 〈p,G〉, for p∈P and G∈Sub⊕,⊖(F ), are specified as follows:
I. 〈p,X〉, with X ∈ free(F ), is in SN , i.e., it is under the control of Nature
which moves to the state ⊤ with probability ρ(X)(p) and to the state ⊥ with
probability 1 − ρ(X)(p). Thus, π(〈p,X〉)(⊤)=ρ(X)(p) and π(〈p,X〉)(⊥)=
1 − ρ(X)(p).
II. 〈p,G1 ∨G2〉 is in S1 and E(〈p,G1 ∨G2〉)={〈p,G1〉, 〈p,G2〉}.
III. 〈p,G1 ∧G2〉 is in S2 and E(〈p,G1 ∧G2〉)={〈p,G1〉, 〈p,G2〉}.
IV. 〈p, 〈a〉G〉 is in S1 and E(〈p, 〈a〉G〉)={〈d,G〉 | p
a
−→ d}. Note that if p 6
a
−→,
then 〈p, 〈a〉G〉 is a terminal state.
V. 〈p, [a]G〉 is in S2 and E(〈p, [a]G〉)={〈d,G〉 | p
a
−→ d}.
VI. 〈p, σX.G〉, for σ ∈{µ, ν}, is in SN and has only one successor state 〈p,G〉,
i.e., E(〈p, σX.G〉)={〈p,G〉}. Hence π(〈p, σX.G〉)(〈p,G〉)=1.
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VII. 〈p,X〉, with X∈bound(F ), is in SN and has only one successor state 〈p,G〉,
where G is the unique (since F is normal) subformula of F bound by a fixed
point operator (σX.) in F , for σ∈{µ, ν}. Hence, π(〈p,X〉)(〈p,G〉)=1.
VIII. 〈p,G1 +λ G2〉 is in SN , i.e., it is under the control of Nature which move to
the states 〈p,G1〉 and 〈p,G2〉 with probability λ and 1−λ respectively. This
is formalized by specifying the function π as: π(〈p,G1 +λ G2〉)(〈p,G1〉) = λ
and π(〈p,G1 +λ G2〉)(〈p,G2〉) = 1 − λ.
IX. 〈p,G1⊙G2〉 is in B1, i.e., it is a branching state under the control of Player
1. The relation E is specified as E(〈p,G1 ⊙G2〉)={〈p,G1〉, 〈p,G2〉}.
X. 〈p,G1 ·G2〉 is in B2 and E(〈p,G1 ⊙G2〉)={〈p,G1〉, 〈p,G2〉}.
XI. 〈p,G1 ⊕ G2〉 is in S1 and E(〈p,G1 ⊕ G2〉) = {〈p, AG1,G2n 〉}n∈N where the
formulas AG1,G2n are specified as in Definition 7.1.2.
XII. 〈p,G1 ⊖ G2〉 is in S2 and E(〈p,G1 ⊖ G2〉) = {〈p, BG1,G2n 〉}n∈N where the
formulas BG1,G2n are specified as in Definition 7.1.2.
Lastly, the parity assignment Pr :S→N, inducing the parity set WPr of completed
paths in A as specified in Definition 2.3.54, is defined as follows:
1. Pr(⊤) = 1 and Pr(⊥) = 0. This assignment models the fact that ⊤ and ⊥
are terminal states winning for Player 1 and Player 2 respectively.
2. Pr(〈p, 〈a〉G〉) = 0 and Pr(〈p, [a]G〉) = 1. This assignment models the fact
that if Player 1 gets stuck at states of the form 〈p, 〈a〉G〉 then they lose.
Similarly for Player 2 at states 〈p, [a]G〉.
3. Let α : bound(F ) → N \ {0, 1} an assignment of natural numbers (greater
than 1) to the variables bound in F such that: α(X) is odd if X is bound
in F by a least fixed point operator (µX.), α(X) is even if X is bound in F
by a greatest fixed point operator (νX.) and α(X)>α(Y ) if X subsumes
Y in F . We then specify the priority assigned to game states of the form
〈p,X〉, with X∈bound(F ), as follows: Pr(〈p,X〉)=α(X).
4. Pr(s)=0, for all other game states.
Therefore a completed path is in WPr if it is finite and ending in the terminal
state ⊤ or in a terminal state 〈p, [a]G〉 (i.e., with p 6
a
−→), or an infinite sequence
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of configurations whose dominant variable X (i.e., the unique variable bound in
F occurring infinitely often in states of the form 〈p,X〉, for p∈P , and subsuming
all other bound variables occurring infinitely often) is bound by a greatest fixed
point in F .
The rules I-VII corresponds to the the pLµ fragment of pLµ⊙⊕ and indeed
coincide with the description of pLµ games given in Section 3.2.3. Rule VIII
describes the game interpretation of the +λ operator. Rules IX and X describe
the pLµ⊙ operators {⊙, ·}. As discussed in Section 5.4, the branching states of the
form 〈p,G1⊙G2〉 can be understood as generating two independent subgames with
the requirement for Player 1 to win in both subgames. Similarly, the branching
states of the form 〈p,G1 ·G2〉 can be understood as generating two independent
subgames with the requirement for Player 1 to win in at least one subgame.
Lastly, rules XI and XII describe the game interpretation of the {⊕,⊖} operators.
Observation 7.1.4. If F is a pLµ⊙ formula, we can restrict the set of game
states in G(F, ρ) to the set {⊤,⊥}∪
(
(P ∪D(L))× Sub(F )
)
which is finite when
L is finite. This is because states of the form 〈q, G〉 with G 6∈ Sub(F ) and G=An
or G =Bn (as specified in Definition 7.1.2) are not reachable in any play from
states 〈p, F 〉, with p ∈ P . Thus pLµ⊙ games enjoy the nice property of being
finite when interpreted over finite PLTS’s.
Observation 7.1.5. Following the previous observation, if F is a pLµ ∪ {+λ}
formula, the sets of branching plays B1 and B2 in the game G(F, ρ) are empty.
Therefore G(F, ρ) is a 21
2
-player meta-parity game with a standard 21
2
-player arena
(see Definition 4.1.5), i.e., it is an ordinary 21
2
-player parity game.
Observation 7.1.6. For every pLµ⊙⊕ formula F , the branching states s∈B1∪B2
in G(F, ρ) have exactly two successor states. Thus G(F, ρ) is a 21
2
-player meta-
parity game finitely branching in the branching nodes (see Definition 5.1.13).
Observation 7.1.7. The parity assignment Pr for the game G(F, ρ) has been
defined in order to be as transparent as possible. Of course, it is possible to
economize on the number of priorities used in the game. For instance, rather
than defining Pr(⊤) = 1, one could add a self-loop to the state ⊤ (i.e., define
E(⊤) ={⊤}) and consider the parity assignment Pr(⊤) = 0 instead. Clearly the
two games are equivalent (see Definition 2.3.54). Also note that, with this trans-
formation, the game G(F, ρ) would satisfy Convention 6.2.1. It is also immediate
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to verify that every game G(σX.G, ρ), for σ ∈ {µ, ν}, satisfies Convention 5.2.1
(by specification of Pr in Definition 7.1.3) and Convention 6.2.6 (by point VII in
Definition 7.1.3).
Observation 7.1.8. Given a PLTS L = 〈P, {
a
−→}a∈L〉, a [0, 1]-interpretation
ρ : V → [0, 1] and a pLµ⊙⊕ formula of the form F = µX.G let G(F, ρ) be the
associated 21
2
-player meta-parity game. As a first observation, every state of the
form 〈p, Y 〉, with Y 6=X a free variable in F , is a ρ(Y )(p)-valued leaf in the sense
of Definition 6.2.2. This follows from point I in Definition 7.1.3. Moreover, note
that the states of maximal priority in G(F, ρ) are necessarily the states of the
form 〈p,X〉 with p∈P . Thus a value assignment for G(F, ρ) (see Definition 6.2.7)
is a function of type {〈p,X〉 | p∈P}→ [0, 1] or, equivalently, a function in [0, 1]P .
It follows from the previous points that, given any f :P→ [0, 1], the pLµ⊙⊕ game
G(G, ρ[f/X ]) is precisely the unfolding of G(F, ρ) with f (see Definition 6.2.8).
Definition 7.1.9 (Game semantics). Given a PLTS L= 〈P, {
a
−→}a∈L〉, a [0, 1]-
interpretation ρ∈V→ [0, 1]P and a pLµ⊙⊕ formula F , we define the game semantics
of F over L as the map LF MLρ ∈ [0, 1]P , defined as follows:





Note that, in general, the function LF MLρ is well defined only under the set-
theoretic assumption MAℵ1 (see Theorem 6.4.2). However, by observation 7.1.5
and application of Theorem 6.4.1, the function LF MLρ is always well defined if F
is a pLµ ∪ {+λ} formula.
We are now ready to prove the main result of this section1.
Theorem 7.1.10. Given any PLTS L = 〈P, {
a
−→}a∈L〉 and [0, 1]-interpretation
ρ :V→ [0, 1]P of the variables into L, the following assertions hold:
ZFC ⊢ JF KLρ =LF MLρ
ZFC + MAℵ1 ⊢ JGKLρ =LG MLρ
where F ranges over pLµ∪{+λ} formulas, and G over arbitrary pLµ
⊙
⊕ formulas.
Proof. The two assertions are proven in a uniform way. The only difference is
that for pLµ ∪ {+λ} formulas, in light of Observation 7.1.5, we shall apply the
1The result, restricted to pLµ⊙ formulas, was announced at the 14th International Confer-
ence on Foundations of Software Science and Computation Structures (FoSSaCS) [83].
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results of Theorem 6.4.1, while in the general case we shall apply the results of
Theorem 6.4.2 which hold under the set-theoretic assumption MAℵ1 .
The proof proceeds by well-founded induction on H ∈ Sub⊕,⊖(G) (see Def-
inition 7.1.2), showing that for every subformula H ∈ Sub⊕,⊖(G), the desired
equality JHKρ=LH Mρ holds for every [0, 1]-interpretation of the variables ρ.
The case for H=X , with X a free variable, is trivial. For the case H=H1⋆H2,





(〈p,Hi〉) = JHiKρ(p). Observe that a play in the game G(H, ρ)
starting at 〈p,Hi〉 is identical to a play in G(Hi, ρ) starting at 〈p,Hi〉. The
desired result then follows by application of Theorem 5.2.10.
The cases for H = 〈a〉H1 and H = [a]H1 can be proved with the same kind
of argument. For example, in the case of H = 〈a〉H1, one first shows, using






d(q) · JH1Kρ(q), for every probability distribution d. Then, again by applying








d(q) · JH1Kρ(q), and
the result follows.
The cases for H = H1 ⊕ H2 and H = H1 ⊖ H2 can be proved with the
same methodology by applying the result of Lemma 3.3.16. For example, in
the case of H = H1 ⊕ H2, the proof goes by showing, by applying the induc-
tive hypothesis, that the value of the game G(H, ρ) at the states 〈p, AH1,H2n 〉,
i.e., the states reachable from 〈p,H1 ⊙ H2〉, is anx,y (see Lemma 3.3.16), where









x,y. The result then follows by application of
Lemma 3.3.16.
The interesting cases are H= µX.H1 and H=νX.H1. We just show how to
prove the desired result for H=µX.H1, because the case for H = νX.H1 can be
proved with the same technique.
Since, for every p ∈ P , the state 〈p,H〉 of the game G(H, ρ) has a unique
successor 〈p,H1〉, we know by application of Theorem 5.2.10 that the following
equality holds:









holds. Moreover, since the state 〈p,H〉, once left after the first move, cannot be
reached any more in any play in G(H, ρ), we can ignore the state 〈p,H〉 from our
analysis. This allows us to have, in the two games G(H, ρ) and G(H1, ρ[f/X ]),
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the same set S of game-states, for every function f ∈ [0, 1]P . In what follows
we use f and g to range over the function spaces [0, 1]P an [0, 1]S respectively.
Given any function g ∈ [0, 1]S, we denote with ĝ ∈ [0, 1]P the function defined as
ĝ(p)=g(〈p,H1〉). Thus, given Equation 7.1, the following equalites hold:









The states of maximal priority in G(H, ρ) are of the form 〈p,X〉, for p∈P . It then
follows the every value assignment for G(H, ρ) (see Definition 6.2.7) is a function
of type {〈p,X〉 | p∈P}→ [0, 1]. In what follows, for notational convenience, we
equate the two function spaces P→ [0, 1] and {〈p,X〉 | p∈P}→ [0, 1]. Thus, in
accordance with the convention above, we use the letter f to range over value
assignments in G(H, ρ). Note that, for every g∈ [0, 1]S, the value assignment fg
(see Definition 6.2.20) is precisely the function ĝ, because the unique successor
state of 〈p,X〉 in G(H, ρ) is the state 〈p,H1〉, for every p∈P .
From the previous discussion, Observation 7.1.8, and Definition 6.2.21 of HG :






































G(H1, ρ[fβ/X ]), or equivalently, given Equation 7.2, fα =
⊔
β<αLH1 Mρ[fβ/X]. In then follows from Equation 7.1 that the equality LH Mρ =
⊔
αLH1 Mρ[fβ/X] holds. By induction hypothesis, we know that LH1 Mρ[fα/X] =
JH1Kρ[fα/X] for every fα. The desired result LH Mρ = JHKρ the follows by the
definition of the denotational semantics of pLµ⊙⊕.
Since pLµ is a fragment of pLµ ∪ +λ, as an immediate consequence of Theo-
rem 7.1.10, we have that Theorem 3.2.14 holds, i.e., the denotational and game
semantics for pLµ coincide on all models. Therefore our result settles a problem
left open in [78], where the equivalence of the denotational and game semantics
of pLµ was proven only with respect to finite models (see Theorem 3.2.13).
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Theorem 7.1.10 is a fundamental result providing a strong semantical basis
for the logics pLµ, pLµ⊙ and pLµ⊙⊕. Indeed one can reason about these logics
using the different tools offered by the denotational and game semantics. One of
the most important advantages of having an adequate game semantics for pLµ⊙⊕
is the possibility of visualizing the 21
2
-player meta-parity game associated to a
formula in order to grasp its meaning.
As an important example of this approach, we now discuss the meaning of the
derived qualitative threshold modalities P>0 and P=1 (see Section 3.3.2.3), using
the game semantics of the logic pLµ⊙. Let us consider the game G(P>0F, ρ)
associated with a PLTS L = 〈P, {
a
−→}a∈L〉, a [0, 1]-interpretation ρ and the
pLµ⊙ formula P>0F
def
= µX.(F ⊙ X). The game G(µX.(F ⊙ X), ρ), at the state
〈p, µX.(F ⊙X)〉 for some p∈P can be depicted as follows:




















After an initial unfolding step from 〈p, µX.(F⊙X)〉 to 〈p, F⊙X〉, the game is split
in two concurrent sub-games, one continuing its execution from the state 〈p, F 〉
(this sub-game can be considered an instance of the game G(F, ρ) starting at
〈p, F 〉) and the other from the state 〈p,X〉. In order to win the game G(µX.(F ⊙
X), ρ), Player 1 has to win in at least one of the two generated sub-games, thus
either in the instance of G(F, ρ) or in the sub-games continuing at 〈p,X〉. This
second sub-game, however, after an unfolding step, progresses to the game state
〈p, F ⊙X〉, where the protocol is repeated generating yet another two sub-games.
The infinite execution of the game leads to the generation of infinitely many
instances of the game G(F, ρ). A branching play T in G(µX.(F ⊙X), ρ) can be
depicted as follows:










where T1, T2, . . . , represent the branching plays corresponding to the plays in each
generated instance of the game G(F, ρ). Since the variable X unfolded infinitely
often in the rightmost path in T is bound by a least fixed point in µX.(F ⊙X),
and since the ⊙ nodes are Player 1 choices in the inner game GT , we have that
T is a winning branching play for Player 1 if and only if there exists some n∈N
such that Tn, the outcome of the n-th generated instance of G(F, ρ), is winning
for Player 1.
From the previous discussion, it follows that the game G(µX.(F ⊙X), ρ), at
the state 〈p, µX.F ⊙X〉 can be simply described as follows: generate an infinite
number of instances of the game G(F, ρ) at the state 〈p, F 〉; Player 1 wins if
at least one of the infinitely many generated instances of G(F, ρ) ends up in
a winning branching play and Player 2 wins otherwise. It is then quite clear
that if LF MLρ (p) > 0 (or equivalently JF KLρ (p) > 0 by Theorem 7.1.10), then the
probability that at least one (and in fact countably many) of the infinite instances
of G(F, ρ) will result in a win for Player 1, is 1. Similarly, if LF MLρ (p) = 0, then
the probability that at least one of the infinite instances of G(F, ρ) will result in a
win for Player 1, is 0. The game semantics for pLµ⊙ thus offers a straightforward
interpretation for the probabilistic qualitative modality P>0 exploiting the simple
idea that an event (which we can, at some extent, see as a pLµ⊙ property) has
probability greater than zero if and only if, when repeated infinitely many time, it
almost surely occurs at least once. An analogous straightforward interpretation
can be given to the other qualitative threshold modality P=1F
def
= νX.(F · X):
generate an infinite number of instances of the game G(F, ρ) at the state 〈p, F 〉;
Player 1 wins if all of them end up in a winning branching play for Player 1, and
Player 2 wins otherwise.
It is trivial, given the previous discussion, to define a game semantics directly
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for the pLµ{0,1} fragment of pLµ⊙ (consisting of pLµ∪{+λ} extended with the two
modalities P>0 and P=1) in terms of 2
1
2
-player meta-parity games. States of the
form 〈p,P>0〉 and 〈p,P=1〉 are branching states under the control of Player 1 and
Player 2 respectively, having an N-indexed collection of successor states which
we denote with bnp,F , for n ∈ N. Each state state b
n
p,F has, as unique successor,




































The use of the game-states {bnp,F}n∈N is technically necessary as they allow us to
represent the desired branching state generating countably many sub-games as
continuing their execution from the same state 〈p, F 〉.
The straightforward interpretation of the qualitative probabilistic modalities
in terms of pLµ⊙ games is, in our opinion, an important feature of the whole game
semantics for pLµ⊙ which is simple enough to be understood at an elementary
level of abstraction, and yet very expressive, as we shall see in Section7.2.
The game semantics for the full logic pLµ⊙⊕, on the other hand, is less satis-
factory because the interpretation of the operators {⊕,⊖} is not necessarily very
illuminating. Indeed the games associated to the quantitative threshold modal-
ities P>λF and P≥λF (see Section 3.3.1) are harder to understand, and do not
necessarily offer an intuitive operational interpretation. On the other hand, the
game-semantics of pLµ⊙⊕ is an important witness for the expressiveness of the new
class of 21
2
-player meta-parity games introduced in Section 5.3, and constitutes a
formal operational interpretation of a very powerful logic which, as we shall see
in Section 7.2, counts the full logic PCTL as one of its fragments.
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7.2 Examples of pLµ⊙ and pLµ⊙⊕ formulas
In this Chapter we discuss a few examples of interesting pLµ⊙ and pLµ⊙⊕ formulas,
using both the denotational and the game semantics to explain their meaning,
thus taking advantage of the results of Chapter 7. The examples show how im-
portant properties of PLTS’s can be expressed in the logic pLµ⊙, or actually in its
fragment pLµ{0,1}. Some examples will also be used to expose interesting prop-
erties of the logic, such as the failure of the so called finite model property. We
are also going to show, at the end of this section, how the qualitative fragment
of PCTL (see Section 3.2.2) can be seen as a fragment of the logic pLµ⊙, and
similarly, how full PCTL is a fragment of the logic pLµ⊙⊕. These results demon-
strate the expressivity of the quantitative logics pLµ⊙ and pLµ⊙⊕ and constitute
a contribution to the development of the quantitative approach to probabilistic
temporal logics, as discussed in Section 3.2.3.
We start with some simple example.




























where the sub-formula H of G3 and G4 is defined as νX.〈b〉X , and can be under-
stood as the formula F2 discussed in Section 3.2.5.
Let us first consider the formula G1. Its semantics is, quite intuitive, the map
assigning to each state p, value 1 if the state p satisfies the pLµ formula νX.〈a〉X
with probability 1, and value 0 otherwise. This example is trivial, but shows that
pLµ⊙ formulas of the form P=1F and P>1F always describe sets of process states,
and therefore it makes sense to say that such a formula holds, or does not hold,
at a given process state p. Recall from the examples of Section 3.2.5, that the
logic pLµ cannot express such properties.
The above considerations are useful for understanding the formula G2 whose
interpretation at a state p corresponds to the limit probability of reaching, by
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Figure 7.1: Example of PLTS with infinitely many states
means of b-actions, a state where the formula G1 holds, i.e., a state q where the
formula νX.〈a〉X holds almost surely. Thus pLµ⊙ formulas are still interpreted
as the limit probability of satisfying a property, but in describing this property
we can use boolean predicates over states, i.e., set of states, defined using the
qualitative threshold operators. As we shall see later in this section, one can
specify all the properties definable in qualitative PCTL as pLµ⊙-formulas.
Another interesting property is expressed by the formula G3 which holds at a
state p if the limit probability of satisfying the property associated with the pLµ
formula µX.(〈a〉X ∨H) is 1. The interpretation of µX.(〈a〉X ∨H) at a state q is
the limit probability the controller has of reaching some state, by means of a finite
number of a-steps, and from there producing an infinite sequence of b-actions.
Here it is important to stress the concept of limit probability. Indeed the formula
G3 might hold at a given state p of a PLTS L even if there is no single process state
satisfying the sub-formula H with probability 1. For example consider the PLTS
of Figure 7.1, and assume that for each n∈N+, JHK(qn)=1 − 1n and JHK(pn)=0.
Clearly no state in the PLTS satisfies the formula H with probability 1, although,
for every ǫ>0 there exists a process state qn which statisfies H with probability
greater than 1 − ǫ. Thus the formula µX.(〈a〉X ∨ H) at the state pn, for every
n∈N , holds with probability 1: Controller can always reach a state, by means of
a-actions, and from there satisfy the property expressed by H with probability as
close to 1 as desired. Thus JG2K(pn) = 1, for every process state pn in the PLTS
of Figure 7.1. Note that the game associated with G3 is a classical example of
21
2
-player meta-parity game where Player 1 does not have optimal strategies.
However one might want to describe a slightly stronger property, namely the
possibility of reaching, by mean of a-actions, a process state where H actually
holds with probability 1. The subformula µX.(〈a〉X ∨ P=1H) of G4 expresses
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exactly this property. In particular JµX.(〈a〉X ∨ P=1H)K(pn) = 0, and thus
JG4K(pn) = 0, for every process state pn in the PLTS of Figure 7.1. The ex-
amples G3 and G4 show how the logic pLµ
⊙ is capable of expressing capable of
expressing subtle distinctions in the encoding of qualitative properties.
We use the last example, given by the formula G5, to discuss an important
property of the qualitative threshold modalities P>0 and P=1 which is useful
to simplify and make some formulas more readable . As is it easy to observe,
the formula G5 is semantically equivalent to the formula G4. Indeed it holds,
in general, that the pLµ⊙ formula Pc1Pc2 . . .PcnF is semantically equivalent to
the simpler pLµ⊙ formula PcnF , where c1, . . . , cn ∈ {= 1, > 0}. The qualitative
threshold modalities share several important properties with the modalities of the
S5 modal logic [25]. Beside the above mentioned way of simplifying sequences
of modalities, also the inequalities JP=1F K(p)≤JF K(p)≤JP>0F K(p) trivially hold
for every process state p. We leave for future work further investigations on the
above mentioned connections between the modalities of the S5 modal logic and
the qualitative threshold modalities.
In the previous examples, we used the probabilistic threshold modalities to
build formulas of the form P=1F or P>0F where F is a closed formula. This kind
of formula is indeed very simple to understand: one starts by interpreting the
meaning of F and then the meaning of P=1F or P>0F is simply the set of pro-
cess states satisfying the qualitative probabilistic constraint. However interesting
formulas can also be built from the qualitative threshold modalities using open
formulas, which can then be bound by further fixed-point operators. We now
discuss a few such examples.




















, for some closed pLµ⊙ formula H ,
The interpretation of the formula H1 might seem a bit obscure at a first sight but
it is actually rather simple. Given a PLTS L, the interpretation of the formula
H1 at a process state p1 is 1 if there exists an infinite a-run starting at p1 in L
(see Definition 3.2.5), i.e., a sequence of the form
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p1
a
−→ d1  p2
a
−→ d2  p3
a
−→ . . .
where pn+1 has positive probability in dn, for every n∈N; the interpretation of
H1 at p1 is 0 otherwise. Thus the semantics of H1 is a boolean predicate, i.e., a
set of processes. To see that this is indeed the interpretation of the formula, we
consider the game-theoretic interpretation of the qualitative threshold modality
P>0 discussed in Section 7.1. The game G(H1) (the interpretation ρ is not impor-
tant as the formula H1 is closed) starts at the game-state 〈p1, νX.P>0〈a〉X〉 and
after an unfolding step reaches the game-state 〈p1,P>0〈a〉X〉 which is a branch-
ing state under the control of Player 1 in the 21
2
-player meta-parity game G(H1).
From this game-state, a countably infinite number of sub-games continuing their
execution from the game-state 〈p1, 〈a〉X〉 is generated, and Player 1 needs to win
just one of them in order to win in the whole game G(H1). The most transparent
interpretation is then, arguably, to think about the game state 〈p1,P>0〈a〉X〉 as a
point on which Player 1 has an infinite number of trials as their disposal to try to
satisfy the property 〈a〉X at the state p. The formula 〈a〉X expresses the possibil-
ity of making an a-action and reach a state p2 satisfying the formula X , which is
unfolded again as P>0〈a〉X . Thus Player 1, having an infinite number of trials at
their disposal at the game state 〈p, 〈a〉X〉, can choose a given transition p1
a
−→ d1
in L in all sub-games; in this way Player 1, with probability 1, will reach their
preferred state p2 ∈ supp(d1) for continuing the next iteration of the fixed-point
game G(H1). Clearly if an infinite path p1
a
−→ d1  p2
a
−→ d2  p3
a
−→ . . .
exists, then Player 1 will be able to win, almost surely, thanks to the infinitely
many opportunities they have of satisfying each 〈a〉X-step of the game. On the
other hand if there is no such an infinite path, Player 1 has no possibility of win-
ning, because in all generated sub-games they will reach at some point a process
state pn without enabled a-transition, i.e., such that p 6
a
−→.
The formula H2 expresses the dual property “there is no infinite a-run”. The
interpretation can be shown to be correct, either by observing that, H2 = H1,
i.e., H2 is the negation of the formula H1, or by an argument analogous to the
one above, where the role of Player 1 is replaced by that of Player 2. These
two examples are useful because they show how the logic pLµ⊙ is capable of
expressing properties of the labeled graph structure underlying a given PLTS L,
i.e., the one obtained by ignoring the probability values labeling the probabilistic
steps d
λ>0
 p from probability distributions d∈D(P ) to process states p∈P in L.
The slightly more complicated formula H3 expresses the existence of a finite a-
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run p1
a
−→ d1  p2
a
−→ d2  p3
a
−→ . . . pn leading to a process state pn satisfying
the formula P1H . Note how the qualitative threshold modality ensures that the
sub-formula P1H can be indeed understood as a boolean predicate, i.e., a set of
process states. Furthermore, if H has already a boolean predicate interpretation
(e.g. H=〈a〉1 or H=P>0H ′) then JP=1HK=JHK.





−→ d2  . . . such that every process state pn appearing in the run
satisfies the property P=1H .
The examples discussed above supply plenty of evidence that the logic pLµ⊙
can express many interesting properties of PLTS’s. Moreover we argue that the
game semantics in terms of 21
2
-player meta-parity games, one of the main results
of this thesis, is sometimes helpful for discussing, or understanding, the meaning
of pLµ⊙ formulas and, more importantly, allows one to interpret the denotational
semantics as the (limit) probability of a property holding.
We now consider a few other examples which we will use to establish some
fundamental properties of the logic pLµ⊙, for example, the failure of the finite
model property.















where F is some closed pLµ⊙ formulas without occurrences of the +λ operator.
Let us first discuss the meaning of the formula ∢aF . First of all, since it is a
formula whose main connective is a threshold modality, its semantics is a boolean
predicate, i.e., a set of process states. A process state p satisfies ∢aF if:
i. p satisfies 〈a〉1 with positive probability, i.e., there exists an a-transition
p
a
−→ d in the PLTS,







e(q) · JF K(q)
)
>0.
In particular, and this is an equivalent characterization of the property if p
has only finitely many a-successor probability distributions, for every p
a
−→ e,
there exists a process state qe∈supp(e) such that JF K(qe) > 0.
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Figure 7.2: Example of PLTS satisfying the formula S (〈a〉1)
Thus the modality ∢a expresses a combination of existential and universal prop-
erties.
Let us now consider the formula S (F ), where the letter S stands for stochastic.
This formula is interesting because every process state p in a PLTS which is non
probabilistic (i.e., a LTS seen as a PLTS as discussed in Definition 3.2.2), cannot
satisfy S (F ), while there exists a PLTS which satisfies, for example, S (〈a〉1) =
∢a(〈a〉1) ∧ ∢a([a] 0), with probability 1. Let us consider some LTS L= 〈P, {
a
−→
}a∈L〉 (seen as a PLTS) and a process state p ∈ P . Since L is not probabilistic
we have that the JF K(p)∈{0, 1} for every process state p∈P (see Lemma 3.3.8).
Thus the meaning of the formula ∢aF at a process state p∈P can be simplified
as follows: J∢a(F K(p)=1 if:
i. there exists p
a
−→ δq, and
ii. for all p
a
−→ δq, with supp(δq)={q}, JF K(q)=1.
Similarly the formula ∢a(F ) holds at a state p if:
i. there exists p
a
−→ δq, and
ii. for all p
a
−→ δq, with supp(δq)={q}, JF K(q)=0.
It is then clear that no process state p in a LTS L can satisfy the formula S (F ),
for any closed formula F without occurrences of the +λ operator. On the other
hand it is immediate to verify that the process state p of the PLTS of Figure 7.2
satisfies S (〈a〉1), i.e., it satisfies both formulas ∢a(〈a〉1) and ∢a([a] 0): for every
reachable distribution d, some elements in supp(d) can perform a-actions, and
some can not.
Lastly, we now discuss the meaning of the formula INF , which is necessarily
a boolean-predicate since its outermost connective is the qualitative threshold
modality P>0. As we shall show, the name of the formula is motivated by the
fact that there is no finite PLTS L (see Definition 3.2.1) and process state p
in L such that JINF K(p) = 1, but there exists an infinite PLTS, and a process
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a // . . .
Figure 7.3: Example of PLTS with infinitely many states satisfying INF





at a process state p can be described as the limit probability
that the controller has of producing an infinite sequence of a-actions, always
reaching states satisfying the formula S (〈a〉1). Recall that S (〈a〉1) holds at a state
p if all (and at least one) of its a-successor distributions p
a
−→ d assign probability
greater than 0 to process states not allowing a-transitions, and probability greater
than 0 to process states allowing a-transitions. Let us now fix a finite PLTS
L=〈P, {
a
−→}a∈L}〉, and let Pa and P¬a be the partition of P defined as Pa ={p∈
P | ∃d. p
a
−→ d} and P¬a = {p ∈ P | ¬(∃d. p
a
−→ d)}. We have that, for every
process state p∈P satisfying S (〈a〉1), and for every p
a
−→ d, 0<d(Pa)< 1. Let
λ be the greatest probability assigned by the finite set of a-successors of states
satisfying S (〈a〉1) to the set Pa, i.e., λ=
⊔
{d(Pa) | JS (〈a〉1)K(p)=1 and p a−→ d}.
Note that, since L is finite, λ is necessarily smaller than 1. Now it is clear that
no process state p ∈ P can satisfy the formula INF . After every a-action, the
controller will reach a state satisfying S (〈a〉1) with probability at most λ. Thus
the probability of having reached, after n steps of a-actions, a state not satisfying
S (〈a〉1) is, at least, probability 1−λn. It follows immediately that the probability
of producing an infinite sequence of a-actions always staying in states satisfying
S (〈a〉1) is 0 in every finite L. On the other hand, the PLTS of Figure 7.3,
where 0 is a process state such that 0 6
a
−→, satisfies the property of the formula
νX.
(




n∈N λn, which can be made positive by
an appropriate choice of probabilities.
The previous examples allow us to state a few basic, yet fundamental, prop-
erties about the satisfiability problem(s) associated with the logic pLµ⊙.
Definition 7.2.4. Given a closed pLµ⊙ formula F , we say that F is λ-satisfiable,
for λ∈ (0, 1], if there exists a PLTS L= 〈P, {
a
−→}a∈L〉 and a process state p∈P ,
such that JF KL(p) ≥ λ. For every PLTS L = 〈P, { a−→}a∈L〉, we say that L λ-
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satisfies F , if there exists a process state p ∈ P such that JF KL(p) ≥ λ. If the
value λ is omitted, it is assumed to be 1.
As an immediate observation, note that we can just focus, for many purposes,
on the simpler notion of 1-satisfiability. Indeed a closed pLµ⊙ formula F is λ-
satisfiable, for some λ>0, if and only if P>0F is 1-satisfiable.
Proposition 7.2.5. The following assertions hold:
1. There exists a closed pLµ⊙ formula F which is 1-satisfiable, but no LTS
L=〈P, {
a
−→}a∈L〉 (seen as a PLTS) 1-satisfies it.
2. There exists a closed pLµ⊙ formula F which is 1-satisfiable, but no (possibly
infinite) LTS or finite PLTS L=〈P, {
a
−→}a∈L〉 1-satisfies it.
Proof. Consider the formulas S (〈a〉0) and INF of Example 7.2.3 for point 1 and
2 respectively.
The first assertion of the Proposition above might be considered an expressiv-
ity result: the properties expressible in pLµ⊙ can distinguish between probabilis-
tic and non-probabilistic systems. This is quite a good property for a temporal
probabilistic logic like pLµ⊙. The second assertion is quite interesting as it ex-
poses an important point on which the theory of pLµ⊙ deviates significantly from
that of the standard modal µ-calculus Lµ. Indeed, every Lµ-formula satisfies the
finite model property : if F is satisfiable, then it is satisfiable by a finite model
[63].
We just settled a couple of basic questions about the satisfiability of pLµ⊙
formulas. Other interesting problems, which we leave open, are listed below.
Question 7.2.6. Does the finite model property, with respect to 1-satisfiability,
holds for pLµ formulas?
Question 7.2.7. Let F be a closed pLµ⊙ formula.
1. Does the finite model property, with respect to 1-satisfiability, holds for
pLµ formulas?
2. Suppose F is 1-satisfiable. Is there always a PLTS 〈P, {
a
−→}a∈L〉 which
λ-satisfies F , such that all the probabilities appearing2 in L are rational?
2We say that a probability λ appears in L if there is a process state p ∈ P , a transition
p
a
−→ d and a process state q∈supp(d) such that d(q)=λ.
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3. is the problem of deciding if F is 1-satisfiable decidable for every pLµ⊙
formula F ?
The previous considerations on satisfiability, and the examples of pLµ⊙ for-
mulas provided so far are actually expressible in the fragment pLµ{0,1} of the logic
(see Section 3.3.2.3). As we already discussed, developing the game semantics of
the logic pLµ{0,1} does not seem any easier than than directly working with the
more expressive logic pLµ⊙, and that is one of the reasons we focused on pLµ⊙.
However there is another important point. The modal-free3 fragment of the logic
pLµ⊙ can be considered as the language of all finite 21
2
-player meta-parity games:
branching nodes under the control of Player 1 and Player 2, are modeled by the
connectives ⊙ and · respectively. Clearly branching states with n children can be
modeled as a sequence of binary branching states. We now provide a translation
of some of the finite 21
2
-player meta-parity games discussed in this thesis into
pLµ⊙ closed modal-free formulas.
Example 7.2.8. Let us consider the 21
2
-player meta-parity game of Example
























It is immediate to verify that G is equivalent to the logical game G(F ) associated
with the pLµ⊙ formula F =(1 + 1
3
0) ⊙ (1 + 1
3
0). Even if in this case the game G
is structurally identical to G(F ), by “equivalent” we refer to a weaker relation of
similarity in the way the two games are played. Our purpose here is to just give
illustrative examples without elaborating on the notion of equivalence underlying
them.
Example 7.2.9. Let us consider the 21
2
-player meta-parity game G of Example
3Here by modal-free fragment we mean the logic pLµ⊙ without the connectives 〈a〉 and [a].
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We can model the presence of the loops in the game graph by using fixed point
operators. Indeed it is simple to verify that the game G is equivalent to the logical







Example 7.2.10. Let us consider the 21
2
-player meta-parity game G of Lemma






































). Recall from Lemma 6.1.9 that this is an
example of 21
2
-player meta-parity where Player 1 does not have positional optimal
strategies.
Proposition 7.2.11. There exists a (modal-free) closed pLµ{0,1} formula F whose
logical 21
2
-player meta-parity game G(F ) is not determined under positional strate-
gies.









as in the previous example and
apply Lemma 6.1.9.
Example 7.2.12. Let us consider the 21
2
-player meta-parity game G of Example
6.2.10, which can be depicted as follows:















The pLµ⊙ formula describing G is F =µX.νY.
(
Y ∧ (Y ·X) ∧X
)
. Note how we
modeled the loops from the states 0 to s and from 1 to s, with greatest and least
fixed point operators respectively. This is because the node 0 is labeled in G
with an even priority, and 1 is labeled with an odd priority. Moreover since the
priority assigned to 1 is greater than the priority assigned to 0, we imposed by
the alternation of fixed points the fact that X subsumes Y in F (see Definition
3.1.5). Note how the Player 2 state s having three children has been modeled by
the sub-formula X · (X⊙Y ) ·Y . We did not parenthesise the formula to highlight
that the operators ∨ and ∧ are associative and commutative, and therefore can
be freely used to model n-ary states. Similarly, the operators {⊙, ·} can model
n-ary branching states.
Recall from Lemma 6.3.7 and Lemma 6.3.8 that this is an example of 21
2
-player
meta-parity game with a non-Borel winning set which requires ω1-iterations of
the WR function (see Definition 6.2.14) to be computed.
The fact that the modal-free fragment of the logic pLµ⊙ can be considered
the language of finite 21
2
-player meta-parity games can be exploited to investigate
the model checking problem from a different viewpoint. Indeed given a finite
PLTS L, a [0, 1]-interpretation of the variables ρ and a pLµ⊙ formula F , there
exists another (modal) closed pLµ⊙ formula F ρMC whose game interpretation is
equivalent to the logical game G(F, ρ). Moreover, it is immediate to verify that
if F is a pLµ{0,1} formula, then also F ρMC is a pLµ
{0,1} formula. Therefore we can
reduce the model checking problem of finite structures for the logics pLµ⊙ and
pLµ{0,1} to the following:
Question 7.2.13. Given a closed modal-free pLµ⊙ (resp. pLµ{0,1}) formula F
is it possible to compute its associated4 value JF K? A weaker property, still
4A closed modal-free formula F is such that JF KLρ (p) = JF KL
′
ρ′ (p
′), for every PLTS’s L and
L′, [0, 1]-interpretations ρ and ρ′ and process states p and p′. Therefore it make sense to just
write JF K.
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practically sufficient for many purposes, is the following: given rationals λ1<λ2,
is it decidable whether JF K∈(λ1, λ2) ?
Solving the above presented model checking problem for the logic pLµ⊙ and
its fragment pLµ{0,1} looks quite challenging: positional strategies do not exist
in general, and the failure of the finite model property, albeit not necessarily an
issue, seems to suggest that novel ingenuous techniques might be needed to settle
the question in a positive, or negative, way.
Up to this point we have only discussed examples, and properties, of pLµ⊙
formulas. We now provide a few examples of interesting pLµ⊙⊕ formulas.






















where the formulas H and G are closed pLµ⊙⊕ formulas, and the quantitative
probabilistic modalities are specified as in Section 3.3.2.4.
The interpretation of the formula J1 at a state p, expresses the limit prob-
ability the controller has of producing a finite sequence of a-actions eventually
reaching a state q that has a probability of at least 1
2
of satisfying the formula H .
The interpretation of the formula J2 at a state p, expresses the limit prob-
ability the controller has of producing a finite sequence of a-actions eventually
reaching a state q at which the property H is more likely to be satisfied than the
property G. This kind of formula is potentially useful for specifying properties
of, say, gambling systems.
Lastly, the formula J3 holds at a state p, and the terminology is justified since
the outermost connective is a threshold modality, if the limit probability the
controller has of producing an infinite a-computation consisting of states where
H is more likely than G, is greater than 1
2
.
We now conclude this chapter by discussing how the logic PCTL and its quali-
tative fragment PCTL{0,1} (see Section 3.2.2) can be encoded into the logics pLµ⊙⊕
and pLµ⊙, or actually into their fragments pLµ[0,1] and pLµ{0,1}, respectively (see
Section 3.3). The encoding is formalized as a function E, mapping PCTL formulas
to pLµ[0,1] formulas, and in particular, PCTL{0,1} formulas to pLµ{0,1} formulas,
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defined in the same style as the encoding of CTL into Lµ (see Definition 3.1.17).
In order to present the encoding in a natural way, it is convenient to assume
that, for each variable X ∈ V, where V is the countable set of logical variables
used in PCTL and pLµ⊙⊕ formulas, there exists a variable X such that for every
[0, 1]-interpretation ρ∈V→ [0, 1]P into some PLTS L, ρ(X)(p)=1 − ρ(X)(p), for
every process state p∈P . It is then natural to extend the negation operator (see
Definition 3.3.3) to open Lµ formulas by defining (X) =X . It is clear that with
this convention, the property expressed by Proposition 3.3.4 holds for arbitrary
open pLµ⊙⊕ formulas.
Definition 7.2.15. We define the encoding E from PCTL formulas to Lµ⊙⊕ for-
mulas, by induction on the structure of the PCTL formula F as follows:
1. E(X) = X ,
2. E(tt)=1,
3. E(F ∨G) = E(F ) ∨ E(G),
4. E(¬F ) = E(F ),














































where ⋆ ∈ {≥, >} and λ ∈ [0, 1]. Note that if F is a qualitative PCTL formula
then E(F ) is a pLµ{0,1} formula.
The following Theorem states that the above defined encoding is correct.
Theorem 7.2.16. Given a PLTS L=〈P,
•
−→〉 with one label, a boolean interpre-
tation ρ∈V→2P of the variables into L, and a PCTL formula F , the following
equality holds: ‖F‖Lρ (p)=JE(F )KLρ (p), for every p∈P .
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Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of F . The cases for F = X ,
F =G ∨H and F =¬G trivial. Let us now consider the cases for F =∃φ, for φ a
path formula.
1. Case F = ∃(◦G). By definition ‖F‖Lρ = 1 if and only if there exists a run
p
•
−→ d  q . . . such that ‖G‖Lρ (q) = 1. In other words ‖F‖
L
ρ (p) = 1 if
and only if there exists a transition p
a
−→ d and q ∈ supp(d) such that
‖G‖Lρ (q)=1, i.e., by induction hypothesis, if and only if J〈•〉E(G)KLρ (p)>0.
It the follows that ‖F‖Lρ (p)=JE(F )KLρ (p)=1 as desired.
2. Case F =∃(GUH). By induction hypothesis we know that the interpreta-
tions of JE(G)KLρ and JE(H)KLρ are the sets of states satisfying the PCTL for-
mulas G and H respectively. The PCTL formula F holds at a process state




−→ d1  p2
•
−→ d3  p3 . . .
with some n∈N such that pn satisfies H and for all i<n, pi satisfies G. To
show that the formula E(F ) captures exactly this property, it is enough to
use the same arguments adopted in Example 7.2.2, which explains the role
of the probabilistic threshold modality P>0 in the subformula P>0(〈•〉X)
of E(F ). The result then follows by standard arguments, similar to those
required to prove Theorem 3.1.18.
3. Case F = ∃(AG). The proof for this case is similar to the previous one.
Indeed, E(F ) is similar to the encoding of the CTL formula into Lµ, spec-








crucial difference is played by the use of the qualitative threshold modality
in the subformula P>0(〈•〉X). By applying the arguments described in Ex-
ample 7.2.2, it is easy to verify that Player 1 wins the logical pLµ⊙⊕ game
G(E(F ), ρ) iff there exist a run p
•
−→ d1  p1
•
−→ . . . , either finite (i.e.,
reaching a state pn such that pn 6
•
−→) or infinite, where every process state
pi satisfies the pLµ
⊙
⊕ formula E(G), or equivalently by induction hypothe-
sis, the PCTL formula G. This is precisely the interpretation of the PCTL
formula F .
We now discuss the last three cases, dealing with the P⋆λ operators of PCTL, for
⋆∈{>,≥}.
1. Case F = P≥λ(◦G). The PCTL formula F holds at a process state p, if
and only if the supremum probability assigned by the probability measures
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PM over runs, associated with Markov runs M ∈ MRun(p) starting at p,
to runs having their second state satisfying G is greater or equal than λ.
By induction hypothesis we have that ‖G‖Lρ = JGKLρ , thus we can restate







{q∈supp(d) | JGKLρ (q)=1}
)
)
≥ λ, i.e., if and only if the inequality
J〈•〉GKLρ (p) ≥ λ holds. The desired result then follows by the denotational
interpretation of the quantitative threshold modality P≥λ. The case for
F =P>λG is identical.
2. Case F =P≥λ(GUH). The PCTL formula F holds at a process state p, if
and only if if the supremum probability assigned by probability measures
PM over runs, associated with Markov runs M ∈MRun(p), to runs satisfying





−→ d1  p2
•
−→ d3  p3 . . . satisfies GUH if there exists some
n∈N such that pn satisfies H and for all i<n, pi satisfies G. By induction
hypothesis we know that ‖G‖Lρ and ‖H‖
L
ρ coincide with JGKLρ and JHKLρ








at a process state p is precisely the
limit probability of runs satisfying GUH ; the proof then follows immediately
by the denotational interpretation of the quantitative threshold modality
P≥λ. Note that the above mentioned fixed-point sub-formula F ′ is the the
encoding into Lµ of the CTL formula ∃(GUH). Our proof thus matches
the standard proof of correctness for Theorem 3.1.18. The game associated





be described as follows:
• if JGKLρ (p) = 1, then Player 1 just chooses the left conjunct and wins
with (limit) probability 1 in the subsequent part of the game;
• otherwise, by induction hypothesis, JGKLρ (p) = 0. Thus Player 1 in
order to avoid an immediate loss chooses to move to the right dis-
junct. By a dual argument, Player 2 will move to the left conjunct
if JHKLρ (p) = 0 or to the right conjunct otherwise, again, to avoid an
immediate loss;
• when the game reaches the state 〈p, 〈•〉X〉, Player 1 has to choose a
transition p
a
−→ d (and loses if such transition does not exists). The
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game then reaches the state 〈X, q〉 with probability d(q), and after an
unfolding step, the new stata 〈q,E(G) ∨
(
E(F ) ∧ 〈•〉X
)
〉 where the
dynamics just described get repeated.
We can simplify this description of the game just looking at the behaviors of
Player 1 as follows. The game starts at the state p; if JGKLρ (p)=1 then Player
1 wins with probability 1. Suppose instead JGKLρ (p) = 0. If JHKLρ (p) = 0
then Player 1 loses with probability 1. Otherwise Player 1 has to choose
a transition p
a
−→ d (and they lose if there is no such transition) and the
game reaches the state q ∈ supp(d) with probability d(q) and the game
progresses from there. Lastly, since the outermost fixed point operator is a
least fixed point, every infinite play of the game is losing for Player 1. It is
now clear that there exists a one-to-one correspondence between strategies
σ1 for Player 1 in the above described simplified game and Markov runs
M in L. Moreover, the probability measures over runs in L induced by
M (see Definition 3.2.7) coincide with the probability measure over Markov
branching plays induced by the strategy σ1 in the game (see Definition 4.1.3
and Definition 7.1.3). The result then simply follows.
3. Case F =P≥λ(AG). This case can be proved, following the same lines used
in the previous case, showing that JνX.E(F ) ∧
(
〈a〉X ∨ [a] 0
)
KLρ (p) is the
upper limit probability PM
(
{~r | ‖AF‖Lρ (~r)=1}
)
, for M ∈MRun(p), of runs
satisfying the PCTL path formula AG. Again this is shown by identifying
a correspondence between Markov runs in L and strategies for Player 1 in
the logical game G(E(F ), ρ).
Note how the encoding of PCTL formulas of the form ∃(φ), exploits the possi-
bility, discussed in Example 7.2.2, of specifying temporal properties of the labeled
graph underlying a given PLTS as pLµ{0,1} formulas. On the other hand, the en-
coding of PCTL formulas of the form P⋆λ(φ) is quite straightforward, being of
the form P⋆λF ′, where F ′ is the encoding in Lµ of the CTL formula ∃(φ).
7.3 Summary of results
In Section 7.1 we defined the game semantics, given in term of 21
2
-player meta-
parity games, of the logic pLµ⊙⊕ and its fragments. The proof of equivalence of the
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denotational and game semantics for pLµ⊙⊕ (Theorem 7.1.10) is the main result
of this chapter. Since the proof technique we adopted is based on the results of
Chapter 6, the equivalence is valid in ZFC + MAℵ1 set theory. For the fragment
pLµ{+λ} of the logic, however, the equivalence holds in ZFC alone, because the
games used to interpret pLµ ∪ {+λ} are standard parity games, and the results
of Chapter 6 concerning parity games do not depend on Martin’s Axiom at ℵ1.
With the techniques developed in Chapter 6, it is possible to prove that the
equivalence between game and denotational semantics holds in ZFC alone for
other interesting classes of pLµ⊙⊕ formulas. We now list, without providing formal
proofs, some of the results we have obtained in this direction.
Theorem 7.3.1. For the following classes of pLµ⊙⊕ formulas, the game and de-
notational semantics can be proved to coincide in ZFC alone:
1. the set of pLµ⊙ formulas without nested occurrences of fixed-point operators,
2. the set of pLµ[0,1] formulas generated by the following grammar:
F,G,C ::= X | F ⋆ G | 〈a〉F | [a]F | µX.F | νX.F | P>λC | P≥λC
where ⋆∈{∨,∧,+λ}, λ∈ [0, 1] and C is a closed formula.
We leave for future research the identification of further interesting classes of
pLµ⊙⊕ formulas whose proof of equivalence can be carried in in ZFC alone.
In Section 7.1 we discussed how the game semantics of pLµ⊙ offers a straight-
forward interpretation of the qualitative threshold modalities P>0 and P=1. This
is one of the pleasant features of the game semantics of pLµ⊙.
In Section 7.2 we presented a few examples of pLµ⊙ and pLµ⊙⊕ formulas for-
malizing interesting properties of PLTS’s. These examples allowed us to prove
some basic results about the logic pLµ⊙, such as the failure of the finite model
property and the fact that some formulas can be satisfied only by probabilistic
systems.
The last result of this chapter is the encoding of the qualitative fragment of
PCTL and of full PCTL in the logics pLµ{0,1} and pLµ[0,1] respectively. It would
be interesting to extend these expressivity results to richer logics for PLTS’s, such
as, e.g., PCTL∗ [9].

Chapter 8
Conclusions and future work
8.1 Conclusions
In this thesis we have defined, following the [0, 1]-valued or quantitative approach
to probabilistic temporal logics, the three logics pLµ ∪ {+λ}, pLµ⊙ and pLµ
⊙
⊕,
each extending the base logic pLµ of [78, 29, 56] with additional operators. The
denotational semantics for these logics is defined straightforwardly. Our main
contribution is the definition and analysis of appropriate game semantics.
The game semantics for pLµ ∪ {+λ}, which is given in terms of standard
2-player stochastic parity games, has been defined as a simple generalization, re-
quired for interpreting the new operators +λ, of the games for pLµ introduced in
[78]. Our main result concerning the logic pLµ ∪ {+λ} is that the game seman-
tics and the denotational semantics coincide on all models, i.e., on all PLTS’s
as defined in Section 3.2.1. Our proof, which is valid in ZFC, constitutes an
interesting, though unsurprising, generalization of the main result of [78], where
the equivalence of the game and denotational semantics for pLµ was proven only
with respect to finite models.
The logic pLµ⊙ is obtained extending pLµ with the operators of product
(·) and coproduct (⊙). These operators have been already investigated in [56],
but as alternative interpretations for the pLµ connectives {∧,∨}, thus not as
operations to consider in combination as in pLµ⊙. The game semantics of pLµ⊙,
defined in terms of 2-player stochastic meta-parity games offers a clear operational
interpretation to the new operators. At a configuration F ·G, the game splits in
two concurrent and independent instances of the game and Player 1 is required
to win in both of them. Similarly, at a configuration F ⊙ G, the game splits in
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two concurrent and independent instances of the game and Player 1 is required
to win in at least one them. Our game semantics also offers a straightforward
interpretation of the derived qualitative modalities P>0 and P=1.
One of the primary interests in a game semantics for pLµ⊙, and more gener-
ally for all logics having a [0, 1]-valued semantics with an intended probabilistic
reading, is to offer an accessible and clear interpretation for the property described
by a formula. We suggest that our game semantics, built on top of the elementary
idea of concurrent execution of independent sub-istances of the game, succeeds
in this task. As discussed in Chapter 7.2, the logic pLµ⊙ is quite expressive as it
can express interesting combinations of quantitative and qualitative specifications
which, for instance, allow the encoding of the the qualitative fragment of PCTL.
An interesting property, also discussed in Chapter 7.2, is that certain pLµ⊙ for-
mulas can be satisfied only by infinite systems. The construction of such formulas
exploits in a crucial way the probabilistic behaviors modeled by PLTS’s. Thus,
we suggest that the failure of the finite model property should be considered as
an interesting expressivity result about pLµ⊙ rather than a negative result.
The strongest logic considered in this thesis is pLµ⊙⊕, obtained by extending
pLµ⊙ with the operators of truncated sum (⊕) and its dual operation (⊖). Our
interest in the logic pLµ⊙⊕ is motivated by the possibility of encoding the full
logic PCTL, as discussed in Chapter 7.2. Our main result about pLµ⊙⊕ is that it
is possible to define an adequate game semantics in terms of 21
2
-player meta-parity
games. As for pLµ⊙, the proof of equivalence with the denotational semantics is




player meta-parity games are clearly designed to match the game-interpretation
of the operations of product and coproduct, their ability to encode ⊕ and ⊖ is far
more subtle. Indeed, the game semantics we obtain captures the meaning of the
operators of ⊕ and ⊖ by means of infinitary protocols, involving operations of
product and coproduct. These protocols, however, do not necessarily offer a clear
and illuminating interpretation for the two connectives, and therefore the game
semantics for pLµ⊙⊕ is perhaps less satisfactory than that given for pLµ
⊙. Having
a game semantics for pLµ⊙⊕, and its fragment PCTL, is anyway an interesting




Our study of the logics pLµ and its extensions pLµ∪ {+λ}, pLµ⊙ and pLµ
⊙
⊕,
constitutes an interesting contribution to the field of temporal logics for non-
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deterministic and probabilistic systems and, in particular, to the applicability of
the quantitative approach to program logics, which is recently finding interesting
applications also in the development of (non-probabilistic) logics for expressing
properties of quantitative and hybrid systems [35, 36].
Notwithstanding our primary focus on probabilistic logics, the present thesis
contains also some contributions of independent interest in the field of game
theory. Indeed, in order to define the class of 21
2
-player meta-parity games, used to
provide game semantics to pLµ⊙ and pLµ⊙⊕, we found it useful to identify a general
class of games capturing the primitive concept of concurrent and independent
execution of sub-games. This led to the definition of the class of 2-player tree
games. We showed that, although simple, the kind of imperfect information
formalized by tree games is sufficient for encoding in a satisfactory way the well-
known class of Blackwell games. We also identified an interesting kind of winning
set, which we named subtree monotone, that enjoys a useful subsitutivity property.
Indeed 21
2
-player meta-parity games are subtree monotone, and the interesting
open problem of qualitative determinacy is reducible to a determinacy problem for
2-player tree games with subtree monotone winning sets. Moreover we observed
that 2-player (non-stochastic) tree games can model stochasticity just by means of
appropriate payoff functions, whereas Gale–Stewart and Blackwell games require
the introduction of a third agent (Nature) to mimic the probabilistic choices.
We identified the class of 21
2
-player meta-games, in which the set of winning
branching plays is defined by means of inner games. We proceeded with a sys-
tematic analysis of those 21
2
-player meta-games whose inner-games are specified
as ordinary 2-player games on trees with prefix-independent winning sets. Prefix
independent winning sets are used in many applications of game theory in com-
puter science, and in particular in verification. Thus our general study may be of
practical interest. However we are primarily interested in one particular class of
21
2
-player meta-games, namely the class having inner-games specified as ordinary
2-player parity games. We named this class of games as 21
2
-player meta-parity
games. The main technical achievement of the thesis is certainly the proof of
determinacy of 21
2
-player meta-parity games, carried out in ZFC set theory ex-
tended with Martin’s Axiom at ℵ1 (MAℵ1). We believe our proof is technically
interesting for the following reasons:
1. It is an interesting and natural example of determinacy for a class of games
which can be considered of imperfect information. This kind of result does
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not abound in game theory, as imperfect information often turned out to
be mathematically intractable.
2. The fact that the winning set of a 21
2
-player meta-parity game is, in general,
not a Borel set, makes our proof quite intriguing. Indeed it is known that
ZFC, extended with instances of Martin’s Axiom, cannot prove determi-
nacy results beyond Borel determinacy. For example it is not possible to
prove that all Gale–Stewart games with Σ11-winning sets are determined in




parity games which, as we showed, can have Π11-complete and Σ
1
1-complete
winning sets, can be proved to be determined in ZFC + MAℵ1 set theory.
3. We are not aware of any other result in theoretical computer science whose
proof is (or at least was originally) carried out in proper extensions of ZFC
set theory. Thus, our proof of determinacy carried out in ZFC + MAℵ1 , is
perhaps noteworthy as being a first example of this kind of result.
Another important, and somewhat unexpected, result about 21
2
-player meta-
parity games is the fact that, even when considering finite game-arenas, positional
strategies are not sufficient for reaching the optimal value of the game: 21
2
-player
meta-parity games are not positionally determined.
8.2 Future work
Several technical theoretical questions have been left open in this thesis, and
can be grouped in two general directions for mathematical research. The first is
aimed at removing the non-standard axiom MAℵ1 from the proofs of our results.
Specific questions of this kind include:
1. Is the assertion mG-UM, which asserts the universal measurability of 21
2
-
player meta-game winning sets (see Definition 5.1.8), and in particular
mG-UM(Γp), with Γp the class of 2
1
2
-player meta-parity games, provable
in ZFC alone?
Even though we think it is quite likely that mG-UM, in its generality,
coincides with the assertion ∆12-UM, in which case mG-UM would not be
probable in ZFC alone (see Theorem 2.1.81), we think it is plausible that
mG-UM(Γp) holds in ZFC alone.
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2. Assuming mG-UM(Γp) as above, is it possible to remove the use of MAℵ1
from the proof of determinacy of 21
2
-player meta-parity games?
As discussed in Section 6.5, this is not obvious, because the ω1-additivity
properties of measure used in our proof, which are consequences of MAℵ1 ,
do not follow from mG-UM(Γp).
The second is aimed at extending knowledge of determinacy results for varieties
of tree games. Specific questions of this kind include:
1. Does Question 4.3.19 has a positive answer, i.e., Is the class of meta-games
with subtree monotone (Borel) winning sets determined?
As discussed in Section 4.4, a positive answer to the this question would
settle the interesting problem of qualitative determinacy in standard 21
2
-
player games with prefix-independent (Borel) winning sets.




3. It the determinacy of all 21
2
-player tree games (with arbitrary meta-winning
sets) consistent with ZF (without the Axiom of Choice)?
Beside these abstract theoretical questions, our work opens the door to other
interesting research directions. Providing verification methods for probabilistic
concurrent systems using the logic pLµ⊙ or, possibly, using pLµ⊙⊕, is an interesting
area for further research. We now list some the possible goals.
1. Model Checking: given a finite PLTS 〈P, {
a
−→}a∈L}, and a pLµ
⊙
⊕ formula
F , is it possible to compute (or at least approximate) the value JF K(p)?
Similarly for pLµ⊙ formulas. Note that Model checking decision procedures
for pLµ are known (see, e.g., [116]).
2. Satisfiability problem: given a pLµ⊙⊕ formula F , is it possible to verify
automatically if there exists a PLTS 〈P, {
a
−→}a∈L} which satisfies it with,
say, probability 1? Similarly for pLµ⊙ and the other probabilistic µ-calculi
discussed in this thesis.
3. Axiomatization: is it possible to find an appropriate system of (in)equalities
such that if JF K(p) ≤ JGK(p), for every PLTS 〈P, { a−→}a∈L}〉 and p ∈ P ,
then F ≤ G is derivable by (in)equational reasoning?
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Related to the last point, a promising direction for future research is the de-
velopment of proof systems for verification. In the past 15 years, several proof
systems have been proposed for reasoning over modal µ-calculus (Lµ) properties.
In [104, 105] the author introduces a sound and complete sequent based proof
system for proving Hennessy-Milner properties for processes described by a class
of well behaved process calculi. At the same time a sequent based proof system
for CCS (see., e.g., [79]) processes and general Lµ properties is introduced in [27].
The judgments of these systems are of the following form
t1 : F1, . . . , tn : Fn ⊢ v1 : G1, . . . , vn : Gm
where t, v range over process-terms described by appropriate operational rules
(GSOS [16] or CCS [79]), and F,G range over Hennessy-Milner or Lµ formulas.
The intended interpretation is that if the the LTS’s corresponding to t1, . . . , tn
satisfy the formulas F1, . . . , Fn, respectively, then for some i ∈ {1 . . . , m}, the
LTS’s corresponding to vi satisfies the formula Gi. These papers provided evi-
dence for the many advantages offered by the use of sequents as basic judgments
in the proposed proof systems (see [105] for a detailed overview).
During our research we have developed [80] a sequent based proof system for
verifying pLµ properties of PTLS’s specified by PGSOS operation rules (see, e.g.,
[6]). As in the above mentioned systems, the judgments are of the form
t1 : F1, . . . , tn : Fn ⊢ v1 : G1, . . . , vn : Gm
but are interpreted as follows:
JF1K(t1) · . . . · JFnK(tn) ≤ JG1K(v1) ⊙ . . . ⊙ JGnK(vm).
Preliminary results show that interesting properties of systems can be derived as
judgments of this kind. We suggest that further investigations in this direction
might be useful for developing (non automatic) verification methods for infinite-
state probabilistic systems.
Other interesting problems are related to expressivity questions for the log-
ics discussed in this thesis. For example it would be interesting to verify if the
qualitative fragment of PCTL∗ (see, e.g., [9]) could be encoded into pLµ⊙. Simi-
larly for full PCTL∗ and pLµ⊙⊕. Another interesting expressivity question is the
following. We often declared that the qualitative modality P>0 is expressible in
pLµ⊙ but not in pLµ and, similarly, the quantitative modality P> 2
3
is expressible
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in pLµ⊙⊕ but not in pLµ
⊙. Although we are quite confident about the validity of
these assertions, we do not know how to prove them. As a last, but not least, di-
rection for future work, we suggest that studying the equivalence induced by the
logic pLµ⊙ or pLµ⊙⊕ on states of PLTS’s (naturally defined as p ≡ q if and only
if for all pLµ⊙ closed formulas F the equality JF K(p) = JF K(q) holds) could be
quite interesting. One hopes to identify fruitful connections between the behav-
ioral equivalences developed for PLTS’s (see, e.g., [93]), and equivalences induced




A.1 Proofs of Section 2.1.4
This section contains proofs of results discussed in Section 2.1.4.
Definition A.1.1. Given a topological space (X, T ), we say that a function




∈T , for every rational number
λ∈ [0, 1]. Clearly every continuous function is lower semicontinuous.
Lemma A.1.2. Given a topological space (X, T ), if f :X→ [0, 1] and (1 − f),
defined as (1 − f)(x) = 1 − f(x), are both lower semicontinuous, then they are
both continuous.













is open, for every open interval with ra-










Proposition A.1.3. Given a topological space (X, T ), any pointwise supremum
of lower semicontinuous functions is lower semicontinuous.
Proposition A.1.4. Let (X, T ) be a Polish space and B a basis for T . For
every basic open set U ∈ B, the characteristic function χU : X → {0, 1} of U is
the pointwise supremum of a countable increasing sequence {fn} of continuous
functions fn :X→ [0, 1]. It follows that also the characteristic function χV , with
V an arbitrary open sets, is the pointwise supremum of a countable sequence of
continuous functions.
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Proposition A.1.5. Given a topological space (X, T ) and finitely many lower





with λi≥0, is lower semicontinuous.
Proposition A.1.6. Given a Polish space (X, T ) and a basis B for T , any
continuous function f :X→ [0, 1] is the supremum limit of an increasing sequence









3. the sets {U ji }0≤j≤ni are open sets.
Lemma A.1.7. Let (X, T ) be a Polish space. The sets UO,λ = {µ | µ(O) > λ},
where O ∈ T and λ ∈ [0, 1] is a rational number, form a subbasis for the weak
topology on M1(X).
Proof. Let W be the weak topology on M1(X), i.e., the coarser topology such
that the map µ 7→
∫
X
f dµ is continuous for every continuous f :X→ [0, 1]. Let
S be the topology generated by the sets of the form UO,λ. We need to show that
S=T , i.e., we need to show that:
1. Every set UO,λ is in W, and
2. every function µ 7→
∫
X
f dµ, for f : X → [0, 1] continuous, is continuous
with respect to the space (M1,S).
For the first point, consider an arbitrary open set O. From Proposition A.1.4,
we know that χO =
⊔
{fn}n∈N for a countable increasing sequence of continuous
functions fn :X→ [0, 1]. Therefore we need to show that:



















fn dµ > λ}
is open. The result then follows from the fact that {µ |
∫
X
fn dµ > λ} ∈W by
definition, since fn is continuous and (λ, 1] is open.
For the second point, let us fix a continuous function f : X → [0, 1]. By
Proposition A.1.6, we know that










as specified in Proposition A.1.6. We
need to show that the map µ 7→
∫
X
f dµ is continuous with respect to the space

























































The function µ 7→ µ(U ji ) is lower semicontinuous, relative to (M1,S) by definition




f dµ is lower semicontinuous as well. Since f is continuous, so is (1−f),
and with the same technique adopted above, one can show that the map 1̂ − f
defined as µ 7→
∫
X
(1 − f) dµ is lower semicontinuous. The desired result then
follows, by application of Lemma A.1.2, by observing that (1 − f̂)=1̂ − f .
Lemma A.1.8. Let (X, T ) be a 0-dimensional Polish space and B a countable
basis of clopen sets for T , such that for every A,B∈B, the set A\B is expressible
as a disjoint union of clopen sets in B. The sets UB,λ = {µ | µ(B) > λ}, where
B ∈B and λ∈ [0, 1] is a rational number, form a subbasis for the weak topology
on M1(X).
Proof. As a first observation, note that if U ∈T is a disjoint union of basic clopen
sets in B, and B∈B, then the set U ∪B can also be expressed as a disjoint union
of basic clopen sets in B. It then follows that finite unions of basic clopen sets
can be expressed as disjoint unions of basic clopen sets. Thus, every open set U
is expressible as U =
⋃
n U
n, where each Un is a disjoint union of basic clopen
sets in B.
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Let S0 be the topology on M1(X) generated by the sets UB,λ. We prove the
result by showing that every set of the form {µ | µ(O) > λ}, for O∈T is open
with respect to S0. This, by application of Lemma A.1.7, will conclude the proof.
Let O =
⋃
nOn, where, for every n∈N, the set On is a disjoint union of basic
clopen sets in B. Note that the equality {µ | µ(O) > λ} =
⋃
n{µ | µ(Un) > λ}
holds. Hence we just need to prove that {µ | µ(Un) > λ} is open with respect to




m, where the clopen sets B
n
m∈B,
for m∈N, are pairwise disjoint. By the same argument as above, we just need to




n) > λ} is open in S0. Since the












the set {〈γ1, . . . , γk〉 |
∑k














µ | µ(B1) > γ1 ∧ · · · ∧ µ(Bk) > γk
}
holds. The desired result then follows straightforwardly.
A.2 Proofs of Section 2.1.5
Proposition A.2.1. Let (X, T ) be a Polish space and µ a complete probability
measure on X. We define, for every ǫ > 0, the partially ordered set (Pǫ,≤)
specified as Pǫ = {U ∈T | µ(U) < ǫ} and U ≤ V if V ⊆U . Then (Pǫ,≤) satisfies
the countable chain condition.
Proof. Let B = {Bn}n be a countable basis for X . Suppose, by contradiction,
that A is an uncountable antichain in Pǫ. Then A ⊆ Pǫ is uncountable and,
for every U, V ∈ A, the open set U is not compatible with V , i.e., there is no
open set W ∈ Pǫ such that A,B ⊆ W or, equivalently, µ(U ∪ V ) ≥ ǫ. Since
A =
⋃
n{U ∈A | µ(A) < (1 −
1
n
)ǫ}, there exists some δ = 1
n
ǫ such that the set
E = {U ∈A | µ(U) < ǫ − δ} is uncountable. For each U ∈ E let FU be a finite




the set {FU | U ∈E} is countable, because there are only countably many finite
unions of basic open sets. We derive a contradiction with the assumption that
E is uncountable, by showing that if U 6= V ∈ E , then FU 6=FV . If U, V ∈ E and
V 6=U , then U and V are incompatible, i.e., µ(U ∪ V ) > ǫ. But µ(FU ∪ FV ) ≥




≥ ǫ− δ. Since µ(FU) ≤ µ(U) < ǫ− δ, it follows that FU 6=FV .
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Theorem A.2.2 (MAℵ1). Let (X, T ) be a Polish space. Then for every proba-
bility measure µ∈M1(X), the σ-ideal NULLµ is ω1-additive.




prove that N is µ-null by showing that, for every ǫ> 0, there exists an open set
G∈T such that G⊇N and µ(G) ≤ ǫ.
Fix some ǫ > 0. Define the poset (Pǫ,≤) as Pǫ = {U ∈ T | µ(U) < ǫ} and
U ≤ V if V ⊆ U . For every α < ω1, define the set Dα = {U ∈ Pǫ | U ≤ Nα}.
Clearly Dα is down-closed. We now prove that Dα is dense in Pǫ. We need
to show that for every U ∈ Pǫ, there is some V ∈ Dα such that U ≥ V (i.e.,
U ⊆ V ). Since µ(Nα) = 0, by regularity of µ (see Theorem 2.1.66) there is some
V ′ ∈ Dα such that µ(V ′) < ǫ − µ(U). Then V = V ′ ∪ U satisfies the desired
property. Define D = {Dα}α<ω1 . Since Pǫ satisfies the countable chain condition
(Proposition A.2.1) It then follows from MAℵ1 that there is a D-generic filter G
in Pǫ. Clearly
⋃
G is an open set and N ⊆ G. Assume by contradiction that
µ(G) > ǫ. Then there exists U0, . . . Uk ∈ G such that µ(
⋃k
i=0 Ui) > ǫ. Since G is
a filter on Pǫ, the set
⋃k
i=0 Ui is in G and thus in Pǫ. This provides the desired
contradiction.
A.3 Proofs of Section 2.2
This section contains proofs of results discussed in Section 2.2.
Lemma A.3.1. Let {xi}i∈N be a sequence of real numbers xi ∈ [0, 1], and let


























































is trivial. Let us suppose, by induction hypothesis, that the desired inequality
holds for n. Then we have that the following inequality holds:









































Since all the summands in the last expression are real numbers in [0, 1], we have





























































































Lemma A.3.2. Let {xi}i∈N be a sequence of real numbers xi ∈ [0, 1], and let

















































holds. This is proven, as for the previous case, by induction on the naturals,
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holds. The case for n = 0 is trivial. Let us suppose, by induction hypothesis,

























































) ≥ (α − β) · (xn+1 − γ). By observing that







) ≥ (α− β) · (xn+1 − γ)
= (α · xn+1) − (β · xn+1) − (α · γ) + (β · γ)





























Lemma A.3.3. Let {xi}i∈N be a sequence of real numbers xi ∈ [0, 1], and let

























Proof. We just prove the first inequality. The proof for the second one can be
carried out in a similar way.

































By lemma 2.2.10 we know that the inequality









































A.4 Proofs of Section 2.3.1
This section contains proofs of results discussed in Section 2.3.1.
Theorem A.4.1. There exists a universally measurable set A ⊆ Nω, such that





not determined under deterministic strategies.
Proof. Let B be an uncountable (i.e., |B| > ℵ0) universally null subset of Nω.
Recall that a set B is universally null if it is µ-measurable and µ(B) = 0 for
every atomless Borel probability measure on Nω. The existence of such a set
can be proven in ZFC, see e.g. [103] and [48]. Moreover every universally null
set is universally measurable, see e.g. [39, 211X(e) in §21]. The set B can
not be a Perfect set, i.e., can not have a closed subset C homeomorphic to the
Cantor space, which is 2ω endowed with the product topology (see e.g. [60, 6.2]).
Suppose indeed that B is Perfect, and therefore there exists a continuous map
f : 2ω →Nω such that f(2ω) =C. Then we can take the uniform measure µ on
2ω, which is atomless, and push it to a probability measure µ′ on Nω specified




, on all Borel sets X ⊆ Nω. Then µ′
is atomless and µ′(B) = 1. A contradiction. Let GS(N, A) be the Gale-Stewart
“Perfect set game” associated with B, as defined in e.g. [60] or [59]. It is known
(see e.g. [60, §21] or [59, §33.9]) that Player 1 has a deterministic winning strategy
in GS(N, A) if and only if B is a Perfect set, and Player 2 has a deterministic
winning strategy if and only if B is countable. Hence GS(N, A) is not determined
by deterministic strategies. However, from the fact that B is universally null, it
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A.5 Proofs of Section 4.3
This section contains proofs of results discussed in Section 4.3.
Lemma A.5.1. Let (X,⊑) be a compact pospace and µ, ν complete Borel prob-
ability measures on X. If, for some ǫ≥ 0, the inequality µ(U)≤ ν(U) + ǫ holds
for every upper-closed open set U ⊆X, then µ(W ) ≤ ν(W ) + ǫ holds for every
upper-closed µ-ν-measurable set W ⊆X.
Proof. It is enough to prove the results for W upper-closed and compact. Indeed,




















ν(K)↑ | K ⊆W
}
+ ǫ
= ν(W ) + ǫ
where K ranges over compact subsets of X , and the second inequality follows
from the fact that the upper-closure of a compact set is compact (see Theorem
2.1.60). So let us consider a compact upper-closed set W . We want to show that










where U ranges over, not necessarily upper-closed, open subsets of X . For an
arbitrary λ > 0, take an open set U ⊇ W such that µ(U) < µ(W ) + λ and
ν(U)<ν(W )+λ. Note that if x 6∈U , then x↓ ∩W =∅, because W is upper-closed.
Let us consider the closed, hence compact, set X \U . By previous considerations,
and since the down-closure of a compact set is compact, we have that W and
(X \ U) ↓ are disjoint compact sets, which are respectively upper-closed and
down-closed. By the order normality Lemma 2.1.61, we know that there exist
an upper-closed open set U ′ ⊇ W and a down-closed open set U ′′ ⊇ (X \ U) ↓,
such that U ′ ∩ U ′′ = ∅. Observe that U ′ is an upper-closed open set such that
W ⊆ U ′ ⊆ U , µ(U ′) < µ(W ) + λ and ν(U ′) < ν(W ) + λ. Then, the following
inequalities hold:
µ(W ) ≤ µ(U ′)
≤ ν(U ′) + ǫ
≤ ν(W ) + λ+ ǫ
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and this concludes the proof, since λ is arbitrarily small.
Lemma A.5.2. Let A and B be Polish spaces, f : A → B a surjective map
preserving the open sets, i.e., such that f(U) is open for every open set U ⊆ A,
and µ∈M1(A) a complete Borel probability measure over A. For every Y ⊆B,














, where ν∗, for a probability measure ν,
denotes the corresponding outer-measure. Let us fix an arbitrary ǫ>0. We need




+ ǫ. Fix an









or equivalently since f is surjective, Y ⊆ f(U). By hypothesis the set f(U) is




=µ(U) by definition of f [µ]. Hence the desired inequality
open cover is f(U).




, where ν∗, for a probability mea-
sure ν, denotes the corresponding inner-measure. This, by the regularity of all
complete probability measures on Polish spaces, will conclude the proof. Let us
consider the set Y = B \ Y . Clearly f−1(Y ) is µ-measurable, since f−1(Y ) is
µ-measurable by hypothesis. With the same method adopted above, we can




. Since by hypothesis the map f is sur-
jective, we have that f−1(Y ) = f−1(Y ), and therefore the desired inequality





Lemma A.5.3. Let {µn}n∈N and {νn}n∈N be two N-indexed collections of prob-
ability measures over the pospace 2 = {0, 1}, which is endowed with the discrete
topology and ordered by 0 ⊑ 1. Let µ=
∏
n∈N
µn and ν =
∏
n∈N
νn be the correspond-
ing product measures on the product pospace 2ω, which is ordered pointwise. If
µn({1}) ≤ νn({1}) +
ǫ
#(n)
holds for every n ∈N for some ǫ≥ 0, where the map
# : N → N is specified as in Definition 2.2.9, then for every upper-closed µ-ν-
measurable set W ⊆2ω the following inequality holds: µ(W )≤ν(W ) + ǫ.
Proof. We first establish the result when the set W is an upper-closed open set.
Let us define the N-indexed collection {ν ′n}n∈N of probability measures over 2
ω
defined as follows: ν ′n = (
∏
i<n νi) × (
∏
j≥n µi). In other words ν
′
n is the product
measure having νi as i-th component, for i < n, and µj as j-th component for
j ≥ n. Clearly ν ′0 = µ. Moreover the sequence {ν
′
n}n∈N converges in measure to
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ν: for every basic open set U , there exists a m∈N such that νn(U) = ν(U), for
all n ≥ m. Thus, by regularity of probability measures on Polish spaces (see
Theorem 2.1.66), for every Borel set A⊆ 2ω and ǫ > 0, there exists n∈N such
that |ν ′n(A) − ν(A)|<ǫ.






holds for every n∈N. The case for n=0 trivially holds, since µ=ν ′0 as observed
before. Let us assume that the property holds for n ≥ 0. Since the open set W
is upper-closed, if it contains a sequence having a 0 in (n + 1)-th position, than
it also contain the same sequence where the 0 digit is replaced by a 1. More
formally the set W is of the form ({0, 1} ×R) ∪ ({1} × T ), for disjoint open sets
R, T ⊆
∏
j 6=n{0, 1} i.e., sets of ω-sequences lacking the n-th component. Note
that ν ′n
(




{0, 1} × R)
)
, because the probability measures ν ′n
and ν ′n+1 differs only on the n-th component. Moreover, by the hypothesis on the




{1} × T ) ≤
ν ′n+1
(
{1} × T ) · (1 + ǫ
#(n)
) holds. Therefore the following inequalities holds:



















































· (1 + ǫ
#(n)
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= ν ′n+1(W ) ·
(


























since the sequence {ν ′n}n∈N converges in measure to ν, we have that the desired
inequality µ(W )≤ν(W )+ ǫ holds, and this concludes the proof for the case when
W is a upper-closed open set. To extend the proof to arbitrary µ-ν-measurable
upper-closed set W , we just need to invoke the result of Lemma A.5.1.
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A.6 Symbol List
The following table contains references and brief descriptions of the symbols ap-
pearing the most often in the thesis.
Symbol Page Description
D(X) 18 Discrete probability distributions over
the set X .
lfp, gfp 20 Least and greatest fixed point opera-
tors.
Σ, Π, ∆ 30, 32 Classes of sets in Polish spaces.
µ, µ∗, µ∗ 35 Probability (outer, inner) measure.
NULLµ, MEASµ 35 Collections of µ-null and µ-measurable
subsets of a space.
M1(X), M1(f) 36 Probability Monad.
UM(X) 39 Collection of universally measurable
subsets of X .
CH 42 Continuum Hypothesis.
∆12-UM 42 Statement about ∆
1
2 sets.
MAκ,MAℵ1 44 Martin’s Axiom at the cardinals κ, ℵ1.
#:N→ N 50 Fast growing function.
GS(X,A), GS(X, φ) 51 Gale–Stewart game.





A 71 Sets of paths in the arena A.
~s, ~t 71 Symbol ranging over paths.
⊳ 71 Prefix relation on paths.
Σ1, Σ2 72 Sets of strategies for Player 1 and
Player 2.
σ1, σ2, τ1, τ2 72 Symbols ranging over strategies.




L 93 Probabilistic Labeled Transision Sys-
tem (PLTS).
PCTL 95 Probabilistic Computation Tree Logic
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pLµ, pLµ⊙, pLµ⊙⊕, pLµ
{0,1} 108 Fragments of pLµ⊙⊕
A 124 Game arena.
〈(S,E), (S1, S2, SN , B), π〉 124 Structure of a tree game arena.
π :S→D(S) 124 Probabilistic transition function.
BPA 125 Set of branching plays in the arena A.
T 125 Symbol ranging over branching plays.
MBPA 125 Set of Markov branching plays in the
arena A.
M 125 Symbol ranging over Markov branching
plays.
PM 126 Probability measure over branching
plays induced by M .
Φ 127 Payoff function of a tree game.
E(M) 128 Expected value (payoff) associated
with M .
Msσ1,σ2 129 Markov branching play induced by
〈σ1, σ2〉.
Psσ1,σ2 130 Probability measure over branching
plays induced by Msσ1,σ2 .
VAL↓, VAL↑, MVAL↓, MVAL↑ 130 Values of a tree game.
S 148 Antichain of finite paths.
T [xi]i∈I , T [Ti]i∈I 148 Empty and filled branching pre-play.





WPr, ΦPr 190 Set of completed paths induced by Pr.
ΦPr, ΦPr 190 Payoff function induced by Pr.

Bibliography
[1] M. Alvarez-Manilla, A. Jung, and K. Keimel. The probabilistic powerdo-
main for stably compact spaces. Theoretical Computer Science, 328:221–
244, 2004.
[2] A. Arnold and D. Niwinski. Rudiments of µ-calculus. Studied in Logic.
North-Holland, 2001.
[3] A. Arnold and D. Niwinski. Continuous separation of game languages.
Fundamenta Informaticae, 81:19–28, 2008.
[4] C. Baier and J. P. Katoen. Principles of Model Checking. The MIT Press,
2008.
[5] C. Baier and M. Kwiatkowska. Model checking for a probabilistic branching
time logic with fairness. Distributed Computing, 11:125–155, 1998.
[6] F. Bartels. GSOS for probabilistic transition systems. In Electronic Notes
in Theoretical Computer Science, Volume 65, Issue 1, 2002.
[7] N. Bertrand, B. Genest, and H. Gimbert. Qualitative determinacy and
deciability of stochastic games with signals. In Proceedings of the 24th
Annual IEEE Symposium on Logic In Computer Science, 2009.
[8] D. P. Bertsekas and S. Shreve. Stochastic Optimal Control: The Discrete-
Time Case. Athena Scientific; 1st edition, 2007.
[9] A. Bianco and L. de Alfaro. Model checking of probabilistic and nondeter-
ministic systems. In Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical
Computer Science, number 1026 in Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 499–513. Springer-Verlag, 1995.
303
304 Bibliography
[10] D. Blackwell. Infinite Gδ games with imperfect information. Matematyki
Applicationes Mathematicae, Hugo Steinhaus Jubilee Volume X, 1969.
[11] D. Blackwell. Operator solution of infinite Gδ games of imperfect infor-
mation. In T. Anderson, K. Athreya, and D. Iglehart, editors, Papers in
Honor of S. Karlin, pages 83,87. Academic Press, New York, 1989.
[12] D. Blackwell. Games with infinitely many moves and slightly imperfect
information. In R. J. Nowakowski, editor, Games of no chance, Combi-
natorial games at MSRI, Workshop, July 11–21, 1994 in Berkeley, CA,
volume 29 of Mathematical Sciences Research Institute Publications, pages
407–408, 1997.
[13] D. Blackwell and P. Diaconis. A Non-Measurable Tail Set. In Statistics,
Probability and Game Theory: Papers in Honor of David Blackwell, vol-
ume 30 of Lecture Notes-Monograph Series, 1996.
[14] D. Blackwell and M. Girshick. Theory of Games and Statistical Decisions.
Dover Publications Inc., New York,, 1954.
[15] A. Blass. Combinatorial cardinal characteristics of the continuum. In Hand-
book of Set Theory. Springer, 2010.
[16] B. Bloom, S. Istrail, and A. R. Meyer. Bisimulation can’t be traced. Journal
of the ACM (JACM), 42:232–268, 1995.
[17] J. C. Bradfield. Fixpoint alternation: Arithmetic, transition systems, and
the binary tree. Theoretical Informatics and Applications, 1999.
[18] J. C. Bradfield and C. Stirling. Modal logics and mu-calculi: an introduc-
tion. In Handbook of Process Algebra. Elsevier, 2001.
[19] T. Brázdil, V. Brozek, A. Kucera, and J. Obdrzálek:. Qualitative reacha-
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